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 Preface 1
Preface 
Why this book? 
This book is the result of nearly three decades of wondering why it is so difficult 
to take action where things are clearly going wrong. My father taught me to love 
the wilderness; the Dutch peat lakes, where one can quietly wander in Dutch 
flat-bottomed boats, and the tropical rainforest, where man still may discover 
many places and species. Both were disappearing then, and this process has only 
intensified since. Later, I came to understand that many people have similar 
feelings about nature and other adversely affected qualities of life. People 
complain about the course of societal development and the role of governments. 
They ask for innovations, high quality development and better governance, 
sometimes referring to ‘governance for sustainable development’. In my 
professional life I have seen many claiming that they have solutions. But in their 
heart they know it is not that simple. After having been environmental and 
management consultant for 15 years I decided to write this book. 
How this book was written 
I wanted to write this book in the first place for people who simply were 
wondering how we could be so collectively stupid, like my father. Secondly, I 
wanted to address policy makers and citizens, pointing at their options to 
contribute to common goals, and developing a language for them to express 
these options to each other. I have become used to apply the term sustainable 
development, as the Brundlandt Commission did in 1987. So, this book 
addresses all who want to contribute to governance for sustainable development. 
When I started off, I asked Geert Teisman to coach me. I admired him for his 
ability to put everything in a context, including contexts. We developed a way of 
analyzing the limitations of the Dutch efforts for sustainable development, and 
constructive efforts to deal with these limitations. These efforts included using 
influence at the right time in the right direction, sometimes in highly politicized 
contexts. It included developing trust that the opponent would not misuse the 
opportunity pointing at negative short-term side effects. It was not easy to have 
access to the deeper thoughts and, sometimes, emotions of the acting policy 
makers. Yet, it was important to follow these people in detail. Otherwise the 
nuances of this process might have been lost, the small differences in initial 
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conditions that create important changes in outcome, might have been over-
looked. 
For my empirical research I was able to make use of my professional 
contacts in the mobility, energy and environmental policy sectors. Job van den 
Berg, one of my colleague consultants, had access to the heart of influential 
networks. Through him I had first-hand access to informal networks which 
developed trust, and whose members were able to express their thoughts and 
emotions enough to allow me to understand the subtleties of their action, and to 
explain the development of policies in The Netherlands, and to some extent in 
Europe. I was trusted not to publish prematurely, and I think my observations 
and reflections made the group as a whole more aware of their own role and 
potential. This lasted five years, allowing me to trace back the link between 
small and large-scale changes in policies. 
In the book I also describe how the group evaluated their own action, and I 
assess the theoretic possibilities for such a group to know if certain courses of 
action have a high quality from a larger-scale point of view. This has led to 
recommendations for those who are willing to try to follow this path, albeit in 
different contexts, and become a sustainable change manager. In hindsight, the 
lessons they had to tell are extremely interesting, and in my view such groups 
may be the only effective way to make use of the opportunities we have to 
create a better development. 
The nature of proactive change 
To these ends, I felt I needed to go back to our basic knowledge about causality 
and change, using insights from political sciences, economical theories, theories 
on trust and cybernetics. Public and private officials ground their policy 
behavior on what they think is real and right. Not the facts but the images of 
reality seem to generate social change, so I had to understand how such ideas 
develop. I identified five themes of social change that have to be considered in 
conjunction: the content of our ideas, the structure of our social system, the 
process that results from social interactions, the individual conduct that leads to 
interactions, and our perceptions of reward and causality, that lead our conduct. 
My first assertion is that larger scale changes only occur if the five variable 
change simultaneously and in reinforcing interaction. My second assertion is 
that such change has to be established at three interrelated levels: power 
interactions, social learning interactions, and personal behavior. 
Simultaneous causally interrelated change of different items may be called 
co-evolution. It can be imagined how the cheetah may have co-evolved with the 
antelope, the chicken with the egg, the city with farming systems, views in poli-
tics with views in society. Where two items are mutually dependent, I assume 
that the alternative for co-evolution is catastrophic inertia. In social systems co-
evolution is required between governments, between the public world and the 
private world, between contrasting pressure groups, higher management and 
lower management, and also different regions or countries. Co-evolution is a 
governance capacity. Each one of these entities needs to be open to change, and 
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needs to be able to transform its existing preferences into combinable ones, 
matching the short-term and the long-term. Letting go the traditional stand-alone 
way of working is, as Machiavelli already observed in the 15th century, the most 
difficult strategic option. Many have put their stakes on what is. This book how-
ever shows possibilities of change. It shows that if a sufficient number of peo-
ple, across parts of social systems, become aware of interdependency and the 
mechanism of co-evolution, they can develop internal trust and generate changes 
in policy agendas. I have termed such groups adaptive networks. This book is 
about adaptive networks in action. I describe them as living organisms, with 
their own metabolism. An appetizer: they feed on social connections. 
Structure of the book 
In this book I develop a framework for understanding adaptive networks. 
Chapter 1 describes dilemmas of governance for sustainable development. 
Chapter 2 explains these dilemmas through an analysis of theories of change, 
from which I deduct observable characteristics in chapter 3. This leads to a 
description of change at three interrelated levels: power networks (chapter 4), 
adaptive networks (chapter 5) and change managers (chapter 6). Chapter 7 
contains conclusions and implications for sustainable change management. I 
hope this book can help you explain to yourself and others how your actions can 
be in the interest of larger groups and future generations. 
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1 Governance for sustainable development 
Sustainability (...) is a development which fulfills the present needs without risking that future 
generations cannot fulfill their own needs. (Brundlandt-Report, UN 1986) 
‘Perception is reality’. By looking for a joint perception, you change reality  
(Paraphrase of Barry Nalebuff) 
1.1 A breakthrough in thinking about sustainable mobility 
2005: optimism about sustainable mobility 
In early 2005 several Dutch ministries developed a joint program to stimulate a 
transition to a sustainable energy system. In its context, there were talks with 
several oil industries and automobile industries about joint action concerning 
‘automotives’ – possibilities for future sustainable car fuel and propulsion 
systems. CEOs were involved, and insiders believed that this significantly 
improved chances of breakthroughs. These insiders were representatives from 
the mobility system, the energy system, as well as academics and influential 
people from different kinds of NGOs, including the mobilists union and the 
environmental movement. Optimism was based on the shared idea that there 
were possibilities for sustainable breakthroughs or at least for interventions that 
may reduce the present lock-in of the automotives system. Insiders saw The 
Netherlands as neutral ground because it doesn’t have a car industry, and 
apparently it had a government that was prepared to act. The process they had 
followed to get this far was termed ‘transition management’. 
2000: pessimism about sustainable mobility 
Five years earlier, in 2000, such relative optimism was largely absent. The oil 
industries and automobile industries did not talk about desirable scenarios or 
joint action, and the government did not encourage such cooperation in any 
credible way. There was cooperation between ministries in research programs, 
involving the private sector and NGOs, but these programs had always stranded. 
Their main characteristic was that they aimed at creating joint scenario thinking 
and subsequent action: backward-looking from an imaginable desirable future to 
present-day joint action. This was termed backcasting. However, that action had 
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never led to market breakthroughs, due to a weak connection with decision-
makers who could take real action. There had also been talks between largely 
the same organizations concerning the future of the Dutch mobility system, for 
example in negotiations about the future of Rotterdam port under the so-called 
greenpolder model. This was a way of doing business between parties that are 
all important for political support. The government had asked these parties their 
advice to enable a decision about extension of the port area. Here, decision-
makers had been closely involved, but in the framework of a spatial decision by 
the government there had been no opportunity to discuss different scenarios or 
interventions for sustainable energy and mobility. There was a gap between 
backcasting processes and processes that were driven by looming short-term 
action by one powerful agent, the government. 
1.2 The theoretical research object: sustainable change management 
A socio-cognitive approach to change 
As the breakthrough in thinking about sustainable mobility shows, many believe 
that certain new automotives may contribute to sustainable development. 
Sustainable development is also my concern, and the key question of this book 
is therefore: How can new ideas about sustainable development, like certain 
automotives, be widely adopted? This question has two parts: First, how can 
ideas in general spread in society and become a motivation for action? And 
second, how can we know which ideas are sustainable? If we assume that it is 
possible to answer these questions, the process of consciously generating and 
spreading sustainable ideas may be termed sustainable governance. The process 
that leads to sustainable governance is management of sustainable change. I am 
in particular interested in sustainable change management. In this section I set 
out how I define ‘change’ and ‘change management’. This is based on the more 
in-depth theoretical overview in chapter 2. For the moment I limit to write that 
the idea of sustainable change management implies a socio-cognitive view about 
proactive change: ‘management’ implies an intentional, conscious social effort, 
i.e. an effort based on understanding (and therefore cognitive). ‘Sustainable’ 
implies proactive, aimed at preventing problems before they occur, or before it 
is widely accepted that they are problems in the first place. 
The themes of change 
To give terms like sustainable change management meaning, it is necessary to 
be keen on definitions. The question about sustainable development and sustain-
able governance is primarily a substantive question: a question of ideas, of con-
tent, like the idea ‘new automotives are likely to be introducible and to signifi-
cantly reduce environmental problems’. However, it is not only content. The 
spreading of ideas until CEOs negotiate about implementation of new automo-
tives depends on the communications between people, and these take place in a 
social structure. The social structure is the whole of interaction patterns between 
people: their generalized relationships, for example in a hierarchical organiza-
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“structures exist that are 
specialized in sustain-
able development” 
“discourses may be only 
‘complexity speak’” 
tion like an automobile industry. Every interaction by definition conveys infor-
mation, and therefore the receiver may interpret it as a communication, in which 
case it might contribute to sustainable development. The structure is the place 
where interactions occur, and the whole of the interactions is the process in 
which ideas may, or may not, spread. These may be ideas about structure, for 
example about an independent organization to control the quality of new fuels. 
Whether ideas are born and what happens to them depends on the conduct of 
individuals. Are they going to interact and propose an idea that they believe to 
be sustainable? Are they looking for sustainable ideas in the first place? If so, 
what do they consider to be sustainable? And, finally, are they rewarded for 
acting in the common interest? (Which takes us back to content: the common 
interest, defined as sustainable development). 
Content, structure, process, conduct and 
reward are thus all closely related and key to 
sustainable development. My hypothesis is that 
structures exist that are specialized in sustainable 
development, in the sense that they try to make 
society more robust against the impact of changing conditions, like the depletion 
of resources. I term these structures adaptive networks: groups of people who 
interact, coming from different parts of society, and who develop ideas that 
influence those parts in the benefit of the whole (as they see it). In that way 
thinking and acting in society becomes more aligned, less contradictory, creating 
fewer dilemmas, and society as a whole becomes more capable of adapting to 
changing circumstances. This process of alignment is termed co-evolution: the 
ideas in different parts of society may evolve separately, but if there are connec-
tions they may also influence one another. Adaptive networks consciously try to 
align the parts. 
Content: sustainable development 
In this book I want to explore how thinking about sustainable development may 
evolve under the influence of adaptive networks. Many people are concerned 
with sustainable development. People ask questions like: how can we stop the 
cutting of tropical forests? How can we improve the quality of our development 
in the sense that it may last a long time? How can society improve its con-
sciousness about the quality of our development and about options or needs to – 
collectively- choose a better development? It is about fair distribution of re-
sources between generations and between social groups. Fair distribution is not 
automatically generated. A well-known example is the tragedy of the commons, 
which causes dwellers to cut forests, in the long term against their own interest. 
On the short term, they have no other option because they don’t know how to 
organize a different development. Yet, they 
know that this can’t go on forever. Such 
dilemmas may be termed social dilemmas 
because they face a society, not just one person. Social dilemmas make people 
act toward their personal, short-term interest, whereas they may have preferred 
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“any leader claiming to 
have a simple solution for a 
complex problem is a 
populist” 
to act in the collective long-term interest if they knew how. Somehow, the 
agents don’t know how to bridge the dilemma. 
Still, there have been studies showing that a sustainable development is tech-
nically possible and only requires collective willpower to shift to another devel-
opment (e.g., several publications of the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development (www.wbcsd.ch); Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the 
Environment and Natural Resources of Canada, 2005). There are barriers in the 
process of governing our own development – we are collectively myopic. We 
are concerned about sustainable development, yes, but we seem unable to de-
velop politically acceptable measures that will change our development in a 
proactive way, before it is too late. We even can identify the cause: there is a 
tragedy of commons (e.g., Scharpf 1997), but we may not trust that the govern-
ment would be able to enforce a collective change of behavior. We develop 
policy discourses (sets of shared ideas) about innovative processes of policy 
making, but we don’t ‘walk the talk’. As there are at present discourses that take 
complexity theories as point of departure, these discourses might in reality be 
nothing more than ‘complexity speak’ (Van Twist (1994): ‘linguistic innova-
tion’; Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Re-
sources of Canada, 2005). The structure of our society, which includes govern-
ment, seems unfit to address sustainability. 
Structure: our division of tasks 
In this book I want to explore how structures, in particular adaptive networks, 
influence our development. Our development is still far from sustainable. In 
theory there may be sustainable alternatives, but they seem unattainable. It is 
often said that we favor the profit of our corporations, thereby neglecting the 
quality of our life (‘people’) and the functioning of our ecosystem (‘planet’), 
which carries nature in general, including us. Neglecting people can lead to an 
unfair distribution, which again may lead to social instability. This may be un-
sustainable. Neglecting the planet may lead to depletion of critical resources for 
which we can find no alternative, or to a reduction of the quality of life. 
The government is insufficiently able to correct that neglect. It is not that we 
are not aware of the social dilemmas. Governments and corporations have de-
partments responsible for the protection of qualities of our development, such as 
environment, health, water, conditions for labor. Such departments try to de-
velop policies and instruments to intervene into market processes and social 
processes. How can we know if such policies really improve the quality of our 
development? It is commonly believed that 
the instruments produced by government 
departments dedicated to the solving of the 
problems caused by social dilemmas are 
insufficient. An international example is the 
Rio convention on Sustainable Development 
(UN 1992). A national example is the Dutch 4th National Environmental Policy 
(Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 2001). 
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The point is that the problems that face us are complex. Every proposed solution 
is likely to meet resistance from people and organizations who see their situation 
deteriorated in the short term with certainty, whilst they are not convinced that 
the solution actually will help solve any problem, not even in the long term. And 
if they do believe that it might help, they might still believe that the cost of the 
solution is unfairly distributed. For example, environmental groups may call for 
drastic action, but often there is doubt as to whether the cure would be worse 
than the disease. A ban on tropical wood in only one country may only 
somewhat slow down the logging. It would be uncertain whether other countries 
would follow. And this gives opposition in The Netherlands – there are enough 
opponents to revolutionary ideas that have obvious disadvantages in the short 
term and unclear benefits in the long term. This is why problems like sustainable 
development are sometimes called wicked problems. 
Solutions for wicked problems are proposed by organizations that might 
have some power, just like they meet resistance from organizations with vested 
interests that also have power. For example, corporations have power to adjust 
their production processes, NGOs have power to influence the public opinion, 
and governments have power to forbid or stimulate certain behavior. All these 
organizations may be aware that they have a common problem, and they may 
search for common solutions. In any discussion between these organizations, it 
is unlikely that solutions for wicked problems can be found. Each organization 
has its own objectives, about which it frequently discusses internally, and on 
which the leaders base their positions. 
These fixed positions make the interactions between organizations fruitless, 
despite the fact that sometimes leaders may speak out that they are in favor of 
sustainable development. The leaders cannot support any concrete solutions, 
because these are contrary to their other pre-existing objectives, which in the 
short term are more important, perhaps even for survival of the organization. 
They have made their commitments to shareholders, employees, voters and 
members. The organizations that interact in such a way, vainly trying to improve 
the quality of their common development, together form ‘structures of struc-
tures’. Such structures may also be termed power networks. The term network 
underlines that no one organization or leader is in charge of what the whole 
network will do. The term power underlines that the interactions are based on 
the formal position of leaders who have power in their own organization, and 
that this power is based on formal objectives. Since the objectives are exclu-
sively produced from within the organization, they are not aligned with the ob-
jectives of other organizations in the network, and the approach to common 
problems becomes fragmented. The cooperation in power networks, or the lack 
of it, is a process that is termed governance. In that process, new structures may 
emerge. If these aim at new cooperation, new connections, they are adaptive 
networks. 
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“the learning of socie-
ties is enigmatic” 
Process: the interactions that shape ideas 
In this book I want to explore how processes shape ideas and structures that may 
lead to a different, more sustainable development. Governance leads to the 
whole of decisions we make to influence our development . The objectives of 
organizations are shaped by their internal interactions; many small decisions that 
create legitimacy for the leadership and its formal objectives. In corporations the 
decisions are primarily based on what people believe will create profit for the 
organization and for themselves. This depends on decisions made in the market, 
and ultimately by consumers. In such a way, the economy has its internal drive 
that, for example, also leads to globalization. When people see that the economy 
has adverse side effects that lead to unsustainable development, they may call 
for action, and new structures like ministries and NGOs may be erected to ad-
dress these problems by correcting market processes. Such interventions are also 
the result of many small decisions. Our development is therefore shaped by the 
everyday decisions we make, which is a process that develops in the context of 
power networks (i.e. in force fields that I term adaptive tensions). 
If we are to change our development we need to change the way we make 
decisions, so that power networks will align their objectives. Paradoxically, the 
process of decision-making takes place in the context of power networks and 
therefore doesn’t automatically create alignment because of its natural fragmen-
tation, as indicated above. Something else is needed to create the required co-
evolution, so that society as a whole may become more adaptive. This would be 
a different kind of process where ideas in different organizations or different 
parts of society can co-evolve in spite of the fixation on short-term benefit in 
power networks. That may increase our collective capacity to solve the complex 
puzzles we face, in other words the quality of our decision-making. Quality 
defined and achieved from multiple points of view may create a more sustain-
able development, since it can help us prepare for changing conditions. 
Influential people are aware of this need and have proposed learning proc-
esses to increase the quality of our decision-making. These learning processes 
should not just aim at education, but on the quality of our interactions. How we 
act is a result of how we think, and how we think depends on how others think 
and act and on what we experience. We therefore should learn through dialogue 
and experimentation. Several initiatives in this line have been taken, like the UN 
Rio Convention on sustainable development (UN 1992), UN Secretary General 
Kofi Anan’s ‘global compact’ initiative (Ruggie 2002); the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development, development aid focuses on piloting, etc. 
A similar discourse concerns ‘innovation’ – also here it is said that breakthrough 
innovations, being of benefit to the larger community, depend on learning. The 
same is also true for ‘quality management’, e.g. the idea of ‘spatial quality’ in 
The Netherlands. Finally, it is mentioned in the 4th National Environmental Pol-
icy (NMP4) of The Netherlands, where it is termed 
‘transition management’. 
It is difficult to evaluate the effects of such 
initiatives. The learning of societies is enigmatic – it is not only the result of 
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specific initiatives that are said to create an alternative process for power net-
works, but also the result of all interactions individuals and groups have, per-
sonal or via the market mechanism. Someone buying a tropical hardwood chair 
in The Netherlands may contribute to the destruction of rainforests without 
knowing it. If he knew it, he may still buy the chair because if he wouldn’t 
someone else would. The issue of rainforests is discussed in several national and 
international policy processes. Individuals from The Netherlands may visit a 
tropical rainforest during their vacation, see the misery or corruption driven 
logging, understand the linkage, and still buy that tropical hardwood chair. At 
the same time such an individual might support the international processes that 
try to prevent continued logging. He might stop buying products from unsus-
tainable forestry. Different furniture corporations may set up a system of certifi-
cates for wood produced in sustainably managed forests. All that may be seen as 
part of a learning process. 
As a new crosscutting dialogue emerges it may be said that a new group of 
people has interactions to achieve a common benefit, which makes that group an 
adaptive network. Adaptive networks by definition are not guided by pre-
existing accountable objectives, but in stead by unspecific objectives like quality 
or sustainable development, and the personal concerns of individuals who leave 
the fixed boundaries of official objectives, and in that way they try to enhance 
dialogue between parts of society, enabling a co-evolutionary learning process. 
They have the aim of improving development and therefore they must be 
influential, but they have no formal power sources, so they have to convince 
purely through dialogue. 
Where people speak about learning or convincing, they often have in mind 
that learning should lead to knowledge, and that knowledge, the ideas someone 
has about the world, can be transferred from one person to the other. If one per-
son tries to convince another of his ideas, he is making a proposal or proposi-
tion. However, this is not helpful if knowledge creation is difficult to separate 
from the creation of the perceptions that create our daily activities and decisions. 
Knowledge is produced, translated and applied in a fragmented way. Fragmenta-
tion of knowledge leads to a whole variety of behaviors, in which there is not 
much consistency in action. Contradicting actions performed by several agents 
lead to disappointing results. This is widely seen as an important problem of 
governance in complex power networks of societies at the beginning of the 21st 
century. It is increasingly recognized that the influence of government on our 
development is limited. There is a need for more interconnectivity in governance 
networks, enabling co-evolution, and thereby more common understanding of 
wicked problems and, based on that understanding, more joint action toward 
sustainable innovations. I see interconnectivity as a characteristic of social net-
works, expressing the degree in which the agents are willing to engage in dia-
logue and act on behalf of the whole, also expressing the degree of trust (assum-
ing that without trust there would be no dialogue). 
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“simply asking 
for dialogue is 
not appealing” 
Conduct: connecting the parts 
In this book I want to explore what kind of conduct contributes to co–evolution. 
Studies show that learning can take place if people are willing to engage in dia-
logue: listen to each other, postponing their judgment, and really trying to un-
derstand the other. To some extent such interactions may occur at grassroots 
level, but how may such small interactions influence the agenda of power net-
works – the current set of objectives they advocate; the positions they take in 
public (i.e. power position)? What statements do leaders make in public? Do 
they take position against the other members of power networks, to re-establish 
their own leadership, or do they take position for the common interest? Do they 
promise reward for developing specific types of ideas or general types of ideas? 
The connecting agents should not only consider the adaptability of society as a 
whole (i.e. its capacity of proactive change to indications of looming changes in 
its environment), but also adapt to their own circumstances, which are defined 
by the context of changing power networks. They must have a skill of develop-
ing ideas that really are accepted on a wider scale. 
From the top down, leaders like Kofi Anan have taken initiatives that should 
stimulate such dialogue. Another example is prime minister of The Netherlands 
Jan Peter Balkenende, who in 2002 personally started up a national dialogue 
about norms and values (Balkenende 2002). The question is whether such con-
duct actually trickles down so that many people develop the required skills, and 
change their ideas in interaction. Leaders like Anan and 
Balkenende often act despite an enormous mistrust that 
the initiatives they take lead to any common benefit. 
Just asking for dialogue is not appealing when people 
experience urgent problems. 
More traditional leaders may empathically reword the emotions of their 
supporters or voters, and even focus the attention on forgotten problems, but 
they don’t even try to supply their supporters with an understandable perspective 
for complex change. They rather insist that simple solutions can solve wicked 
problems, which is why they are popular. Many citizens, on the other hand, are 
aware that simple solutions don’t exist, and turn away from politics. There is no 
language in which political leaders can express to their voters in an 
understandable way, how they subtly connect different organizations in 
governance networks to improve co-evolution of ideas and consistency of 
behavior. Traditional public leaders often have reached their position because they 
have made promises to their voters. They are rewarded for claiming that they 
have effective and simple solutions. They implement these solutions from the 
top down. Creating an understandable problem analysis and a solution that only 
needs to be implemented provides a comfortable feeling that things are under 
control, and that there is order. At the same time, such leaders often are aware 
that reality is not that simple, and that their solutions may easily fail. This is why 
traditional, more hierarchical public leadership feels rather uncomfortable with 
the increasing complexity. 
  
 Governance for Sustainable Development 13
“traditional leaders often 
create fragmentation” 
“how to re-
ward connect-
ing behavior?” 
Such leaders also tend to seek solutions by creating new order in the new or-
ganizations they set up to cope with complexity, by stating new objectives and 
by restructuring or re-organizing. New and clear responsibilities, on which pub-
lic managers and their political leaders can be accounted, give an appearance of 
an effective approach. However, this in itself forms no guarantee for learning. It 
may only increase the number of organizations and leaders who try to interfere 
with societal development. This dividing way of 
order seeking often results into a higher degree 
of fragmentation. 
The alternative to creating new order that 
only adds to complexity is to personally act in a connecting way – not setting up 
structures that do it, but to actually do it, make the connections. Recently, sev-
eral social scientists call for new cognitive approaches like scenario thinking and 
systems thinking (e.g., Senge 1990, Flood 1999). These theorists assume that 
such learning capacities will help a group to deal with an ongoing process of 
changing circumstances. The cognitive approach will provide a language that 
helps to communicate about ideas, which then may co-evolve and lead to pro-
active innovations to adapt to new circumstances. Acting together becomes eas-
ier because trust develops more trust (Falcone & Castelfranchi 2001). Leaders 
who take connecting initiatives and create enthusiasm for adaptive networks in 
such a way are sometimes called change managers, transformative leaders, mod-
erators or connectors. Senge (1990) speaks of personal mastership – focusing on 
what really is important to a person. However, this activity costs time, and is 
difficult to understand for the client, voter or member. 
Reward: investing in recognition 
In this book I want to explore how conduct that contributes to co-evolution can 
be rewarded. Adaptive networks and their interactions, seeking new goals, are 
obscure phenomena. By definition they connect hierarchical organizations and 
parts of society, without having their own visible agenda. Their members must 
go beyond activities that are officially recognized and therefore they are unlikely 
to be rewarded by the organizations that pay their salary. The effects of what 
they do have the form of more aligned ideas between parts of society – but since 
nobody is in control and few people are even aware of how ideas evolve, it is 
difficult to reward someone for such a result. Thus, the members of adaptive 
networks must be prepared to invest personally in the common interest of soci-
ety, perhaps hoping that recognition comes later. This is not easy when they are 
under pressure to produce visible results. They should trust 
that their superiors will not punish them severely if they 
fail, but will rather reward them for good efforts. Trust is 
then similar to an expectation of reward. 
It is not evident that people make such an investment, 
or if they try, that they actually make a difference. There may be no trust that 
they actually do so. Responsibilities should be shared but under complex condi-
tions fragments act on their own. Nobody is in control, and connections are 
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“Little affairs are so difficult to achieve 
as change and innovation, because 
many have put their stakes on what is” 
Niccolò Machiavelli, 1469 – 1527 
needed, but how to recognize and reward connecting behavior? Due to this 
negative general orientation on interconnectivity, the rewarding for connecting 
activity becomes intrinsically problematic. No new language may emerge that 
can be used to share thoughts about useful contributions, and enabling leaders to 
be rewarded for connecting behavior. 
Connecting behavior is also called transformative leadership or change man-
agement; it is a matter of leadership because nobody is in charge and taking 
action toward change is therefore someone’s personal initiative. It is transforma-
tive because the leadership is aimed at innovations that fit long-term ends and 
create new short-term ends. It is a paradox between two components of social 
processes; these are produced by two reward mechanisms, which are created by 
two counter-acting needs: the need to account for achieving orderly goals, and 
the need to create opportunity for seeking new goals in dialogue. 
How can larger societies develop ways of encouraging people to display 
connecting behavior? What kind of language do we need to share our thoughts 
about the benefits of connecting behavior? How can such a language develop in 
the different subsystems that it benefits, in co-evolution? 
1.3 The governance paradox of complex societies 
Above I have identified the following themes for my book: content, structure, 
process, conduct and reward, which are all key to sustainable development. I 
also have indicated that these themes are closely related, which is why focus on 
any individual theme in isolation from the other themes is dissatisfactory. An 
adaptive network is a structure, 
but it is also the context and the 
result of a process, which is 
enabled by a type of conduct, 
which rewards different conduct 
in others, in particular conduct in 
the common interest, i.e. conduct that contributes to sustainable development. 
I therefore structure my points according to a paradox that cuts across the 
whole set of themes: the paradox between accounting and goal-seeking 
interactions. The interaction types are similar to what Heclo terms powering and 
puzzling, in relation to policy learning and the view that policy actors are 
involved in the 'puzzling' or 'powering' whereby ‘Much political interaction has 
constituted a process of social learning expressed through policy’ (Heclo 1974: 
305-06). My point, in line with Heclo’s, is that the contrast between powering 
and puzzling, created by complexity forms a tension that can be used creatively. 
However, to overcome the inertia Machiavelli and others have observed, some 
level of empowerment is needed. It sheds light on the position of the object of 
this book, adaptive networks. 
Governance of complex problems like sustainable development 
In this book the complexity of modern societies is the point of departure. I as-
sume that different governments are aiming at a whole variety of objectives at 
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the same time, and necessarily governance content is a mess. All power net-
works confronted with wicked problems have intrinsic difficulties to deal with 
long-term objectives. Dealing with such objectives requires different kinds of 
interactions than the more classic approach of objectives in which short-term 
solutions have to be reached, by fixing and thereby simplifying a problem. 
Complex societal systems are highly dynamic due to the enormous amount of 
interferences and interaction. This leads to the assumption that the only stable 
characteristic of complex modern societies is their chaotic state of being. Loom-
ing threats at the level of any of its parts cause ongoing tensions in the whole 
system, which lead to some level of chaos. Some agents purposefully exert pres-
sure to create such tension, because they hope it leads to unexpected solutions. 
In messy and complex governance networks interactions aimed at partial 
problem solving by seeking new goals will always occur alongside interactions 
to achieve fixed partial goals. Coincidental contradictions, interferences and 
intertwining between parallel interactions will always take place and will often 
to a large extent influence the outcomes. In order to deal with complexity, 
participants in governance networks will try to create linkages between 
coincidental parallel interactions, in order to generate a larger, common benefit. 
They are then acting part of a power network, but simultaneously and on their 
own initiative, almost illegally, they are also acting part of an emerging adaptive 
network. I assume that the messy and interfering interactions in networks can be 
classified in two types: the accounting type and the goal-seeking type. The 
accounting type is created by the idea that chaos can be controlled, at least in the 
sense that the agent expects reward for his contribution to an orderly goal. This 
goal is formed by the context of power networks in which the agent operates and 
that create expectations of reward. The goal-seeking type is the opposite: 
individuals try to develop new combined actions with people from different 
backgrounds, which may (or may not) yield accepted solutions in a wider 
context that they cannot control. They interact, and an adaptive network 
emerges. Both components, each representing a specific combination of content, 
structure, process, conduct and reward, occur alongside. Some people act 
primarily according to fixed objectives, others primarily seek new objectives. 
Before analyzing their relationship, I present stereotypic descriptions of both 
types of governance. 
Accounting 
The accounting style of interaction develops under the influence of fixed objec-
tives that form the prime criteria for reward. Power networks provide such ob-
jectives. Power networks are structures that control resources like funding and 
regulations. The standing institutional framework, which by nature changes 
slowly, forms them. People in charge have achieved their position because they 
make promises in which their supporters believe. In that position they can con-
trol how their subordinates are rewarded in the implementation process, which 
leads to new laws, institutions and investments. They can allocate funds to peo-
ple and activities they believe will produce the promised results. They can moti-
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“re-organizing often 
does not help” 
“the market needs a 
stable playing field” 
vate their people by means of the statements they make in public, and by re-
warding behavior that fits the objectives. 
The power network forms therefore a context 
that attracts certain behavior according to prefixed 
expectations. This is beneficial because this 
fixation is helpful to give agents in the market 
certainty about the playing field in which they will act in the future, so they can 
invest without taking too much risk. The playing field is formed by the whole of 
government interventions like regulations, taxes and subsidies (the institutional 
regime). Even communicating about possible future changes can create a per-
ceived investment risk and reduce the level of investment. This may reduce 
support for the power network among market agents who see their interests 
adversely affected. It is therefore important for society that expectations about 
the future playing field don’t change without necessity. 
As problems are complex, leaders may declare that they will work together 
with other leaders to develop solutions. However, to them it is vital that what-
ever solution emerges, this is not contrary to what their supporters define as 
primary, short-term objectives. Without their support, they would lose their 
position. Their agents, the people who carry out the actual work in the problem-
solving process, are in the first place conditioned to watch out for these immedi-
ate interests. Otherwise, they are rewarded for cutting costs. It is then less attrac-
tive to contribute actively to a process of goal seeking. Because the goals ha-
ven’t been found yet and these are therefore formulated in an unspecific way, 
and it is never certain whether superiors will really perceive a proposed solution 
as a success. The risk of meeting resistance from unexpected corners is consid-
erable. And if there is success, many organizations have contributed to it, and 
one cannot be sure to get reward for one’s own contribution. In other words, if 
responsibilities are shared, and the dominant interaction type is the accounting 
type, it is likely that nobody acts as a problem owner, making effort for the 
common benefit. 
Simultaneously, re-organizations with the aim of increasing productivity take 
up most of the attention of managers. Such measures can easily be presented as 
effective solutions for wicked problems. Traditional leaders or managers, apply-
ing the accounting style, often resort to control because it provides the appear-
ance of effectiveness. However, if problems are 
wicked this approach will not produce the promised 
outcome. Reorganizing organizations hoping they 
finally will fit in with the new changed environment 
in many cases does not work. Quite often such organizations find themselves in 
an ongoing state of reorganization, without getting the sense of really controlling 
developments within and outside. 
If the accounting style were the only style, there would only be reactive so-
cietal change. The societal system may produce, in its evolution, innovations in 
the market that become successful and start a chain reaction of changes that start 
in smaller niches, eventually tipping regimes (Rotmans et al, 2001). These inno-
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vations might be triggered by incremental technological progress or by the ex-
haustion of resources that the systems needs. For example, if fossil fuel runs out, 
the transport system must shift to other energy sources, and when sufficient 
people believe that the energy price will rise they will start the required research. 
However, if the energy price rises significantly, there may not be enough time to 
develop other energy technology that meets the needs of society. The system 
could collapse or the new system could create less desirable side effects (like the 
impact associated with hydro-energy or atomic energy). For a more proactive 
attitude towards sustainable development, the goal-seeking style is also required. 
Goal-seeking 
Goal-seeking interactions are just as real as accounting interactions, because 
otherwise all change would have to be produced by political parties that formu-
late their programs, voters that reward the best program, and Cabinets that im-
plement. Reality is probably that the solutions proposed and implemented are 
significantly influenced by many goal-seeking interactions. These interactions 
are not aimed at control but at development of some kind. It may be compared 
with parallel processing of information by computers – if all information has to 
pass through one microprocessor that controls everything, the process is slowed 
down and fewer problems can be solved. In the case of Cabinet there may be 
over a dozen of ‘microprocessors’, which is still by far insufficient in complex 
modern society. The alternative is that power networks put many microproces-
sors to work, let them freely associate with each other to combine their knowl-
edge and search for new ideas, and the top level selects the results that have the 
best quality. If formal leaders are of the traditional type, they will have difficulty 
selecting solutions that do not meet their fixed objectives, which they already 
had formulated before in terms of simplistic solutions in their program. If the 
leaders apply the goal-seeking style, they formulate their objectives more in 
terms of problems, and work together with other leaders in the power network to 
create a joint perception of quality, and communicate about that, guiding the 
microprocessors that work in parallel, and selecting the best ideas that are deliv-
ered. 
The goal-seeking component of governance is a process of building a case 
for change, in line with the idea of ‘problem solving’, introduced by Fritz 
Scharpf (1997), who describes the difficulty of wicked problem solving in the 
context of institutional hierarchy in game theoretic terms. A sufficient number of 
influential people must believe the case before it can be publicly proposed – 
otherwise, there is a high risk that a majority will reject the case for a long time. 
This proactive source of change could be early policy-making with the aim of 
preventing a system collapse or less desirable side effects. This policy process 
should then give impulses to the system with the aim of starting a sustainable 
chain reaction, preventing the system from locking into a less sustainable 
equilibrium. The goal-seeking component, in the eyes of Senge (1990), 
identifies such impulses or interventions. 
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“adaptive is both pro-
active and reactive” 
However, there are several paradoxes related to pro-active policies. First, the 
process may be said to aim for sustainable development, but there is no widely 
accepted operational definition of that concept. So, a social process is needed to 
assess whether any action will effectively cater to a sustainable development and 
should be admitted. This social process, which takes up time and knowledge, is 
necessarily limited to a small group. However, who will believe a small group if 
they propose sustainable changes that go against the short term interests of many 
others who don’t understand their case? Thus, pro-active policies have to start in 
small groups, which make proposals for interventions, but small groups have to 
seek support in much larger groups before they can be effective. This process of 
support gathering consists of co-evolution of the thinking in different parts of 
society, and the people who are actively involved in that process are connected 
in adaptive networks. I have chosen the word adaptive networks because they 
try to adapt to changing circumstances as early as 
possible, before a wide sense of urgency emerges 
through market processes (e.g. a quick price 
increase of oil). Mitleton-Kelly (2003) reserves 
the term adaptive systems for systems that react to a changing environment by 
adapting, and co-evolution where different interdependent systems co-evolve all 
along, adapting to each other. Her point is that the boundary between a specific 
system and its environment is difficult to define. I take as point of view that 
intentional co-evolution of ideas always reacts to previous ideas that interven-
tions are required to prevent greater catastrophe or to create larger benefits. In 
that sense they are adaptive, also in Mitleton-Kelly’s terms. 
Proposals from adaptive networks are the result of a learning process that 
necessarily must precede the public agenda of the intervening organizations. The 
public agenda is formed within the structural context of society. Since 
institutions have a natural tendency for self-continuation, as described above, 
proposals for change will not easily emerge on the public agenda (unless 
formulated in unspecific terms, like most policies for sustainable development).  
Thus, the existing societal structure, which includes the structure of government, 
forms an inert ‘force field’ for the public agenda, within which adaptive 
networks may develop views about change, and try to influence the public 
agenda by long-term reasoning. Until their ideas have been adopted in the public 
agenda and the work programs of their organization, they have no other 
resources than knowledge and skills. 
The tension between the accounting component and the goal-seeking component 
If both fixed objectives that are controlled and new objectives that are developed 
could be totally re-conciliated, a high quality of development would emerge. 
However, this is not possible and therefore there is a tension between the two 
types of governance interactions: the results of goal seeking are difficult to see 
and people are pushed to produce visible outcome. Goal-seeking leads to a rea-
soning that may only produce visible results in the long-term, that may lead to 
reward only if others can be convinced. On the other hand, only striving for 
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fixed goals may be unsatisfactory for many, since it creates no solutions either; 
it may merely provide certainty for market agents. The tension between the two 
styles is often felt in rather implicit ways, like ‘I hate bureaucracy but make the 
best of it’. The tension may be felt when people from different, competing or-
ganizations identify a common interest or a possibility for synergy that is diffi-
cult to realize because official objectives are aimed at outsmarting the other, and 
not at cooperation. This may be the case if interest groups or ministries don’t 
agree about short-term government interventions, political parties compete for 
votes, or corporations in a production chain compete for customers. 
The tension is indicated in Figure 1. The upper right formal, highly visible 
agenda setting process within the power context is too slow for alert responses 
to complex societal dynamics, since new insights have to be sufficiently shared 
in political circles before they emerge on the public agenda ‘from the top’. Their 
four-yearly election programs often bind parties. Adaptive networks (lower left) 
can be more alert, but they have no formal powers and resources since only the 
public agenda can allocate resources. To have an impact, they must raise the 
interest of others who share their views, until sufficient momentum for action is 
gathered. The effectiveness of a learning network may thus be evaluated through 
its influence on the public agenda. The arrows in the diagram indicate power and 
influence as causal linkages between processes at three levels. This, then, has to 
be observable through a changed behavior of leaders, reflecting more than be-
fore the joint perspectives of the adaptive network, and if concrete action pene-
trates the public agenda, it may influence the law making and institution devel-
opment process. 
Figure 1. Influence through goal seeking and power through accounting 
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However, the members of an adaptive network are unlikely to clearly influence 
the public agenda for short-term interventions, unless they are capable of devel-
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oping a convincing case for change. Thus, in the case of complex change, it may 
take up some time before an influence on the public agenda is observable. Be-
fore that moment, the participants of an adaptive network should evaluate their 
own chances of success. 
This tension between interaction types may have a creative effect, because if 
adaptive networks see, and seize, opportunities, it may lead to a different public 
agenda that makes society as a whole more adaptive. It may provide the best of 
both worlds: ideas that have emerged in co-evolution and therefore are relatively 
robust and adaptive at the level of the whole, without creating more chaos than 
necessary. If that happens an adaptive network has influenced the way in which 
the power network exerts its power and creates expectations of reward. The 
point where both forces meet is intermediary in terms of dynamics and reward. 
The public agenda setting process is the process where formal leaders change 
their conduct in public, under the influence of both forces. They take a little risk; 
because their supporters, who legitimize their position, may not all understand. 
Reward is therefore uncertain for them too. They assess whether the time is ripe 
for such a shift. 
Not only new communications by public leaders are an expression of a 
changing agenda. Also the choices made by agents responsible for implementa-
tion may have that effect. They must improvize in a real world, where things are 
not that simple. Agents may adjust their practices according to reality and in co-
evolution with other parts of society affected by their practice (given complex-
ity), often making irreversible decisions in the implementation of formal poli-
cies, and thereby influencing development in a way comparable with jurispru-
dence. If the agents act according to the rules, they are safe but may be person-
ally unsatisfied with results. They may want to find balance so that they can 
believe in what they do, and they may develop that balance in dialogue with 
representatives of the other affected parts of society. Where the two forces meet 
in the center of Figure 1, also here there is a learning process in the sense that 
objectives and therefore conduct in the power network are adjusted according to 
ideas that have co-evolved via an adaptive network. 
Both components are needed to create a sustainable development, and both 
need to be sensitive to the other in order for anything to change. Power net-
works, having a power position, should appreciate the necessity of co-evolution 
and adaptive networks, and adaptive networks, having an influence position, 
should appreciate the susceptibility of power networks for certain proposals. A 
power network forms adaptive tensions, context in which adaptive networks 
operate. 
Change management as management of tensions 
Thus, there is tension between the agendas proposed by order seeking organiza-
tions and the ideas developed in adaptive networks. What happens in such a 
situation, depends to some extent on the ‘human factor’ – that of conduct. Indi-
viduals may have some degree of liberty in their conduct, and may choose ac-
tions that relieve the tension they feel. They may choose to either stay on the 
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“instruments for sustain-
able governance easily 
lead to bureaucracy” 
safe side, making sure they will be rewarded for their actions by staying close to 
fixed but less creative objectives, or they may take initiatives by connecting with 
others to develop new combinations and ideas. When they make the first choice 
a tension is never created, and if they make the second choice they try to ‘make 
ends meet’ which would release the potential energy in the tension. This is a 
risk: if they fail the investment is lost, only if they succeed there is payoff. They 
can do this by developing influential ideas that are new but still affect the public 
agenda, since then they are effective and likely to be rewarded (either in terms 
of career or in terms of personal objectives). The issue is that individuals first 
must see the opportunities before they participate in networks to create innova-
tive proposals. If it seems like an impossible task, they will probably not begin 
the search process in the first place, and choose certainty. 
Managers may be aware of the potential 
benefit of tensions. By means of their 
communications they can adjust adaptive 
tensions to challenge teams of people to engage 
in goal searching by indicating the types of 
ideas that they will reward. To that end they should be prepared to defend that 
before their own supporters. Managers may also describe opportunities in exist-
ing contexts, making others enthusiastic to join in an adaptive network. 
But what about very complex problems like sustainable development? To 
some extent, traditional governance is aware of that role and the potential bene-
fits of exerting pressures and tensions. Policy discourses like impact assessment, 
participatory planning and transition management have been used more or less 
explicitly to tell about the need for and the potential creative effects of these 
tensions (despite the fact that their formal rationale usually is more simplistic). 
However, often a normative approach toward learning removes its flexibility 
and creativeness, and the procedure becomes bureaucratic (Nooteboom & Teis-
man 2003).  There is a need for more personal initiative for connecting behavior 
in real life situations, and not a need for new procedures that only add to the 
complexity of real life situations. The pressure caused by such instruments 
should therefore be cautiously dosed and customized at a level where it really 
evokes connecting behavior by providing opportunities for reward. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2. In power networks actors can purposefully adjust their agenda 
to create a visible tension in the power network, which forms an opportunity for 
adaptive networks to develop innovative proposals (a third way). The tension 
between the power network and the adaptive network is then a creative tension. 
The process of change may start at both sides. 
Learning networks’ can be power networks in disguise 
I write consistently about adaptive networks when I refer to networks of people 
who try to connect thinking and acting in different parts of society. I have indi-
cated that a characteristic of such networks is that the co-evolution of ideas leads 
to a changed behavior of power networks, setting a different agenda. They have 
to be driven by the potential energy of tensions. Enthusiasm is based on the 
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ability to see opportunities. The ultimate success is that wicked problems are 
solved in the eyes of large groups in different parts of society. I have chosen the 
word ‘adaptive’ because such networks need to adjust to circumstances if they 
are to find solutions to wicked problems. They have to monitor contextual con-
ditions and create new linkages, with leaders in different parts of power net-
works, to see their potential. They have to assess their own credibility. 
Figure 2. The tension in a power network creates an adaptive tension between it and 
possible adaptive networks 
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order seeking, bridging the tension generated by what seems a governance para-
dox. The tension has many appearances, like order – change, power – creativity, 
short-term – long-term, stabilizing the status quo – innovation of societal sys-
tems. I look at all themes: content, structure, process, conduct and reward, and I 
study public managers, change managers, who display connecting behavior, 
looking for new goals and making others enthusiastic to follow in that quest by 
linking knowledge about social context and technological options. Due to the 
fact that these interconnecting leaders often are not in the limelight of our me-
dia-oriented democracy, there is not much known about what they do and how 
effective they are. 
I consider the question how the two parallel worlds co-evolve. Where can 
tensions be pointed out that lead to new solutions, and where are the tensions 
unproductive? Is there a power context that invites co-evolutionary initiatives? 
Do adaptive networks know what to do to appeal to power? It is my assumption 
that a productive co-evolution of innovative and intertwining ways of manage-
ment and control-oriented approach has to be based upon three conditions. First 
the adaptive network that evolves has to create internal trust (i.e. trust between 
members of an adaptive network) and external trust (trust between adaptive 
networks and power networks), because these attempts have an organizational 
border-crossing character by definition, and so take place in a context of con-
trasting objectives and competition for support. In this book I present theories on 
trust and develop from these theories a theoretical model to analyze the process 
of trust building (or loss of trust). Third, I assume that in order to develop initia-
tives that change the present system an adaptive network needs capacities of 
foresight. This foresight, in order to assess the potential effectiveness of coop-
eration and create a belief, may concern the future of all themes (content, struc-
ture, process, conduct, reward). 
Figure 3. Overview of key words in section 1.2 
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If all three assumptions are accurate for a given adaptive network, I assume it 
has the ability to cooperate in a context of competition and contrasting interests. 
This crucial competence of connecting leaders, for which they have to make 
others enthusiastic too, is termed coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff 1996). 
If this ability is present, people can see that the cooperation may have benefits 
and may reward them. They can consciously ensure that trust is continuously 
generated in the process. They hope that by linking the knowledge they have, 
they can develop proposals that are acceptable, being in the interest of the power 
network. I elaborate the aspects of this cooperation in competition competence 
and develop a model. 
An overview of key words in this section is presented in Figure 3 and in 
Figure 4. In order to underpin and test my theoretical thoughts I do case study 
analyses in Dutch attempts to create sustainable development, under the transi-
tion discourse. My theoretical questions are: 
• How can the idea of adaptive networks, including ideas about trust and 
coopetition, be related to existing theories of complexity and change? 
This question is answered in chapter 2, which includes the philosophical 
question related to the evaluation of the sustainability of ideas; 
• How can these theories be operationalized to observe adaptive net-
works, their interaction with power networks, and the spreading of sus-
tainable ideas in the real world? Do the theoretical ideas help to explain 
the content, structure, process, conduct and reward in the case of a spe-
cific adaptive network? Which questions should I answer to give more 
clarity? This is considered in chapter 3; 
• Which lessons for sustainable change management, contributing to sus-
tainable governance, can be drawn? This is answered in chapter 7, 
which deals with issues like coopetition, which, as conduct in adaptive 
networks, may contribute to a more adaptable society. 
Figure 4. Change management as connecting behavior 
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The empirical research object, transition management, and the empirical ques-
tions, are introduced in 1.4 – 1.6. 
 
1.4 The empirical research object: transition management 
The transition discourse 
The theoretical research object, as introduced above, is the goal-seeking compo-
nent of governance. This is behavior that takes place in structures termed adap-
tive networks, and it leads to a process that generates new content. 
The empirical research object is the transition discourse, which is character-
ized as follows: 
• Content: the transition discourse in the Netherlands (2000 – 2005); 
• Structure: the structures that emerged and that produced the transition dis-
course, that is the team that prepared the 4th National Environmental Policy 
(NMP4) (VROM 2001), and three follow-up processes of NMP4 (the 
Innovation Board Sustainable Mobility, the Energy Transition Process and 
Inter-ministerial Cooperation); 
• Process: the goal-seeking interactions that took place in these structures, 
and between these structures and the outside world, and which explain the 
emerging and evolution of structures; 
• Conduct: the goal-seeking behavior of influential participants which ex-
plains the process; 
• Reward: how these individuals expect to be rewarded for their behavior. 
 
The NMP4, published in 2001, is widely seen as a landmark in the process of 
the transition discourse, and gives it its name (see 1.5 on Page 28). However, 
earlier forms of this discourse already emerged in the 1990s, and after 2001 its 
evolution has continued. In 2006 it is still alive; it has evolved into an inter-
ministerial program. 
As indicated above under Change management as management of tensions 
(Page 20), the transition discourse is interesting because it is a discourse about 
the goal-seeking component. It creates some legitimacy for goal-seeking behav-
ior. An interesting question is; does that help? Before describing in detail what 
happened in chapters 4 - 6, I give a general introduction to the rise and consoli-
dation of the transition discourse. For further illustration I include parts of the 
NMP4 text and summaries of influential precursor studies and processes. 
The transition discourse around 2001 
The recognition of sustainable development as wicked problem and the need for 
goal seeking has emerged in Dutch and international policy networks that aim at 
sustainable development (in particular environmentally sustainable develop-
ment) in the late 1990s, after circles involved with environmental policies had 
been disappointed with the effects of their earlier efforts. Similar noises were 
 26 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
heard in the USA (National Research Council 1999) and in the EU (Open 
Method of Coordination). 
The problem analysis can be read from the NMP4 and several precursor 
studies and magazine articles. Influential people saw as main barrier to sustain-
able development that two types of processes were never connected. One type 
were the processes aiming at sustainable development, with primarily a long-
term market focus. The other types were the processes aiming at economic de-
velopment, with primarily a short-term market focus. The short-term goal of the 
sustainability projects was to illustrate the feasibility of sustainable develop-
ment, and to convince decision-makers to take the appropriate measures. Only 
the first goal was achieved. In my words, both process types contained mainly 
interactions of the accounting type, which made them incompatible. Given com-
plexity of sustainable development there was no sufficiently large-scale co-
evolution of ideas; a case of fragmented power networks where every process 
was dominated by someone’s short-term motives and therefore not credible to 
the other side. The first type of processes never became concrete; the second 
type never was accepted. 
The solution was sought in learning processes between the domains that 
share an interest in the future of societal systems like mobility, energy, agricul-
ture and international trade. The domains were identified as businesses, govern-
ments, NGOs and academics. According to NMP4, forerunners from different 
domains should come together and focus on the removal of the more specific 
barriers to sustainable development, like unfit regulations or a wrong playing 
field for the market. These ‘arenas’ should apply heuristics like learning by do-
ing, backcasting, and keeping options open. The competence of system’s think-
ing was seen as critical. And finally, the NMP4 indicated that the government 
should encourage such processes. In my interpretation, this was a call for adap-
tive networks, but without making a complete analysis of success conditions. 
The difference between power networks and adaptive networks was conceptual-
ized by applying the concept of ‘forerunners’, which suggest these groups are, or 
should be, prepared to take some risk and spend some time. The assignment of 
these groups was on purpose formulated wide and on a 30-year horizon, leaving 
considerable room for goal seeking. The flipside was, of course, that this as-
signment was not accountable. This idea became embedded in government poli-
cies in NMP4 in 2001, which called this type of process transition management, 
and indicated that the government should stimulate it. 
The linkage of the transition discourse with the innovation discourse 
In The Netherlands after 2001, several Dutch (non-environmental) ministries 
initiated groups (so-called transition arenas), which had the aim of sustainable 
development in specific sectors like energy, mobility, agriculture and interna-
tional trade. The environment ministry VROM, having the task of coordinating 
and reporting to Parliament about transition management, organized a group to 
catch the generic lessons learned in the separate transition groups. In the ses-
sions of these groups, people from practice and academics were invited to share 
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views. These sessions were in the first years organized by VROM, and around 
2004 this was taken over by networks of research and knowledge organizations, 
financed by several ministries. The ministry responsible for energy (EZ) set up a 
‘competence center transition management’. 
A strong conceptual linkage had developed between the idea of transition 
management and the idea of innovation management. Whereas ‘system innova-
tions’ had been almost synonymous with ‘transitions’ all along, people became 
increasingly aware that sustainable development by itself is less likely to gather 
enough momentum. It had to be made more tangible by linking it to other ur-
gencies like energy security and competitive power of the Dutch economy – it 
was said that the Dutch should become forerunners with sustainable services and 
techniques. The linkage between the discourses about transitions and about in-
novations, carried by different power networks, was thought to help, since they 
both encouraged goal-seeking activities. 
Table 1. Principles of transition management according to several authors in the 
magazine ArenA (several issues 2004) 
Emphasize in your communications the urgency of the problem (whatever its solution), in 
order to claim more resources for goal seeking. Feed the dialogues that form the core of the 
goal seeking with transdisciplinary research – organize variation but also select once in a 
while. 
Let management take part in goal seeking, to get their commitment and to select; enabling 
political discussion to concentrate on main lines and conditions for goal seeking  
Have the courage to get rid of old regulations if these block transitions 
Accept that bureaucracy always has difficulty to change and enable internal competition by 
making room for innovations at the highest management level 
Different ministries should be more self-conscious and jointly make agreements about prob-
lems and solutions with economical sectors 
Explain to the impatient environmental movement why it all takes so long: ideas that are 
proposed at political level are vulnerable; you first need to organize support about main lines 
 
Throughout 2001 – 2005, there were regular publications about transition man-
agement in the journal ArenA of the Netherlands Association of Environmental 
Professionals. Several academics published about it, as well as an organization 
NIDO (National Initiative Sustainable Development). In 2004, I published an 
overview paper of several previous publications by influential thinkers about 
sustainable development, all in ArenA. These thinkers were Peter Aubert, Jaap 
Jelle Feenstra, Leo Jansen, Derk Loorbach, Jan Rotmans and Roel In ‘t Veld. 
They were civil servants, university professors, one former Parliamentarian and 
one former Cabinet member. All gave their view about the improvement of tran-
sition management, which I summarized in Table 1. These views demonstrate 
 28 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
that the environmental sector tried to become more skilled in goal seeking, and 
was asking questions about the nature and quality of behavior in adaptive net-
works. 
1.5 Relevant content of Dutch environmental policies 
To illustrate the transition discourse I have translated some passages of the 4th 
National Environmental Policy (NMP4): 
‘… we need to make choice now that may have benefits only after 30 years. This re-
sults in a different kind of NMP; its horizon is 30 years and encompasses the world-
wide implications of our actions. We have been successful in the past and also these 
ambitions can be achieved with a well-organized approach.’ 
‘… past successes have been significant but limited to policies that do not need to 
change the economic or societal system. However, we have run into difficult prob-
lems, which need worldwide system innovations or transitions. Several past efforts to 
address these problems have been evaluated. The Paper on environment and economy 
(1997) already indicated that private actors (the market) shared responsibility with 
governments to achieve ‘delinkage’ of economic growth and environmental pressures. 
The evaluation reveals limited success: joint action had been taken, but not leading to 
enough delinkage. Stronger interventions are needed to ensure adverse effects are in-
corporated in prices. This is technically and politically difficult. ‘Cabinet believes that 
its policies should be directed towards internalization of external costs in prices.’ In 
another evaluation, the conclusion was drawn that politics is unwilling to develop in-
terventions that would have disastrous economic effects for specific sectors, despite 
leading to overall more welfare (with the example of intensive farming). A more im-
portant fail-factor, however, was the Dutch habit to formulate ‘accountable’ environ-
mental targets without knowing whether these are feasible or what their implications 
are. Instruments don’t work because they are not based on a sound analysis of costs 
and benefits. Once there is enough agreement, market-based instruments are most ef-
fective. Policies like the Kyoto protocol are extremely uncertain, and The Netherlands 
would do well to seek international allies to implement measures without that con-
text.’ 
‘…. the following difficult worldwide problems need our attention: loss of biodiver-
sity, climate change, overexploitation of natural resources (wood, fish, clean water, 
clean air, fertile soil, energy), health threats (of partly unknown substances and food), 
risk of large scale accidents, deterioration of the living environment, possibly uncon-
trollable risks because of unforeseen conflicts between the natural system and the hu-
man system. To address the problems there is a need for ‘global governance’, to make 
use of the opportunities of globalization. It is not difficult to sketch an ideal world in 
terms of desirable life conditions, but there are barriers. These are unequal distribu-
tion, short term thinking, fragmentation and a lack of effective institutions, limited in-
struments, problems cannot be solved by those who experience them, extreme uncer-
tainties around solutions, a lack of proactive attitude.’ 
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‘Therefore a new kind of policy is needed: systems innovation based on key principles 
like sustainable development. We need more integrated policies, and rich countries 
need to take primary responsibility. Objectives should be clear for the long term but 
also flexible. This is a shared responsibility and the role of the government is to have 
the overview and to link parties to share their knowledge. (These parties aimed at 
were forerunners from corporations, NGOs, governments and academics.) It should 
stimulate research and action, and create the right conditions for all parties to take 
their responsibilities. Where necessary, the government intervenes with more tradi-
tional instruments, in particular market-based instruments and voluntary agreements. 
This is the government’s contribution to transition management, which is the process 
that is needed to create sustainable system innovations. Transition management has 
the following features: 
• learning to handle uncertainties, among other things by working with scenarios; 
• keep options open and reduce fragmentation of policies: stimulate knowledge and 
technological development, create innovations and improvement, think in terms of 
multiple domains and agents; 
• long term thinking as framework for short term policies; 
• attention for the international dimension of change processes and searching for 
solutions at the right scale.’ 
 
According to NMP4, this approach should be applied on a system-by-system 
basis, with priority for the agricultural system, the system that creates pressure 
on international biodiversity and use of natural resources, and the energy system 
(also addressing mobility). For each system the environmental and other urgen-
cies are indicated, and possible scenarios are sketched. 
1.6 Other publications in the transition discourse 
The text of NMP4 has resulted from the way it had been prepared: in dialogue 
with stakeholders and academics. People from all relevant domains (NGOs, 
corporations, academics, governments) had participated and supported the dis-
course. Their opinions had been formed in perhaps a decade of failing sustain-
ability policies, and these experiences had been reported in earlier publications, 
which also made recommendations. In Table 2 I summarize precursor studies 
done by VROM, in addition to those already quoted in NMP4 itself (see under 
1.5). 
Table 2. NMP4 precursor studies by or on behalf of VROM  
Bekkers, Heijne, Frissen, Ester 1996. Governance conceptions and instruments in environ-
mental policies. In search for forms of co-production. The authors indicate that an open policy 
style is more effective. Objectives should be results rather than starting points. Moderators 
may assist in developing realistic perceptions between parties and developing joint action 
based on multiple goals. Incremental decision-making, through linking the process with cru-
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cial decision-makers, increases support. This ‘co-production’ demands high strategic and 
tactic competencies of the participants. VROM should become moderator, architect of deci-
sion-making arrangements, referee, allocator of resources, and connector of scales. 
VROM Council 1998. Advice on the 3rd National Environmental Policy (NMP3). This advice 
council referred to a ‘greenpolder model’ where societal partners (all relevant domains) nego-
tiate about spatial government decisions, and indicated that an NMP4 was necessary to embed 
such main lines. 
Cabinet 1999. Inception note for a paper on spatial planning. It indicated that a new govern-
ance approach was under development, which appeased environmental and other desires. It 
had the features that include an open policy process, subsidiarity and use of the ‘greenpolder 
model’. 
ORIGIN/Institute for Societal Innovation 1999. Learning and Innovation. Lessons from the 
private sector, opportunities for VROM. The authors reviewed theories about the learning 
organization and ‘the learning society’. Their conclusion was that VROM needed to apply 
such ideas more strongly, including improving related competencies of their employees, and 
providing a context for innovation processes outside and inside VROM  (Ctd next page) 
to compete for government support and resources. In these processes VROM could be con-
nector as well as implementer of actions. 
Article by Leo Jansen in ArenA, May 1999. Leo Janssen had been program manager of the 
inter-ministerial program Sustainable Technological Development (DTO). Here sustainable 
scenarios had been created together with the agents who could implement these scenarios. In 
this article he indicated that for sustainable development we need a coordinated change of 
culture, structure and technology and leadership. 
Above the clover flower the daisies; societal network for innovations directed toward sustain-
ability; Henk Diepenmaat & Harry Te Riele, 2001. This was a report written by two consult-
ants with a background in process management and innovation. VROM had asked them to 
develop a perspective for a process of system innovation. They had developed the idea of 
innovation teams and strategic teams, both composed of individuals with influence and 
knowledge from all domains: businesses, governments, civil society, academics, intermediary 
organizations and citizens. The operational teams would have to develop concrete innovations 
under the guidance of the strategic teams, which would have to ensure political support. The 
report was prepared when the ideas about transition management were still formed, and was 
of influence to the NMP4.  
Transition management, the case of a sustainable energy system (Rotmans e.a. 2001). A 
particular influential study in 2001, which was prepared by Rotmans e.a., introduced the word 
‘transition management’, which became building block for the NMP4. The study was an 
exercise of the type of analysis that could be made by an imaginary learning group striving for 
a transition to a sustainable energy system. In particular a diagram showing an S-curve with 
the phases of a large-scale transition became widely quoted in the discussions during and after 
preparations of NMP4. The S-curve showed that societal change processes are not linear but 
large systems can quickly (i.e. within a generation) move to a different equilibrium. They can 
also be inert if actions to distort the equilibrium are absorbed by short-term interests (lock-in). 
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The challenge of transition management was defined as forming a joint vision about desirable 
outcomes of transitions (‘a basket of objectives’) and letting this be leading for actions to 
develop dynamic views (‘learning by doing’) of how short term interventions can lead to 
paths of development that fit the vision (transition paths). The key was to think backwards in 
time, ensuring that short-term actions fit the vision, and if that is not possible keeping all 
options open and take joint action to reduce uncertainties. Actions aim at developing new 
economic niches with an eye on breakthroughs at regime level and ultimately at landscape 
level of socio-economic systems. 
An example of a research program for sustainable development 
One of the experiences that opened many people’s eyes for the need for transi-
tion management was the DTO program (DTO is a Dutch acronym for Sustain-
able Technological Development) (Aarts 1997). The objective of the program, 
which was a cooperation of four ministries, was to illustrate how cooperation 
around sustainable technology can make our development more sustainable. In 
the period 1994 – 1999, seven illustration projects were implemented in unsus-
tainable activities like building, feeding, residing, water, washing, chemicals and 
transporting. The projects were co-productions of the program bureau with in-
dustries and other societal groups. Dozens, if not hundreds of individuals had 
been involved. 
In each process the same joint steps were made: a strategic problem explora-
tion, a sketch of a sustainable future, backcasting to action now, definition, 
elaboration and implementation. In 1997 the program was evaluated (Aarts 
1997). The conclusion was that despite the fact than many people believed cer-
tain sustainable scenarios, a breakthrough was not in sight. Either the projects 
had become devaluated to become incremental, or they were not feasible or 
politically acceptable in the short term. 
Vergragt & Jansen (2001), who had been closely involved in DTO, con-
cluded that non-technological barriers culture and structure were at least as im-
portant, and that the processes drifted off into a direction that would be interest-
ing for the short term of involved stakeholders, without staying in tune with the 
long term. They drew some lessons as explicit recommendations for those who 
would be implementing the ideas of NMP4 about transition management. One 
was that stakeholder involvement is key – in order to understand on what basis 
they would cooperate. The role of the government would be to formulate chal-
lenges for the long term, but otherwise it should be limited. It should remove 
barriers in legislation, but its fragmentation reduces possibilities for other roles. 
At present it only looks four years ahead. They identified fragmentation and 
short sightedness of government and politicians as key bottlenecks, and that it 
was time for a 3rd generation of environmental policies: to remove structural 
barriers without falling back to blueprint planning. The government should help 
creating niches where innovative companies can experiment. This first phase is 
unattractive for companies, due to uncertain payback and ownership of the cre-
ated knowledge. 
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In 2001, another article also looked back on DTO (Van Kasteren 2001). It came 
to similar conclusions. Despite the fact that many projects had been followed up 
by further research or pilot projects, no breakthroughs could be reported. The 
initiators were uncertain about the market demand for their ideas. One program 
coordinator compared the program with building a cathedral: the return on in-
vestment is too small. Industries cannot take the initiative. Further more, a 
breakthrough depends on a change of culture and societal structures. There sim-
ply is no sustainable technology available that the market can absorb. 
The greenpolder model 
The greenpolder model was a discourse and a procedure in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, about the way interactions should take place with respect to large 
spatial investments. It has been the platform for several discussions about sus-
tainable development where the environment movement met economic forces 
under the context of a government decision. This section is strongly based on 
Teisman & Nooteboom (in prep). Other international publications about the 
Greenpolder Model are Glasbergen (2002) and Deelstra et al (2003). In depth 
cases studies in Dutch are presented in Weggeman (2003). 
The Greenpolder is an evolved form of the better-known Dutch polder 
model. The polder model is a specific pattern of interactions that emerged in the 
Dutch polder culture in the 1980s. It was a context for cooperation between 
employer’s and workers unions to keep wage negotiations and other social pol-
icy negotiations from getting out of hand. The Dutch polder model has some 
international appeal, despite the fact that it is criticized for decades. President 
Clinton commended it, when he and Prime Minister Kok of the Netherlands met 
at the end of the last century. Three characteristics are indicated as essentials of 
the Dutch polder model (Pleij 2005): (1) Joint decision-making is based on ex-
change of arguments. Arguments will work when they are able to convince the 
other and if they clarify point of disagreement; (2) Respect for dissent and giv-
ing dissenters the opportunity to express themselves; there is an open orientation 
towards inclusion, not exclusion; (3) Participants are guided by the pragmatism 
of daily life and looking for efficient and manageable socially broad basis. In the 
early 2000s the Dutch economy was less successful and the polder model was 
accused of delaying decisions, short-term thinking and incapability of making 
decisions altogether. Pleij (2005) however argues that the Dutch polder model 
must not be abandoned because it is ‘a beautiful and socially well-trained deci-
sion-making technique that already exists in the Netherlands for ages’. In his 
eyes it is a nice self-willed combination of conflict and consensus. 
However, the polder model was exclusively aimed at socio-economic poli-
cies. During the 1990s the controversy about major investments in national 
physical infrastructure strengthened. The opposition against these investments 
was growing as were the environmental demands posed to these investments. In 
order to deal with the growing resistance more open and interactive approaches 
were applied (for empirical evidence in the Netherlands: Edelenbos 2000, 
Hendriks & Tops 2001). The most serious problems arose in the two interna-
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tional so-called mainports of the Netherlands: the Rotterdam Harbour and Schi-
phol Airport in Amsterdam. Important investments were needed in order to pre-
serve their high positions in the international rankings of mainports. On the 
other hand the policy towards sustainable development – adopted by national, 
regional and local governments determined limits to growth. The two mainport-
developments were considered to be bifurcations and test cases that require stra-
tegic decisions about the future of The Netherlands as a whole. 
It seemed to be impossible to find solutions for mainport development that 
could fit at the same time the economic demands and the ecological ambitions. 
In order to find solutions that could fit both demands and could lead to a more 
solid societal support of economic and environmental lobby groups a specific 
interactive approach was started. This approach was called the Greenpolder 
Model. The idea came from participants in the Socio-Economic Council (SER). 
They translated their traditional polder deliberation approach oriented towards 
the cleavage between economy and social welfare to the new upcoming cleav-
age between economy and sustainability. The advisory council of the Ministry 
of the Environment suggested using this idea in the physical planning domain. 
The concept was adopted by national government and used for ‘mainport’ deci-
sion-making. The quick adoption probably has much to do with the relative 
success of the Dutch economy during the 1990s. 
The then existing interactive approaches in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were 
transformed into the Temporary Platform for Deliberation about Schiphol 
(TOPS) and the Project Mainport Rotterdam (PMR). Environmental groups and 
representatives of private companies active in the mainports were invited to look 
for joint results. TOPS was successful in terms of joint fact finding (Deelstra et 
al 2003, Weggeman 2003). In a short period an enormous amount of facts and 
figures were produced and several participants got the impression that a kind of 
joint understanding was growing. It however failed to come to joint conclusion. 
The main reason for that was that the aviation industry did not want to come to 
such a conclusion in deliberation with the environmental groups without having 
some kind of consent with national government. National government however 
was not willing to due so. This noncommittal approach is in clear contrast with 
what often happened in the classic polder model. So, national government did 
not seem to be ready for a new polder approach if that should lead to changes in 
their own policy making process. 
The PMR process was more successful. The environmental groups and the 
Port Authority as representative of the private sector did succeed to reach a joint 
conclusion: a new polder for harbour activities reclaimed from the sea and new 
natural areas to compensate the land reclamation. Once this alliance was con-
cluded it became almost impossible for national government to neglect the out-
come of PMR. The minister was not very pleased with it. She got the impression 
that non-governmental alliances ruled the sector. So, even though the outcome is 
seen as an important success, also this case indicates that government was not 
really ready for a new polder approach. It was for these reasons that the green-
polder concept became less popular at the end of the 20th century. 
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The polder model and the greenpolder model are mainly based upon three char-
acteristics. First of all it is based on tripartite talks. Government, private compa-
nies and civil society are involved in joint decision-making. Secondly, the nego-
tiations take place between people with a substantial rank and file in governmen-
tal organizations, private companies or non-profit. Thirdly, they are looking for 
and gaining a balance over and over again between partially overlapping and 
partially conflicting interests (negotiations in long rows of games). In the case of 
the greenpolder model, in contrast with the traditional polder model, the private 
and societal participants were not in a position to negotiate as they had been in 
the traditional polder model. A lot of the gains of the game could not be trans-
lated in direct financial terms and government claimed a much more prominent 
role. For the non-governmental participants, it was a closed shop. There are 
clear signs that government did not take the results as serious as it did in the 
traditional polder model (Teisman & Nooteboom in prep). The Greenpolder 
Model approach worked in certain respects well in a few concrete cases (the 
development of a new port area in the Rotterdam). Overall however the Green-
polder Model was not seen as a highly successful arrangement. The main reason 
was that the environmental groups and the lobby groups of the business commu-
nity were not able to make deals with each other, like they were used to do in the 
traditional polder model. Government was too heavily involved in the environ-
mental issue and was not willing to share responsibility with the two other par-
ticipants in the Greenpolder Model. Often governmental officials used the di-
vergence of opinions between the two lobby groups as a permit to go on with 
their own policy proposals and approaches. And if the two groups really 
achieved a joint result of negotiation, as in the Rotterdam Port case, the minister 
was not satisfied because she got the idea of not being in charge. In particular 
the Rotterdam case has been a learning process for involved parties. Societal 
partners made a deal about a large extension of Rotterdam Port based on a joint 
vision about the development of the transport sector in general. On the one hand 
it was satisfactory that such a process was possible between the environmental 
movement and the economic sectors, on the other hand it was also clear that the 
outcome was still in many ways a compromise. 
Empirical questions 
In this book I address the following questions about the transition management 
discourse: How did power networks evolve, and where can adaptive networks be 
hypothesized as an explanation of that evolution? (answered in chapter 4). How 
did adaptive networks evolve, and where can change managers be hypothesized 
as an explanation for that evolution? (answered in chapter 5). How did change 
managers influence development? (answered in chapter 6). These questions are 
further explained in section 3.7. 
  
 Theoretical Notions of Complexity  35
2 Theoretical notions of complexity 
If facts are the seeds that later produce knowledge and wisdom, then the emotions and the 
impressions of the senses are the fertile soil in which the seeds must grow (Rachel Carsons) 
On page 23 I have described possible dilemmas that the governance paradox 
may produce, like the tension between conduct aimed at short-term benefits and 
long-term benefits. These dilemmas are not new to the social sciences. What can 
we learn from existing scientific literature about the existence of co-evolution 
between accounting behavior in power networks and goal seeking behavior in 
adaptive networks?  
In this chapter I present an overview of existing theories, and I take it as it is 
offered to me: discipline-by-discipline. I start my search in the political (and 
public administration) sciences, from where I explore private and public man-
agement theories, which I build up from economic theories to knowledge man-
agement and innovation management. From there I focus on complexity theories 
that have recently developed in these and other sciences. Finally I will highlight 
some insights from theories on trust. This overview serves as a background base 
for developing an operational framework for empirical analysis, which is devel-
oped in chapter 3. 
2.1 Political sciences 
Machiavelli 
It seems sensible to start this theoretical exploration in the political sciences. 
After all, Machiavelli said already in 1515: ‘There is nothing more difficult to 
take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to 
take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.’ and, even more cyni-
cal, ‘Men are always wicked at bottom unless they are made good by some 
compulsion.’ (from The Prince). A deep paradox can be felt in his work, be-
tween the need to be wicked in order to achieve power, and the need to be good 
for the general benefit. ‘For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, 
being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so 
that the flavor of them may last longer.’ Even if ‘to do good by some compul-
sion’ is their primary goal, leaders first have to achieve and maintain power. 
Obviously, in Machiavelli’s eyes, knowledge about the impacts of actions is 
 36 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
only relevant to rulers if it helps them to achieve and maintain power, and then 
perhaps, ‘to do good by some compulsion’. 
Modern classics 
Classic modern theorists (Simon 1957, March & Olson 1976, March 1994) still 
believe decision-making is only partly based on collective rationality. Of course, 
democracy, new technologies and globalization have had some impact after 
1515. In the stable Western world of the 2000s, ‘wicked’ more has a meaning of 
playing games, which can be as dirty as the prevailing political culture allows. 
Rulers now have to share political power and cannot use repression. Perhaps 
leaders now can make use of research and ITC to develop better ideas of what 
the people would view as benefits, making it easier to ‘do good’. The margins 
for politicians have also become narrower since their power basis depends on 
their inflexible political program. The voter may be better educated, enabling 
him to choose the best program or person. On the other hand, the societal system 
is more complex and more difficult to influence with political power – it has its 
own, fast dynamics. It is increasingly ‘governanced’ in networks, coalitions of 
agents who have related interests in the system (Castells 1996). Perhaps ITC 
makes governance in networks, where rulers share power in a complex society, 
more effective, since it is easier to make and adjust agreements for joint action. 
However, complexity makes it more difficult to maintain a power basis, since 
action is difficult to explain to voters. 
There is no ‘knowable’ rational complex decision 
The competent decision-maker, once being in power, may be supposed to act in 
the interest of society. However, even then, political sciences know no way of 
evaluating that he does. The first, rather philosophical, question that therefore 
must be asked is: ‘Is there in theory a criterion available to determine whether a 
decision is rational from the point of view of society as a whole’? Whereas tradi-
tional welfare theory usually gives a negative answer to this question (e.g. De 
Bruin et al. 1998), several social scientists try to deal with this question within a 
constructivist paradigm (see also Page 23 and Jasanoff & Wynne 1998). Under 
that paradigm, a belief in the rationality of certain decisions is constructed 
through social interaction processes. Different social groups have different ra-
tionalities. The question whether there is some yet unknown joint rationality of 
which social groups are unaware, and of which they might become aware 
through a social learning process, is theoretically unanswerable. If it is assumed 
that such rationality exists, it only can be constructed by way of that interaction 
process –a ‘social learning process’. 
Tracing back a policy process, decisions must therefore be seen as clews of 
actions by many interdependent agents. Every once in a while an idea breaks 
through, which is remembered by many. These events and the periods between 
two breakthroughs may be called development rounds (Teisman 1992). As I 
explain hereafter under complexity theory, development rounds (or break-
throughs in thinking which are in hindsight linked to specific formal decisions) 
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are the result of non-linear developments or transitions in a relatively small so-
cial subsystem. 
Process and rationality in governance networks 
Since 1990 a dramatic increase has occurred in publications about the idea of 
policy networks and governance in networks of private and public agents (e.g. 
Powell (1990), contrasting networks with markets and hierarchies; Castells 
(1996), proclaiming a network society). Globalization has increased the relative 
significance of networks of interdependent agents, who might or might not co-
operate. Decision-making processes become clews of rows of decisions in which 
the interaction is crucial for the outcomes (Teisman 1992, 1995, 1998). There is 
no single decision-maker who can take a ‘rational decision’. Rather, the ‘deci-
sion’ is a sequence of interactions between policy makers who represent stake-
holders like businesses and governments. Each unilateral ‘action’ and ‘re-action’ 
represents a small decision. These small decisions add up to joint views or deci-
sions by larger, co-operating groups. A number of competing or cooperating 
arenas try to influence decisions by a competent authority. 
If power is distributed in networks, accounting a single actor for the out-
comes does not cater to better decisions. No single actor has the interactions 
fully under control. The implication is that the content of complex public deci-
sions can only be evaluated from a mono-rational point of view, which obvi-
ously is insufficient. However, there might be more agreement about the most 
desirable process of decision-making rather than its result. For example, a deci-
sion that was prepared according to democratic rules might be acceptable to 
most groups in a certain society. This decision represents process rationality. We 
enter a paradox: the most influential ‘small decisions’ are not so much taken in 
the procedural steps, but rather in informal interactions that cannot be regulated. 
Therefore, the content of the resulting formal decision will mainly be rational 
from the viewpoint of those being able to make the most influential small deci-
sions (e.g. In ‘t Veld 2000). 
In reality, in line with Machiavelli, the social context of the personal net-
works of a policy maker is more important than any ‘rational’ information that is 
offered to him by others (March 1998). Participants in the policy process will 
use information about impact of current or potential action only if it helps them 
to explain to their own rank and file why they should support the outcomes. If 
such policy maker has learned something through his interactions in the arena 
that has changed his rationality, he must be able to share this lesson with his 
own organization or supporter group, or a mismatch with his short-term interests 
will result and he will not be able to maintain position. The cognitive learning 
abilities of people are limited, leading to a bounded rationality (Simon 1957). 
Alternative actions that might be sustainable cannot be understood. Policy-
makers have no choice but opting for the short-term interests created by collec-
tive bounded rationality. This explains inertia in the face of overwhelming evi-
dence that things go wrong. 
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Common rationalities 
Where bounded rationality hampers governance from a collective rationality, 
collective rationalities do exist to some extent. The process that leads to them is 
often called social learning (in the management sciences it is also called knowl-
edge management, see page 43).  One of the first authors to deal with his was 
Lindblom (1965) who described ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ as behavior that 
leads to some level of coordination among different actors in a network, which 
increased ‘the intelligence of democracy’. Heclo (1974) referred to puzzling and 
powering in networks, where ‘much political interaction constitutes a process of 
social learning expressed through policy’. Authors like Scharpf (1997) studied 
the conditions under which actors in a network are rewarded for conduct in 
game-theoretic terms; i.e. by some clear and predefined payoff for themselves. 
He infers that complex problem solving is unlikely because it depends on rare 
capabilities. 
Nonetheless common rationalities do exist. Peter Hall (1993) described 
changes of dominant rationalities, which he called paradigm shifts. The emer-
gence of rationalities in networks is also described in Discourse Theory. Hajer 
(2003) defines discourse as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is 
produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices. He claims: 
‘It should be possible not only to identify discourses but to assess their influence as well. 
Two terms facilitate this: discourse structuring occurs when a discourse starts to dominate 
the way a given social unit (a policy domain, a firm, a society – all depending on the re-
search question) conceptualizes the world. If a discourse solidifies in particular institu-
tional arrangements, say a measuring system for air pollution, then we speak of discourse 
institutionalization. We thus have a simple two-step procedure for measuring the influ-
ence of a discourse: if many people use it to conceptualize the world (discourse structur-
ing) and if it solidifies into institutions and organizational practices (discourse institution-
alization).’ 
Governments have tried to stimulate social learning by organizing a trans-
parent and participative process. As ‘game leader’, the government might try to 
create new interdependencies between actor groups, so that they can negotiate 
about policies at early stages and possibly adjust their agendas. Ideally, a collec-
tive rationality would emerge. Policy arenas often request the government to 
undertake such action, which is then often termed ‘interactive policy-making’ 
(Edelenbos 2000, Healey 1997, Innes and Booher 1999). It is also said that the 
government may moderate learning networks, like Kofi Anan’s Global Compact 
(Ruggie, 2002), and the transition management discourse in The Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, governments have not been very successful in stimulating so-
cial learning that leads to a ‘merging’, or at least attuning, of discourses. The 
interdependencies are pervasive and asymmetric (one group is more dependent 
on the other than vice versa). The more interests are linked in a negotiation 
package, the more difficult it becomes to develop joint action that satisfies all 
parties, whilst any single party can block a general agreement (Edelenbos 2000). 
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There is frequently no single negotiation process, but a number of parallel and 
competing arenas trying to influence government decision-making. This process 
is not controlled or moderated by anybody. These arenas do not represent all 
influential perceptions. The processes in and between such partial arenas have, 
for example, been described as policy advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1991). 
As different networks have competing or conflicting ideas, pushing and giv-
ing an overload of information will provoke more countervailing power by those 
who defend their immediate interests (Galbraith 1952). In a democracy, coun-
tervailing powers can have significant influence and create balance as well as 
inertia, depending on whether there is cooperation between the powers. Oppo-
nents may believe that there could be potential benefits of cooperation, but the 
costs in terms of the time required to get to joint action are too high (Kickert 
1997). In many cases, the actors do not agree on what the problem actually is, or 
on the type of knowledge that is useful to solve the problem (ill-structured or 
‘wicked’ problems). Under such conditions, negotiating actors may fear that 
they will get no support for any progress made; i.e., the political cost of shifting 
positions will be too high, which brings us back to Machiavelli. On the other 
hand, cooperation may work and solutions for the common benefit can be found. 
This may be heavily influenced by cultural traits. The Dutch polder model, for 
example, is about deals between employer’s organizations and labor union about 
socio-economic policies. Bill Clinton and Tony Blair have commended it, but in 
the early 2000s it became less functional. Anton Hemerijck, a political scientist 
and expert in the polder model, said at the time ‘Sooner or later the Dutch will 
return to negotiating with each other again, after all, that's what they do best.’ 
(The Economist, 2004). The green polder model, which has already been sum-
marized on Page 32, is a similar approach, applied to large spatial decisions. 
In the 1990s and 2000s in The Netherlands, a number of discourses about 
governance have emerged quite strongly, and penetrated into parliamentary 
discussions and official policy papers. Examples are not only ‘interactive policy 
making’ and ‘greenpolder model’, but recently also ‘different government’ 
(headed by a dedicated minister), ‘transition management’, and ‘development 
planning’ (in spatial policies). Such discourses are, in political networks, gener-
alized under the title ‘innovation of governance’. The general idea among Dutch 
public management theorists is that such ‘linguistic innovations’ (Van Twist 
1994) are necessary to achieve a more common rationality also at the level of 
policies, but also that the success probably is limited. 
Formalizing complex decision-making processes 
Discourses about governance can institutionalize just as well as other policy 
discourses. In that way, efforts have been made to get the dilemmas created by 
bounded rationality under control by means of formalized decision-making 
processes. The institutionalization of the polder model, and to a lesser extent the 
green polder model, can also be seen as such efforts. An early and successful 
effort was the division of the executive, legislative and judiciary powers pro-
posed by Montesquieu in the 18th Century as the Trias Politica. Later, more 
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detailed rules developed with the aim of discouraging policy making against 
certain interests, rules about transparency of public information or provision of 
information before decisions are made. Such developments are often driven by 
international treaties, like the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(UN 1992), which has strongly encouraged formalization of Environmental 
Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment. The general view 
about effectiveness of such instruments is that whereas they may protect against 
obvious mistakes, in complex situations they do not really help to develop new 
common rationalities (Nooteboom & Teisman 2003). Our point in 2003 was that 
a more relevant question is whether the different actors, despite differences, are 
willing to cooperate. Procedures form no guarantee that they will do that. The 
government can try to moderate cooperation, but this is difficult to formalize in 
procedures, and it probably does not depend on the existence of formal proce-
dures, as long as the government remains authority for crucial development 
decisions. The government could initiate a process of changing the interaction 
patterns. The ‘rules of the game’ determine whether actors accept knowledge 
offered by others if it doesn’t support their position. If they do, such knowledge 
may be termed a ‘serviceable truth’ or ‘negotiated knowledge’ (e.g. Jasanoff 
1990, In ‘t Veld 2000). Such common rationalities can be developed without 
detailed procedures, as long as the political force field creates interdependencies 
between actors, so that there is an incentive to cooperate. 
Coopetition 
The processes where moderators succeed in helping opponents to cooperate are 
difficult to formalize. Under the ‘threat’ of government action or under the pres-
sure of countervailing powers, these processes can emerge if actors are prepared 
to cooperate to some extent. As the puzzle becomes more complex, the out-
comes are more often a compromise than they are the best possible outcome. 
Good solutions without adverse side effects are usually not found under these 
conditions. Scharpf (1997) explains that complex problems require a process he 
terms ‘problem solving’, which needs a common agreement regarding the over-
arching policy goals. Such agreement in his view difficult to combine with the 
negotiation process that also is needed under complex conditions, to enable 
government decisions. Combining the two modes of interaction requires excep-
tional skills of simultaneously negotiating and cooperating (Scharpf 1997). On 
the other hand, cooperation between opponents may also emerge without the 
pressure of programmed governmental action. Policy entrepreneurs may take the 
initiative for such cooperation, being keen on opportunities to link discourses 
(Kingdon 1995). ‘Co-opetitive’ relationships, where those who compete for 
customers, members or voters jointly structure the context of their competition, 
may increase the acceptance of knowledge as useful for decision-making (Bran-
denburger & Nalebuff 1996). 
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Lessons from political science 
Machiavelli’s thinking still stands. Political leaders must be in a comfortable 
position before they can manage change. Under complex conditions there is a 
paradox, since many leaders must work together, whilst they are also competi-
tors for power. A comfortable position suggests inertia rather than change. In 
democracies interdependence is created in networks, which forms an incentive 
to search for common rationalities. This leads to behavior of puzzling and pow-
ering, where to some extent solutions can be found, but under complex condi-
tions common rationalities are mainly based on compromises. Being aware of 
this problem, widely shared discourses about governance emerge. However, 
there is uncertainty as regards the effects of such common but rather abstract 
rationalities on real life development. The process of working together may, or 
may not be improved. If interdependencies are manifest at the political level, 
formal procedures like impact assessment probably do not help a lot in increas-
ing the skills of cooperation. 
2.2 Economics and management 
Adam Smith 
The object of this research is social learning to enable sustainable transitions, 
also termed system innovations. The latter term is from the innovation sciences, 
which build on (evolutionary) economical sciences. Like in political sciences 
also here the linkage between human decisions and human knowledge has al-
ways been at the core of the debate. Adam Smith, in his The theory of moral 
sentiments (1759):  
‘Thus self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great ends which Na-
ture seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. Mankind are endowed with a 
desire of those ends, and an aversion to the contrary; with a love of life, and a dread of 
dissolution; with a desire of the continuance and perpetuity of the species, and with an 
aversion to the thoughts of its entire extinction. But though we are in this manner en-
dowed with a very strong desire of those ends, it has not been entrusted to the slow and 
uncertain determinations of our reason, to find out the proper means of bringing them 
about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate in-
stincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and 
the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any 
consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature 
intended to produce by them.’  
In other words, people can be concerned about the future of mankind, and at the 
same time act in a selfish way with short-term motives. In the An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nation of 1776 Smith indicated that the 
invisible hand of the market uses selfish behavior to create a common benefit 
via scarcity of goods that are in demand and supply. 
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Evolutionary economics and innovation governance 
The nature of change processes in a society where the market is a major driver 
of change has been studied in economics. The general assumption is that actors 
in the market maximize their individual welfare, and invest if that is likely to 
happen within an acceptable horizon. From prehistoric times our society has 
developed in several waves. People tried to invent new items to be sold on the 
market, which led to technological innovations. Schumpeter introduced the term 
creative destruction in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), showing 
how innovations may lead to the destruction of old economic activities. This 
was an inspiration for evolutionary economics, next to thoughts from evolution-
ary biology. The idea was that economic activities develop much like biological 
species, with niches as the direct context that determines the life conditions for 
an ‘economic species’, regimes that form a wider context comparable with habi-
tats, and landscapes forming an even wider context comparable with larger eco-
systems (Rotmans et al 2001). New combinations (neue kombinationen) of re-
sources and ideas drive the development. 
Scholars of evolutionary economics mainly try to analyze the evolution of 
economic systems by explaining the interaction between the three levels. 
Change has to occur at different levels, which is compared with biological co-
evolution. Several directions of change can compete, and when one wins, the 
technological paradigm changes (Dosi 1988). If an innovation enters an empty 
niche a bandwagon effect can occur, but if the innovation is considered desirable 
for long-term reasons its niche may have to be artificially protected until a 
breakthrough occurs (Hoogma et al 2002). To that end, a dominant direction has 
to develop among all groups that can influence the niche. There is a risk of lock-
in: the system may enter a local equilibrium, which it cannot leave even if it is 
known that there are better development options. The system develops it own 
dynamics and all actors dependent on it must follow. 
In 1995 a scientific group supporting the OECD wrote (OECD 1995):  
‘Thus innovation policy has only recently emerged as an amalgam of science and tech-
nology policy and industrial policy. Its appearance signals a growing recognition that 
knowledge in all its forms plays a crucial role in economic progress, that innovation is at 
the heart of this ‘knowledge-based economy’, and also that innovation is a more complex 
and systemic phenomenon than was previously thought. Systems approaches to innova-
tion shift the focus of policy towards an emphasis on the interplays between institutions, 
looking at interactive processes both in the creation of knowledge and in its diffusion and 
application. The term ‘National Innovation System’ has been coined for this set of institu-
tions and flows of knowledge.’ 
This was recognition that innovation policies were not a responsibility of only 
corporations or only the government, but of the two together. In 2005, OECD 
continues (OECD 2005):  
‘Innovation policy in the OECD countries has mostly been seen as an extension of R&D 
policy. As such it has been linked to research and technological development. This re-
mains the case, even though the systemic approach developed under the label ‘national 
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innovation systems’ during the 1990s expanded this perspective to include interactive 
linkages in the innovation system.’ (…) ‘The governance of innovation is knowledge-
intensive. Achieving a coherent cross-sectoral innovation policy will require organizing 
the production and use of policy-relevant knowledge and integrating it in decision-making 
processes. Hence, policy learning is a key element of innovation governance. (….) The 
learning-oriented governance system should rely more on flexible, decentralized man-
agement practices, open learning, and flexibility.’  
Systemic instruments 
To follow-up on the observed need for innovation governance, Smits & 
Kuhlmann (2004) propose that a new type of policy instruments, the systemic 
instruments, should be furthered. These systemic instruments focus more on the 
connectivity between the organizations that need to contribute to innovations 
and the need of social learning. They use terms like connectivity and co-
evolution, which I will elaborate further in 2.3. Smits & Kuhlmann (2002) 
claimed a co-evolution, a mutual influence, between innovation practice, inter-
ventions and theory (‘Triple PIT Helix’), which can be sped-up by means of 
instruments that intervene at the level of the whole helix (system level). Such 
instruments should e.g. manage interfaces between (social) systems, facilitate 
construction of new subsystems, identify prime movers, provide a platform for 
learning and an infrastructure for strategic intelligence, and finally stimulate 
demand articulation, strategy and vision development. They observe that these 
five types of intervention are emerging in Dutch innovation policies, in addition 
to ‘traditional’ R&D policies. They review four Dutch systemic instruments 
(including DTO which I analyzed in 1.6). Smith and Kuhlmann (2004) claim 
that public policies may help to increase the use of systemic instruments, by 
providing strategic intelligence and spaces for learning (Lester & Piore (2005) 
use the term ‘public space’ for a similar approach). 
Volberda & Van den Bosch (2004) claim that there is a need for managerial 
and organizational enablers of innovation. In their view these should provide 
innovations that trigger a sequence of events that eventually lead to desirable 
reform; comparable to the levers for change suggested by Senge (1990). Such 
levers should create selection environments (internal to business) and strategic 
regulations (external to business – i.e. government). They refer amongst other 
things to regulations that create high environmental ambitions and form an in-
centive for innovation. Loet Leydesdorf (2005) makes a similar assertion from 
sociological point of view: 
‘The evolutionary perspective in economics can be complemented with a turn towards re-
flexivity in sociology in order to obtain a richer understanding of how the overlay of 
communications in university-industry-government relations reshapes the systems of in-
novations that are currently subjects of debate, policy-making, and scientific study. (….) 
The social construction by agency can then be considered as the subdynamics of produc-
ing variation, whereas selection is structured at other levels. (..) The model of evolution-
ary theorizing in economics, for example, can be recognized as providing a meta-
biological perspective in which selection environments are often considered as ‘given’ for 
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a firm. (…) From a sociological perspective, however, neither selection environments nor 
technological options are biologically given.’ 
Change and knowledge management and organizational learning 
With change and knowledge management I refer to the thinking about how firms 
and people can survive and develop in a dynamic, global and knowledge-
intensive economy. Several theories have emerged about the improvement of 
capabilities of organizational learning. Already in the late 1960s, Peter Drucker 
introduced the term ‘knowledge workers’, and claimed that their effectiveness 
should increase, and is the best measure of capital or welfare. In the 1990s, a 
wealth of studies and management guides has emerged. 
Several authors (e.g. Argyris 1985, Senge 1990), have focused on the cogni-
tion of a management team as unit of change (Virkunen & Kuutti 2000). Senge 
(1990), for example, indicates that managers may join their knowledge to form a 
perception of the system they try to manage, looking for interventions (levers) 
that change the processes in the system. Other authors have focused on the idea 
of learning by doing. For example Levitt and March (1988) argue that conduct is 
usually derived from logic of appropriateness rather than logic of consequence. 
In other words, historically formed routines only change incrementally. If the 
life system of an organization changes too fast, it cannot adapt. Others (e.g. 
Schön 1973; Hall 1993) have indicated that under changing conditions some 
adaptation is possible through double loop learning or higher-order learning. 
Under the pressure of changing conditions, managers of several parts discuss 
change for the common benefit. At another level, authors focus on the type of 
interactions needed to become good at that, for example Brown & Duguid 
(1991) on Communities of Practice and Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) on creative 
dialogue between abstract and concrete thinking. Nonaka & Takeuchi see organ-
izational learning as a system of knowledge production, where tacit knowledge 
in different individuals can be merged to create systemic knowledge, which is 
then internalized and converted to operational knowledge. 
Learning groups can develop a joint ‘what-if?’ strategy, orienting themselves 
toward anticipated context changes, e.g. by interacting with large groups 
through market research, trend watching and by interacting with smaller groups 
through joint evaluation or joint fact finding. Descriptions of possible futures are 
central to motivating joint action, and should consist of easily understood narra-
tives (e.g. Schwarz 1991, Rotmans et al. 2001). 
Coopetition 
Like in political theories, in management theories the idea of cooperation be-
tween competitors has also emerged. Nalebuff & Brandenburger (1996) refer to 
coopetition between corporations that have complementary products and ser-
vices. It is in their common interest to offer their products together, which gives 
a synergy. However, they could also try to each deliver all products as pure 
competitors. Coagulating into one large corporation creates slow adaptability. 
To achieve a common benefit activities should be attuned and, to prevent free 
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rider behavior, the relationship should be governanced. Trust is important to 
work across organizational boundaries in Communities of Practice or otherwise. 
The focus on possibilities for coopetition in networks of organizations is a state 
of mind, and managers have three options: linking the perceptions of the differ-
ent organizations, selectively activating or de-activating organizations in a net-
work, or creating arrangements where the network can regularly meet (Teisman 
2005). 
The lessons from economics and management theories 
Economic and management theories reach the same conclusions, as does politi-
cal science: network governance is needed, and this is a matter of cooperation 
between many different organizations that also must compete. Building a large 
hierarchy does not help to deal with societal complexity and dynamics. The 
solution is in a selection mechanism that favors the development of practices 
and ideas in smaller organizations for their common benefit. Where for a single 
firm such selection environment is given, it is not impossible that coopetition 
develops in the interaction between firms. The relationships in such a network 
should somehow be governanced to prevent free rider behavior. The question is 
how such governance can emerge. Some say that the government should create 
instruments that ‘help the network help itself’, like environmental regulations. In 
terms of complexity theory: by creating tensions that bring the system at the 
edge of chaos, where it has an incentive to search for new solutions. Under that 
incentive, people with a different, more connecting, ‘state of mind’ can become 
successful. 
2.3 Complexity theory 
The theories about politics, economy and management reach a similar conclu-
sion: under complex and dynamic conditions the conduct of interdependent 
individuals and organizations determines the degree in which they can adapt to 
changing circumstances. That conduct determines the capability of complex 
problem solving, puzzling, coopetition or complex innovation. It has compo-
nents of trust, merging perceptions through interaction and systems thinking, 
and these may lead to interventions in societal systems. In the 1990s such think-
ing merged with thinking from other corners like biology, where theories about 
chaos and complexity had emerged. These theories help us understand how 
different types of conduct may emerge under certain conditions, or evolve over 
time in complex social subsystems. That very understanding may theoretically 
lead us to different, more adaptive, behavior. Eve Mitleton-Kelly (2003): 
‘If organizations are seen as complex evolving systems, co-evolving within a social ‘eco-
system’, then our thinking about strategy and management changes. With the changed 
perspective comes a different way of acting and relating which could lead to a different 
way of working. In turn, the new types of relationship and approaches to work could well 
provide the conditions for the emergence of new organizational forms.’ 
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In complexity theory social subsystems are defined as groups of individual 
agents (people, organizations) that have relationships and show some level of 
organization or order (also called the ‘pattern that connects’). A specific type of 
social subsystem is the policy network, where interdependent actors interact for 
common policies. The difference between social subsystems and other systems 
like physical or biological systems is supposed to be caused by free will: hu-
mans may not only be a play-ball of their environment, reacting in predictable 
ways. They could also take development in their own hands and simply ‘decide’ 
to become more adaptive. Eve Mitleton-Kelly is not alone in her suggestion that 
understanding complexity could help us manage ourselves and lead to new or-
ganizational forms. For example, C. Joslyn, F. Heylighen & V. Turchin make a 
similar suggestion with the idea of metasystem transition theory (Joslyn, Hey-
lighen & Turchin 1997). Jenner (2000) writes about group consciousness and 
culture as an adaptive system (borrowing ideas from Carl Jung). In communica-
tions theory similar expectations exist; Loet Leydesdorff (in prep.):  
‘A globalized system can be considered as a strongly anticipatory system which con-
structs its own future states. A strongly anticipatory system is no longer necessarily based 
on historical manifestations, but its operation can increasingly be knowledge-based.’  
How can these expectations be understood? 
Complex systems 
A system consists of units that interact, like atoms in a molecule or ants in a 
colony. The interaction pattern is a form of order. There are higher-order and 
lower order systems. Several subsystems may interact like if they were agents, 
and their evolution becomes linked. Then they form a higher-order system with 
the lower-order subsystems as agents, several layers can emerge by combining 
subsystems to next levels or systems disintegrating into parts whilst retaining 
their higher-level structure to some extent. A nested subsystem emerges. As 
economic systems have a nested structure with niches, regimes and landscapes, 
so do the social systems. A family is a relatively more embedded (nested) sub-
system; a nation state is less embedded. The whole of human population is a 
social system, and since all humans have relationships either directly or indi-
rectly, all smaller groups that may be distinguished as having more internal in-
teraction than external interaction, are technically subsystems. A special kind of 
nested system is the heterarchy (e.g. Mitleton-Kelly & Ianacci, 2005). A heter-
archy is a group of loosely connected hierarchical organizations, also called 
network organization (see also March and Simon 1958, Thompson 1967). A 
structural cooperation between firms, governments and NGOs, as intended in the 
transition discourse, may therefore be classified as heterarchy. 
Composed socio-economic (innovation) systems 
Social systems often depend on market systems. For example, the transport in-
dustry, the services industry (commuters), part of the government, part of the 
academic world as well as environmental groups are all social systems that may 
have an interest in development and change of the same mobility system. To-
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gether, these subsystems compose the (social) mobility system. Some compo-
nents depend on the continuous growth of the mobility system and are strongly 
interwoven with it; other components are negatively affected and try to control 
it. If different social systems are strongly related to a single economic system, 
the term ‘composed system’ may be applied. In recent innovation theories, the 
term ‘innovation system’ is proposed (Smits & Kulhman 2002), but still poorly 
understood (Leyesdorff 2005a). 
The (social) mobility system is an example of a composed system. Its com-
ponents are subsystems that emerge on the same roots (the same citizens / con-
sumers), but may develop ideas and discourses that are in conflict with one an-
other. A person could drive a car and also be member of an environmental NGO 
that discourages car use. He knows that self-sacrifice (using environmentally 
friendly transport) will only help if enough people make that choice, which he 
doesn’t know how to achieve (the so-called prisoner’s dilemma). So, he be-
comes member of an environmental NGO that may press the mobility sector to 
search for solutions that overcome the prisoner’s dilemma. In the transition 
management discourse, it is said that transitions need the cooperation between 
forerunners from all domains of a system. In the case of the mobility system this 
may include the mobilists, the logistical sector, public transport, environmental-
ists, academics with knowledge about possible development and impacts of 
mobility, governments responsible for infrastructure development mobility man-
agement, and other governments like finance and environmental protection. 
Dissipative structures, entropy and human motivation 
Many complex social systems are in a state of constant flux. They are then a 
special case of complex systems that are called dissipative structures (Prigogine 
& Stengers 1985). These are structures that develop (i.e. non-equilibrium) in 
open interaction with their environment. Their development is not an extrapola-
tion of their history: it is non-linear and often with quick changes. Dissipative 
structures maintain their order - their stable structure - in the face of a constant 
flux of matter and energy passing through them by dissipating entropy to their 
environment – i.e. by constantly creating new order and disorder from energy-
matter that previously did not belong to the system. As the amount of order 
grows, the structure becomes more complex and chaos is reduced. Examples of 
dissipative structures are biological cells, organisms, ecosystems, economic 
systems and social systems. Throughout history, systems on earth have become 
increasingly complex. The input of solar energy increases the entropy (disorder) 
on earth, like water molecules move more chaotically when warm, but ‘under 
certain conditions, entropy itself becomes the progenitor of order’ (Prigogine & 
Stengers 1985). For example, entropy can be transferred as sunlight taken up by 
chlorophyll, which forms the basis of a complex, orderly ecosystem. 
Despite the attractive simplicity of the 2nd law of thermodynamics, entropy is 
not a currency that can be easily recognized as such and traced as it is passed on 
between subsystems. The energetics of genetic blueprints, markets, hierarchical 
organizations and network organizations need other explanations. In such dissi-
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pative systems, it has the form of information that helps the system to find en-
ergy-matter in the future (e.g. Hierarchical Information Theory and Shannon 
entropy, based on the information content or complexity of a system). In the 
market mechanism entropy may be represented by the purchasing power of 
money (money is not only energy-matter but also a form of information based 
on trust); in organizations it may be the expectation of reward and punishment. 
However, it is in social systems often unclear how information motivates peo-
ple, and to which extent it is the promise of material reward. A lot has been 
written about human motivation (e.g. McLelland 1987; Beck & Cowan 1996). 
People who have a motivation to learn may choose to participate in network 
organizations, next to earning positions in the market and in hierarchical organi-
zations. They may be encouraged by creative tension (Fritz 1989) – an aware-
ness of the option to move from the current state to a desired state. 
Self-organization 
The process of spontaneous formation of interaction patterns (‘emergent proper-
ties’) in systems is termed self-organization. Mitleton-Kelly (2003): 
‘In an organizational context, self-organization may be described as the spontaneous com-
ing together of a group to perform a task (or for some other purpose); the group decides 
what to do, how and when to do it; and no one outside the group directs those activities. 
An example is what happened in an Integrated Project Team (IPT) in the Aerospace in-
dustry. The team was brought together to create a new project. The members of the team 
represented firms, which outside the IPT were competitors, but within the team had to co-
operate and to create an environment of trust to ensure that sensitive information, neces-
sary for the creation of the new product, could be freely exchanged. The team had to pre-
pare a six-monthly report for its various stakeholders. This report was on hard copy and 
was usually several inches thick. Some members within the team decided that they would 
try an alternative presentation. They found that they had the requisite skills among them 
and they put in extra time to produce the next report on a CD. The coming together of the 
sub-team to create the new format for the report illustrates the principle of self-
organization. No one told them to do it or even suggested it. They decided what to do, 
how and when to do it.’ 
In this example, the right persons were together at the right time and they re-
sponded to the assignment that had been given to them. Apparently that is what 
they were programmed to do, or at least capable of doing for whatever motive. 
They created their own order. If stakeholders take the assignment away, the 
team may dissolve, and its ideas and patterns may be lost. This form of self-
organization is then reversible (conservative in words of Mainzer 1996, quoted 
in Mitleton Kelly 2003). On the other hand it may also be consolidated else-
where or on another basis, for example if the team has learned lessons it thinks 
are also valid in other contexts. If self-organization is irreversible the route back 
to the old situation is cut off; the subsystem may still fall back to lower com-
plexity, but not like it was before. In social systems self-organization (ideas and 
networks that carry them) may either evaporate or consolidate (Teisman 2005). 
If some people deal constructively with tensions in a social system they may 
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seek change that relieves the tension, which may lead to temporary reversible 
hiccups of change that are premature but do lead to new ideas that may resurge 
irreversibly; for example when the pressure is higher and felt by more persons 
who are willing to participate in the change. The ability of creating lasting ideas 
and networks (according to ideas about the learning organization) itself is an 
emergent property (Mitleton Kelly 2003). 
Living systems (autopoiesis) 
One step further to complexity is the idea of autopoiesis, first proposed by the 
Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana. The key idea relevant in this book is that 
capabilities of spontaneous self-organization may evolve under influence of 
natural selection. Maturana saw life as an emergent property of autopoietic sys-
tems, a type of dissipative systems. Maturana & Varela (1992) define autopoi-
esis as a circular network of production processes in which the function of each 
node in the network is to participate in the production or transformation of other 
nodes. The entire network continually (re-)makes itself as nodes are replaced. It 
is a closed network of production processes in which the output of one process 
ultimately feeds back into itself. The system may gradually change by means of 
natural selection of the characteristic of its nodes. 
Social network theory sees behavior in networks as a continuously repro-
duced set of ideas and rules, carried as a local culture between the members of 
the network. Therefore, in that sense social systems are alive. When a social 
system is confronted with new circumstances, self-organization may occur with-
out any process of natural selection, making use of the already present character-
istics of the network. This is not autopoiesis and requires no natural selection 
(Kauffman 1993). If, however, the nodes with capabilities to self-organize are 
relatively successful, endurance of this behavior or these competences may be 
favored (e.g. Leydesdorff 1997). Therefore, adaptive capabilities may improve 
by autopoiesis. Improving adaptability of a social system may for example occur 
under the pressure of other social systems, which compete for the same limited 
resources, like subsidies. On the other hand, the whole group may profit from 
the capabilities of a few. In that case, free riders are equally rewarded and there 
may be no relative advantage in the selection process. As natural selection of 
nodes (in social systems: lower order systems or at the lowest level, persons) 
determines the properties of the network, and the properties of the network de-
termine how ideas develop in the network, the question becomes how can char-
acteristics evolve that further ideas for the common good. 
Emerging order 
If social systems are life forms, that doesn’t mean there is always order. Dissipa-
tive structures maintain their structure by creating new order from the energy 
they receive from their environment. They can do that by creating more order or 
more disorder. If they create more order, this can be in the form of an emerging 
new subsystem, but this could be temporary and fall back to disorder. In evolu-
tionary economics the idea of creative destruction of economic systems 
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(Schumpeter 1934, 1980), and the social systems dependent on them, represents 
the combination and even causal linkage of order and disorder. 
Figure 5. A fractal 
 
 
 
Emerging order may be compared with graphics called fractals, which may be 
produced by recursively applying algorithms in computers. The repetition re-
sembles autopoietic growth. As algorithms operate, the fractals develop and 
order may emerge (Figure 5). Comparing human history with a fractal, all living 
individuals are somewhere at its developing edge. The inside of the fractal is 
history, which currently still can be read from the genetic, geographic, economic 
and cultural situation as well as from the direction of development. Neverthe-
less, in real life different social subsystems compete for the same limited re-
sources, which causes chaos – these systems do not experience a predictable 
environment or future for themselves. Their autopoietic dynamics are disturbed, 
and this may happen unexpected and there may be no solution at hand that 
leaves both competing subsystems intact. To prevent a catastrophe, both systems 
need to adapt in non-obvious ways. However, notwithstanding the power of 
historical legacy, in theory humans can make the choice to change the mammoth 
tanker’s course. The question is whether they can achieve the necessary degree 
of social alignment. Each social subsystem has its own autopoietic dynamics and 
people in these systems are not easily rewarded to go against that because it 
makes the future more uncertain. 
Coping with inherent uncertainty 
People experience chaos or disorder as unpredictability of their future in relation 
to the future of their social and physical environment. The future is not an ex-
trapolation of the past, but it is inherently uncertain. Still, in that context people 
and organizations have to make decisions about their own conduct. Teisman 
(2005) distinguishes two ways of dealing with that. The first view he terms the 
‘order-seeking’, ‘rational-mechanic’, ‘organization and decision-oriented’ or 
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‘complexity-reducing’ view, which some theorists apply to find general patterns 
in what at first seems to be disorder. This behavior leads to what I have in chap-
ter 1 coined the accounting component of governance. Order-seeking managers 
try to broaden the span of control of people and organizations by treating a com-
plex system like it were a complicated kind of simple system. The second view 
according to Teisman (2005) is the ‘disorder-acknowledging’ view, in which 
people and organizations accept that their span of control is limited. Teisman: 
‘The composite nature of social systems, and for a part coincidental and temporary in-
teractions between subsystems, drive development.’  
Such interactions are, in many ways, equal to the goal-seeking governance 
component as I have defined it in chapter 1. Such a worldview doesn’t have to 
lead to fatalism; people and organizations still can make educated guesses about 
what to do. They can be driven by the desire to develop anything for which they 
are immediately rewarded; they can also be driven by the desire to take the 
future of the larger social system into account. 
Proactiveness (adaptive systems)  
Adaptive systems can adjust to changing circumstances. These circumstances 
consist of their environment, the real life world where the social systems feed 
from, and of the other social systems that feed on the same world, and may 
compete for resources and may provide complementary services. An adaptive 
social system, like an organization, may either react to an observed change of 
conditions and adjust its operations accordingly (reactive response), or it may 
assess its possible future environment, observing resources stocks, trends and 
behavior of competitors, and prepare itself for possible change (proactive re-
sponse). In the first mode it co-evolves via the market mechanism, in the second 
mode it co-evolves via the world of ideas. 
Under complex conditions there is a huge bonus on being the first to adapt, 
but if whole societies depend on coordinated behavior to cope with a changing 
environment, wide scale co-evolution of ideas is required. Taking an extreme 
example, climate change is a problem of the whole of humanity. To be prepared 
for all that might happen to us as the climate changes and to prevent the worst, 
co-evolution of ideas at world scale is needed. As that happens the complexity 
of ideas carried by humanity may perhaps match the complexity of its environ-
ment, which is required for adaptive systems according to the Law of Requisite 
Variety. If the range of possible courses of action to respond to development is 
too narrow, there must be many developments to which the system cannot adapt. 
To be able to flexibly implement solutions as fit, co-evolution is required. Hu-
manity should think and act together to some extent. Several authors indicate 
that we could learn to do that. Mitleton-Kelly (2003) writes, for example: 
‘The notion of co-evolution is thus one of empowerment, as it suggests that all actions and 
decisions affect the social ecosystem. No individual or organization is powerless—as each 
entity’s actions reverberate through the intricate web of inter-relationships and affects the 
social ecosystem. But co-evolution also invites notions of responsibility, as once the eco-
system is influenced and affected it will in turn affect the entities (individuals, organiza-
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tions, and institutions) within it. This notion is not the same as proactive or re-active re-
sponse. It is a subtler ‘sensitivity’ and awareness of both changes in the environment and 
the possible consequences of actions. It argues for a deeper understanding of reciprocal 
change and the way it affects the totality.’ 
Another such author is Rotmans (2005), who terms this activity transition 
management: 
‘Transition management is aimed at stimulating societal innovations towards sustainable 
development. This being aware that this is not possible by enforcement or top-down, but 
subtle and co-evolutionary, by means of a visionary process of agenda-setting, learning, 
designing and experimenting.’ 
The idea behind such reasoning is that human social systems are different than 
other complex systems: humans have the capacity to think ahead and act ahead 
and to develop cooperation where required. Whether we do that is our choice. 
Individuals cannot do that on their own – the awareness of the need has to 
emerge at different places, so that new systems can emerge by means of a new 
system of rewarding people in social networks. However, there may be no need 
to see human social systems as principally different than other complex adaptive 
systems. Humans may be more adaptive than other systems, because they are 
capable of representing some of the system’s complexity in their brain, therefore 
anticipating more. Stewart (2000) argues that evolution is directional, toward 
greater collective intelligence. 
The future is still unknown, however. These individual and collective mental 
representations are still based on past events and exemplars, which people ex-
trapolate into the future, being aware of the dynamics of complex systems as 
they had seen in the past. It is uncertain to which extent the masses, who have to 
accept interventions for the common good, share in the co-evolution of ideas 
about such interventions. 
Co-evolution, interconnectivity and connective behavior 
If co-evolution of ideas is to occur, people and subsystems need to be not only 
connected through the market mechanism, but also through exchange of ideas. 
As such they are member of a complex nested, composed system. Proactive 
adaptive behavior (i.e. before the non-linear change of indicators from the mar-
ket) has to facilitate co-evolution of ideas and depends on the extent to which 
interactions occur between people and subsystems of different levels. This has 
two elements: the number of connections people have and the quality of these 
connections (are they only aimed at market transactions or are they also aimed at 
the evolution of the systems they share, i.e. their future). If there are interactions 
that create ideas at the level of the whole composed subsystem, and that are also 
meaningful for lower-order subsystems, the connections are good and it is more 
likely that the system can adapt to changing circumstances when there are warn-
ing signals that change is looming. Since circumstances are created by yet other 
social systems, also there is an opportunity for next order co-evolution. 
However, complexity limits connectivity, through bounded rationality and a 
dominant reflex of order seeking behavior, as an extrapolation of successful 
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behavior under less complex conditions. Energy is wasted on building political 
pressure and counter-pressure, where subsystems collide in the political arena 
without constructing an alternative. If most people have an order-seeking atti-
tude (Teisman 2005), they only add to complexity without developing ideas for 
an alternative development. In other words, with a domination of order-seeking 
behavior the higher-order systems have too many conflicting selection criteria 
for ideas about development, and many good new ideas never emerge or never 
reach the surface. Inertia is the result. Communications appear more chaotic 
since more people seek power from more points of view, and eventually lose 
position as they inevitably fail. The actual development is not influenced until 
the exterior world selects (for example through a rise of energy prices). 
If a significant part of the population displays disorder-acknowledging be-
havior, more alternatives may be generated and implemented. By taking ideas 
about complexity as starting point, they can enhance chances of success. They 
can, for example, look for the ‘adjacent possible’ (Mitleton-Kelly 2003) – an 
option of conduct that forms new combinations between existing systems by 
looking around in the neighborhood for lucky combinations. An example is the 
Senseo – a combined product of two corporations - electrical device engineering 
and coffee dispensing. At the edge of chaos, autopoietic development moves 
toward satisfaction of the needs the system has defined for itself, but not all 
needs are vital – a temporary setback doesn’t have to affect its vital life support 
systems but could limit to aspects of the quality of life. This gives it time to look 
for another development. 
Much of the literature about learning organizations or management in com-
plexity is in line with this thought. I focus on Etzioni (1986), Senge (1990) and 
Kingdon (1995). In general, according to these authors, such managers should 
fix their personal objectives pragmatically and flexibly, staying in tune with the 
chaotic behavior of the larger system as possible, developing a network to some 
extent at random, scanning for opportunities and taking them, forming new 
combinations. One of the first ideas that fit into this thinking is mixed scanning 
proposed by Amitai Etzioni in the 1960s (Etzioni 1986), indicating that people 
and organizations should develop and constantly update a wide view for orienta-
tion, whilst focusing on concrete actions that fit that view. Peter Senge (1990) 
indicates ‘the whole’ is ‘unfigureoutable’ but still an open eye to the whole can 
give rather intuitive insights. It becomes rational behavior to spend time scan-
ning the whole by means of more or less random networking and development 
of specific innovative initiatives in combinations of knowledge and influence 
from new sets of parts– more so than defending the direct interest of subsystems 
in political games. If people and groups of people are capable of doing this they 
still will be of little influence unless they make politically acceptable proposals. 
So, they should seek opportunities that may bring the system out of balance, and 
bring it to another equilibrium. If collective development is at a crossroads (a 
bifurcation), a small intervention (a lever according to Senge) can make a big 
difference. To create such interventions it may be helpful to seek political op-
portunities to find support. Political systems are unpredictable, and an alignment 
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of actions depends to some extent on chance: the opportunity for a match should 
be there, and someone may be capable of seeing it and using it. Such a policy 
entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995) enhances connectivity. He may not only react to 
observed opportunities, but also create perceptions, with others who have 
complementary knowledge, from opportunities that may emerge. 
On the other hand people and organizations that seek order do not easily re-
ward this disorder-acknowledging behavior. From an order-seeking rationality 
the benefits of disorder-acknowledging behavior are invisible – they don’t fit the 
partial goals that have been agreed. Managers earn their position in an order-
seeking context. To prevent inertia they must acknowledge disorder and act to it. 
What is needed to make people and systems bridge this tension? Teisman (2005) 
points to the skill of ‘double thinking’. In his view it is inevitable that in the 
public rhetoric the order-seeking view dominates. Leaders who propose simple 
solutions are popular. At the same time these leaders should be aware that their 
solutions lead to a fragmented approach, which needs to be supplemented by an 
approach that connects with the whole, and which is difficult to communicate 
widely. 
Co-evolution of connecting behavior 
As connecting behavior, next to order-seeking behavior, helps to make larger 
composed subsystems co-evolve, several authors have asked how connecting 
behavior itself may evolve. Such behavior seems self-sacrifice of the individual, 
because there is no reward in terms of reaching the objectives set in order-
seeking behavior. As connecting behavior precedes more systematic coopera-
tion, Axelrod (1984), for example, has asked the question how cooperation can 
evolve, in terms of game theory. Heylighen (1992), for example, argues that 
through the evolution of language, ideas can be widely shared and cultures can 
emerge where language itself becomes a system that rewards behavior. The 
ideas (or memes) that can be expressed in that language (like altruistic norms, 
e.g. the ten commandments) can evolve by natural selection, without having to 
be altruistic themselves in the sense that they favor the survival of competing 
ideas. Humans or human systems on the other hand are submitted to their own 
culture, which entails altruism at their level. 
The question, of course, becomes how do memes evolve; what is their selec-
tion mechanism. The answer might be that the agents that produce the language, 
humans, believe that it is in their benefit to apply that language and to reward 
themselves and other for responding to its norms. As primary needs are fulfilled, 
the agent will have spare energy to give attention to future survival, which de-
pends much more on the future of the group as a whole. They can make that 
assessment due to abilities of foresight that have evolved for direct survival, and 
which are perfected in the evolution as different groups compete on competen-
cies of long-term survival and population growth. Only with a focus on the long 
term, learning-by-doing is more difficult because there is delay between conduct 
and effect. In a social system, belief therefore becomes a self-reinforcing idea. 
To which extent beliefs are selected that actually help long-term survival may 
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depend on the ability of individuals to make that assessment adequately, and 
follow their own ideas rather than ill-founded beliefs of others. Whether there is 
any direction in the evolution of that capacity is unclear. Chance may be a fac-
tor, similar to the observation of Prigogine & Stengers that: 
‘… under non-equilibrium conditions, at least, entropy may produce, rather than degrade, 
order (and) organization (….) if this is so, then, entropy, too, loses its either/or character. 
While certain systems run down, other systems evolve and grow more coherent’ (Prigog-
ine & Stengers 1985, quoted in Mitleton-Kelly 2003). 
Such processes should be observable at the level of conduct of managers. As 
different competing corporations learn to cooperate as well, double think and 
connecting behavior can be observed to co-evolve. Gradually, the two firms 
learn to cooperate and see the benefits of that. What happens at the level of indi-
viduals? In each corporation, a manager may have to continuously earn his posi-
tion. As he gets replaced his successor may behave differently, more connecting, 
due to his character or his training. This can be the result of a learning process at 
the level of runners-up who develop different competencies than the sitting man-
agement, in co-evolution with a learning process at higher management level 
that rewards the runner-up with the competencies they prefer. An enabler at high 
management level may protect this behavior, which is based on sound reasoning 
but doesn’t fit the corporation’s culture. The enabler might take this initiative 
because of his own analysis and his initiative to seek contact with an enabler in 
the competing firm. Together, they connect the corporations by allowing their 
ideas about cooperation to co-evolve. The question remains, under which 
conditions is such double thinking rewarded in the first place. 
At higher system levels, co-evolution of ideas may occur between universi-
ties, industries and governments in a ‘triple helix’ (Leydesdorff 2005a). In this 
process, better interfaces between these domains develop, whereby the ‘whole’ 
functions better. Leydesdorff: 
‘The management of these interfaces is both an economic imperative and a political chal-
lenge, yet knowledge-intensive in the elaboration.’  
The question is still, what do these interfaces look like if they are effective, can 
they, for example, be generically structured, and how is that behavior rewarded 
in a culture of order-seeking, accounting behavior. Interconnectivity itself 
should be rewarded. 
Build-up of human and social capital under ‘adaptive tension’ 
 – at the edge of chaos 
Several authors have described how self-organization speeding-up co-evolution 
occurs and even can be managed in a hierarchy where one system controls the 
resources of other systems. They can take measures that improve qualities of 
distributed intelligence (McKelvey 2001), organizations as brains (Morgan 
1997), or structuring chaos (Brown & Eisenhardt 1998). 
The reasoning starts by assuming that a complex social system is under 
threat and needs to adapt to survive, and that this threat is observed by at least 
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some managers in this system. This complex social system could in theory be 
the whole of humanity, if it has a common ‘enemy’ like climate change or social 
instability after population growth, but several authors focus on firms that need 
to survive in a globalized and unpredictable market.  McKelvey’s point is that 
whereas pressures (energy-differentials) from the environment place a value on 
change for the firm as a whole, ‘charismatic visionary CEOs more often than not 
create conditions likely to inhibit the development of distributed intelligence’. In 
his view leaders in complex situations should not develop charismatic visions 
but ‘manage adaptive tensions’.  Leaders can make the firm more aware of the 
threat and build up tensions inside the system where they have some control 
because they can ‘attach a motivational valance’. They should create the right 
amount of tension (‘at the edge of chaos’ and ‘far from equilibrium’), and the 
right kind of tension (‘managing the attractors’), and they should manage the 
agency problem. 
The system (hopefully) reacts by self-organizing collective intelligence as an 
emergent order. Managers don’t impose solutions (visions), but define the prob-
lem, creating opportunities for reward. The firm self-organizes according to the 
available human capital (the competences of the individuals) and social capital 
(the way in which the individuals are ‘wired’). Then, as intelligence operations 
are repeated at the edge of chaos, existing or new personnel fits better in the 
learning requirements, and the firm’s adaptability to a changing environment, its 
human and social capital, improves. 
Managing the amount of tension 
McKelvey (2001), following Cramer (1993), identifies two critical pressure 
values for social systems, analogous to physical systems. Below the first critical 
value for the pressure, the system returns to its equilibrium state (also called 
point attractor). Above the second critical pressure value, the system becomes 
chaotic – it’s behavior is almost completely unpredictable (‘stochastic’), doesn’t 
return to the previous equilibrium, and in stead goes astray to what is called a 
strange attractor. If one were to try to simulate this, small differences of initial 
conditions would have big effect on the outcome (the so-called butterfly effect), 
but the now chaotic system still remains within certain boundaries. An example 
is the weather, where storm depressions are difficult to forecast, but remain 
within a storm-prone part of the atmosphere. Some chaos within limits is needed 
to obtain room for innovations. Catastrophe theory predicts that as adaptive 
tensions build up without adaptation of the system, the butterfly effect may 
cause a landslide when the time is ripe. Tension builds up until the resistance is 
broken. Only if the system succeeds early in passing on the external tension to 
its individual agents, so that they too feel an adaptive tension between the two 
critical values, such landslides can be prevented. The system can distribute its 
intelligence and simultaneously link it in new combinations according to the 
dynamic pressures from outside. Then it may hold requisite variety, meeting the 
variety of perturbations from outside by the variety of knowledge combinations 
from inside. 
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Only between the two critical values, ‘far from equilibrium’ (Prigogine & 
Stengers 1984), there is an emergent order, ‘at the edge of chaos’ (Kaufmann 
1993). Only in this situation, it may develop requisite variety and increase its 
negentropy (order, opposite of entropy) by creating new order as a dissipative 
structure. By doing that, it might out-compete existing structures in its environ-
ment, implying that these other systems are pushed over their second critical 
value. This is equivalent to creative destruction. On the other hand, in a highly 
competitive industry, competitors may co-evolve to become highly adaptable. 
McKelvey (2001): 
‘Employees in high-velocity firms in Silicon valley work routinely in an atmosphere 
of adaptive tension much higher than might ever appear in large dinosauric firms or 
government agencies’. 
Managing the attractors 
Attractors are the direction to development, for which the system is geared. 
Game theoretic processes lead co-evolution in this direction; the pressures on 
the system define the tradeoffs of the game, and thereby the attractor. If the 
pressures are low, it is a point attractor created by bureaucratic negative feed-
back. Strong visionary leaders function as such, and inhibit collective learning. 
As the pressure rises connective behavior may be rewarded as well, leading the 
system away from the point attractors to strange attractors, which may lead to a 
new equilibrium with new point attractors. In advance, the new equilibrium is 
not predictable, but it has certain knowable boundaries. These boundaries can be 
defined and constantly updated by a learning community, and communicated to 
the larger firm by strong leaders. McKelvey: 
‘The trick is the aim these strong leader types toward using point attractors that ‘drive’ the 
system toward reducing the Ts (SN: external tensions), but do not ‘define’ it in the com-
mand-and control ways that inhibit change.’ 
Such strong leaders may also be termed enablers, because they enable a learning 
process. They succeed in combining their legitimate position, based on their 
vision, with being connected to dissipative structures in their firm that constantly 
redefine vision and reward. As the time is ripe they adjust their point attractors. 
The time will be ripe quickly if the firm has more human and social capital. The 
enabler manages both at the same time, through point attractors (the legitimate 
position) and strange attractors (the aim of learning activities). This is similar to 
what Teisman (2005) terms double thinking. It also enables co-evolution of 
thinking in the firm with thinking in its environment. The firm has to react to 
what it sees happening in its environment, and for that it needs to be connected 
to its environment. If it is not, it will only be able to react to visible develop-
ments in the market, which might be too late. Such enablers can change the way 
ideas co-evolve; in other words, they change the selection mechanism for 
memes. If such enablers are successful, this behavior may be reinforced and 
managing change can become a successful meme. This may have happened in 
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Silicon Valley, and it depends on the benefits of fostering learning processes: 
how much human and social capital can develop? 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) writes: 
‘In a social context, it is the series of critical decisions each individual takes from several 
possible alternatives that may determine a particular life path for that individual. The al-
ternatives available, however, are constrained by the person’s current state and the state of 
the landscape the person occupies. Thus the emergent behavior of the person is not a mat-
ter of ‘chance’ but is the result of a person’s selection among a finite set of perceived 
choices; as well as the past choices made (the history) that have shaped that person’s life 
path. Once the decision is made, there is a historical dimension and subsequent evolution 
may depend on that critical choice; but before the decision is finalized, the alternatives are 
sources of innovation and diversification, since the opening up of possibilities endows the 
individual and the system with new solutions. When a social entity (individual, group, or-
ganization, industry, economy, country, etc) is faced with a constraint, it finds new ways 
of operating, because away-from-equilibrium (established norms) systems are forced to 
experiment and explore their space of possibilities, and this exploration helps them dis-
cover and create new patterns of relationships and different structures.’ 
Such a social entity can also be defined as an agent in a hierarchical organiza-
tion, like a government agency. McKelvey (2001) indicates that human and 
social capital holders (the agents) could choose to put their own interests ahead 
of that of shareholders, creating what is termed ‘slack’. He argues that managing 
the tensions and attractors right will help ensure that their selfish interests coin-
cide with that of shareholders. Obviously the limits of effectiveness still lie in 
the attainable levels of human and social capital. This view reduces the rational-
ity of focusing on efficiency, input versus achievement of fixed goals, if agents 
have to function in highly dynamic environments. The terms human and social 
capital can be seen as the capacity at all levels (including the human brain itself) 
of observing and passing on tensions, and allow ideas to emerge that might help 
relieve these tensions. 
Connectivity in large social systems 
Whereas McKelvey (2001) focuses on firms, this book is mainly aimed at much 
larger social units; composed subsystems. These have no hierarchy, other than a 
government that in theory has powers, but that can only act if there is a majority. 
However, the difference may not be that large. Like in firms, also in politics 
there are strong leaders, and they too can manage tensions. Only, the number of 
interdependent but perhaps weakly connected social groups involved is likely to 
be larger. Effective connecting behavior may then depend relatively more on 
mass communication than only on personal relationships. Tensions are less 
likely to be created through a hierarchical reward system, and more through 
pressures of a cultural and linguistic nature, that spread in discourses. That so-
cial process is also studied in communication sciences. Discourses in two related 
systems can become aligned in a process of co-evolution, by means of hyper-
incursion, i.e. implicit self-reference at next-order level. Leydesdorff (2005b): 
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‘The interaction between these two analytically different mechanisms of anticipation can 
be expected to organize stability in the historical manifestations of the strongly anticipa-
tory system. The latter can be expected to develop in terms of fluxes. Stabilization can 
also be considered as a resonance among two selecting subdynamics.’ 
A large strong anticipatory social system is thus theoretically possible, because 
hyper-incursion is possible: self-reference enables not only persons and firms 
but also societies to become aware of itself and its own future, and its options, 
and thereby create its own future. However, the question remains what conduct 
is required for hyper-incursion, whilst letting it be solidly founded on various 
observations of the real life world. 
Required competences 
The insights from complexity theory seem to help our thinking about managing 
co-evolution through understanding connecting behavior. Several competencies 
fitting complexity have been mentioned earlier, like Teisman’s (2005) idea of 
‘double thinking’, Senge’s (1990) ideas of (first order) ‘systems thinking’, Nale-
buff & Brandenburger’s (1996) idea of ‘coopetition’. Lissack & Roos’s (2000) 
idea of ‘coherence’ may be added, focusing on acting in a manner consistent 
with what a system ‘is’ in relation to the rest of the world (‘coherence: an 
alignment of context, viewpoint, purpose and action that enables further pur-
posive action’). Coherence perhaps comes one step closer to the idea of hyper-
incursiveness (Leydesdorff 2005b): if more would act coherently, the world 
would probably be a stronger anticipatory system. Several authors (e.g. Kingdon 
1995) emphasize the importance of moderators; under complex conditions the 
management of connections can be seen as a useful specialization. Moderators 
must apply double think, because they connect different subsystems whilst hav-
ing a position of their own. A moderator must be able to imagine how their con-
necting behavior can lead to results, also for him. To that aim, he can apply the 
ideas of McKelvey (2001) about the management of tension. This is related to 
the idea of second order systems thinking introduced by Leydesdorff (1997). 
Effective learning groups may assess whether a system is far from equilib-
rium and open for change. They can use mass events and publications for testing 
ideas, and see if these resonate. They should be aware of the cultural and game 
theoretic restrictions – for example, ideas should take the interests of many sub-
systems into consideration and define a perspective that can be accepted as in 
the common interest, creating a favorable context for breakthrough interven-
tions. The knowledge represented in networks should not only include the mar-
ket system, but also the political system. 
Epistemological implications 
Complexity theories have their implications for the nature of scientific knowl-
edge itself, since they become part of the system. The triple helix model in inno-
vation sciences illustrates this since science is one of the three strings of the 
helix. The science about scientific knowledge is called epistemology. Modern 
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epistemological views are excellently explained on the Principia Cybernetica 
Web (Heylighen 2003), of which I present the following excerpt: 
‘Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge. It attempts to answer 
the basic question: what distinguishes true (adequate) knowledge from false (inadequate) 
knowledge? Practically, this question translates into issues of scientific methodology: how 
can one develop theories or models that are better than competing theories?  
The first theories of knowledge stressed its absolute, permanent character, whereas the 
later theories put the emphasis on its relativity or situation-dependence, its continuous de-
velopment or evolution, and its active interference with the world and its subjects and ob-
jects. The whole trend moves from a static, passive view of knowledge towards a more 
and more adaptive and active one. 
A recent view is that of constructivism. It assumes that the subject of knowledge builds up 
all knowledge from scratch. There are no 'givens', neither objective empirical data or 
facts, nor inborn categories or cognitive structures. The idea of a correspondence or re-
flection of external reality is rejected. Because of this lacking connection between models 
and the things they represent, the danger with constructivism is that it may lead to relativ-
ism, to the idea that any model constructed by a subject is as good as any other and that 
there is no way to distinguish adequate or 'true' knowledge from inadequate or 'false' 
knowledge. This 'absolute relativism' is avoided by social constructivism, which sees con-
sensus between different subjects as the ultimate criterion to judge knowledge. 'Truth' or 
'reality' will be accorded only to those constructions on which most people of a social 
group agree. 
In these philosophies, knowledge is seen as largely independent of a hypothetical 'external 
reality' or environment. As the 'radical' constructivists Maturana and Varela argue, the 
nervous system of an organism cannot in any absolute way distinguish between a percep-
tion (caused by an external phenomenon) and a hallucination (a purely internal event). 
The only basic criterion is that different mental entities or processes within or between 
individuals should reach some kind of equilibrium. 
Though these constructivistic approaches put much more emphasis on the changing and 
relative character of knowledge, they are still absolutist in the primacy they give to either 
social consensus or internal coherence, and their description of construction processes is 
quite vague and incomplete. Different forms or evolutionary epistemology offer a more 
broad or synthetic outlook. Here it is assumed that the subject or group of subjects con-
structs knowledge in order to adapt to their environment in the broad sense. That 
construction is an on-going process at different levels, biological as well as psychological 
or social. Construction happens through blind variation of existing pieces of knowledge, 
and the selective retention of those new combinations that somehow contribute most to 
the survival and reproduction of the subject(s) within their given environment. Hence we 
see that the 'external world' again enters the picture, although no objective reflection or 
correspondence is assumed, only equilibrium between the products of internal variation 
and different (internal or external) selection criteria. Any form of absolutism or 
permanence has disappeared in this approach, but knowledge is basically still a passive 
instrument developed by organisms in order to help them in their quest for survival. 
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A most recent, and perhaps most radical approach, extends this evolutionary view in order 
to make knowledge actively pursue goals of its own. This approach, which as yet has not 
had the time to develop a proper epistemology, may be called memetics. It notes that 
knowledge can be transmitted from one subject to another, and thereby loses its depend-
ence on any single individual. A piece of knowledge that can be transmitted or replicated 
in such a way is called a 'meme'. The death of an individual carrying a certain meme now 
no longer implies the elimination of that piece of knowledge, as evolutionary epistemol-
ogy would assume. As long as a meme spreads more quickly to new carriers, than that its 
carriers die, the meme will proliferate, even though the knowledge it induces in any indi-
vidual carrier may be wholly inadequate and even dangerous to survival. In this view a 
piece of knowledge may be successful (in the sense that it is common or has many carri-
ers) even though its predictions may be totally wrong, as long as it is sufficiently 'con-
vincing' to new carriers. Here we see a picture where even the subject of knowledge has 
lost his primacy, and knowledge becomes a force of its own with proper goals and ways 
of developing itself. That this is realistic can be illustrated by the many superstitions, fads, 
and irrational beliefs that have spread over the globe, sometimes with a frightening speed. 
Like social constructivism, memetics attracts the attention to communication and social 
processes in the development of knowledge, but instead of seeing knowledge as con-
structed by the social system, it rather sees social systems as constructed by knowledge 
processes. Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members share the 
same meme. Even the concept of 'self', that which distinguishes a person as a individual, 
can be considered as a piece of knowledge, constructed through social processes, and 
hence a result of memetic evolution. From a constructivist approach, where knowledge is 
constructed by individuals or society, we have moved to a memetic approach, which sees 
society and even individuality as by-products constructed by an ongoing evolution of in-
dependent fragments of knowledge competing for domination. 
At this stage, the temptation would be strong to lapse into a purely anarchistic or relativis-
tic attitude, stating that 'anything goes', and that it would be impossible to formulate any 
reliable and general criteria to distinguish 'good' or adequate pieces of knowledge from 
bad or inadequate ones. Yet in most practical situations, our intuition does help us to dis-
tinguish perceptions from dreams or hallucinations, and unreliable predictions ('I am go-
ing to win the lottery') from reliable ones ('The sun will come up tomorrow morning'). 
And an evolutionary theory still assumes a natural selection that can be understood to a 
certain degree. Hence we may assume that it is possible to identify selection criteria, but 
one of the lessons of this historical overview will be that we should avoid to quickly for-
mulate one absolute criterion. Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and 
not even survivability, are sufficient to ground a theory of knowledge. At this stage we 
can only hope to find multiple, independent, and sometimes contradictory criteria, whose 
judgment may quickly become obsolete. Yet if we were to succeed in formulating these 
criteria clearly, within a simple and general conceptual framework, we would have an 
epistemology that synthesizes and extends all of the other philosophies.’ 
Thus, according to the Principia Cybernetic Web, a full memetics epistemology 
has not yet developed. Such an epistemology would be almost inseparable from 
complexity theory itself, because memes and meta-memes, including scientific 
 62 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
ideas, are emergent properties. A researcher studying knowledge production 
creates meta-memes, adding an extra recursive level, which is very individual – 
it is only shared with others if readers actually understand the book as intended, 
drawing lessons they actually use. The choice for this epistemology makes the 
researcher part of the system; he cannot validate the analyses made by the study 
object. Comparative, statistical research is difficult.  The plausibility of the rea-
soning has to be demonstrated by referring to complexity theory itself – self-
reference. Yet, if his theories become accepted in the system, they may create a 
deeper understanding of the learning processes in the composed subsystem and 
improve effectiveness of learning. More complex memes can be formed rein-
forcing the effectiveness and the learning process. Co-evolution between the 
practice of learning networks and thinking about learning networks may then 
occur. This is also the idea of modern innovation sciences (e.g. Smits & 
Kuhlmann, 2004). 
Memes develop at the edge of chaos in social systems far from equilibrium, 
where entropy may diminish and therefore complexity may grow under adaptive 
tension. Finding a measure for this adaptive tension and that entropy is the chal-
lenge, because that would create deep understanding. Leydesdorff (2005a): 
‘(…) a new mode of knowledge production can increasingly be generated. The local reso-
nances compete at a next-order systems level. In order to study this selection, however, 
this ‘virtual’ (next-order) system has first to be hypothesized and specified.’ (…) ‘Since 
the reflexive selection mechanisms of cultural evolution cannot be identified by unmedi-
ated observation, the neo-evolutionary analysis (SN: this is the name Leydesdorff gives to 
this kind of analysis) has to begin with the specification of a hypothesis. ‘What’ does one 
expect to be communicated and why? The study of how this communication is institution-
ally arranged (and therefore measurable, in principle) is then a question of empirical de-
sign.’ 
2.4 Theories about trust 
Trust has been identified as important by several complexity authors (e.g. Bran-
denburger & Nalebuff 1996; Leydesdorff 2005b). It is therefore worthwhile to 
summarize theories on trust, which helps in developing operational research 
questions. 
Trust as a characteristic of conduct in social systems 
I build this section mainly on B. Nooteboom (2002) and Mosch & Verhoeven 
(2003) who present overviews of trust theories. Trust shows as a characteristic 
of conduct in the relationship between social subsystems, at the lowest level 
individual people. These may depend on each other to achieve mutual benefits. 
If someone acts for the joint benefit, he anticipates getting something in return 
from the other. Since he cannot control the other he takes the risk that the other 
defects (opportunistic behavior). One definition is therefore: ‘trust is a bet about 
future contingent actions of others’ (Sztompa 1999). The object of trust can be a 
person or any social group that is perceived as a unity in terms of conduct. One 
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may trust organizations or complete subsystems. For example, a consumer may 
have trust in the economic performance of a country. The object of trust could 
also be a physical system, e.g. trust in a stable climate. 
Zucker (1986) has proposed three types of trust: process-based, institutions-
based and characteristics-based trust. Process-based trust is created in the per-
sonal experiences between people. It has to be continuously re-earned in interac-
tion. Laws and general practices will not change so easily and therefore create 
institutions-based trust. For example, trust that inflation will be kept under con-
trol. Characteristics-based (or values-based) trust is the more subconscious kind 
of trust. For example, trust that people are intrinsically trustworthy. There might 
be a hierarchy: process-based trust may only develop if a person gives the proc-
ess a chance, which may depend on his pre-existing values-based and institu-
tions-based trust. 
Trust mechanisms 
In order to understand and manage trust, we need an understanding of trust 
mechanisms. Trust mechanisms are defined as: ‘frequently occurring causal 
patterns that offer a plausible explanation for emergence and continuation of 
trust in bilateral and collective inter-human relations’ (Hemerijck 2002, quoted 
in Mosch & Verhoeven 2003). 
In a situation of interdependency, interactions may emerge slowly and trust 
may gradually develop. When cooperation goes well trust may increase. Trust is 
therefore caused by as well as the cause of successful cooperation without op-
portunistic defection. The idea that trust develops through positive feedback 
loops and that it has several embedded levels, is generally supported. Perceived 
in that way, trust becomes a characteristic of social systems. Different levels of 
trust are patterns that emerge at different embedded system levels. Consciously 
managing trust is therefore an application of second order systems thinking, as 
proposed by Leydesdorff (1997). 
Trust is based on continuous feedback because it builds on the capacity to 
abstain from defection for the common good on the longer term. If there is trust, 
a necessary resource (such as time before the next elections) may become de-
pleted, and an incident may be enough to enter a steep negative spiral again. The 
so-called Dutch ‘polder model’ illustrates this point (see 1.6). 
Trust in nested subsystems 
At the system level such trust mechanisms create several ‘layers’, with a main 
distinction between trust localized in small groups of acquainted people, embed-
ded in the general culture of trust in the larger system (e.g., Moody & White 
2000). In small groups there are small-scale dynamics of trust development, and 
in bigger groups there can be large-scale changes (which may sometimes move 
very quickly as well). Layers of trust can be, for example (in order of em-
beddedness:) genetic development of the human race where people depended on 
each other in the struggle for life, deeper cultural characteristics (social capital), 
childhood development where children depend on their family for survival but 
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when less is at stake also learn from their siblings not to trust blindly, coopera-
tion in a production process where added value is created in production and 
consumption chains, and finally cooperation in complex innovations. 
What happens at the more embedded levels depends on the context formed 
by the less embedded levels. In the Dutch context, the polder model could 
emerge. Ultimately physical conditions may be of influence like joint battle 
against water (Dutch), little interdependency due to mountainous or desert con-
ditions, need for joint planning due to long winter season, etc. 
Table 3. Forms of trust (Nooteboom 2002) 
Trust in an actor as such (behavioral trust) 
Trust in means and inputs the actor whom you trust can dispose of (material trust) 
Trust the competences of an actor (skill, languages, knowledge, ..) (competence trust) 
Trust in the aims of an actor in several degrees (intentional trust) 
Trust in outside enablers (conditional trust) 
Trust in role models or methods that have been successful in the past (exemplar trust) 
Trust in the information on which we base our trust (information trust) 
In a system of positive feedback the question becomes which condition limits 
growth of trust (Senge 1990). A distinction must be made between the factors on 
which the agents base their decisions, which may be crude rules of thumb (trust 
heuristics), and actual trustworthiness in terms of living up to created expecta-
tions. B. Nooteboom (2002: 50) proposes several semi-conscious ‘forms of 
trust’ he has found in the trust literature, which are listed in Table 3. The inter-
play of these factors can be quite complex, especially because different actors 
may not apply the same trust heuristics and therefore misunderstandings may 
arise. Trust is based on perception of trustworthiness. In a healthy relationship 
where opportunities for opportunisms are frequent, the trustworthiness of the 
other may be constantly re-evaluated. Bounded rationality and intrinsic uncer-
tainty reduce possibilities for risk calculation, and lead to development of rules 
of behavior (heuristics) for control of trustworthiness. Heuristics develop as 
rational behavior under conditions of bounded rationality, with deeper trust 
mechanisms levels as subconscious drivers or motives. Relational risk is ‘gov-
ernanced’ by taking small joint steps toward more intensive cooperation. Each 
step is a ‘satisficing round’ where actors give just enough information to make a 
next step (cf. ex post satisficing, Teisman 1992). 
External trust and internal trust 
The website of the T3 group in Rome (T3 stands for trust, theory, technology) 
provides an interesting section on trust theories, which has a section that I be-
lieve is in particular relevant, about external trust and internal trust: 
‘In order to decide to rely on Y, the trusting agent X must trust the environment too, or in 
other words X needs to have positive expectations about the external conditions that 
  
 Theoretical Notions of Complexity  65
might influence Y's actions. In fact, the four basic beliefs of trust (competence, disposi-
tion, dependence, fulfillment) could be fulfilled but nonetheless trust may vanish because 
of hostile external conditions. On the contrary, these conditions might be so favorable that 
even if Y is able only to a limited extent, X could equally decide to trust him because the 
environment is extremely facilitating.’ (From: http://www.istc.cnr.it/ 
T3/trust/pages/internalexternal.html) 
Whereas the four basic beliefs of trust as T3 defines it are in line with B. Noote-
boom’s overview, the idea of external trust seems especially relevant to adaptive 
networks; these have no power by definition and therefore depend on the force 
of arguments. They should trust that power networks are open to these argu-
ments. If the power context is favorable, adaptive networks might depend less 
on internal trust to ‘survive’. 
Significance of trust for change management 
B. Nooteboom (2002) has remarked that trust is especially important for groups 
aiming at radical innovations. Scharpf (1997) has described the capacity of 
complex problems solving as a competence, of which trust formation is an im-
portant element. Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) have indicated the importance of 
trust in relation to organizational learning, and Lester and Piore (2005) in rela-
tion to management of innovations. Lester & Piore argue, for example, that em-
phasis on expanding the reach of market competition risks choking off the econ-
omy’s vital  ‘public spaces’, which are invaluable since here ideas from different 
subsystems can merge. Indirectly they indicate that due to a weak general under-
standing of the innovation process there is insufficient trust that such spaces are 
effective. These authors give little advice on achieving trust. The implication of 
their inferences is nonetheless that trust is an enabling factor for successful 
change management, and may to that end itself be ‘managed’. According to 
systems thinking, the further development of trust may depend on a limiting 
condition, perhaps one of the factors in Table 3. A change manager may then try 
to create a positive spiral of trust by applying a lever; a relatively small interven-
tion, but still creating a sequence of events (Senge 1990). Learning networks, 
aware that a lack of trust limits progress, can try to identify that limiting factor 
and to find such a lever. 
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3 A method of complexity research 
Yet in most practical situations our intuition does help us to distinguish perceptions from 
dreams and hallucinations (Francis Heylighen) 
The overview of theories in chapter 2 provides various disciplinary ways of 
analyzing co-evolution and coopetition, where content, structure, process, con-
duct and reward gradually change, and a complex societal system may develop a 
degree of adaptability. In different disciplines, trust is believed to be an impor-
tant variable that enables tensions to become creative, facilitating co-evolution 
and increasing adaptability. The reasoning is as follows: wicked problems ask 
for a complex approach; this complex approach may be observed in what I de-
fine as adaptive networks that facilitate complex ideas which can only emerge in 
co-evolution, but the implementation of these ideas in the real world depends on 
power networks. Whereas power networks depend on wide support for the indi-
vidual (trust in traditional leadership), adaptive networks depend on the trust in 
their own common capacity to make their ideas spread over power networks 
(trust in connecting capacities). The understanding of this second kind of trust is 
key to managerial approaches to increase the success of adaptive networks. Ex-
ternal trust, internal trust and foresight, three elements I wrote in the introduc-
tion, are considered relevant, but have not yet been conceptualized. The theory 
of coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff 1996) focuses mainly on game theo-
retic analysis in inter-firm relations, rather than composed subsystems. 
In the present chapter I make this theory operational for analyzing empirical 
cases through observable characteristics of the themes content, structure, proc-
ess, conduct and reward. This forms the ‘dictionary’ of analysis (see also the 
glossary). Then, I re-order this into answerable research questions about co-
evolution and coopetition. This forms the ‘grammar’ of analysis, because it pro-
vides structure in the writing. Together, they form the language, the theoretical 
content of this book. 
3.1 Content: ideas 
The nature of content 
Content is composed of units: the views, ideas, discourses or knowledge that 
emerges and is passed around in a social subsystem. I take position for the me-
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metics view (see Page 59), in which a social subsystem constructs memes 
(views, ideas) about itself, its parts and the world. This world includes other 
subsystems it tries to influence. The link between worldview and conduct of a 
person or subsystem in interactions is defined as rationality. When asked, a sub-
system is assumed to present its rationality. There can be a difference between 
the rationality as it sees it and the rationality as it tells it, since it may not be 
trustworthy. Rationalities should therefore be verified from different sources 
(triangulation). Hereafter, I normally use the term idea or discourse (as a shared 
set of ideas). A subsystem can pass ideas on to itself. It may also pass ideas on 
to the wider subsystem it connects, especially if communications are amplified 
in positive feedback processes (resonance). Different subsystems may produce 
different ideas, and these may compete for the attention of higher-order subsys-
tems. 
The study of how ideas develop and survive in the social jungle also creates 
ideas– ideas about ideas, or meta-ideas. This book studies how meta-ideas de-
velop and is therefore itself a form of content at meta-meta-level. Hopefully the 
ideas in this book will fly about to influence many, intentionally creating a lan-
guage to reward connecting behavior, and in that way contribute to sustainable 
development. Content may or may not lead to different structures, processes, 
conduct and reward. Because this book is complex, it seems unlikely that many 
whose business it is to shape the world, disposing of the resources to put levers 
in place, will share it – but if it does, a next order subsystem may be created. 
Whilst applying a lever is defined as conduct (hereafter), the imagining of 
possible conduct is content. I distinguish two kinds of levers (see Figure 6). The 
first, and most obvious, kind of lever is to put in place market interventions that 
have a structuring effect on market processes, which affects the adaptive ten-
sions in the societal system, which again causes new tensions and opportunities 
for goal-seeking behavior. Examples of interventions that in some degree had 
this rationale are Impact Assessment, pollution levies, and command-and–
control systems that are not based on knowledge about the feasibility of allow-
able alternatives. Examples of the latter are the European Directives on air qual-
ity, water quality and protection of natural habitats. The idea was, more or less 
implicitly, that putting restrictions on our development will force developers to 
seek alternatives. The second kind of lever is strategic communication where a 
member of a power network communicates about his intentions. This may pro-
voke reactions and strategic behavior of the rest of the power network, but more 
importantly through the media a big audience can be reached and the communi-
cation, if cleverly designed by an adaptive network, can have far reaching ef-
fects on behavior in the societal system. 
Meta-ideas may exist only in the head of an observer, or may be shared with 
others in a higher order (reflexive) process. According to the Law of Requisite 
Variety, reflexivity is needed for adaptability, because a subsystem should 
match the complexity of its environment if it is adaptive. If a subsystem depends 
on many other subsystems, it needs to create complex ideas to be adaptable. 
However, all members need not cognitively share the full complexity of these 
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ideas – the connecting pattern may be there, like an emergent property of the 
whole subsystem, perhaps unwittingly formed through the individual behavior 
of its agents (like an ant colony can be more intelligent that its ants, or a brain is 
more intelligent than its neurons). The pattern is the complex, evolving idea. 
Such an idea then can be reconstructed by observing behavior of many nodes in 
the network, and their interactions. If the pattern is observed, a next order idea 
forms, and if it is shared it may enable to adjust the pattern to become one de-
gree more adaptable. 
Figure 6. Content: thinking about conduct in a part of the Dutch government  
(based on an unpublished report) 
Market interventions (carrot, stick and preach) may be used as levers of the first type that 
intervene in market processes, whilst social interventions (setting the agenda, joint reflection 
and adaptive) may be used as levers of the second type that intervene in social processes to 
induce co-evolution. 
 
If meta-ideas emerge, the involved agents are capable of influencing the devel-
opment of lower-order ideas; i.e. the selection mechanism for ideas is adjusted. I 
like to use the word natural selection, comparing the selection of ideas (memes) 
in a social system with the selection of genes in an ecosystem. Which meta-ideas 
resonate in the higher-order system and become amplified, at the cost of other 
ideas, depends on a selection mechanism at the higher-order level, and this de-
pends on the conduct of the agents. Successful ideas consolidate themselves, and 
Develop  
yourself 
Carrot, stick or  
preach 
Setting the  
agenda 
Joint reflection Adaptive 
governance 
Adaptive governance is seeking new goals to adjust the style to  circumstances. 
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the subsystem that produces them. If subsystems are not successful, their ideas 
evaporate, and they dissolve. 
Observing content 
Ideas as such are not observable; an observer needs to interpret them from the 
words and actions of people who (as he might hypothesize) belong to a subsys-
tem. If people speak the same language and say they have mutual understanding 
about the world, they are assumed to share ideas. (However, they may not base 
similar conduct on these ideas). Higher order ideas consist of ideas about lower 
order ideas that are produced by lower order subsystems. The ideas should be 
identifiable at each system level and be meaningful for the participants, even if 
not one of them sees the whole picture at lower level. 
3.2 Structure: who does what 
Structure as idée fixe (literally) or self-fulfilling prophecy 
When people make choices, they take the perceptions they have of the structure 
of society – of who does what - into consideration. The assumption in complex-
ity theory is that a valid generalization of who does what is possible, and it is 
defined as structure. Whereas structure may exist only as ideas in our mind, we 
assume that a real structure exists, simply because we all have the same structure 
in mind – and interact accordingly. It is important to see the structure as it really 
is produced by interactions, because it, and the conduct of its parts, determines 
how other ideas are passed on, and therefore how the structure itself will de-
velop under the influence of these ideas. 
The structure consists of social subsystems that consist of agents (or nodes) 
and a connecting pattern – a generalized set of interactions between the agents. 
An agent can be a subsystem that acts as a whole, or a person (in this text I often 
refer to persons where I also could have written the more general ‘agents’). Any 
structure is itself a subsystem of something bigger. A hierarchical organization 
is full of power networks (nested subsystems). A social subsystem is also con-
nected to the physical world, the ecosystem and the market system. Market sys-
tems and ecosystems also have a structure; it may, for example, be divided into 
interrelated systems of food production, mobility and housing.  Each market 
system has a set of associated social subsystems – organizations, which may be 
divided into domains. A market system and associated social subsystems may be 
termed composed subsystem. A hierarchical organization may be part of one 
domain (like a university is a research institute), but may also incorporate differ-
ent domains (like a ministry of transport may have an environmental department 
which is closely associated with an environmental ministry).  
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Table 4. Structure of a composed subsystem 
Explication: A composed subsystem is a societal system, like in this case a mobility system in 
one metropolitan area. Such a mobility system itself is also a subsystem of still larger scale 
composed subsystems. The table includes hierarchical organizations. One hierarchical organi-
zation might include several domains and / or components. Each subsystem, including people, 
may show complex behavior by interrelating with other subsystems at different levels. People 
can be strongly embedded in departments where they are on the payroll, but they can also be 
less dependent consultants to the cooperation at higher subsystem levels. The latter is only 
possible if they are rewarded for that, i.e. the hierarchical organizations must be prepared to 
cooperate, which entails increasingly complex behavior. 
Domains Components 
(Inter)national 
Government 
Metropolitan 
government 
Research 
Institutes 
Business Civil 
society 
Public transport 
providers 
 
    
Commuters      
Environmental 
policies 
 
    
Freight trans-
portation com-
panies 
 
    
Manufacturing 
Industries 
 
    
 
A composed subsystem is governed by its structure, where different interests 
meet in a political arena. The different components are defined as the groups of 
subsystems in the composed subsystem that each represents a different interest. 
Table 4 gives an idea of the composition of a generalized metropolitan mobility 
system. 
Structure as analysis tool for connecting behavior 
If agents have the intention to develop new ideas about desirable futures of the 
composed subsystem, in order to making it more adaptable to changing circum-
stances, they have to allow for the interdependencies between its components. 
To intentionally develop ideas in co-evolution between different components, 
they need to develop an accurate image of its structure. They should not only 
focus on the structure of its interactions in the market, but also on its power 
networks, because the latter enable to reach a large audience with their ideas, 
and to get feedback and support from many (a requirement for market interven-
tions). Power networks may be complex because many organizations are not 
Organization with 
departments 
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dedicated towards one composed subsystem only. Administrative boundaries 
cross the boundaries of market systems. Businesses operate in different markets. 
Political leaders and managers often have little responsibility for many systems, 
whilst nobody has final responsibility. Moreover, due to political developments 
the attitude of key players in power networks may quickly change. 
 
Power networks and adaptive networks 
Agents may simultaneously belong to several social subsystems. One such 
subsystem can be a power network, where behavior is aimed at (getting reward 
for) achieving public agendas and striving for promised goals. Interaction will 
be of the accounting type. However, this does not exclude that the same group 
can also deploy in goal-seeking interactions for the common benefit. This 
network then forms two seemingly incompatible structures. However, only the 
one with goal-seeking interactions, the adaptive network, is a higher order 
structure in the sense that it seeks meta-ideas with the aim of co-evolution. 
A higher-order structure emerges if agents from different, but interdependent 
subsystems (i.e. belonging to one composed subsystem) form a new subsystem 
without compromising the original subsystems. If agents become dependent on 
the new subsystem, it is not a higher order system but it simply adds more com-
plexity to the power network of the composed system. It becomes a competitor 
to the pre-existing power network, rather than connector. The agents therefore 
need to participate in two connecting interaction patterns: one at each level; one 
for ideas and one for meta-ideas. The ideas at the higher level influence the de-
velopment of ideas at the lower level – a mechanism for natural selection of 
ideas, and the result is assumed to be more likely to be in the interest of the 
higher order subsystem, and therefore also in the (long term) interest of its parts. 
The structures that produce such meta-ideas are adaptive networks. 
Observing structure 
Structure can be observed through the ideas agents have about it. If many agents 
share ideas these are more likely to be accurate. Power networks, consisting of 
subsystems that can be identified and classified along the lines of Table 4, are 
relatively easy to observe, because their leaders, with their ideas, are widely 
recognized. Adaptive networks are obscure, since their interaction patterns are 
by definition only observable to the directly involved agents. (If others can see 
them as well, their ideas have already penetrated the agenda in a power net-
work.)  
An adaptive network includes members from power networks, who are will-
ing to separate power interactions from learning interactions, and to use the 
tension between these two creatively. Learning interactions are reflexive, about 
the composed subsystem as a whole. However, the idea an adaptive network has 
about its own position in the structure is observable through interviews (‘In 
which subsystems do you have influence and knowledge?’ ‘How are these sub-
systems interdependent?’ ‘Where are your blind spots?’ – the latter may seem a 
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paradoxical question, but adaptive networks may have the feeling that there is 
some component or domain in their composed subsystem where they don’t have 
enough knowledge or influence). An adaptive network should be able to identify 
itself (its composition), the tensions in power networks to which it is attracted, 
and how it separates the process of the usual power games from their learning 
interactions. Its existence is finally demonstrated through the innovative ideas it 
proposes to power networks. It they are successful, someone in the power net-
work uses the proposition to intervene in the power arena, by making transpar-
ent statements about his own future conduct. 
Figure 7. Observing adaptive networks 
proposition 
Power network 
(visible for  
outsiders) 
Adaptive networks 
(only visible  
for insiders) 
Mental or 
physical  
separation 
intervention 
Co - evolution 
Learning, 
trusting 
Probing 
Creating 
expectations 
 
3.3 Process: collective conduct in development rounds 
Defining development 
Social subsystems are, I assume, living structures. In interaction with their social 
and physical environment, its agents continually interact, reproducing the sub-
system. However, interactions are influenced by ideas, and as ideas may evolve, 
so may interaction patterns, and therefore the subsystems that carry them may 
evolve. This evolution process is termed development. The pace of development 
may be incremental (linear), or fast (non-linear). Involved agents may observe a 
fast change as a development round, and may be able to give a consistent ac-
count of the nature of the change. Development rounds can also be seen as 
changes of the public agenda at some level of composed subsystems. If one city 
politician decides to support investigating the feasibility of a metro system, this 
can locally be seen as a breakthrough. If the city council decides to build it, it is 
another breakthrough. If it is the first of its kind, other cities may copy the sys-
tem and it may break through in a larger metropolitan area, where it may replace 
other public transport systems. It all may start as an idea of an architect who 
asks his superior resources to develop the idea; these are all breakthroughs at 
different scales. 
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I assume that the development of a subsystem depends on the external dynamics 
(the changing circumstances) as well as on its internal dynamics (resulting in its 
conduct as a whole). If external conditions change, the subsystem may adapt or 
not. If adaptability is high, the subsystem has high interconnectivity, i.e. many 
participate in adaptive networks, as at the edge of chaos new order is created 
(e.g. Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). In that case agents are prepared to suspend the 
short-term reward that they are used to receive for routine behavior, and develop 
shared perceptions of changes in behavior required to adapt. In that way, they 
try to influence development, steering it in a different direction by means of a 
lever, a small intervention that requires little power (from the side of the adap-
tive network) or political risk (from the side of the power network), but leading 
to co-evolution in power networks and ultimately in the composed system. If 
they don’t succeed, a crisis may emerge (which is a different type of develop-
ment round). I assume that development, in the market as well as in the world of 
ideas, shows spiral dynamics, depending on processes of negative or positive 
feedback, and a lever may reverse a process in a desired direction, like the pro-
verbial butterfly in Rio may cause a storm in Texas. 
Trust 
Connecting behavior requires suspending routine reward and connecting with 
other agents, influencing the development of ideas. I assume this depends on 
trust that reward will come, which again depends on trust in persons or subsys-
tems and their individual and common capabilities. I assume that trust elements 
are the indicators an agent uses to make a decision about behavior with uncer-
tain effects. How an agent interprets an indicator depends on his personal con-
duct, but this also depends on the conduct of others. Each element, as it is inter-
preted, can contribute to either an upward or a downward spiral of trust in the 
subsystem, depending on whether there is enough of it. If one of these elements 
stops giving positive feedback (e.g. doubt about someone’s intentions) it may 
meet a limiting condition and the relationship may not develop further or tumble 
into a downward spiral of trust. 
I propose trust elements, which B. Nooteboom (2002: p 50) has found in the 
literature (see 2.4). My first distinction is between internal trust and external 
trust. Agents in adaptive networks should in the first place trust the other mem-
bers of the network (internal trust). In the second place they should trust that 
they can get through to power networks to some extent (external trust). Internal 
trust, trust in the network’s own abilities, is divided into two components. The 
first is intentions: Do all believe in the same objective at higher-order level? Do 
all want to contribute to it? Will no one betray the others by exposing common 
ideas prematurely so an effective counter-campaign can be set-up and the idea 
will remain unacceptable for a long time? The critical characteristic of inten-
tional trust is that all in the group should trust all others, because one ‘traitor’ 
may ruin the process. The second component is competences: the group must 
believe that it has not only the will but also the capacity to achieve change at the 
higher-order level, given open minded power networks. The critical characteris-
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tic here is that all should believe that enough competencies are present in the 
group, but not necessarily in each person. 
External trust is defined as the belief that power networks have an open mind 
toward a certain kind of proposals for change, and want to support those, for 
example by changing their communications in public, enabling feedback and a 
wider learning process. Will political circumstances remain favorable? Will 
people with high positions be able to remain interested to link to the process and 
to enable it, or will they focus on other things, perhaps forced by the circum-
stances? Will actions be rewarded? The fundamental difference between internal 
trust and external trust is that the group can influence internal trust by means of 
its intentional interactions, whereas external trust depends on the larger political 
process, which by definition they cannot influence. They should simply trust 
that circumstances remain, or will be, favorable. This analytical difference 
seems important to explain the life story of adaptive networks – building the 
team whilst being blind to context changes is a risk, but the reverse doesn’t cre-
ate a team in the first place. 
Foresight 
I assume that a process may lead to more collective foresight (or rationality): the 
capacity to anticipate changes in the wider subsystem and possible effects of 
own actions. I assume that it helps if an adaptive network trusts that it has, or 
can develop, collective foresight. It is acting with some intention or aim, albeit 
unspecific and long-term. Foresight serves to somehow visualize how connect-
ing behavior, given enough trust, may lead to that aim. Foresight is therefore a 
source of competence trust. Because it can develop in the process it enables, is 
also a product of competence trust. It is also a (complex, perhaps intuitive) 
meta-idea that gives direction to connecting behavior at the level of lower order 
ideas, thereby inducing a co-evolution. 
Taking wicked problems and complexity theory as point of departure, the 
real potential effectiveness of an adaptive network depends on whether it takes 
into account the lessons of complexity theory. Therefore, under complex cir-
cumstances, the group needs to assess what conduct increases the chance of 
becoming a proverbial butterfly. Such butterflies are difficult to identify in hind-
sight, and therefore such behavior may be less likely to be rewarded afterwards. 
Nonetheless, assuming there is a mechanism for reward of thinking and acting 
along the lines of complexity theory in the common interest of a large group, the 
question becomes how an adaptive network can do that. How should they ana-
lyze their own conduct? Only by reflecting on how the group might create im-
pact, making use of foresight, the group becomes a higher order subsystem. 
The term ‘sense of urgency’ in this interpretation is part of foresight. If peo-
ple tell each other that there is urgency, they refer to the impressions that have 
many people in relevant subsystems think and speak about certain wicked prob-
lems that need addressing. That perception may be part of their assessment that 
the time is ripe for change. In that sense, foresight is similar to trusting on your 
senses. 
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Observing process 
I will study the empirical research object by describing its development by 
means of reconstruction of development rounds. These rounds emerge from the 
descriptions, in hindsight, of participants from the different involved subsys-
tems. By first reconstructing the major development rounds, and then recon-
structing the smaller development rounds that prepared for the larger ones, I can 
get closer to the proverbial butterfly – the one connecting action that resonated 
throughout the larger system and contributed to creating a series of ever-greater 
breakthroughs. A small breakthrough may form a different communication in a 
power network, about new action. That new action could be a lever for different 
interaction patterns and ultimately breakthroughs in the market. 
Realistically, that butterfly or that lever may not be observable, but I will try 
to reconstruct how groups in influential processes displayed connecting behav-
ior, imagining how they could become a butterfly. I will reconstruct their com-
mon objective, their trust and their foresight. I will try to reconstruct the process 
of positive and negative feedback that led to increased trust and foresight, and 
therefore to co-evolution, by asking the views of participants about enabling 
conditions. I will look especially for elements of trust and foresight that seem 
important from the angle of complexity theory, in order to see if respondents are 
aware of these elements, used and improved them. First I ask participants how 
they envisaged creating a joint impact. This would reveal that they have a joint 
language for systems thinking. They should be able to analyze their situation in 
terms of subsystems and power networks. From a higher-order perspective they 
should discuss possible action in lower-order subsystems, looking for levers to 
bring the social context into a new equilibrium, i.e. creating a spiral in a desired 
direction. They should put their trust in the same exemplars: stories about how 
other groups, people or interventions have created leverage in similar situations. 
One group member may also himself, through his conduct, be a role model to 
the rest of the group. Finally, as the weak point in previous sustainability pro-
jects has been the link to power networks, I will evaluate the way these groups 
thought about influencing power. Did they develop personal relations with 
power networks needed to achieve the next level breakthrough – possibly with 
the aim of achieving breakthroughs at yet higher management levels?  
3.4 Conduct: individual behavior to build tension 
Processes in subsystems are shaped by the conduct of their agents, which in-
cludes their reaction to signals from outside. Human agents have the option to 
give attention to higher-order adaptation (if they can see how to do that). The 
ability of seeing how, i.e. foresight, may develop in co-evolution. However, in a 
power context co-evolution only occurs if individuals take the initiative without 
guarantee of reward. Connecting behavior, transformative leadership, is re-
quired. One individual doesn’t have enough knowledge or influence to create 
ideas that break through, and therefore he must make other people, with com-
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plementary knowledge or influence, enthusiastic for a common cause, and start 
with creating trust and foresight. 
If such a leader succeeds in drawing a perspective that other people believe, 
the process may gain momentum. That perspective is seen as an opportunity for 
developing proposals that will be accepted by power networks. In other words, 
such a leader should make the tension between the existing situation and oppor-
tunities visible to others, so that in a creative process through foresight they can 
combine their knowledge, and develop and test ideas. Opportunities should after 
a while be communicable to decision-makers who in small steps can change 
their communication, testing how the subsystem at large reacts. 
Conduct is important, because tensions could also be interpreted as impossi-
ble to bridge, and trust may spiral downwards, which makes the tension even 
more destructive. Connecting behavior therefore is defined as taking the initia-
tive of making tension between different subsystems visible to others, and lead-
ing the road to proposals that bridge the tension. First, few can see that road, 
later and if successful, many can see it and it may break through in physical 
reality. Agents may simultaneously belong to several social subsystems, which 
may compete for their attention. 
Observing connecting conduct 
Conduct can be observed by asking participants for which ideas they were en-
thusiastic, who else were enthusiastic, and where that enthusiasm started. How 
did they deal with the involved risks? Did they consciously provide others with 
opportunities, and did they reward them for their good efforts? 
3.5 Reward: the drivers of change 
Why would anyone invest in creating enthusiasm for adaptive networks? Even if 
someone succeeds in becoming the proverbial butterfly causing a storm, few 
people will be able to reconstruct this. Whilst at a personal level there may be 
several motives, for the sake of the argument I assume that there is some kind of 
reward if others recognize that the effort realistically may be expected to create 
impact in the wider world of ideas and in the real life world. If others can recog-
nize such behavior, and if they reward it, it may also improve and disperse 
through a comparative advantage over objectives-following or interests-
protecting behavior. The question of reward is therefore important in the study 
of co-evolution. 
Enthusiasm may be created by a shared objective (a dream that is conta-
gious), but in order to influence power networks, this dream must be realistic. 
Dreams must be close to what power networks think their supporters will sup-
port or at least accept. If that really happens, then the power networks as well as 
the adaptive networks that give them advice are rewarded. Realistic foresight 
may be shaped along the lines of complexity theories, but that is no guarantee 
that power networks will appreciate it. Systems thinking as such should first 
spread in the system before people can or will reward other people for it. 
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Connecting behavior may also evolve if it is rewarded in other ways, for exam-
ple because there somehow is a correlation between connecting behavior and 
trustworthy behavior. Loyalty may be rewarded in hierarchical organizations, 
and therefore automatically, connecting behavior would also be rewarded. In 
such a case, connecting behavior would not have to be based on foresight. On 
the other hand, power networks are sensitive to political risk. If the adaptive 
network builds a case and convinces the power network that risk is low, and 
potential benefit high, reward depends on what actually happens. These chances 
depend on realistic foresight. 
I assume that reward is crucial in the spiral dynamics of trust development – 
to understand how trust develops in interaction, it should be understood how 
trusting behavior (connecting behavior) is rewarded, or how people believe it is 
rewarded. If a next step in trusting behavior, required to endeavor in new enter-
prises, is not rewarded, trust is unlikely to grow. It then meets a limiting condi-
tion. This may also take away hope of getting further to success, and the adap-
tive network may then dissolve. After a while, even intentional trust may disap-
pear. 
Observing reward 
If connecting behavior is rewarded, the power networks should show through 
their behavior (as interpreted by adaptive networks) that they are open for a 
certain kind of proposals (i.e. giving a broad rather than specific objective), and 
that they want to share in the political risk of either not being productive or tak-
ing initiatives that are not immediately rewarded in the political arena. They 
should be perceived to understand and reward such proposals, and also the rea-
soning behind it, which is based on systems thinking. Respondents may indicate 
that they had legitimized their behavior, implying that they expected at least 
acceptance of the effort and an open ear for outcomes. 
3.6 Tension, interconnectivity and co-evolution 
If observations about the themes above are available, it should be possible to 
assess in some degree how tensions are shaped in society in power networks and 
how (depending on the human factor; i.e. the presence of skilled change manag-
ers) adaptive networks develop. This gives an impression of how interconnectiv-
ity develops. In which degree is the nature of social dilemmas related to bifurca-
tions shared and discussed under higher-order tensions, and the degree in which 
this discussion leads to evolution of higher-order social tensions, providing new 
opportunities for adaptive networks to address these problems. These adaptive 
networks are so to speak invited to emerge and to develop ideas in co-evolution. 
Co-evolution is manifest if the adaptive network develops complex ideas that 
influence the public agenda and, in the perception of the power network, dimin-
ish some of the tension. As indicated, I assume that this requires coopetition: 
trust and foresight. 
This should be observable through the tensions individuals observe, feel or 
consciously create in their own context, and the degree in which they have a 
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conscious explanation of this tension, the explanation for how this tension de-
velops under influence of ideas, and the degree in which this explanation is 
shared with others. This is the result of a positive spiral of trust and common 
rationality based on foresight. This depends on people who create enthusiasm 
and who make a common analysis of the appropriate social tensions. By manag-
ing these tensions appropriately, and given appropriate conditions, they can push 
the composed subsystem in a positive spiral, leading to more interconnectivity. 
Complex ideas may travel quickly through higher-level subsystems based on 
joint foresight. In that way, the subsystem becomes more flexible and more 
adaptable to changing circumstances. The limit might be set by the boundaries 
to the complexity of ideas that can be hold in the individual mind. 
3.7 Research questions 
The key research question is: ‘How can new ideas about sustainable develop-
ment be widely adopted, and how can this be evaluated in the case of transition 
management?’ This key question is split in partial questions that I answer chap-
ter-by-chapter. Chapters 4 through 6 are purely empirical chapters, and chapter 7 
is an interpretation and generalization of the empirical findings, with the aim of 
contributing to new theory. 
Table 5. Summary of observable characteristics 
Interpretation of participants of the content of the network (ideas and meta-ideas about desir-
able future and action for subsystems) 
The ideas participants create about the structure of the composed subsystem they try to influ-
ence, and the adaptive network’s own position in the structure (i.e. which knowledge and 
influence does help to create more foresight) 
The process of development rounds in which these ideas developed, reconstructing how adap-
tive networks influenced power networks, achieving a spiraling interaction between power 
networks and adaptive networks, where trust either diminishes or increases. How capacities of 
foresight developed in this process (according to the interpretation of participants). 
Connecting behavior can be observed by asking participants for which meta-ideas they were 
enthusiastic, who else were enthusiastic, and where that enthusiasm started. 
Reward given by power networks to connecting behavior should show through their behavior 
(as interpreted by adaptive networks). What makes the content of connecting behavior con-
vincing to power networks? 
 
Above I have defined observable characteristics of a hypothesized adaptive 
network; summarized in Table 5. These characteristics are assumed to be ob-
servable through interviews, where respondents are selected after hypothesizing 
the adaptive network. They are based on my interpretations of complexity theo-
ries, as explained above. The theoretical framework above provides the building 
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blocks for an analysis of a hypothesized process of co-evolution, under influence 
of tension in a power network. However, the themes are closely related and it is 
not useful to give a separate account for each theme. I have chosen to split the 
analysis into three empirical chapters and a concluding, partly normative chapter 
as indicated in Figure 8. The chapters 4 – 6 summarize the dynamics I have 
observed throughout a period of four years, through interviews supported with 
documents. Chapter 7 summarizes 4 – 6, theorizes about implications, and draws 
lessons for sustainable change managers. 
Figure 8. Structure of chapters 4 – 7 
Individual
Ideas
Networks
Rounds
Ext. trust
Intern. trust
Foresight
Naked eye
Magnifying glass
Microscope
4. Power networks
5. Adaptive networks
6. Change managers
7. Sustainable change management
 
 
Chapter 4: Power networks. How did power networks evolve, and where can 
adaptive networks be hypothesized as an explanation of that evolution? In this 
layer I focus on the most visible layers of content, structure (i.e. power net-
works) and process (accounting interactions). These are the layers that are visi-
ble with the ‘naked eye’. Which tensions occurred in power networks, what kind 
of new ideas emerged? New structures may emerge, split off and die like in an 
evolutionary tree. I describe how structures and the associated ideas evolved in 
development rounds. Higher-order subsystems are characterized by meta-ideas, 
which can be distinguished from other ideas because they are about partial ideas 
that live in partial subsystems. I reconstruct how partial ideas are influenced by 
meta-ideas and why these were thought to be in the higher-order interest. If co-
evolution can be reconstructed, adaptive networks may be hypothesized. 
 
Chapter 5: Adaptive networks. How did adaptive networks evolve, and where 
can change managers be hypothesized as an explanation for that evolution? This 
layer contains explanations in terms of development of trust and foresight. Since 
adaptive networks are more implicit than power networks, I need a ‘magnifying 
glass’. The implication is that some of the bigger picture is lost. How do partici-
pants explain their own conduct – and that of others? Which tensions did they 
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feel, how did they deal with the tension? Why did they become enthusiastic – or 
skeptical? 
 
Chapter 6: Change managers. How did change managers influence develop-
ment? This layer explains the events through the influence of individuals that 
displayed connecting behavior. These events can only be seen through a ‘micro-
scope’, which is why only a partial explanation is possible. On what did they 
base their enthusiasm or how could they convey it to others? How did they ana-
lyze their situation and possible effects? Did they apply systems thinking, use 
exemplars, or reduce distance to power? How did they expect to be rewarded for 
this behavior (if they had any expectations)? 
 
Chapter 7: Sustainable change management. Which lessons for sustainable 
change management, contributing to sustainable governance, can be drawn? 
This chapter reflects my interpretation of the competences that spread in adap-
tive networks, and contributed to trust. It starts with an overview of findings and 
general conclusion, which is then elaborated in detail. Then I propose issues that 
would deserve further attention, including lessons for change managers. 
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4 Power networks 
The purpose of war is peace (Aristotle) 
The empirical objects of this study are some of the networks under the transition 
discourse, which I introduced in chapter 1; there I wrote about what people were 
telling each other in 2001, and which led to Dutch sustainability policies, laid 
down in the 4th National Environmental Policy NMP4. The idea was then that a 
new type of process was needed to deal with wicked environmental problems 
related to unsustainable development of several societal systems, most notably 
the energy and mobility systems. The proposed new type of process had simi-
larities to what I have termed coopetition to achieve co-evolution in adaptive 
networks. That would create hope that in the context of the transition discourse, 
some degree of co-evolution would be achieved. Based on interviews I have 
hypothesized several interlinked adaptive networks in the context of the transi-
tion discourse, as the title of the present chapter indicates. I distinguish the 
emergence of the following hypothesized adaptive networks: 
• Development of major sustainable policy papers: the NMP4 process. The 
inter-ministerial team that prepared the NMP4 including the ideas about 
transition management that were accepted by Parliament and subsequently 
implemented by different ministries. The formally leading ministry was the 
environment ministry VROM, and another influential ministry was eco-
nomic affairs (EZ), responsible for energy policies; 
• Think tanks for sustainable mobility: The Innovation Board Sustainable 
Mobility (IB). An informal network that emerged in the follow-up of the 
NMP4. It was an initiative of the transport ministry V&W; 
• Think tanks for sustainable energy: The Energy Transition Process (ETP). 
This process also formed follow-up of the NMP4. This process was initiated 
and guided by the ministry for economic affairs EZ, which was responsible 
for energy policies. EZ invited transition teams from all domains linked to 
the energy system and promised a budget of 35 million euro for transition 
experiments, and smaller subsidies for the earlier feasibility studies. EZ ac-
cepted only proposals that created ideas that fitted, in its view, the general 
idea of sustainable development. To that end, EZ required that environ-
mental pressure groups supported proposals. Explicit efforts were done in 
EZ to reflect on the process and to create lessons at management level; 
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• Strategic inter-ministerial cooperation: the five DG deliberation. After the 
adoption of NMP4, several non-environmental ministries initiated transition 
management processes. VROM, responsible for NMP4, remained coordina-
tor of annual progress reports to Parliament. In that context, the involved 
ministries regularly met to discuss progress at the level of Director General. 
The same ministries also cooperated at operational level in the IB and the 
ETP. The five Directors General (DGs) convened several times a year as of 
2001. At first each ministry ‘implemented its own transition’, relating to the 
composed subsystem they had most knowledge about (e.g. V&W for mobil-
ity, EZ for energy). In 2005 they adopted a joint programmatic approach. 
 
In this chapter I describe content, structure and process of these networks. I 
describe how ideas and meta-ideas developed and spread in rounds through the 
structure, but also affecting the structure. The general set-up is as follows: 
 
Goal A 
  
Goal B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal C 
 
 
For simplicity I assume that the tensions in power networks can be summarized 
in the polarity between two goals (A and B), which summarize the main con-
flicts. Structure is formed by a power network and, in its context, a hypothesized 
adaptive network. Content is formed by the goals, the Goal A and Goal B are 
proposed in a power network, and an adaptive network may propose Goal C that 
neither fits A or B, but still relieves the tension between A and B. If the power 
network accepts C to replace A and B by confirming these goals in public, creat-
ing expectations before a larger audience, a successful adaptive network can be 
hypothesized. If a player in the power network changes his public Goal unilater-
ally with the aim of inviting adaptive networks to produce a third way, he tries 
to initiate an adaptive network by managing creative tensions, which I define as 
connecting behavior or change management. Process is formed by the consecu-
tive power networks and adaptive networks, which develop in rounds that result 
from the interactions. 
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4.1 Development of major sustainable policy papers 
Summary of three development rounds in the NMP4 process 2000 - 2001 
Sustainable development  
discourse 
1 – Environment minister: an in-
novative but concrete NMP4 
2 – VROM principals: EZ to man-
age energy and mobility transition 
 
3 – Believers in politics: the analy-
sis is correct and deserves our sup-
port; it is the road to sustainable 
development 
 Sectoral development  
discourse 
1 – EZ principals: NMP4 should 
be harmless 
2 – EZ principals: V&W to 
manage the mobility transition; 
EZ only the energy transition 
3 – Skeptics in politics: despite 
the importance of sustainable 
development this is a waste of 
time for Parliamentarians 
   
NMP4’s Transition Discourse 
1 – NMP4-team: vague discourse but supported by the private (energy) sector and by 
relevant NGOs; at several stages Teljeur, linking the NMP-team with EZ principals, ob-
tained the approval of his principals at EZ to do surveys with groundbreaking questioning 
lines 
2 – Civil servants, in particular V&W, present transition management as opportunity; The 
Director General of V&W saw the opportunity as well and changed the perception 
VROM had of his ministry 
3 – The Minister for energy agreed to ‘manage the transition to sustainable energy’ after 
her civil servants had put her in this position, enabled by the discourse in Parliament. No 
budgets were reserved, so she was not vulnerable for criticism from budgetary side. By 
doing this, she created pressure on the other ministers and state secretaries to follow, 
which they did. 
Note: all published documents with respect to the NMP4 process downloadable at 
www.vrom.nl. 
Sustainability research and greenpolder model (before 2000) 
In the years before 2000, individuals from the energy, mobility and environ-
mental policy subsystems had become disappointed with results of their efforts 
toward sustainable development. Despite research projects jointly undertaken by 
all domains (public, private, academic, NGO), despite innovation policies that 
encouraged sustainable initiatives, and despite strategic cooperation between all 
domains around large infrastructure projects (in the greenpolder model, see Page 
32), sustainable mobility or energy still had not been achieved, and there wasn’t 
even a shared idea of what it meant. Many shared that disappointment and the 
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“The NMP-series was 
seen as highly influential” 
general idea that sustainable development is still an important option. Further 
more, each one knew that the others felt in this way and were prepared to spend 
their energy on it. In other words, people from different subsystems had devel-
oped personal relationships and shared a sense of urgency of sustainable break-
throughs. They did not know (at least not collectively) how to develop such 
breakthroughs, however. They only knew that the previous efforts hadn’t 
worked because they had failed to convince decision-makers of required con-
crete changes. 
Round 1: Management support for transition management (around 2000) 
Around 2000 the minister for environment Jan Pronk decided to develop the 
NMP4, which was also mandated by the Environmental Management Act. Par-
liament, lobbyists at large, and other ministries took this very serious. There was 
a wide sense in the administration and politics that large policy notes really mat-
ter. For example, the first National Environmental Policy (NMP1) was seen as 
highly influential. NMP4 might also become 
groundbreaking. 
Pronk gave project leader Jan Kort in the 
environment ministry VROM a free hand to 
develop innovative environmental policies. Parliament, lobbyists at large, and 
other ministries took this serious since previous NMPs had received a lot of 
attention and were said to be effective, albeit insufficient. There was what 
Nooteboom (2002) terms exemplar trust: the previous NMP’s served as exem-
plar for NMP4. In this context, a close cooperation developed between Jan Kort 
and Hans Teljeur, who was responsible for sustainable energy scenarios in the 
Economic Affairs ministry EZ. This team developed the NMP4 text about tran-
sition management, in dialogue with their networks of researchers and lobbyists, 
including companies in the energy, environment and mobility sectors. 
A critical moment was when Hans Teljeur proposed to his management to do 
a survey among the energy sector companies and related NGOs, about sustain-
able energy and expectations of the role of the government (in particular EZ). 
The clear outcome was that, given the ongoing market liberalization process in 
the energy sector, competition was expected to increase and therefore the gov-
ernment should take compensating initiatives to maintain cooperation about 
sustainable energy. EZ’s management then accepted that NMP4 was an oppor-
tunity for EZ to claim that role. 
The result was a draft NMP4, reasoning that certain environmental problems 
are too complex to be solved under the responsibility of environmental policies. 
Previous policies, like hierarchical control, voluntary agreements, fiscal and 
social instruments (what I term levers of the first kind, directly intervening in 
market processes, see Figure 6 on page 69), had reached their limits because 
profound societal changes were required, not only environmental – in the case of 
security of energy supply, economic affairs was the responsible ministry. All 
policy domains (private, public, civil society, academic, citizens) share respon-
sibility. The systems resisted the pressures exerted on them through environ-
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“insiders appreciated the idea 
of transition management” 
“VROM handed its policies 
over to other ministries” 
mental policy instruments, and joint action was needed between corporations, 
NGOs and scientists and governments to develop better instruments to push the 
system into a new equilibrium. The role of the government would be to initiate 
that process and to create interactions between forerunners from all domains. It 
should help the forerunners to develop joint objectives for the long term and 
reason backwards, via so-called transition paths, toward short-term action. 
The NMP4-text about transitions (see 
also 0) was widely appreciated by insiders 
from all domains, most of whom were said 
to have shared the previous disappoint-
ments and felt that the key to breakthroughs was in the cooperation between 
domains. The insiders were persons who worked in all domains but were con-
cerned with environmental and sustainability issues. The only pressure group 
that expressed doubts was the employer’s union VNO-NCW. On the other hand, 
many ‘outsiders’ or people who had no faith in constructive cooperation thought 
that transition management was unspecific and unaccountable. 
Round 2: Cabinet decision about NMP4 and responsibility for its implementation 
(Spring 2001) 
Environment Minister Jan Pronk initially had doubts because he thought that the 
texts of draft NMP4 were too vague, but higher management in EZ supported 
Jan Kort. The draft text was then offered to the relevant ministers in Cabinet. 
The minister for economic affairs Annemarie Jorritsma, responsible for energy 
policies, was the first minister who agreed to become charged with the imple-
mentation of a transition, as proposed in NMP4 (in terms of the transition dis-
course, she became ‘transition manager’). For the first time, the environment 
ministry gave the prime responsibility for an important part of environmental 
policy to another ministry. 
A widely remembered event was a meeting that took place in June 2001 in a 
popular restaurant on the beach. Representatives from all domains concerned 
with sustainable development had been invited, and the Director Generals of the 
ministries who the NMP4 team considered to have the best knowledge and rela-
tions in the targeted societal systems, were there. Each DG presented his ideas 
about sustainable development. Not long after that meeting, it was decided that 
the ministry of agriculture would ‘manage’ a transition to sustainable agricul-
ture, the ministry for transport (V&W) would ‘manage’ a transition to sustain-
able mobility, and the ministry of foreign affairs would ‘manage’ a transition to 
sustainable use of biodiversity and natural resources, which was concerned with 
the system of international trade. As the energy minister had taken the first step, 
the ministries responsible for the other concerned societal systems also volun-
teered. It is less clear if this really was based on co-evolution of the discourse, or 
simply the wish to be a match for the en-
ergy minister, attracted by the adaptive 
tension between Cabinet and Parliament 
and the competition between coalition 
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partners. On this day, the idea was shared that the ministry that has most knowl-
edge and influence about the concerned societal system can best manage transi-
tions. 
There were only doubts about mobility. The mobility system is the largest 
user of energy, but the responsibility of V&W, not EZ – and therefore EZ and 
V&W both proposed that V&W manage a transition to sustainable mobility. 
VROM did not trust that V&W would be willing to take that task serious. V&W 
was said to be a slow adapting, perhaps self-centered ministry. The energy min-
istry, however, said it didn’t have a network in that sector, and the positive atti-
tude of the transport DG at the beach meeting and at other occasions had con-
vinced VROM. 
Round 3: Acceptance by Parliament (November 2001) 
Despite being unspecific and unaccountable, Parliament accepted transition 
management. It gave NMP4 the benefit of the doubt, but requested annual pro-
gress reports. It was a kind of compromise that might result if there are no major 
objections, and a limited number of supporters. The environment minister 
pleaded to spare him the difficult obligation of reporting on progress, but that 
did not help. ‘Transition management’ became known in The Netherlands (at 
least in the environmental sector) as the next generation of environmental pol-
icy. Five ministries worked together on four different sustainable transitions. A 
non-environmental minister headed each transition, and the minister (later state 
secretary) for environment coordinated the communication with Parliament, and 
would report on a yearly basis. DGs of five ministries met every two months 
from then on. At the time, the new concept of transition management gave rise 
to many questions and publications. Four years later, support was still mixed, as 
rich discussions in ArenA, the magazine of the Society of Environmental Pro-
fessionals, show (see Table 1 on Page 27). The adoption of NMP4 in 2001 and 
the implementation agreement in Cabinet created a condition for cooperation 
between ministries for several years. When new Cabinets arrived, new Cabinet 
members defended transition management. The first to do this was state secre-
tary for environment Pieter Van Geel as of July 2002, in Cabinet Balkenende I 
and II, and the second was Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, who joined Cabinet Bal-
kenende II in 2003 as minister of economic affairs. 
Co-evolution and adaptive networks 
The ideas that emerged in the NMP4 process were about joint interests of 
VROM and EZ, and therefore they were meta-ideas. The link Hans Teljeur – Jan 
Kort, both representing a larger group in VROM and EZ, developed proposals 
that did not fit the original assignment they had got from their management, but 
they built a case by using input from the outside world. The outside world was 
connected with Parliament through all domains. The NMP4-team had sensed 
that there was support for this line of thinking outside the national government, 
and used that to create co-evolution inside. 
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Environment minister Pronk had given Kort a free hand, but at the end of the 
day was not charmed with the unspecific texts (he personally has deleted texts 
about transition management that Kort and Teljeur with their team had written). 
Whereas Pronk may have been forced to support transitions because of other 
circumstances, the power network in VROM was only partly convinced at the 
time. Several saw it as a loss of influence for VROM. In EZ however, more 
people in the energy department seem to have become enthusiastic for transition 
management. The EZ minister supported this idea as she had been challenged by 
Parliament to address sustainable development. Parliament had exerted pressure 
on her by creating that opportunity. The civil servants had, without her involve-
ment in the preparations, given her the opportunity to be rewarded; and this is 
probably why EZ’s principals also were pleased. Hans Teljeur had created that 
opportunity through interviews and several events, getting feedback from all 
domains. This had opened the eyes of EZ’s principals to the potential of a new 
role as moderator of transitions. The idea that it was in the interest of both EZ 
and VROM that EZ would take that role, had co-evolved between VROM and 
EZ, and the lobbyists in the environment and energy fields. (From that day on, 
the axis VROM-EZ would remain the driver of the transition discourse, with a 
key role for environment DG Karel Zijp who arrived just after NMP4 had been 
approved). Co-evolution stretched further than VROM and EZ. By involving 
influential people from all domains in the preparation of NMP4, also Parliament 
was reached. This explains why it accepted the vague NMP4 with a horizon of 
30 years. 
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4.2 Think tanks for sustainable mobility 
Summary of development rounds in the mobility transition process 2001 - 2005 
‘Economic progress depends on 
auto-mobility’ discourse 
1 – Skeptical V&W principals: 
Don’t make any promises 
2 - Skeptical high government 
managers: Don’t waste time in 
the IB 
3 – Delaying CEOs: New auto-
motives are not in our interest 
 
‘Auto-mobility is unsustainable’ 
discourse 
1 – Enthusiastic V&W principals: We 
can at least try 
2- Enthusiastic high government man-
agers: We shouldn’t give up quickly 
3 – Enthusiastic CEOs: Sustainable 
innovation may be in our interest 
   
Sustainable automotives Discourse  
1 – V&W civil servants: get quickly together an influential and knowledgeable group accord-
ing to the transition discourse 
2 –IB: defines a mind map and seizes the opportunity of an EU conference with a focus on 
automotives 
3 –IB: is so connected throughout Europe, that it can formulate well underpinned social di-
lemma’s for the automotives system, which it tests at the EU conference 
Round 1: mobilization of the mobility board (summer 2001 – winter 2001) 
In summer 2001, former member of the NMP4 team and civil servant at trans-
port ministry V&W, Bas Harms made use of the political momentum of NMP4 
to obtain a statement of the transport minister that she would ‘manage a transi-
tion to sustainable mobility’. This delicate commitment was enough to legiti-
mize Bas Harms to do a series of interviews with persons who might have been 
willing to join a transition team. It was not difficult for Harms, making use of 
networks dating back to the 1990s, to find a group of motivated people from 
environment and mobility NGOs, oil multinationals, car technology firms, aca-
demics, consultants and directors from the ministries V&W, VROM and EZ. 
A highly knowledgeable and influential group of policy makers emerged, 
who together could oversee the mobility system, its problems, and its possible 
futures, as well as political reality in all domains. Commitment among V&W 
principals for transition management was low, since V&W had hardly been 
connected to the NMP4 process. Still the deputy Director General Jeroen Tulp 
joined this group, which met every 2 months as of 2002 under the name Innova-
tion Board Sustainable Mobility (IB). Jeroen Tulp was widely considered to be 
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one of the most influential principals in V&W, and V&W was, given its budg-
ets, one of the most powerful ministries. Although insiders saw the emerging of 
the IB as a breakthrough, it never existed as a formal activity of V&W however, 
other than the obligation to report progress of V&W’s role in transition man-
agement. The few individuals from V&W who were involved, had no budgets 
and limited time. Table 6 presents some key members of the IB, as well as the 
power context in their domain. 
Table 6. Some members of the Innovation Board and their power context 
Onno van Dongen, director of the mobilist’s association ANWB, had been influential in 
national and regional discussions about government policies. Most Dutch car owners are 
member of the ANWB and read its magazine. The ANWB often manifests itself in policy 
processes, in the press and via its magazine. Their credibility is based on the support of its 
members who are in the first place interested in cheap and efficient transport by personal car, 
but increasingly also in a good quality of the living and recreation environment. Van Dongen 
had before been helpful in policy processes that tried to combine the two seemingly contradic-
tory objectives, but had experienced that in the usual policy processes about single govern-
ment interventions like infrastructure development or taxing of road transport, breakthroughs 
had never been achievable. What they had to offer was their influence on the Dutch mobilists 
and their other European counterpart organizations, and knowledge about the thinking of 
mobilists through their polls. What they were looking for was a government that would ad-
dress the dilemma between mobility and environment in a more strategic way. 
Piet de Jong, a leading member of the politically influential Foundation for Nature and 
Environment (SNM). Whereas many environmentalists still have doubts about personal 
transport by car, he and his staff had accepted the inevitability of the growth of forms of 
individualized passengers transport, and was prepared to invest in environmentally friendly 
forms of it and use his influence to defend good ideas before his supporters. SNM also had 
supported the ministry of environment by suggesting to Parliament that it request yearly 
progress reports of transition management. Parliament, doing this, challenged the transport 
ministry with an opportunity show its skills, which the minister accepted (like other ministers 
also had done). De Jong, in summary, had influence on the larger environmental movement 
(also in Europe), and knowledge about their behavior. 
Arthur Groen, innovation manager at Klingon, had personal relations at the level of Klingon’s 
board of directors. Klingon had been investing in sustainable energy technology for years. 
Both showed in the IB that they were prepared to contribute with their knowledge and influ-
ence for the benefit of the long-term future of the energy and mobility system at large. Both 
could help through their skills in systems thinking, scenario development for which Klingon 
is well known, and the knowledge they had of innovations in the fuel and energy industry. 
Often operating without explicit consent of Klingon’s management, they invested many days 
of their private time in the IB. When through Groen a member of Klingon’s board of directors 
became involved in the preparation of the EU conference, also other oil industries started to 
show interest. (Ctd next page) 
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The car industry became involved only late in 2003, in the person of Kees van Arkel who 
represented Takey Europe. He had been invited when the IB had discovered that break-
throughs depend on car technology and on the willingness of the car manufacturers to invest 
in that. Japanese Takey was relatively advanced because it offered a car with a hybrid propul-
sion system: petrol fuel and electricity (this car has become auto of the year in Europe as well 
as the USA). The European car industry was (in close discussion with EU policy makers), 
focusing more on clean and efficient diesel technology to achieve environmental objectives. 
Van Arkel, whose primary aim was to support Takey’s market, gave an impulse to the devel-
opment of ideas for possibly sustainable technology scenarios, and through him Takey par-
ticipated in the EU conference in the person of Raymond Jansen who is mentioned in the 
introduction, challenging many other car manufacturers to do that as well. The European car 
manufacturers, participating at high level in the EU conference, were confronted with ideas to 
which they in the eyes of others had no response. 
Three Dutch ministries were represented at the level of directors from the start of the IB: 
deputy director general Jeroen Tulp and deputy director Bas Harms, two directors of the 
environment ministry, and a director of the economic affairs ministry responsible for the 
energy industry. They were all legitimized to spend time on the IB because under the fourth 
Environmental Policy NMP4, signed by all their ministers, they were supposed to cooperate 
on transition management, a new and yet vaguely defined role for government. Their respec-
tive directors-general, the highest administrators in their ministries with direct responsibility 
for policy development, had agreed to meet regularly to discuss progress of transition man-
agement, and thus stayed committed to this process throughout the study period. Most of 
these directors entered the IB with a relatively open mind, and supported the joint organiza-
tion of the EU conference, and other joint initiatives. In interviews, they all indicated that the 
IB was a unique and useful group to them. The knowledge they had acquired at the IB helped 
them to test and improve the policy processes at home. They said they had a general sense 
that the process in the IB could be useful to make steps to sustainable mobility, in particular if 
the policies of the powerful but independent ministry of transport could be influenced. 
Other participants were representatives from the association of car dealers, car maintenance 
shops and filling stations, recently privatized bus companies, two university professors and a 
consultant. The contributions of some of these were highly appreciated in terms of knowledge 
and skills to integrate knowledge (including a professor who had highly appreciated structur-
ing qualities and was able to use knowledge he had as member of several national advice 
councils to the government (transport as well as environment), and the group’s moderator, a 
consultant who was once explicitly evaluated by the group). 
Round 2: Joint preparation of the EU conference Energy in Motion (2002 – 2004) 
In summer 2003, three ministries (V&W, VROM and EZ) decided to organize 
jointly a European Conference on sustainable automotives (‘Energy in Motion’), 
which was to be held in October 2004. This decision has been highly influenced 
by the IB, where directors of these three ministries participated. The proposal 
was well received, perhaps because the minister for energy Laurens Jan Brink-
horst and the state secretary for environment Pieter van Geel were personally 
committed to the ideas of the 4th environmental policy on transition manage-
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“Inter-ministerial 
cooperation was 
seamless” 
ment. This Dutch ‘Troika’ became the host of the conference, and used their 
influence to get enthusiasm for the conference in their European networks. This 
cooperation had been unthinkable before, and the outside world was for the first 
time influenced by the IB, without being aware of that. 
The ministries had chosen automotives because they believed that The Neth-
erlands would be an interesting experimenting ground for new technology; the 
urgency of breakthroughs was shared from many sides (dependency on oil, cli-
mate change), and other they expected that EU countries shared in this general 
feeling. To make the conference agenda as relevant as they could, a common 
problem description was needed. Thus, the IB members had made a decision in 
their formal capacity (to develop a conference together), which formed an adap-
tive tension for them as IB members to look for a problem description for auto-
motives that their own supporter groups would be willing to accept. Thus from 
then on, organizations where IB members worked started to give coherent sig-
nals to their different supporter groups. These 
signals were in the form of perceptions of the 
automotives problem. 
Jeroen Tulp and his people, VROM and EZ 
communicated each in their European networks about the EU conference and 
the problem description. Jeroen Tulp visited many countries personally. The 
mobility and environment NGOs in the IB mobilized their own partner organiza-
tions in the EU. A Japanese automobile industry provided accurate information 
about present and possible future car technology. An oil company provided 
knowledge about energy technology. Participating organizations asked their 
supporters, in their formal capacity, to participate in so-called ‘snowball groups’ 
that had been initiated by the conference preparation team. The preparation team 
had interviewed about 30 people all over Europe about their views on sustain-
able mobility, to sense their concerns. The question was, which conference 
agenda would be timely? The Klingon and Takey IB members approached their 
managers and CEOs with these ideas, and these were willing to participate in the 
conference and let their people take part in snowball groups. Other energy in-
dustries and car manufacturers who were also invited saw the momentum that 
this process was taking and participated in snowball groups and in the confer-
ence as well. 
The snowball groups addressed specific parts of the mind map, and consisted 
of representatives of industry, mobility and sustainability NGOs, and govern-
ments. In these groups, people came to realize in the first place that many others 
also believed that the issues at stake were important, that sustainable options 
might be available, and that the relevant actors were prepared for dialogue. One 
IB member who participated in some of the snowball groups said: ‘By giving 
the right example, we have tried to pass on our ideas about open dialogue, to 
ensure that the same kind of connectivity could emerge throughout Europe by 
means of the snowball groups’. 
Findings of the snowball groups were discussed in the inter-ministerial team. 
With feedback from the snowball meetings, the conference’s agenda grew in a 
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“The IB’s ideas resonated 
in Europe” 
year’s time. The resulting conference discussion paper is summarized in Table 
7. In retrospect, it is difficult to identify precisely where specific elements of this 
problem description have originated (several people may ‘claim’ an idea, or 
people don’t remember where an idea has come from originally). Causality, who 
influenced who in these power networks, is hardly determinable any more. On 
occasions, the preparation team leader could identify new dilemma’s that cre-
ated opportunities for the organization. For example, the paradoxes between 
counteracting EU legislation on clean vehicles. Another important new idea was 
that regional mobility problems have an international dimension, since break-
throughs may depend on new transport systems that should be introduced in 
regions, and facilitated by European policies. During the preparations, the idea 
had also spread that several sustainable breakthroughs may be possible, which 
would require joint leadership. 
So, there was wide agreement that a co-evolution of thinking about automo-
tives had occurred, at least temporarily, at European scale and between the auto, 
energy and environment sectors. IB members believed that the IB itself had been 
key to that success. However, the 
interdepartmental team did not recognize this, 
and indicated that inter-departmental 
cooperation had been better before. A VROM-
representative said, ‘other parts of VROM were cautious, and doubtful as to 
whether V&W would take proper care of environmental issues. However there 
was no doubt as to whether the conference was a joint effort with V&W’. This 
suggests that the cooperation was still young. The only higher civil servant that 
was actively involved in the preparations on behalf of the three ministries, was 
Jeroen Tulp. If Tulp acted in coordination with the other two ministries, that 
process would have been in the IB and therefore unnoticed by the civil servants. 
Round 3: The EU conference and the automotives platform 
 (October 2004 – summer 2005) 
Early 2005, the Dutch government established a platform for automotives, after 
a short intermediary situation where there was only a platform for sustainable 
car fuels. It had the intention of dialogue between major players in the oil and 
auto-industries, and between them and the government. The DGs for environ-
ment, transport and energy, who had been present at the EU conference, be-
lieved that sustainable automotives had a chance, because of wide support at the 
highly successful EU conference. 
  
 Power Networks 95
Table 7. Discussion paper for Energy in Motion
 
‘Energy in Motion’ 
EU journey towards a clean and climate-neutral road transport system 
Amsterdam, 19 and 20 October 2004 
Management summary Presidency discussion paper 20 September 2004 
How can we secure our future energy supply and make the EU less dependent on imported 
fossil fuels? 
How can we reduce emissions of CO2 in the EU to a sustainable level? 
How can we make our cities healthier places to live, particularly where air quality is con-
cerned? 
How can we ensure that the EU becomes the most competitive and innovative economy in the 
world? 
In recent months, we, the Dutch Presidency, discussed these four challenges and the way in 
which the road transport sector can deal with them with many of our European partners. This 
‘tour’ of Europe showed us many good initiatives but, although considerable progress has 
been made in some areas, much still has to be done. We observe widespread concern about 
the challenges Europe is facing. However, there is a lack of common understanding through-
out Europe about what level of urgency is to be attached to the challenges, what is needed to 
tackle these, whether choices must be made now or can be postponed until later, and what role 
the transport sector can and must play in this. 
Many parties express a great need for a clear, common long-term perspective on energy and 
transport; one that could serve as a guide towards clarifying the short-term steps that bring us 
closer to achieving the long-term goals; a perspective that could provide industry with stable, 
long-term incentives to develop their products. We also observe a great need for formulating 
concrete next steps leading to tangible results that are visible to citizens and show that long-
term progress can truly be made. 
We believe that there is clearly a window of opportunity, and that it is time for action. We 
want the ‘Energy in Motion’ conference to help Europe make use of this window by generat-
ing discussion about the key questions and dilemmas and a search for clever choices. Many 
parties throughout Europe show a great eagerness to act and are looking for other parties to 
collaborate with because they realize that finding effective strategies and converting them into 
concrete action require partnerships involving governments, industry, cities, NGOs, etcetera. 
We call upon all parties to act and to be part of the solution. 
During the conference we will look for what is needed to turn possibilities into reality. More 
than 100 senior representatives of governments, European Commission, industry, cities, 
NGOs and the scientific community will join us in this search. 
We will discuss what partnerships will be needed to deal with the complexity of the issues we 
are facing; partnerships that could encourage stakeholders to engage proactively in the move 
to a clean and climate-neutral road transport system. (Ctd next page) 
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We will explore the current rules of the game and see whether they are sufficient to achieve 
our goals. We will do this by taking on a concrete example: the position taken by the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development in their Mobility 2030 Report. 
We will discuss the ‘sense of urgency’ of the four challenges, how this affects the transport 
sector itself and the realisation of effective strategies for the transport sector, with a special 
focus on reducing GHG emissions and securing energy supply. This will include the key 
question of timing: should we act now (and accept current high costs and low cost-
effectiveness of CO2 reduction in the transport sector) or should we act later (and risking that 
we will not ensure the timely availability of the measures necessary in the future)? 
We will discuss the necessity and possibility to come to a viable range of promising options 
of clean low-carbon vehicles and fuels, in order to guide and encourage the progress to be 
made in this area. We will look for what should be the most important selection criteria for 
limiting the range of options, and we will discuss what industry needs from governments to 
maintain/strengthen its competitive position. 
We will also discuss opportunities for short-term options for improving energy efficiency and 
reducing CO2 emissions in road transport, focussing on both the potential for improvement of 
vehicle technology and on behaviour and organisational (logistics) innovations. We will 
discuss possibilities and in particular the political, social and economic conditions needed to 
turn these possibilities into reality. We will discuss the key question of how to kick-start 
markets for clean low-carbon vehicles. We will investigate the roles of the three stakeholder 
groups (industry, consumers and governments) and the suggestion that the key to breaking the 
chicken-and-egg dilemma (no demand without supply, no supply without demand) is with the 
governments. We will look for possible approaches that governments could embrace, and we 
will investigate what contribution the EU could/should make in solving this dilemma. 
Finally, we will discuss how the EU and Member States can assist competent cities and re-
gions to overcome perceived obstacles in promoting clean urban transport, with a special 
focus on the role clean vehicles could play in making our cities healthier places to live. We 
will also look at the situation in cities in the new Member States, and investigate to what 
extent it differs from that in the rest of the EU. 
The Dutch Presidency attaches great value to the contribution eco-efficient innovations can 
make to achieving the Lisbon objectives. We want to explore the possibilities for eco-efficient 
innovations in the transport sector and together convert these into opportunities to make sub-
stantial progress on meeting the four challenges and to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
European industry. 
Source: http://www.eu-conference2004.nl/ 
 
There were 60 out of 80 invited Director Generals of national ministries from 25 
EU countries, corporations (40% of 140 participants were industrials, incl. sev-
eral major car and oil industries represented at high level), Parliamentarians, 
NGOs, scientists. Keynotes were given by, among others, transport minister 
Karla Peijs, environment state secretary Pieter van Geel, European Director-
General for transport and energy Pascal Lamoureux, President Director of Shell 
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Netherlands Rein Willems, and Tadashi Yamashina, Managing officer of Toyota 
Motor Corporation. Groen of oil multinational Klingon said after the confer-
ence: ‘I have participated in many international conferences that dealt with en-
ergy and mobility, but never one with such a wide and high-level presence of the 
industries.’ Through the well-organized preparations and the fitting agenda, the 
oil and automobile industries apparently had decided that this conference was 
different and relevant to attend. And, not only the CEOs who already had com-
mitted with sustainable development participated, but also the ones who had not 
yet done that. 
Some CEOs had given indications that they believed the issue was important, 
and other followed, perhaps because the arguments from sustainability point of 
view were compelling. According to polls done during the conference, two 
thirds of the participants agreed on concrete issues like that fiscal incentives 
were needed to stimulate new fuels and propulsion systems and that innovations 
should first be introduced at city level. E.g. the conference polls show that 81% 
of participants believed that advanced biofuels and hybrid car systems should 
receive more attention at EC level, requires mores harmonized fiscal incentives, 
and new markets should kick start in cities. As Raymond Jansen, manager gov-
ernment affairs at the auto multinational Takey put it a month after the confer-
ence: ‘Where strategic cooperation in the car industry is developing in the World 
Business Council on Sustainable Development, there is still little concrete coop-
eration in development of breakthrough technologies and technological stan-
dards. This is absolutely necessary to keep mobility affordable in the long term, 
but it requires short-term choices that only can be made by the mobilists, either 
through their consumer behavior or their acceptance of government interven-
tions. One of the results of the EU conference is a greater awareness that interac-
tion with mobilists about such choices is a joint responsibility of industries and 
governments.’ 
The emphasis of European automobile industries, thus far focused on im-
proving diesel systems, was now widely seen as probably insufficient for sus-
tainable mobility. It was accepted that a more far-reaching transition, perhaps to 
different hybrid systems and ultimately possibly hydrogen systems, was desir-
able and probably feasible. And finally, there was agreement that further dia-
logue and joint efforts were needed between the main stakeholders and leading 
corporations, and that the government should break the chicken-egg dilemma. 
The platform automotives, led in cooperation between the relevant ministries, 
offered just that. Raymond Jansen: ‘one of the messages was that several gov-
ernments need to give coherent signals about what they will require from the 
industries, making use of coherent signals from the industries about what is 
possible.’ For the first time the finance ministry also became involved, as it saw 
that support for fiscal incentives was increasing. 
The EU conference was therefore an event that made earlier agreements that 
had developed in co-evolution, resonate loudly again, and this had convinced 
DGs that there was a real opportunity for them to show that the government 
could do what so many influential people expected them to do. In this new 
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power context, lagging CEOs were expected to join the platform as well. The 
DGs invited an IB member to chair the platform and several others joined. 
A question is to which extent the ideas in V&W have co-evolved. Despite 
having three representatives in the IB, among which until 2005 a deputy Direc-
tor General, not many others of V&W seem to have been linked – in the sense 
that they understood the IB’s ideas and its relevance for mobility policies in 
general. On the other hand, the expectation was created that if the platform 
automotives were to propose changes of V&W’s policies, V&W would cooper-
ate. Involvement of V&W at high level in the inter-ministerial program created 
that expectation. 
The EU conference was one of the IB’s joint enterprises. There are several 
examples of smaller power actions under their influence, mostly aimed at R&D. 
Key people in the environment movement were now publicly in favor of the 
private car (or car like devices) as vehicle of the future. An automobile industry 
and an environment NGO published a joint ad about sustainable cars. Large fleet 
owners were supporting low emission vehicles, steps toward the desirable transi-
tion. 
Adaptive tensions and co-evolution 
Different policy fields, oil and auto multinationals, mobility and environment 
NGOs, started to communicate different than before, about sustainable automo-
tives. There was more alignment between their problem descriptions. At the EU 
conference, new roles for the government became accepted, and urgency of 
cooperation was widely felt. The European car industry was criticized of lag-
ging. This created an adaptive tension on Governments and industries to engage 
in that dialogue, and that dialogue was organized in the Dutch automotives plat-
form. 
The conference preparations were the start of this European co-evolution 
process, and behind the scenes the IB kept the actions of the Dutch organizers 
connected. The IB itself had emerged several years earlier, as it was attracted by 
the adaptive tension of NMP4 that urged V&W to initiate a sustainable mobility 
transition process. There were several other examples of co-evolution, more 
aimed at R&D. 
The governmental power network at DG level accepted the IB’s proposal to 
organize the EU conference according to its lines. The civil servants preparing 
the conference were enthusiastic, but were hardly aware of the IB’s connecting 
role in the background. Their superiors simply gave different signals, or gave 
them a free hand and enough resources. Ultimately, the involved ministries and 
the mobilists unions and environmental groups throughout Europe were in-
volved in dialogues about automotives. The result was a co-evolution of ideas 
that showed clearly in the EU conference. 
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4.3 Think tanks for sustainable energy 
Summary of development rounds in the energy transition process 2001 - 2005 
‘Sustainable energy (e.g. biomass) 
is still too expensive’ discourse  
1 – Skeptical EZ principals: EZ’s 
role is limited to ensuring that the 
market functions according to liberal 
principles 
2 – EZ: We need visible transition 
experiments within a few years, with 
wide support from all domains, to 
make a case for a new level playing 
field 
3 – Parliament: We want account-
able targets and concrete measures 
in the level playing field. 
 ‘Sustainable energy (e.g. biomass) is 
already possible’ discourse 
1 – Concerned EZ principals: EZ will 
loose credibility if it doesn’t take sus-
tainability concerns more serious 
2 – Those with interests in certain 
alternative energy technology: These 
experiments should include us. Those 
concerned with climate change: Ex-
periments should be a breakthrough to 
carbon-free energy. 
3 – EZ Minister Brinkhorst: I stick to 
reasoning backwards, and we haven’t 
proceeded enough yet for such targets 
   
High-level coordination Discourse  
1 – EZ civil servants: By doing interviews and organizing events, they make a case for a new 
role at meta-level, as worded in the transition discourse. They gather wide support from all 
domains. Four long-term objectives, including Biomass, are identified and accepted. 
2 – Working groups: These could gather wide agreement to some extent, but as their reason-
ing backwards from a vision reached immediate decisions about the experiments, (in the case 
of biomass at least) the tension could not be bridged, and EZ made no clear choices 
3 – EZ civil servants in close communication with loose networks: The civil servants, enabled 
by Brinkhorst, tried to explain in their communication with Parliament what they were trying 
to do. However, they did not succeed in presenting strategic social dilemma’s that could be 
debated, and debate was still focused on instrumental issues. Nonetheless they could convince 
Brinkhorst, a supporter of the transition discourse, that they would manage enough support in 
NGOs and influential companies not to undermine support in Parliament. This had its reper-
cussions especially in the wider support for long-term energy research. The transition experi-
ments were seen as necessary to have visible outcomes, albeit perhaps not the required break-
throughs for a sustainable level playing field. 
All published documents with respect to the energy transition process can be 
downloaded at www.energietransitie.nl 
Round 1: EZ trying to give shape to its new role 
Summer 2001, EZ had become ‘manager of a transition to a sustainable energy 
system’ in the context of NMP4. A handful of EZ civil servants, in the energy 
 100 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
directorate and in the management team, became involved with organizing tran-
sition teams with forerunners, as indicated by NMP4’s discourse.  EZ operated 
in a complex power field. Sustainable energy had been an issue for several 
years. Alternative systems based on wind, solar and biomass energy had been 
developed, but breakthroughs to a significant scale had not yet happened. For 
example, bioenergy, created from plant material (biomass), was in Europe seen 
as a major sustainable option.  According to a European Directive, fiscal incen-
tives would be implemented to promote biomass as component of car fuel (bio-
fuels). Another possibility was bioelectricity production (or production of other 
carriers like hydrogen). It was said that this also had the benefit of creating a 
new market for farmers, since organic waste was in limited supply. The imple-
mentation of a system for biomass from wastes was faster in neighboring coun-
tries, in particular in Germany. There are different technical options for bio-
energy. Advantageous from point of view of climate change seemed to be a 
large-scale ‘biomass-to-fuel’ plant, since existing biodiesel could be a lot im-
proved. It was expected that the price of raw fossil fuel would rise in the long 
term, and by early adopting sustainable energy, The Netherlands would not only 
benefit from reduction of fossil fuel dependency and reduced cost of import, but 
also from the export of sustainable energy systems. An overview of these posi-
tions is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. The involved groups of the energy system and their internal context 
The sustainable energy lobby was mainly interested in promoting industrial initiatives in The 
Netherlands, that may become an interesting export in difficult economic times. Many such 
initiatives had been started up with idealistic and business aims. They were at different stages 
of development, but none of them was profitable without financial government support. A 
large number of initiatives had been taken; small companies had been erected, often together 
with larger energy companies, and with financial support from EZ. EZ also supported scien-
tific research in this direction, and many researchers depended on that. A lot of knowledge 
was available in this world, as well as the interest of creating a market context that would 
allow developed solutions to break through. Market reforms however increased competition, 
making the role of energy companies less clear. The active role of energy companies had 
created legitimacy for EZ to support their initiatives: if the market believes in the feasibility of 
a sustainable energy system and therefore invests, the EZ effort was said to be well spent. 
Oil multinationals, like Klingon, had also been investing in sustainable energy, albeit at a low 
level compared with their total investment. Large-scale investment in sustainable energy 
production would require more certainty for them about willingness of society and govern-
ment in enough countries to accept these new systems despite higher cost. At the same time 
many oil multinationals were opposed to government interventions that would reduce demand 
for fossil oil and gas. (Ctd next page) 
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The environment movement had a long history in sustainable energy as well. Their point of 
view was that sustainable energy was needed to reduce climate change, but not create adverse 
side effects. This had created dilemmas. Wind turbines kill birds, for example. Nuclear energy 
has toxic waste. All were much concerned with possible adverse impacts of bioenergy, like air 
emissions caused by impure fuel. One particularly active NGO was the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, acting mainly on behalf of climate change. Another one was SNM, which was defend-
ing the global as well as local environmental interests. Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth) 
was also active; it had taken the position that storage of CO2 emission from the use of fossil 
energy was not desirable since it was still based on fossil fuel. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs, EZ, was interested in combining sustainable energy (re-
ducing CO2 emission and fossil fuel dependency) with opportunities for new Dutch industries. 
Sustainable energy might be an export product, but also the shipment of energy carriers, in 
particular biomass, in Europe might be interesting for port development. In particular in 
Groningen, in the North of The Netherlands there was a region that badly needed economic 
impulses. The Rotterdam port area was another one. However, EZ had internal dilemmas, 
since market conditions (‘playing fields’) were mainly created by measures by the European 
Commission in Brussels, where energy innovation was one of many other negotiation issues. 
These negotiations were mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. Proposing 
changes at that level would make the overall negotiation process more complex, and good 
arguments would have to be developed and shared between energy and fiscal ministries over 
Europe. EZ knew that it should somehow make the link between thinking about sustainable 
energy in The Netherlands and in Europe, but it could make no promises. It was even more 
complex because the Biofuels Directive was a responsibility of the environment ministry. So, 
three ministries would have to align their actions. People in EZ had experiences with persuad-
ing businesses to develop sustainable policies. For example, Klaas Vries had been responsible 
for developing the ‘multi-year agreements energy efficiency’ with the energy-intensive sec-
tors. One thing he had learned, he said, was that it was wrong to start with your own agenda 
by approaching the larger companies right away – they would have their own agenda. He 
clearly has used this lesson in transition management, by first listening to the energy system, 
and collecting initiatives from any corporation that fitted a joint agenda. 
VROM, the environment ministry, had a department called Climate change and Industry, 
which was responsible for general policies to reduce climate change, like the Kyoto Protocol. 
Interventions in the energy sector with a primary environmental objective generally belong 
their scope of work. It saw CO2 storage as a serious option for meeting the targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol. It was responsible for negotiating with the finance ministry about the imple-
mentation of the EU Biofuels Directive. Other parts of VROM were responsible for the other 
side effects of energy system. However, it was not primarily responsible for energy policies. 
VROM had implemented several initiatives with acronyms like COOL and DTO, which 
aimed at system innovation. However, they all had run into barriers, and people in VROM 
were almost desperate to find ways around these barriers. (Ctd next page) 
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The Finance ministry was opposing an ambitious implementation of the Biofuels Directive – 
let alone promotion of expensive energy systems without requirement from Brussels - because 
it either reduces purchasing power or raises the national budget deficit. Production cost of 
bioenergy was higher than that of fossil energy, and at least for several years this would not 
change. Political climate in general was not in favor of such interventions that create benefits 
only, if you are lucky, in the long term. The attitude of this ministry, which was not actually 
involved in the transition process, had strong influence on it. 
To activate the outside world and get feedback on the progress of it agenda and 
the transition teams, EZ organized several events. These events were mainly 
used to reconfirm support for EZ’s initiative and to improve the process. An 
event that was remembered by Arthur Groen of Klingon, was a conference EZ 
had organized on a bus in the framework of Hans Teljeur’s project ‘The Voy-
age’ in December 2001. He indicated that here the basis was formed of the later 
successful project groups and platforms. This was in his view the beginning of a 
more focused and better-underpinned shared focus on stimulation of energy 
innovations by the Dutch government. In this bus, a shared feeling emerged that 
a change was needed and that transition management was an opportunity be-
cause the government showed signs of becoming more aligned. He personally 
thought that that was important, since before that time sustainable energy poli-
cies hardly had led to successful experiments. From that moment on Groen spent 
considerable amounts of his personal time in the ETP, until in 2004 Klingon 
gave him the resources to become Klingon’s focal point for affairs of the Dutch 
energy transition process. 
Another event took place on 16 April 2003. EZ thought it was necessary to 
reemphasize the importance of the energy transition and the serious intentions of 
the government to facilitate cooperation. EZ organized a major conference. 
Among the speakers was State Secretary for Energy Joop Wijn, Deputy Director 
for Energy Klaas Vries, DG Environment Karel Zijp, and Secretary General of 
EZ Willem-Jan Oosterwijk. Klaas Vries, who had become project leader of the 
energy transition, characterized the transition discourse as ‘governed evolution’. 
Zijp emphasized the shared responsibility of keeping the process integral and 
focused on the long term, which EZ should facilitate. Oosterwijk promised to 
ask the Parliamentary committee on economic affairs their continued support for 
keeping the activity on EZ’s agenda and budget. Afterwards, Oosterwijk said he 
was surprised by the appreciation of companies, including oil multinationals, of 
the better cooperation in respect to energy policies. The busiest working session 
in the conference was the one on biomass (60 participants). All this time, EZ 
was confirmed that their approach was supported in the energy system, which 
was enough to keep support for continuation of transition management in EZ 
itself. 
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“EZ asked understanding 
for its dilemmas” 
Table 9. Biomass 2040: the green motor of knowledge economy and  
sustainability: a vision 
This vision is by and for the biomass community in The Netherlands. A group from all af-
fected domains has developed it in a period of three months. It is an initiative of the ministry 
of EZ to initiate a transition to sustainable energy. The potential for biomass as raw material 
for energy and other products is estimated at 30% of all raw materials in 2040. It can be sus-
tainable if certain conditions are closely observed during its development. It has clear benefits 
for global warming and may have benefits in rural areas, in particular in developing countries 
and in the European Union. We expect that European energy policies will facilitate the use of 
biomass, and that this is an opportunity of the Dutch knowledge economy. It has a strong 
position with regard trade, economy, science and development. A clear set of conditions for 
sustainable biomass should be developed, which should take into consideration the emissions, 
closing of mineral loops, wastes, social effects in developing countries, and prevention of 
competition with food production. We expect that the bio-energy production chain will be 
closely integrated with other uses of biomass, where a share of 20 – 45% should be possible. 
This scenario depends on a European level playing field in the raw materials markets where 
biomass competes, and where external effects are calculated in the prices. Direct competition 
between innovative sustainable raw materials and traditional raw materials is facilitated. 
There is a certification system for sustainable biomass, and emissions in industrial processes 
are controlled. Biomass is gained from wastes, but mainly produced outside of the Nether-
lands in agriculture as raw material. Research & development are motor as well as spin-off of 
the biomass transition. 
Source: www.energietransitie.nl (English summary by SN) 
Round 2: developing transition experiments 
EZ’s project director for transition management, Klaas Vries, felt supported by 
the reactions from society, but also was aware that at some point results of tran-
sition management should be visible. This was the consequence of making the 
ETP a formal project in EZ. According to the transition discourse, transition 
teams should develop visions, transition paths and market experiments. Since 
only experiments are highly visible, the accountable objective of the project 
became transition experiments. EZ’s role would be to initiate transition teams. 
In spring 2002, minister Brinkhorst promised a substantial EZ budget for the 
energy transition (35 million Euro). Subsidy would be granted if the teams could 
show that the experiments fitted a vision and transition paths that were sup-
ported in all domains, including the environmental domain. EZ would also 
evaluate the experiments on the basis of eco-
nomic and financial feasibility, and contribution 
to the competitiveness of the Dutch economy – 
these were the responsibilities of EZ. 
To develop such experiments, EZ had initiated several transition teams, and I 
will focus on one of these: the Project Group Biomass. It consisted of eleven 
representatives of oil multinational Klingon, an electricity producer, a chemical 
industry, an international bank, environmental NGO SNM and the ministry of 
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EZ, which was assisted by consultants. Albert Veenstra of DG Innovation of EZ 
led the group. The Project Group produced its advice to EZ in December 2003 
in the report ‘Biomass: the green engine in transition’. The advice consisted of a 
vision for 2040 (30% bioenergy, see Table 9), possible transition paths toward 
the vision, promising research avenues, and proposals for concrete action to 
support the chosen transition paths. Since these paths were not profitable yet, 
some kind of assistance by EZ may be needed. The biomass community in these 
cases depended on EZ’s Klaas Vries’s decision to support their investments. In 
October 2004, EZ published the Unique Opportunities Regulation for giving 
subsidy to transition-experiments that contribute to ‘EZ-recognized’ transition 
paths (see Table 10). EZ had boiled down the transition paths to these essences – 
perhaps not to preclude any proposals from coalitions that had not been involved 
in the biomass project. There was some sensitivity about this. The Project Group 
had not put forward the idea of BioSyngas as feasible for market experiments. 
Influential members of the biomass community publicly disagreed with the out-
come of the process (see Table 14). In EZ’s subsidy regulation, BioSyngas had 
returned prominently, as a link between biomass (or other raw energy sources) 
and many applications. 
EZ’s decision followed a synthesis report by EZ that was discussed by Par-
liament on 15 June 2004. The report was named ‘Innovation in energy policies. 
Energy transition: state of affairs and follow-up’. It announced that EZ envis-
aged ‘recognizing’ transition paths in five ‘main routes’ to sustainable energy. 
Candidates were the 23 transition paths proposed by the different Project 
Groups, including all ten from Biomass. The report presented in total five ‘main 
routes’ to a sustainable energy system, and biomass figured in three of them 
(which were green raw material, alternative motor fuel and sustainable power). 
It referred to over 80 specific transition-experiments to make a start with bio-
mass and other transition paths that had been generated early 2004 by market 
coalitions (with limited financial support from EZ). It promised that it would 
include criteria for subsidizing transition-experiments in the Unique Opportuni-
ties Regulation, related to the likely effectiveness of the experiment in terms of 
the transition path (e.g. demonstrable commitment of private enterprises). The 
synthesis report asked political understanding for the unspecific transition ap-
proach and its dilemmas. It referred to NMP4 and presented the transition ap-
proach as a form of innovative governance, since the biomass community (and 
the wider energy community for the other partial transitions) had developed an 
advice by itself. It saw innovation of the energy system in this time of recession 
as an opportunity to create new market for Dutch businesses as much as a need 
for sustainable energy supply. A third urgency had thus been added above secu-
rity of the energy supply and reduction of climate change, which affected EZ’s 
policy. 
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“R&D policies were 
now more aligned” 
Table 10. Some EZ-recognized transition paths 
Main route Green Raw Material: 
Biomass production: The sustainable production and transport of sustainable produced bio-
mass (‘green raw material’) for conversion to energy or as raw material for physical products. 
Biomass processing: the processing of raw biomass to (half-) fabricated articles that can be 
used for further processing or end users. 
BioSyngas: The processing of biomass to gaseous products that can be used as raw material. 
Bioplastics: The production and marketing of plastics from biological material. 
Main route Alternative motor fuel: 
Biofuels: Replacing diesel and petrol in motor vehicles by fuels of biological origin. 
Main route Sustainable Power: 
Biomass: Efficient production of electricity from fuels of biological origin. 
Source: www.energietransitie.nl 
 
EZ also indicated that it was too early to set measurable targets for the main 
routes, e.g. in terms of sustainable energy shares. The main routes should struc-
ture a continued learning process between market and government. It should 
influence ‘running (short-term) policies’, with measurable targets, as soon as 
enough lessons would have been learned. By giving examples like the hydrogen 
economy, EZ suggested that it was trying to achieve a major transition. It also 
suggested that the bottleneck in achieving it was, still, a lack of trust and coop-
eration, despite the fact that the previous two years had catered to a significant 
increase of it. EZ suggested that emphasis on short-term targets would destroy 
the strategic process. The main long-term dialogue should now be about the 
‘level playing field’. The term ‘level playing field’ as used in these discussions 
referred to all conditions under which enterprises have to work as far as created 
by the government. The government may intervene by means of fiscal or finan-
cial measures, by direct control, but it may also include expectations created by 
the government about the measures it will take in the future. However, EZ ob-
served a low sense of urgency for such a dialogue, despite the high urgency of 
sustainable energy itself. It envisaged taking a more active role in the dialogue 
within the European Union. However, the report urges that its long-term ambi-
tions should not be misinterpreted as targets for which EZ is accountable: it is 
only a facilitator of the market – but the market has to do it by itself. 
The transition paths selected market initiatives 
in some degree. There would be no financial 
support in this regulation for photovoltaic and wind 
energy, and the choices were sustained with 
arguments. For example, experiments with new gas were regarded to be a poten-
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tial step toward an energy economy based on hydrogen. However, no all saw all 
experiments as likely to trigger a market breakthrough. An example was Bio-
Syngas: although technology was available, it would only be an attractive in-
vestment if major countries would shift to this technology. The Netherlands was 
considered too small, as Arthur Groen of Klingon indicated. On the other hand, 
in due time other countries could make the shift and The Netherlands could then 
easily follow. There was no need for Dutch experiments. 
Table 11. Criteria for R&D support by EZ 
 Contribution to a sustainable energy system 
 High Low 
High Focus points Knowledge export 
themes 
Contribution to the 
knowledge econ-
omy of The Neth-
erlands 
Low 
Knowledge import 
themes No R&D theme 
Source: EZ 2004 
 
As regards other technology that was not proven yet or ripe for market experi-
ments, there was a separate R&D policy.  EZ made decisions in dialogue with 
stakeholders and experts in the framework of their Long Term Energy Research 
Strategy (EOS-LT), which was leading for subsidies. EOS-LT was not formally 
linked but conceptually it was coherent with the strategic visions that had 
emerged in the transition process, and had delivered widely accepted criteria for 
government R&D support (see Table 11). These criteria created a long-term 
focus and stability of government support, which was ‘strong as iron’ according 
to Arthur Groen. A lot money was saved in his view, and the energy researchers 
knew what they would be rewarded for. 
Round 3: Political continuation of the ETP, and creating a more strategic context 
Where energy had been the motor behind transition management during prepara-
tion of the NMP4, and the energy sector was still widely supportive of it, in June 
2004 Parliament reacted disappointed on the synthesis report. All five main 
fractions indicated that Minister Brinkhorst should have showed more leadership 
by making accountable choices for the short term. The synthesis report was in 
their view full of vagueness and hopes. Parliament was not interested in a debate 
about governance, and focused on choices for the short term, in particular an 
existing subsidy regulation, wind power, and bureaucratic obstacles to it. Some 
asked for solar energy and nuclear energy to be included in transition manage-
ment. These short-term issues were controversial, and therefore the transition 
process had not come to terms about them. The whole idea of the transition 
process had been the opposite: to develop widely shared visions for the long 
term, reasoning back towards options for the short term that everybody supports. 
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“the minister defended tran-
sition policies with ill under-
stood arguments” 
“EZ tried to connect with 
implementation power” 
Apparently the process was stuck somewhere midway the long term and the 
short term. A socio-democrat and green party member asked about more system 
regime changes (i.e. new level playing fields) that would create ‘a market for 
sustainable energy’ or ‘shifting the prices’. 
Minister Brinkhorst of EZ said in his reply that he was still accountable for 
targets for the short term (2010), but an integration framework was needed that 
had to be based in the long term. Asking commitment of the private sector was a 
way of reducing uncertainty – but the implication was that the Minister could 
not be held accountable, and therefore would not set measurable targets. As 
regards to the short term, he made his own political choices, and he referred 
vaguely to ‘fiscal greening’. Since Brinkhorst fully maintained his transition 
policies, and published the Unique 
Opportunities Regulation 6 months later, the 
Parliamentary debate may be seen as a ritual 
fight. Brinkhorst could afford to continue 
spending considerable budgets. 
The joint General Energy Council and the Council for Environment, Spatial 
Planning and Housing worded their appreciation of EZ’s and VROM’s efforts in 
an advice to Cabinet in December 2004. Their appreciation was widely shared 
by many who believed that an energy transition was needed and that this re-
quired a new type of cooperation between non-governmental and governmental 
organization. They also indicated that the process had fundamental weaknesses 
and improvements were necessary, in particular that politicians should be more 
(actively) involved. 
However, after the synthesis report and the Unique Opportunities Regulation, 
EZ took initiatives to create a more strategic context for the continuation of the 
ETP. At the end of 2005, it initiated new project groups, which were called plat-
forms. Five platforms were erected, the four original themes with an additional 
platform for alternative motor fuels. For each platform EZ had chosen a chair-
man of outstanding record. For example, the platform ‘Green resources’, succes-
sor of the project group Biomass, was chaired by Paul Hamm, former director of 
the chemical multinational DSM, and alternative motor fuels was chaired by 
Frits Hermans, former director of Shell. Each chairman was assigned to achieve 
innovations that contribute significantly to a sustainable society within four 
years. In practice this meant a switch from unsustainable to a sustainable energy 
system at a scale of at least 1% of the Dutch energy system. They received re-
sources from EZ. The objective of EZ was to raise the ETP’s profile and to get it 
closer to implementation power – the 
multinationals first. To that end an additional 
‘task force’ was established, composed of 
politically influential people and captains of in-
dustry, like Herman Wijffels, chair of the Social Economic Council, the heart of 
the Dutch polder model. This group was said to have a ‘door handle’ function – 
attaining access to organizations at the highest level. 
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“focus shifted to 
context man-
agement” 
Adaptive tensions and co-evolution 
The transition teams worked under the context of EZ’s promise to provide sub-
sidy. Until 2004, EZ created no expectations that it would help transition teams 
to develop wider support for their ideas in the government. EZ itself had, com-
pared with other ministries and lower governments, little competences as re-
gards the institutions that shape the playing field of the energy market. There-
fore, there was no adaptive tension toward change, other than the subsidies. 
Nonetheless the NMP4 had created some expectations, EZ tried to be a really 
independent moderator, and this was rewarded by positive feedback that gave 
the ETP the benefit of the doubt. Transition teams produced visions that were 
widely supported until choices between transition paths needed to be made. The 
selection among short-term development options was therefore mainly limited to 
R&D. In that sense the co-evolution was significant. However, oil multination-
als were not actively participating in experiments. They were more interested in 
co-evolutionary thinking about level playing field, and participating in experi-
ments did not help there. Possibly transition teams contained too many people 
who were heading for specific transition experiments without developing 
thought about gaining support for the market conditions 
required for the breakthrough. Successful experiments 
might, or might not provide the missing information that 
convinces to provide these conditions. That analysis was 
not made. On the other hand, less complex transition 
experiments that fit widely supported ideas about sustainable development still 
may give a contribution to sustainable development, and might even be a lever 
for a much bigger transition. 
Despite these problems, EZ could keep support for the ETP throughout. This 
was still inspired by the tensions in society; the urgency was still felt. However, 
where initially the ETP was completely focused on market experiments, in 2004 
the focus shifted from there to creating a context where more knowledge and 
influence could be connected. EZ had become aware that focus on experiments 
alone probably would not be enough to create conditions for involvement of the 
more capable players in the energy system. 
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4.4 Strategic inter-ministerial cooperation 
Summary of development rounds in the Strategic inter-ministerial cooperation 
2001 - 2005 
Keep my minister out of the wind 
 
1 – Cabinet and DGs: We need to 
produce consistent progress reports and 
create no too high expectations 
 
2 – Six ministries: We are willing to 
help society find support for sustain-
able sets of government interventions 
 Get to grips with transition man-
agement 
1 –  Parliament: We should pressur-
ize Cabinet to perform for the sake of 
sustainable development, and to 
sharpen the transition discourse 
2 – CEOs: If Cabinet is so serious 
about this, we better make sure that 
we advice them adequately. 
   
High-level coordination to provide just the right pressure  
1 –DGs, mainly environment and energy: Have regular meetings to keep least transition man-
agement on the agenda and develop more trust. This facilitated implementation of the four 
transitions which included the IB and ETP. In 2005 the DGs developed the inter-ministerial 
program, and Finance joined. 
2 – Automotives platform: The automotives platform funneled the positions of the private 
sector and NGOs via the Inter-Ministerial Energy Transition Program to the six ministries. 
This created an opportunity for CEOs who wanted change to develop proposals that fitted 
Cabinet’s request. Closed processes emerged between auto-industries and between oil-
industries to develop proposals in coopetition. 
Round 1: The Inter-ministerial Energy Transition Program (2001 – 2005) 
In November 2001, the NMP4 was discussed in Parliament. It asked Cabinet in 
a motion to yearly report about the progress of transition management. In the 
view of some this motion only created bureaucracy. For example, the environ-
ment minister Jan Pronk begged in the November 2001 debate in Parliament 
‘don’t do this to me’. In 2005, this was still an idea in the environment ministry. 
However, in the view of others the progress reports stimulated the ministries to 
at least continue their communication at DG level about progress to prevent 
inconsistencies, which would form a political risk. These were difficult to pro-
duce, because each ministry who was ‘transition manager’ had taken its own 
course. There were little similarities and little progress to be reported other than 
at process level and therefore in the eyes of Parliament difficult to explain to 
voters. In 2004 the energy ministry filed its own report in Parliament about pro-
gress of the Energy Transition Process. 
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“Parliament is not a place 
for dialogue, yet it may 
support dialogue elsewhere” 
Official discussions in Parliament were rarely about strategic social dilemmas, 
and the added value of transition management was not anymore acknowledged 
openly. One (environmental) parliamentarian said in an interview: ‘I believe in 
certain specific measures that should be implemented in the short-term, and my 
supporters expect me to advocate these. Where personally I might find long-
term dialogues important, Parliament is not a place for that’. Political signifi-
cance of transition management as such, on 
the other hand, was confirmed in October 
2003 when the Parliament challenged the 
state secretary for environment to explain the 
link between the NMP4 objectives, which 
have a 30-year horizon, and concrete actions taken by the different ministries. It 
also asked for distribution of responsibilities, and the State Secretary answered 
that each involved minister was responsible for his own transition, with a coor-
dinating role for environment to prevent ‘departmentalizing’ transition manage-
ment. 
In Cabinet, Environment Minister Jan Pronk’s role was limited after NMP4’s 
adoption. After mid 2002, in Cabinet Balkenende I and II, his role was taken by 
State Secretary for Environment Pieter Van Geel. He organized meetings with 
the involved Cabinet members, so that their reports would be coherent. At sev-
eral occasions at larger meetings of the environment sector (like at the annual 
congress of the Society of Environmental Professionals), he pleaded for the 
continuation of transition management, and in a publication in its magazine 
ArenA he compared transition management with a peat fire that should smolder 
underground, invisible for most, until the time is ripe. Reactions in the environ-
mental sector were mixed; on the one hand many people understood this, but on 
the other many were impatient. 
At the level of the civil servants, the five Director-Generals met every two 
months to discuss progress of transition management, which is said to be excep-
tional. The environment DG Karel Zijp and civil servants in EZ said later that in 
their view these meetings were important to keep transition management under 
the attention of all ministries as a joint enterprise. In that context four ministries 
started to assemble groups they called transition arenas or transition teams, as 
indicated in NMP4. The IB and the ETP’s transition teams are the most notable 
ones. They tried to vitalize these groups as learning networks, making use of 
lessons learned before 2000. They asked the arenas their advice about govern-
ment interventions (as in the greenpolder model of the 1990s, see Page 32), but 
did not specify the type of interventions nor even the policy fields to which they 
should relate. The arena should develop proposals by itself through backcasting 
(as in the sustainability research projects of the 1990s). 
As coordinator of transition management, VROM sought other roles. It initi-
ated ‘learning meetings’ between those closely involved in the implementation 
of transitions, academics and involved thinkers from different other domains. In 
2005, VROM established a Competence Center Transitions with the ministry of 
EZ and private partners, which still organized regular meetings where good 
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“Outsiders did not see the 
inter-ministerial transition 
directorate as a breakthrough” 
practice cases of transition management were presented and discussed. Mostly 
policy makers from the government, academics, environment NGOs and con-
sultants reflected on possible transition paths, and how to deal with barriers. 
After the EU conference Energy in Motion in October 2004, the five DGs 
gave a joint assignment to two ministries (VROM and EZ) to develop an Inter-
ministerial Program Directorate Energy Transition (the Dutch acronym eventu-
ally became IPE). The Ministry of Finance joined soon. In May 2005, the now 6 
DGs proposed to set up an inter-ministerial program for all EZ platforms. The 
platforms could thus develop strategic proposals to the DGs that were the joint 
‘clients’ of the platforms. Klaas Vries and the platform chairs made public 
statements about this new approach. He said in the email newsletter about the 
energy transition in April 2005, ‘We are moving from thinking to doing. The 
past five years, we have sketched a vision for the future. Now we have estab-
lished five platforms. The chairmen have set up the platforms now, and it is time 
for concrete innovative projects that will be ready in about two years.’ (Two 
years also was the time frame of the first lot of the subsidy for transition ex-
periments.) He also said ‘the platforms are the spider in the web of the imple-
mentation of these transition projects. They should listen to stakeholders and 
communicate with them about the government’s objectives and about their 
needs for innovative projects.’ (Which need to be fulfilled by the government.) 
‘An important success factor is the cooperation with other ministries. (..) An 
important success was the establishment of a platform sustainable mobility with 
the ministries of VROM and V&W. In it, EZ does the energy component, V&W 
the clean engines component and VROM the fuels component.’ The chair of the 
platform Green resources, made this more concrete in his own contribution to 
the newsletter. Among others, he indicated that politicians and CEOs should be 
involved, as well as international stakeholders. In December 2005, six ministers 
signed the agreement about the IPE. The term ‘energy transition’ was interpreted 
broadly, since it also included sustainable mobility. EZ’s manager of the ETP 
and a senior civil servant from VROM of the energy transition process led the 
IPE on a full time basis. To most outsiders, this was only the next government 
effort, likely to fail. To insiders, it was a breakthrough. 
The Task Force Energy Transition, with ex politicians and CEOs, which had 
been established in the ETP, continued to 
‘identify the necessary preconditions to 
realize innovations of the energy system’, 
‘identify focal points that relate to the 
economic chances for the Dutch economy’, 
‘ensure a sense of urgency for a transition at the highest level of government and 
industries’, ‘advise about benchmarks for the progress of the main routes of the 
energy transition’. It was to work closely with the platforms (newsletter spring 
2005). Between the lines it can be read that it should address the main dilemmas 
related to level playing field, which were too sensitive for politics to discuss 
directly. 
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“on behalf of 6 ministers, 
the IPE would break into 
fragmented policies” 
“the sustainable corporate govern-
ance discourse and the transition 
discourse went together” 
The IPE would organize dialogue between 
the six ministries and the private sector (the 
non-governmental domains) aiming at long-
term themes, initially mainly linked to sustain-
able energy (work plan IPE, Dec 2005). Non-
governmental platform chairs with outstanding reputation would be assigned to 
gather forerunners to develop long-term visions, transition paths and guide the 
dialogue to proposals for interventions. The IPE would organize a parallel dia-
logue in the six ministries. As matters would become more concrete (only the 
automotives platform had reached that stage late 2005), the platforms would set 
some kind of medium term market objectives. If the platforms would develop 
recommendations in conflict with ministerial policy lines, the DGs anticipated to 
‘break into’ running policies in the six ministries. 
The experiments of the energy transition were still in development in 2005, 
and the IPE principals believed these to be important, but they were not con-
cerned with them. The IPE was there to develop a strategic layer to enable better 
underpinning of these and possible new transition experiments. The IPE princi-
pals were worried that progress would be difficult to show to politics, if that 
would remain limited to dialogues between private and public about long-term 
issues, and about how these should ‘break in’ running policies. They saw moni-
toring of progress as important methodological problem, and experiments would 
remain useful if only to show visible progress in a more opportunistic debate. 
Round 2: The platforms under the Inter-ministerial Program Directorate Energy 
Transition (IPE) (2004 - 2005) 
Under the IPE, the platform sustainable mobility was said to be the most ad-
vanced in 2005. It had emerged from a previous platform automotives, which, 
again was created by the five DGs after the EU Conference Energy in Motion 
(October 2004), by expanding the assignment of a platform sustainable motor 
fuels that existed under the ETP. Here, I focus on the automotives, which has 
inspired the DGs to widen their joint approach under the IPE. At the EU confer-
ence, the DGs for environment, energy and transport had become aware that 
there was a momentum for a dialogue between forerunning oil and automobile 
industries. The platform had as objective to produce a visible market change of 
1% towards more sustainable automotives, within four years. It had considerable 
budget to hire chairpersons. 
In 2005 the automotives platform managed to involve key individuals and 
commitment from several major oil and automobile industries. The chairman of 
the platform indicated how he managed to attract these by indicating that the 
government was meaning business this time, that the case for sustainable auto-
motives was widely shared (as the EU 
conference polls had shown), and that 
six ministries cooperated to realize the 
interventions needed to support 
sustainable automotives. The level of 
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“the 6 DGs (through a well-functioning IPE) 
and societal platforms were believed to create 
reciprocal adaptive tensions” 
ambition was limited to what would have been achievable in four years, and at 
Dutch scale. This implied that the ambitions for level playing field (mainly by 
taxing pollution) were limited, but the steps taken might be considered levers or 
at least facilitator of further breakthroughs. When this platform started, Klingon 
and Takey, also members of the IB, were the first to act. Other CEOs of oil and 
automobile industries were then attracted to the platform because they were 
publicly committed to sustainable corporate governance. Throughout the year, 
this process became more and more attractive, and others volunteered. 
The IPE, itself government, did not specify any conditions for the chair lead-
ing a platform of private organizations. The challenge to him was to organize the 
dialogue between public and private, so that proposals could be made from both 
sides, leading to a package of interventions by different ministries and different 
industrial branches. Any element missing in the package might imply failure. 
The presence of the NGOs was needed to ensure they would give consistent 
signals to Parliamentarians. This would have to increase the political influence 
of the platform, and keep its attractiveness and momentum high. Like the chair a 
number of platform members were, as might be expected, former members of 
the IB. The lessons the IB had learned about transition management were ap-
plied again in the platform, newcomers would be taken up in this culture and 
trust would build. This local culture would, in the eyes of the chair, ensure a 
good chance of success. In his eyes the target of market breakthroughs within a 
few years, supported by the organizational arrangements of the platform and the 
history of its participants, formed a creative tension. 
Adaptive tensions and co-evolution 
The ministries were motivated to at least report coherently about progress to 
Parliament; there was a light adaptive tension to develop a common language 
about transition management. However, most they did until end of 2004 was 
organize competence centers and legitimize their civil servants to spend time on 
implementing transition management. This was perhaps more than expected 
with a view on their cooperation before 2001, and NMP4’s language of transi-
tion management was at least kept alive. In that sense the co-evolution contin-
ued in the loose networks that already were in favor of transition management. 
On the other hand, there was impatience as well. Support for transition man-
agement was mixed: on the 
one had many people were 
willing to think about it as a 
‘peat fire’, spreading 
underground, and invisible 
as well as closed to them, on the other hand it was unclear what kind of result 
would be expected, monitoring was widely seen as an important problem, and 
transition management was not useable as a political term – it was only mean-
ingful to believers, or those who gave it the benefit of the doubt. It was the adap-
tive tension of this doubt that drove politicians, DGs and platform chairs to keep 
focusing on experiments within several years. The transition discourse, they all 
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believed to be important, could not be kept alive without also promising some-
thing on the shorter term. 
It took four years before the DGs took the step of organizing the IPE, which 
was an unusual arrangement. The DGs communicated about this as a more 
credible approach to transition management. In this way they created an adap-
tive tension for themselves; as the platform would develop proposals to the gov-
ernment, it would have to speak back with one mouth. If that would not be suc-
cessful, and inconsistent messages would return from different ministries, the 
IPE would lose credibility. The expectation would not hold that the government 
would implement the interventions require to facilitate the market breakthroughs 
developed in the platforms. The thinking of the DGs along these lines, willing to 
stir-up their own organizations and take responsibility for decisions themselves 
as a team, was completely new, and was the result of co-evolution. 
The better cooperation in the government created an adaptive tension on the 
industries, and the EU conference had been a key event in that process. The 
forerunning industries were pressurized to produce proposals that were politi-
cally acceptable, and the government had created the expectation that it could 
manage that process on the government side. The platform chair had resources 
and a target that fitted the ideas that had been widely shared at the EU confer-
ence and in the ETP. Several CEOs were committed with sustainable develop-
ment and when presented this credible opportunity the platform started-up 
quickly. 
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“the government hadn’t 
asked the right question” 
5 Adaptive networks 
Trust comes on foot and goes on horseback (Thorbecke) 
In chapter 4 I have hypothesized the existence of adaptive networks, in the con-
text of a succession of power networks where co-evolution was observable. In 
the present chapter I analyze the interactions in these successive networks, look-
ing for explanations of co-evolution. I have interviewed persons closely in-
volved in the change processes, and asked how they explain changes of behav-
ior. The reflections of individuals on the behavior of others and their own behav-
ior give a series of socio-cognitive explanations with or without overlap, which I 
have merged to a bigger picture. I analyze how interviewees reflected on risk 
and trust, how they rationalized individual and collective behavior, and how 
they strived for, and explained, breakthroughs. 
5.1 Development of major sustainable policy papers 
Sustainability research and greenpolder model 
At the start of the process of developing NMP4 
there were dozens if not hundreds of policy 
makers from all domains who shared 
disappointing experiences. Already before 2000 
they had learned that proposals needed to be timely for decision-makers who 
must operate in a political force field; this was a feeling that was vaguely shared 
in loose networks. In the power networks of the greenpolder model sectoral and 
environmental policy makers negotiated about large projects, and in this context 
loose networks of sectoral and environmental lobbyists developed (see Page 32). 
In these networks people started to respect each other’s intentions. Competence 
developed to agree on complex projects where adverse impacts are compensated 
and to make this acceptable to supporter groups, whilst formulating conditions 
for further policy making. However, representatives from NGOs and from the 
private sector had also learned that the greenpolder model did not know how to 
create sustainable reforms. The government hadn’t asked the right question: 
under the greenpolder model the government already had a specific type of in-
tervention in mind (a spatial decision) and only asked advice about that specific 
intervention. Any other advice to the government would be untimely, because 
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“shared frustrations had 
created respect and trust” 
the hierarchical ‘government machine’ hadn’t formulated its operational objec-
tives in that way. It was a closed shop, a limiting condition in the search for 
sustainable development. Many lobbyists were left with the idea that they should 
link up with people with knowledge of sustainable reforms under a different 
power context, but they had no idea how to develop influence to achieve that 
context, or whom they could trust to work towards that influence; in other words 
they had no foresight of possible success. 
In sustainability research the situation was the opposite. Long-term research 
and environmental policy networks drove this process, but the sectoral systems 
were unable to take up their recommendations. Limiting condition here was lack 
of influence. The proposals were not accepted by implementing power networks, 
in particular CEOs. The proposals did not match with short-term objectives. 
Joint research projects, without any involvement of decision-makers at the high-
est level, develop results that can only be timely by chance – and the odds are 
small. 
These frustrations, which included decision-makers, had led to a combination 
of trust and a joint challenge: to create a context where governments as well as 
private groups can learn to develop proposals that do lead to a desired develop-
ment, and that are politically timely. Several policy makers were aware that this 
might require patience – not, like in the past, using the momentum of one spe-
cific ‘power wave’ like a spatial plan under development or a sustainable devel-
opment scenario, but keeping sustainable options in mind and look for opportu-
nities to bring them a step forward. In other words, make sustainable develop-
ment independent of the pre-existing agendas 
of power networks. 
This shared trust and foresight made the 
unspecific transition policies of NMP4 come at the right time for influential 
lobbies - whereas thanks to their vagueness they were not perceived as a threat 
by vested interests. Several were aware that the tensions in the wider systems 
were increasing: the threat of shortage of energy and high fuel prices, as well the 
failing belief that congestion would be solvable by creating more traditional 
infrastructure solutions, were widely supported. Climate change and (later) air 
pollution added to the widely felt urgency. The right time for breakthrough pro-
posals was nearing, and individuals across subsystems knew where to find each 
other and where they stood. 
There was therefore in the early 2000s a wide sense that environmental poli-
cies needed an innovative approach, overcoming the limiting conditions: the 
closed shop of the greenpolder model and the lack of influence of the sustain-
ability research projects. If anybody knew how, they would be greeted enthusi-
astically. Some internal trust had developed in these loose networks, but no 
external trust (the right power context was precisely what was missing) and 
foresight was a joint analysis of the bottleneck: linking up to implementation 
power. 
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Round 1: Management support for transition management (around 2000) 
For the loose networks mentioned above, NMP4 was an opportunity to create 
external trust i.e. a stable power network with adaptive tensions for a new proc-
ess that would overcome the previous limitations. This is why the NMP4 team 
developed the transition discourse. 
The NMP4 would be co-signed by several ministers, including those respon-
sible for environment and energy. Therefore an inter-ministerial team was estab-
lished, led by Jan Kort of VROM. Hans Teljeur represented EZ with a few col-
leagues. Other important ministries were also involved. This NMP4 team took 
the academic idea of transition management to core environmental and energy 
policies. In the context of the NMP4 team, a power network where ministries 
watched out for inconsistencies with running policies, close cooperation devel-
oped between Jan Kort and Hans Teljeur. Teljeur also was responsible for sus-
tainable energy scenarios in the Economic Affairs ministry EZ. This team de-
veloped the text about transition management. They had concerns about the 
political acceptance of such an unspecific statement. A strong tradition was to 
set quantitative targets for environmental indicators, that can be monitored so 
that Parliament can reward or punish the administration. However, in the transi-
tion discourse, accountable targets were thought to be useless and even may 
produce a misleading appearance of certainty, whilst the transition discourse 
offered a different way to deal with uncertainty. Uncertainties and risks would 
have to be more shared in the process, by 
giving a role to forerunners in all domains. 
This process should be initiated and 
moderated by the government. 
In the NMP4 development process, a series of meetings between national 
think tanks and academics applying evolutionary economic models and civil 
servants from VROM and EZ, had led to the joint idea of transition manage-
ment. According to team leader Jan Kort things got together when at a certain 
point prof. Jan Rotmans presented his ideas of transitions and integrated think-
ing. It became suddenly clear to the group that integrated thinking had to de-
velop between organizations that jointly can create enough knowledge and in-
fluence to actually make a difference. A VROM-member of the NMP4 team: 
‘We understood that it was not enough to only be focused on the 2010 Kyoto 
targets to abate CO2 emissions – we should already begin to worry what should 
happen after that.’ 
Jointly developing storylines for future development of the energy system 
created a further joint understanding, merging academic knowledge with practi-
cal knowledge about the energy system and energy policies. The skills required 
for integrative thinking and learning were actively discussed, making use of 
terms like basket of aims, backcasting, joint action, separating strategic thinking 
from instrumental thinking, ‘system governance’. A particular term that later 
became widely used and communicated was the S-curve. It indicated the stages 
of a transition, including the possibility to influence the initial stage by strategic 
integral thinking. In an unpublished paper by the inter-ministerial NMP4 team, 
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months after the NMP4 had been published, transition management was identi-
fied as the third generation of environmental governance, after hierarchical con-
trol and negotiations with target groups. 
The question was whether politics would accept such a document that made 
Cabinet seem not to have a clear direction. To get more certainty several meet-
ings were organized with civil society, and there were indirect contacts with 
Parliamentarians. The transition ideas were received with cautious encourage-
ment. Insiders were aware that this was difficult to explain to their wider sup-
porter groups, but personally thought that the transition discourse had some 
potential. The transition discourse was first accepted in the administrations of 
EZ and VROM, whose supporter groups liked the idea. 
Rounds 2 and 3: Political decision-making (Spring 2001) 
The Cabinet agreement to share responsibility for transition management was 
enabled by EZ minister Annemarie Jorritsma. In April 2001, she wrote a letter to 
Parliament that she wanted to become ‘manager of the energy transition’. She 
made no detailed statement at the time. Her responsibility was elusive, and she 
took no great political risk (other than perhaps being accused of inefficiency, but 
then no significant budget was initially reserved for managing the energy transi-
tion.) But she created an adaptive pressure for other ministers to follow her ex-
ample. 
The Cabinet decision therefore largely had to be explained by the learning 
process in EZ itself. The proposal made to the minister by her civil servants was 
the result of a process where ideas co-evolved in the loose networks of sustain-
able energy, and Parliament could recognize transition management as a credi-
ble approach for sustainable development. This proposal was made to the minis-
ter because the EZ principals had participated in the learning process. Principals 
in this ministry, including Norbert Zwaan, Director-General for energy at the 
time, saw it as an opportunity: it wanted to be transition manager. After the lib-
eralization of the energy sector, EZ would need a new task. However, coopera-
tion between EZ and VROM had not been really constructive in the past, so how 
could this happen? 
Higher management in EZ was not interested at first in using the complicated 
NMP4 process to reach joint objectives. In the early 2000s, the dominant politi-
cal stance toward the energy sector was still that it should become more efficient 
through privatization.  NMP4 however was likely to become a highly conceptual 
process with a scattered action program, creating no major new responsibilities 
for non-environmental ministries. The management team of EZ was not giving it 
attention until Hans Teljeur convinced them that a link should be made with 
another EZ project called ‘long term energy outlook’ (LTVE). This link proved 
to be pivotal for transition management to be accepted by Cabinet. Teljeur used 
LTVE to do a series of interviews in the energy sector (Progress Report De Reis 
17 September 2001) EZ received constructive advices about the types of sus-
tainable energy futures to pursue and about its own role to achieve these futures. 
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“the energy sector requested 
EZ to pick up this new role” 
“sustainable development is no negotia-
ble outcome if power comes together 
for spatial decisions” 
Most interviewed market actors said that they were prepared to commit to such a 
process. 
However, as possible energy futures were discussed in more detail, there was 
some controversy. Biomass was controversial because it was very uncertain if 
sufficient green supply of it could be organized, and whether it should be used 
as biofeedstock in power plants, or to prepare transport biofuels. Photovoltaic 
solar energy was not widely seen as an option that should break through in the 
clouded country of The Netherlands (though solar panels might be an export 
product). People differed views about the likelihood that hydrogen would ever 
be a cheap and safe energy carrier, and the usefulness of investing in that. Nu-
clear energy was still taboo. Through these interviews it became clear that the 
energy sector and stakeholders were prepared to participate in dialogues about a 
new energy system, and several robust options were consistently mentioned. 
Biomass was one of these. 
Norbert Zwaan confirmed later that they believed the transition initiative 
would be widely appreciated since they were asked by the energy sector to do 
this. EZ’s management team endorsed the 
idea that ‘an energy transition was 
inevitable, and that society requested a new 
role of the government to influence that 
transition to make the energy system more sustainable’. EZ would be the appro-
priate ministry to coordinate that processes, since it was ‘the ministry that en-
sures that the lights stay on’. The NMP4 was an opportunity to give that role a 
legitimate basis (i.e. a power context). 
On the other hand, support in EZ was mixed – only few people understood 
the idea. In VROM, several people believed that VROM would be ‘giving away’ 
responsibility for environmental problems (and therefore influence) to other 
ministries, in return for a possible coordination task that was not very politically 
attractive. Not everybody 
belonged to the loose networks 
that shared the experience that 
‘pushing’ does not help. Kort and 
Zwaan needed to convince the independent thinker Jan Pronk about transition 
management. Then, the issue became which ministry would implement which 
transition. Here, Kort, Teljeur and Zwaan offered Jorritsma to take the first step. 
Kort: ‘We were aware that transitions are too big for VROM to manage. On the 
other hand we wanted VROM to coordinate because we knew that the pitfall 
would be that the other ministries would quickly redress their transition to ordi-
nary policy, losing the idea of integrated thinking. Coordination at Cabinet level 
was not an option, so we accepted to do that at DG level.’ 
Trust and foresight 
The limiting factor for sustainable development had in loose sustainable devel-
opment networks been analyzed as the link between knowledge and power. The 
greenpolder model brought implementation power together but was a closed 
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shop; they had learned that sustainable development is not a trick of power; 
sustainable development is no negotiable outcome if power comes together for 
spatial decisions. It is too complex to develop and implement a sustainable, 
alternative development in that context. Sustainability research programs, quite 
the opposite, produced knowledge about alternatives scenarios, but that was 
untimely and therefore not accepted by networks with implementation power. 
They had learned that sustainable development is not a powerless trick. The 
loose networks had become aware that a more patient process of cooperation 
with implementation power was needed, and some saw the NMP4 as an oppor-
tunity to create a context for that. The limiting factor at that stage, had become 
the political credibility of the idea of transition management. Credibility de-
pended on a balanced approach of forerunners from the public and private do-
main, to make sectoral borders permeable. If the government is confronted with 
a united team of forerunners from relevant corners of society, and society is 
confronted with a united team of forerunners from relevant parts of the govern-
ment, both sides will be attracted to each other. There will be more trust that the 
other side will make credible propositions. 
A process of change therefore had to start at both sides simultaneously. The 
team EZ-VROM developed the idea of transition management in its sustainable 
development networks. They sensed how the outside world would react to this, 
and the reactions were favorable. There was wide agreement that the first step to 
bridge the gap public – private had to be taken by the government, and that this 
required a coordinated approach. Coordination was therefore the first step, in 
order to initiate a process with balance between public and private forerunners. 
In this context the team VROM-EZ developed transition management as an 
idea that was not (at least not yet) accountable. The core idea was that the gov-
ernment would moderate private forerunner groups in society as learning net-
works in order for the government to feel a pressure to respond to the proposals 
of these networks, which would enable the coordination in the government that 
was lacking. However, such a proposal would be against traditions in the gov-
ernment, and took some courage to develop. The NMP4 team gained support 
from especially businesses in the energy sector, next to many individuals sharing 
the experiences of before. The team succeeded in preparing a formulation that 
was acceptable to both the minister of environment and of energy, despite being 
unspecific. NMP4 was accepted but political credibility of transition manage-
ment depended on a small number of enthusiastic members of Cabinet and Par-
liament. The credibility was temporarily improved because politicians gave the 
ministries of VROM and EZ the benefit of the doubt, trusting in their intentions 
and competencies. In short, the NMP4 team succeeded to make the ministerial 
borders permeable, at least for a while. 
The involved outsiders dispersed the idea, although it was difficult to under-
stand for outsiders. There was an implicit expectation, based on previous inter-
actions, that in the other domains the discourse would also be defended. This 
chain of trusts extended into Parliament, where they created an opportunity for 
minister Jorritsma. Where foresight in the loose networks was limited to a vague 
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feeling that power and knowledge might be brought closer together, Zwaan, 
Kort, Teljeur and others speculated about the implementation of transition man-
agement and the possible effectiveness of a shared responsibility with coordina-
tion by VROM. However, this only had become possible because Teljeur and 
Kort got along so well and convinced EZ’s management. At large, the idea of 
transition management was still hardly understood in both ministries. The 
VROM-EZ network had operated on their joint foresight, relied on each other 
for support, and hold on to their arguments. 
After the adoption of NMP4 by Cabinet, the new limiting condition became 
the continued political credibility of the idea of transition management, so that 
political players would allow each other to give it attention and to manage the 
process together, enabling their people to work together rather than work in 
parallel. The NMP4 team had temporarily created that credibility, but transition 
management still had to prove its value. 
5.2 Think tanks for sustainable mobility 
Round 1: mobilization of the mobility board (summer 2001 – winter 2001) 
Failing attainability of travel destinations and the contribution of transport to 
climate change and disturbance of the local environment already had been on the 
public agenda for years. IB members sensed in 2001 that breakthroughs were 
necessary, urgent and possible, if only cooperation could be created to enable 
successful ideas to develop. An idea about how to achieve such cooperation was 
missing, but several IB members were aware that this needed time to grow. 
The NMP4 and the V&W (transport) minister’s formal commitment legiti-
mized Bas Harms’s initial efforts. Transition management was not an idea of the 
transport ministry itself, and despite NMP4 it could easily have focused on other 
priorities. A mixture of personal commitment with the idea of sustainable mobil-
ity, and the small possibility that this could develop into something bigger, 
drove a handful of V&W civil servants to do this. Harms did a series of inter-
views to see whether enough people could be interested to start a dialogue about 
transition management in the mobility system. Positive signals returned, and the 
IB quickly self-organized. 
These signals were also paradoxical: 
whereas transition management was seen 
as an open concept that could lead to anything, it was precisely this openness 
and the involvement of several ministries that created expectations. Several 
envisaged participants were personally interested in the theme and they were not 
scared off by uncertainty. The mobility and environment NGOs, as well as sev-
eral people from the industry, were already aware that an open commitment of 
the government would one way or the other be necessary for breakthroughs. The 
same is true on the side of the energy and environment ministries where people 
with similar experiences to those of Harms, De Jong (environment movement) 
and Van Dongen (mobilists’ association) had developed the idea of transition 
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“a year was needed to develop 
self-confidence as a group” 
management which had become prominent cabinet policy and were now sup-
porting each other to participate in the IB. 
The group was therefore attracted to each other because they were prepared 
to invest in an uncertain process with a common end, and because they knew 
that the other participants were influential and knowledgeable in important parts 
of the mobility system. They believed each other’s intentions and competencies, 
and that if any, this group would be capable of make steps. In particular the 
participation of Jeroen Tulp, the influential deputy DG of V&W, created an 
expectation that the group could have influence. Some of the others perhaps 
were more attracted by other opportunities this interesting group might offer. 
The group came together every two months, and in 2002 it called itself Innova-
tion Board. 
Round 2: Joint preparation of the EU conference Energy in Motion (2002 – 2004) 
The first good year of the IB was spent on orientation what the group may be 
doing, and how they would do that. It was quickly agreed that the IB would 
focus on sustainable mobility as defined by 
the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development, and that it would not be 
given any formal status. All members 
needed to participate purely on their personal behalf, and not on behalf of their 
organization. The group shared a feeling of unfulfilled potential. There were 
widely felt and urgent problems with mobility, but the social structure of the 
system was complex and inert. Many previous initiatives to implement sustain-
able innovations had failed, for example because environmentalists protected, or 
the investment was too high and reduction of environmental impact did not re-
turn on the investment. Now, for the first time, a group like this was together 
and prepared to discuss these sensitive issues, and it knew that the governmental 
representatives were legitimized to give this some attention, driven by the politi-
cal expectations NMP4 were said to have created. In hindsight people indicate, 
‘Apparently a year was needed to build trust among the participants and to get 
things going’. 
Participants agree that their working method as of 2003 started to function 
better and brought new insights and opportunities for joint action to light. The 
working method developed in interaction, and was not ‘invented’ by any single 
actor. It consisted of six-weekly two-and-a-half, sometimes three-hour meetings 
with a combination of scanning and in-depth analyzing. The scanning was about 
current events in everyone’s domain, discussing actions taken by IB members 
and lessons learned, and in depth analysis concerned specific topic, often with a 
guest speaker. 
The idea of an EU conference appeared in summer 2003. The IB quickly re-
alized that this was an opportunity to create impact in the mobility system. He 
ensured that this task was assigned to personnel with the appropriate process 
skills to ensure that the preparations would not be dominated by the agenda of 
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“the IB members complemented each 
other’s knowledge and influence” 
the transport ministry itself. The IB members of the ministries for energy and 
environment did the same, and they made a joint proposal to their ministers. 
At a certain point, the issue of fuels and propulsion systems was chosen for 
the conference. It had potential since it was close to the knowledge and influ-
ence of the many group members, and it also had an international dimension. 
They saw The Netherlands as a potential and credible area for experiments for 
new automotives systems, since it did not have its own automobile industry, but 
several conditions for such experiments would have to be fulfilled internation-
ally. Climate change and reliability of energy supply had already been on the 
European agenda, but there was no breakthrough in sight. The European Union 
was still mainly focused on diesel systems and decoupling of economic growth 
and transport growth, and this was clearly not going to solve the problem. This 
made fuels and propulsion systems an appropriate issue for the EU conference. 
The group realized that a more common mindset in Europe would be needed 
to create more support for specific interventions. Yet, such support could only 
emerge in dialogue, and the required interventions could not be known in ad-
vance. This general idea led the IB members who belonged to the ministries to 
let their ministries work closely 
together in the conference 
preparations, and the industries and 
NGOs to stimulate their arenas to 
have an active stance toward the conference. The IB sensed that they needed to 
connect primarily with the oil and automobile industries, the only ones who 
would be able to implement sustainable automotives. They consciously tried to 
create a context for that, but they needed to be sure that everyone would work 
from a coherent mind set. One participant said afterwards about this period: 
‘Participants were really complementary, since some could offer long-term sce-
narios and possibilities, others could identify the possibilities to adjust short-
term policies, some were skilled in creating systemic overviews and technologi-
cal possibilities. Yet, others could take this knowledge home and align it with 
actions.’ Certain members were able, through their interventions, to integrate 
that thinking: individuals started to see connections and possibilities in the same 
way. People could also make use of their personal networks in their own organi-
zations, to find additional knowledge and to check the validity of assumptions. 
This is how their vision emerged and how it was applied and updated. At-
tracted by the EU conference, they developed by the end of 2003 a set of roads 
to sustainable mobility futures, which they called a mental map or mind map 
(Figure 9). Many of these options consisted of combinations of technologies 
under development in subsystems (a portfolio of innovation initiatives). Many 
would have difficulties breaking through without supporting government poli-
cies. The system descriptions focused on its physical appearance, and the steps 
focused on actions needed by relevant stakeholders. The map was drawn as a 
matrix, and the narrative behind it was largely shared in meetings and quickly 
summarized on paper. The mind map distinguished innovations at the level of 
technology, individuals and society that would be conceivable within time spans 
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of 0 - 4 years, 4 – 8 years or more than 8 years. In this way, the linkages be-
tween the long term and the short term, as well as between system components, 
became visible. 
Figure 9. The mind map of the IB early 2004 
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Explanation: most terms in the mind map are only comprehensible for insiders since they 
refer to Dutch innovation processes or ideas. Shaded areas represented closely interdependent 
ideas. They were 1) automotives, 2) demand driven system innovations in transport produc-
tion chains, 3) pricing and fiscal greening, 4) reducing transport demand, 5) noise package, 
and 6) dual mode and vehicle conduct systems. The arrows cluster the whole and formed the 
three main the transition paths to sustainable mobility. 
 
By iterating between possible developments and their implications for human 
welfare, six more or less interlinked routes to sustainable development were 
discovered. Each route assumed a natural order of events, from certain innova-
tions being introduced in the market, conditions put in place by the government, 
consumers reacting, and so on and so forth. One route concerned the relatively 
autonomous subsystem of fuel and propulsion systems of vehicles, which was 
related to reliability of energy supply, climate change and local environmental 
quality. Another was aiming at the behavior of travelers, reducing pressure on 
the environment, within a given supply of transport options. A third was to de-
velop new transport modes that intrinsically cause less use of environmental 
resources and maintain a fair attainability for all. A fourth one was to increase 
  
 Adaptive Networks 125
“members connected their 
new knowledge with their 
formal role ” 
the efficiency of the use of physical space for transport, in particular in sensitive 
areas. Finally, there are the innovations that mitigate side effects of the present 
system, and the general idea of putting pressure on the system to change by 
calculating a price for side effects of behavior. 
The IB now had a coherent set of ideas of what a sustainable automotives 
system might be, how it fitted in sustainable mobility at large, and they would be 
capable of separating truths from clear nonsense and certainties from uncertain-
ties, and they knew all would be consistent about that in their power interactions 
when the prepared the EU conference. The IB did not communicate this com-
plex idea as such to the outside world, but the IB members knew that they could 
now develop concrete action and had a common language to verify if the actions 
of other members fitted the common interest and to pilot ideas based on that 
thinking in their communication with the outside world. 
The moment that this mind map emerged in the eyes of the group as a whole 
is therefore remembered as a breakthrough. The ideas were in themselves not 
new but they were linked together in a collectively meaningful way. The group 
explicitly used the map from that moment on to explore and prioritize options, 
identify crucial uncertainties and undertake actions to reduce these uncertainties, 
for example by means of R&D. All members interviewed in this period indi-
cated that the process had become unique and important. Many also said that at 
this time the transport ministry should not institutionalize the IB, since that 
would imply a possibility of political control over the process. Several of the 
ideas on the IB’s agenda did not match the public agenda of the transport minis-
try, and the ministry itself was still hardly connected to the IB. 
As during the conference preparations 
several IB members acted in their formal role 
as representative of an organization, they 
started to communicate in their own circles in 
careful steps about slightly different perceptions of automotives. As they re-
ceived feedback, the IB collectively determined how that affected their mind 
map as regards automotives, combined the new knowledge. Without being too 
explicit about it, Jeroen Tulp took this with him as leader of the conference, and 
the organizing team of three ministries hardly could see that he based his behav-
ior on the IB. Only the IB members, and sometimes their superiors, could see 
the significance behind the scenes of the IB. This was a conscious line of action 
that had been agreed from the start. The arguments would have to have their 
own influence, and not the force of who said it (the IB), or the organizations in 
the mobility system could easily fall back in power struggles. 
In this period the IB consciously tried to remain balanced – in the sense that 
all domains that are key to sustainable automotives were involved in IB and 
therefore the IB as a whole would maintain sight on technically and politically 
feasible implementation scenarios. This is why at a certain point they invited 
Kees van Arkel of car manufacturer Takey. Takey was a well-known forerunner 
with automotives. In the dialogue several scenarios were discussed, and the link 
between fuel and car technology brought new interesting scenarios to light. Van 
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“cooperation in the govern-
ment was needed to attract 
vested industries” 
“the IB’s ideas resur-
faced in a new context ” 
Arkel indicated at a certain point: ‘But this is not consistent with Takey’s strat-
egy’. Then Groen of oil multinational Klingon helped Van Arkel to find argu-
ments that could make the scenario interesting for Takey. 
Round 3: The EU conference and the automotives platform (October 2004 – 
summer 2005) 
At the EU conference itself several IB members were present. They were satis-
fied with the conference, because they saw that the level of agreement at the 
conference influenced power networks. They were also satisfied because they 
had shown that the IB could function as they had intended, moderating behind 
the scenes between organizations that normally have difficulties to work to-
gether. Afterwards, the IB member from EZ said, ‘My ministry probably could 
not have organized such a constructive conference’. Other IB members indicate 
that it had been critical that Tulp had become, through his interactions in the IB, 
open to a wider scope for the EU conference: not only focusing on technology, 
but also on consumer behavior and spatial aspects. 
On the other hand, few civil servants in V&W had picked up this thinking, 
and IB members realized that continued tensions would be needed to keep V&W 
in motion, in particular with a view on the opportunities created by the confer-
ence. IB members felt that pressures needed to be built on the auto and oil indus-
tries, since the energy could now be used constructively rather than wasted on a 
standoff situation where initiatives from the 
fuels sides did not match initiatives from the 
auto side, which made the whole process less 
credible. Tacitly, a few IB members had 
realized that the crucial uncertainty was in 
organizing the influence on vested industrial interests, and that these could only 
be challenged to cooperate if the government would organize itself more inte-
grally and create serious expectations for action. 
The IB itself had therefore an uncomfortable feeling around the time of the 
EU conference. In autumn 2004 some members decided that it was time for a 
self-evaluation of the group. Certain members had been pushing for joint ex-
periments in the market but there was insufficient belief that this could be suc-
cessful. And the most telling sign of lost energy was that people started missing 
meetings after the success of Energy in Motion. It felt as if the source of their 
inspiration had disappeared. The evaluators talked individually with all other IB 
members, after which the group came together again. Both the interviews and 
the resulting plenary discussion indicate that there still was some energy, but 
that in particular Tulp and some of the less 
engaged IB members were disappointed that 
apparently the group had failed to develop a 
more concrete perspective on next steps after the 
conference. 
At the time they did not realize that the conference itself would create its 
own momentum, the IB would be overtaken by the DGs, and IB’s members 
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“trust was gov-
ernanced” 
concerned with automotives would be getting together under that new power 
context. Having an opportunity to sit in the now really influential platform, or in 
its supporting working groups, rewarded IB members for their earlier efforts. 
They could see that their ideal was closer to becoming reality, and they could 
now contribute in a more formal capacity. In addition, the success of the transi-
tion path automotives motivated the IB to continue working as an informal 
group toward breakthroughs in other transition paths. 
Trust and foresight 
The IB created several breakthroughs in thinking about sustainable mobility. 
The domains that could implement and legitimate the government’s role seri-
ously discussed alternative scenarios for automotives. NGOs with large sup-
porter groups helped each other. The Dutch mobility system was widely known 
as inert and complex. There was a tradition of conflict about infrastructure and 
encouragement of transport. Different subsystems, like the environment ministry 
linked to environment NGOs, the energy ministry linked to the energy sector, 
and the transport ministry linked to the transport sector and mobilists’ NGOs, all 
had developed their own prior way of reasoning about sustainable transport, and 
had positioned themselves in the political arena. For example, parts of the envi-
ronmental movement favored a limitation of car transport, the mobilists’ group 
had been against road pricing, the car industry and the oil industry did not know 
where to invest because they said the government should first ‘choose a future’ 
and put the appropriate incentives in place. The government’s reflex had been to 
return responsibility to society since it neither had the knowledge nor the sup-
port for drastic decisions. Several IB members realized, that this ‘game of not 
sharing responsibilities’ never was going to lead to a pro-active breakthrough in 
policies, unless connecting analyses were first shared more widely. This fore-
sight motivated the group. 
Several IB members had known each other from the previous conflicts (the 
greenpolder model), and they were quickly mobilized as V&W initiated the 
transition team. There was trust in a stable context in Cabinet, at least for a 
while, so directors of three ministries participated. They also trusted that sus-
tainable mobility would remain an urgent issue in societal organizations, and a 
potential opportunity for industries. Therefore, the context in these domains also 
seemed to remain favorable. When the group became interesting enough for 
deputy DG Tulp to join, it combined an unprecedented span of knowledge and 
influence in the Dutch mobility system. There was an atmosphere like ‘we are 
going to help each other to act for sustainable mobility’. 
However the first year was completely spent on developing an identity: what 
do we want to achieve and how to do that. It was clear that given sensitivity of 
the issues there needed to be absolute certainty that no one was driven by partial 
interests, which was why the IB was never a formal 
group, and nobody was paid. Trust was explicitly 
governanced (see Table 12 at the end of this section). By 
freely exchanging information about developments in the 
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parts, combinations of IB members could be made who linked their knowledge 
and influence for joint R&D type of activities. 
The IB was aware that sustainable mobility is a broad ranging issue and fo-
cus was needed. This subject was quickly chosen for three reasons: a majority 
was knowledgeable and influential in automotives, they saw chances, and it was 
appropriate for an EU conference. The EU conference and the choice of automo-
tives gave the IB a clear focus and their actions were in a considerable degree 
led by foresight of the social process needed for market breakthroughs. To be 
sure that everyone agreed about the idea of sustainable automotives, however, 
the mind map was seen as crucial – it was seen as a language, a tool for manag-
ing internal trust – that ensure all worked from coherent ideas. Under the crea-
tive tension of the EU conference this mind map quickly emerged, and it formed 
a trust basis needed to let knowledge flow freely across the European mobility 
system, through the IB. Whereas some specific participants consciously pointed 
to the need to guard coherence, functioning as a kind of conscience for the IB, 
all saw this overarching problem description for mobility as a breakthrough for 
the IB’s functioning. 
Foresight also is observable through remarks IB members made in interviews 
about management of tensions to move the oil and automobile industries, as well 
as the ministries, in a position where the gap public – private could be bridged. 
It seems as though this was not discussed really that explicitly in the IB’s meet-
ings, but several IB members clearly were directional in their actions. They 
consciously tried to build cases they could use in their own organizations to see 
reality slightly differently, and made use of the knowledge acquired in the IB. 
This is for example how the environment NGO made a case (in small cautious 
steps) that cars may be sustainable. It is how Klingon made a case that there may 
be a possible momentum for sustainable motor fuels where the forerunners may 
have a benefit (despite competing with its own traditional activities). Finally, the 
IB tried to focus on the weakest link in their case. At a certain point they saw car 
technology, and willingness in the automobile industry to support change, as the 
weakest link, which is why they consciously invited Van Arkel. Van Arkel was 
new to this network, and it took some time for him to adopt the same kind of 
systems thinking and to invest in the tension between sustainable automotives 
scenarios and the strategies of Takey. 
The IB was taking slow steps, attracted by the EU conference, in a direction 
they sensed was necessary to link to implementation power. They facilitated co-
evolution in power networks. They made no hasty choices for scenarios where 
critical implementers were not linked to the process. However, the power con-
text they sought at the end of the day organized itself and was even rather unex-
pected. Late 2004, the IB had no further ideas about what next after the EU con-
ference, but right at that time the five DGs came with a proposal for the automo-
tives platform. Important was that soon after, the finance ministry also was 
linked. This was a power interaction – it had become clear to Finance that mo-
mentum was building up around them. At the same time it was clear for this 
group, that ambitions had to be tempered – there was still no political support 
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“the gap public – private was 
bridged at the highest level” 
anywhere in sight for drastic change of the fiscal structure of the fuels or motors 
market. Purchasing power was still sacred, and the EU posed limitations on what 
The Netherlands could do. Therefore, in 2005, the automotives platform sensi-
bly aimed at breakthroughs that would be feasible within these limitations, and 
that also would be consistent with the mind map. In other words, the short-term 
market breakthroughs should form a lever for further changes. For example, like 
the hybrid car might be step toward a hydrogen car. 
This makes the point clear that the limiting factor of trust for the IB always 
had been their span of knowledge and influence. They only could moderate co-
evolution in parts of the mobility system that they were connected with, and 
where ‘political movement’ was conceivable. The complexity of their own mind 
map and the coherent actions derived from that, had a limit. Their implicit strat-
egy had been to connect the parts that together can create momentum to take 
further steps – in the direction of Finance and the European Commission. The IB 
seems to have had no hope of creating a span of influence that would include 
organizations that may create wide support for measures that would go at the 
expense of purchasing power. In other words: switching to sustainable automo-
tives should not go at the expense of that. Yet, within that boundary a lot was 
thought to be possible, if enough cooperation between market and political com-
petitors could be achieved. 
The question is, in which degree have all these thoughts been shared in the 
IB. It is my impression that this was limited to a core group, and not really made 
explicit by them either. They, and the rest of the IB, simply had an understand-
ing that all would act from the point of view of the mind map, and some indi-
viduals (the best systems thinkers) created at critical points support for inviting 
new participants to address the weak links in their case toward sustainable 
automotives. 
In 2005, a whole new power context had 
emerged for automotives. There was an 
expectation that social dilemmas about 
sustainable automotives and power 
interventions could be discussed in the automotives platform, which could be 
fed by a dialogue between the public and private sectors at the highest level, 
perhaps even with a direct link to Parliament. There was an expectation of over-
coming the bureaucratic inertia in this way, whilst making use of all the avail-
able knowledge. This expectation gave life to the whole automotives subsystem 
– this would not strand prematurely as other initiatives had. This power context 
also attracted the laggards. Several IB members participated in the platform and 
continued their mode of operation there. Other than that, IB members also un-
dertook other joint activities that matched the mind map, and at the end of 2005 
the IB itself was discontinued, and several of its members participated in other 
platforms about sustainable mobility, which were comparable to the automotives 
platform. They took their mindset and their working method with them, and it 
may be said that the IB itself was a temporary manifestation of a local culture 
that lived on in other networks. Among several members of this network there 
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was a wish to link this more to international networks, since after the EU con-
ference multinational corporations remained involved, but the process was 
mainly aimed at market change that could be implemented without cooperation 
of other European governments. On the other hand, as one IB member said: ‘it 
will be difficult to export the IB’s working method as a model for learning net-
works.’ The international snowball groups organized by the conference team 
were only partly successful – IB members had observed that Dutch civil servants 
displayed power behavior rather than adaptive behavior, trying to convince oth-
ers of their point rather than engaging in dialogue. The snowball groups quickly 
died afterwards. 
Table 12. The explicit dealing with trust in the IB 
The IB increased its internal trust significantly during its existence. Intentional trust was there 
in the initial group, but the group still had to develop joint steps to take toward possible inter-
ventions. Such steps entailed risk before the vested interests. Gradually, the IB developed a 
competence to do that, by making use of opportunities and by defining small steps toward 
support. 
The importance of trust. Many IB members claimed that they would not have changed their 
behavior had they not trusted other IB members or trusted the continuation of transition man-
agement as wider government initiative. Only when IB members were confident that the IB’s 
complex ideas could be underpinned (and that other IB members were faithfully offering their 
knowledge), did they stand up in their home organizations and test new ideas before a larger 
public. ‘Sworn enemies’ like the SNM and Takey could make a joint ad in a national newspa-
per in February 2005, because two people had come to trust each other in the IB. Offering 
strategic information about the attitude of significant parts of the supporters group, and devel-
oping shared strategies for change toward each other’s supporters, required a confidence that 
such information would not be used for other, more opportunistic causes. 
Development of trust, an increasingly efficient working method (clearer perception of the 
process required for success) has swept each other up throughout the life of the IB. Smaller 
breakthroughs, only visible to the IB itself, were crucial. The initial IB group must have had 
basic trust and dialogue skills. These were perfected in interaction to an efficient working 
method. The integrators gave the example, others followed. As Johan Cruijff has said, ‘you 
only see it after you get it’, or in the words of one IB member: ‘you only appreciate chocolate 
after trying it’. The IB was a success because it was informal. The process in the IB from 
2001 up to 2005 was so fragile that many members said it should not be institutionalized since 
then it would become dominated by short-term interests. If this were to become an official 
V&W program, the V&W agenda would have dominated it. There was no trust that V&W 
even had intentions to apply ‘transition thinking’ as it was called. Having no mandate allowed 
the learning process to take its own course irrespective of any prefixed political objectives. 
This gave it the possibility to freely develop a joint language and a working method. By let-
ting official political targets go, a process could develop that took some years but which 
eventually formed influential ideas about sustainable mobility.  (Ctd next page) 
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Not even the team preparing the EU conference had fully appreciated the IB’s role behind the 
scenes. It did not want to claim success, in order not to be seen a threat to others. IB members 
aligned the actions they took in their formal capacity, but the outside world could not see or 
understand that. 
Joint communication skills. The IB developed the competence of developing its ideas ‘in 
dialogue with the mobility system’ via representative and knowledgeable actors. Much of this 
dialogue was indirect, by jointly influencing the preparation of a EU conference through a 
preparation team that had interviews around Europe. The IB gave the preparation team easy 
access to NGOs and industries and enabled it to ask the right (integral, unbiased) questions. 
The information returning in this dialogue helped to better make a case for further steps. This 
explains the high attendance of high-level industrialists and civil servants at the conference, 
which again enhanced their enthusiasm for the later platform. If a mandated organization had 
proposed the platform it could easily have been perceived as biased by partial, short-term 
interests. Now, the initial idea formally came from the joint DGs, and IB members developed 
the detailed proposal in their ‘other’ capacity. 
Consciously managing trust and expectations. The group consciously developed trust that 
nobody would take advantage by making ideas public prematurely or by leading the group to 
premature conclusions for their individual sake. This was for example done by developing 
long-term views and reasoning backward in time, and as they got close to concrete interven-
tions or investments that were not yet widely supported, to start with cautious communica-
tions in the home networks about possible alternative ways of looking to the future or courses 
of action. The people developing the NMP4 as well as the people starting up the IB had suffi-
cient trust in the intentions of the others, but in the process other people needed to be invited 
as well to complement the pool of knowledge. The IB tested people by not allowing any 
payment for participation. People were tested for their active contribution to the whole. Some 
people were invited only once, but a core group, who were particularly influential in the 
administrative, political and private system stayed together, never betrayed the ‘whole’ in 
their communications in the own organizations, and actively spread ideas that were ripe 
enough. Before that stage, they looked for ways of filling gaps in knowledge or for opportuni-
ties to bring ideas forward to test them and create an impact in the wider social system – this 
may be called the ‘piloting of ideas’ by communicating about them in the wider system, to see 
what kind of feedback returns. Other ways of piloting that were applied in framework of 
transition management were facilitating experiments in the market, and asking feedback from 
citizen’s panels. 
5.3 Think tanks for sustainable energy 
Round 1: EZ trying to give shape to its new role (2001 - 2004) 
It is possible to distinguish an EZ-network of civil servants who really believed 
that EZ should try to moderate cooperation towards breakthroughs, and were 
legitimized to experiment with that new role. The NMP4 had created room for 
EZ, with Hans Teljeur closely involved, to spend attention and resources to 
transition management. Director-General Zwaan had almost gone away, but in 
his place Secretary-General Jan-Willem Oosterwijk strongly supported transi-
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tion management in the EZ administration. He believed that to remain a credible 
ministry, EZ had to find a new role and focus in the long term. He also strongly 
believed that policies to influence the energy system, also if these are motivated 
by environmental reasons, should be developed by EZ – which had most know 
how. Transition management was to him an opportunity to improve cooperation. 
Table 13. EZ’s dilemmas in 2004 
Should transition management take the place of (or incorporate) business as usual policies 
(no)?  
Should EZ admit that the ten promised transition-experiments were delayed, rather than 
avoiding this by focusing on (much less concrete) transition paths (no)?  
Should EZ make choices for certain transition paths, as the outside world demanded (‘leader-
ship’) (no, but we do apply criteria of general public interest)?  
Should EZ give quantitative targets for sustainable energy production, under very uncertain 
conditions (no, except it should be a considerable part of energy supply)?   
Should EZ reward market actors who invest in the transition process through a ‘special 
relationship’, whilst this would distort the level playing field (only with forerunners)?  
Should EZ propose that The Netherlands display leadership by risking investing in sustainable 
technology? (yes). 
Should EZ propose that the EU creates incentives for specific transitions, or leave it com-
pletely open (Netherlands tries to create support in Europe for the transition approach, and as 
transition paths develop specific regulation may be adequate)?   
Source: internal note EZ, February 2004 
These civil servants felt an adaptive tension – to change the way it operated and 
become a credible transition manager. For the next years they would continue its 
communication with the outside world about transition management at meta-
level, despite the fact that Parliament did not support it in 2004. Positive feed-
back kept returning – at the meta-level.  At the same time EZ struggled with its 
role in stimulating debate about the wider long-term dilemmas of future energy 
systems. In an internal note dated February 2004 Hans Teljeur proposed to share 
some of EZ’s dilemmas with the outside world (see Table 13). EZ’s struggle is 
also illustrated by what happened to its internal report ‘policy innovation’, pre-
pared in parallel to the four partial transitions in 2002 by a project team headed 
by Hans Teljeur. The report summarized what the outside world had said in 
interviews about the performance of EZ. When it was internally discussed with 
the DG and the deputy DG, they were worried that this could bring the Minister 
in problems. The criticism may be interpreted as a way of projecting the prob-
lems of the energy system to EZ as problem holder, without acknowledgement 
of its dilemmas – and the fact that these dilemmas are in fact caused by wider 
social dilemmas. Whatever EZ chose to do, it would always be easy to criticize 
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from either side of the dilemma. For support to long term R&D, this was easier, 
since here EZ could anticipate more significant changes of the playing field in 
the long term. It could make decisions about support linked to the visions of the 
project groups. 
Round 2: developing transition experiments (2002  - 2005) 
In 2002 and 2003, EZ’s Albert Veenstra led the Project Group for biomass. The 
aim was to start a societal transition toward sustainable biomass by the end of 
2003. The involved people were not paid by EZ, other than consultants who 
supported the Project Group as a whole. The idea behind this was that all should 
be willing to invest, showing that they really believed in their ideas. The year 
2002 was largely used to get the biomass community warm for getting biomass 
options and uncertainties more clear, and for making choices about the process 
that would be needed in 2003 to get a widely supported advice to EZ. The out-
come was that major knowledge gaps were, first, the options for a market place 
to trade biomass as a commodity, second the side effects of possible technologi-
cal systems, and third, conditions for successful continuation of the process. 
These conditions were: a long-term vision with implications for most feasible 
transition paths, market niches to start up transition paths, coherent government 
interventions to facilitate these niches, and an  ‘arena’ to keep direction and 
coherence in the transition. 
In 2003, the biomass project continued; the Project Group’s composition was 
refined and better geared to address the uncertainties that it had identified. EZ 
had refined its request to the Project Group by indicating that the project should 
define transition experiments, which could be supported by EZ. The Project 
Group checked its results in a widely distributed questionnaire, two busy work-
shops, and in meetings of its soundboard group. The soundboard group had 
about ten members of the energy industry, two environmental NGOs (SNM and 
WWF), academics and three ‘transition ministries’ (EZ, VROM and LNV – the 
latter is responsible for agriculture and nature development). Moreover, three 
working groups, with in total about 80 participants, were set up to address par-
tial questions. The working group Vision was led by Energy Technology Con-
sultancy, the working group Sustainability by SNM and the working group 
Trading place by Rabobank. 
Summer 2003, there was still unanimity in the biomass community, when the 
Project Group presented the results from its supplementary analysis and merged 
all knowledge into a ‘vision’ for biomass. It was clear to the group that biomass 
could be sustainable and had great potential. Such a situation could be reached 
in many ways, which could not all be supported. Focus would be needed, if only 
because 35 million is a limited amount. This analysis was shared in a workshop 
on 1 July 2003, with 160 participants. There were no protests. Since a signifi-
cantly ‘biomass-based economy’ depends on import of biomass, impacts would 
be felt in the countries where biomass would be produced. Although these coun-
tries were not represented in the process (they were unknown), this issue was a 
major topic in the discussion, as were other kinds of possible side effects. The 
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unanimity was based on the idea that the government should create a level play-
ing field for all transition paths to compete. This would include the fair pricing 
of (or equal limits to) environmental impacts (in particular climate gas emis-
sion). This issue went beyond biomass, but it included importance of market 
breakthrough of a system on short or long term, and whether a system would 
generate livelihood in The Netherlands or elsewhere. These issues were left for 
EZ. 
Table 14. The BioSyngas discussion 
One of the four ideas that was given less priority by the project group biomass, was called 
BioSyngas: the large-scale production of synthesis gas from biomass. SynGas can be con-
verted to biodiesel, methanol, hydrogen, synthetic natural gas and basic chemicals. Main 
argument by the project group was that BioSyngas depended on large-scale investments by 
the oil industry, which were uncertain given the fact that these industries were not involved in 
the experiments brought forward to the project group. Active participation by the industries 
that should make a transition path work was seen as a prerequisite by EZ, and most other 
members of the project group. 
However, influential people from the biomass community did not agree with this choice. 
Sible Schone of WWF and academics Cees Daey Ouwens and A. Faaij posed in an article 
(Transition Biomass: a dead end? In: Stromen, 2, 2004) that from point of view of the global 
environment and economy, BioSyngas was in many influential studies proven to be feasible 
and very clean. They urged EZ to disregard the advice of the Project Group, and make a clear 
choice for this transition path. The reaction of Albert Veenstra, EZ’s moderator of the project 
group, was that most members of the biomass community were not only interested in global 
sustainability, but also in Dutch economy. So, there was a dilemma – and therefore conflict of 
interest - between solving the problem of global warming and the problem of stimulating 
Dutch economic growth. Moreover, the investment in such a plant is enormous, and depends 
on long-term guarantees of fiscal encouragement of the use of biofuel. The three dissidents 
made in their article the point that this depends on actors who had not been involved: oil 
multinationals, international governments. They suggested it was EZ’s responsibility to get 
the commitment of these actors for a joint framework for sustainable development. Someone 
in Klingon said later that this is not realistic for a small country like The Netherlands. 
 
Nevertheless, the Project Group had to limit the number of transition paths, 
since that had been the request of the leader of EZ’s Project Implementation 
Transitions Klaas Vries. It invited market coalitions to propose transition paths 
and related experiments that could be supported by EZ. It set up a jury of experts 
to evaluate all proposed transition paths on the basis of the vision. They chose 
seven transition paths to do experiments at market level, and four were consid-
ered to be interesting only in the long term. At this point, the biomass commu-
nity did not reach agreement, and the working group’s proposals were contro-
versial (see Table 14). This was partly corrected in EZ’s decision; the synthesis 
report of April 2004. 
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“the level playing 
field was critical” 
“the project group had a 
temporary assignment” 
The assumptions about a sustainable ‘level play-
ing field’ were critical for many initiatives. People 
participating in the project group biomass knew this 
uncertainty, but the group did not formulate its own 
strategy of influencing the general debate about a sustainable level playing field 
for the energy market. They centered on a vision of what would be sustainable 
and theoretically possible in the long term (‘30% biomass’), and technological 
pathways to that vision. The non-governmental participants implicitly assumed 
that EZ should be responsible for creating the level playing field necessary for 
sustainable development, whereas EZ perhaps had even less influence on fiscal 
policies than the energy sector. Albert Veenstra of EZ and moderator of the 
project group biomass indicated that the coalitions putting forward transition 
experiments would have to develop such strategies, but it was not generally 
expected that these scattered initiatives would actually be able to do that. 
Round 3: Political continuation of the Energy Transition Process (ETP), and 
creating a more strategic context (2002 – 2005) 
A fair number of transition coalitions had developed, thanks to this process – 
joint in 23 transition paths altogether in December 2003, of which ten in the 
‘main route’ to develop biomass to replace oil and gas as raw material for prod-
ucts, materials and energy. These all fitted the vision shared by all identifiable 
stakeholders of sustainable energy, and were actively supported by industries 
and environmental movement. The question remains, to which extent these coa-
litions actually might become levers to a sustainable transition. 
In 2004, there was still wide appreciation of the ETP, as was also shown 
through a report by the scientific VROM Council and Energy Council in De-
cember. The meetings EZ organized, as well as the transition teams, were still 
widely attended, despite some controversies and reservations. Insiders said that a 
learning process had happened that led to more focus in R&D and useful ex-
periments. These reactions probably represent the understanding many policy 
makers in the loose networks around the ETP had for EZ’s dilemmas, and their 
continued belief that the ETP was on the right track. Despite the negative debate 
in Parliament in summer 2004, the ETP as such was not politically threatened. 
Businesses and pressure groups were mostly cautiously positive about transition 
management. Civil servants from EZ, looking back on the debate in Parliament 
summer 2004, indicated in hindsight that it is apparently difficult to have con-
structive dialogues with parliament – with voters watching. Parliamentarians 
have difficulties being open for alternatives that are not in their party line, since 
that is too early for part of their audience. Some civil servants therefore specu-
lated about other ways to communicate with Parliament. The ‘transition manag-
ers’ in EZ, as well as others in the loose networks, also realized that there was a 
need for a more strategic process to address the 
wider societal dilemmas related to the level 
playing field. 
A level playing field was defined as a set of 
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“lead to agreement 
about the nature of 
social dilemmas” 
economic conditions, created by the government, to correct market failure by 
giving a price to pollution. Other legislation and standards should not distort the 
market as well. However, many interpretations are possible, in particular be-
cause the level playing field should allow for international competition. Some 
level playing fields might be feasible in the short term, others in the long term 
because more governments would have to work together toward a common in-
terpretation. The Project Groups, however, only had temporary assignments; that 
visible transition experiments should be set in motion by 2004. They did not 
have time, not the vision, to connect with sufficient influential actors to develop 
any outlook to a specific level playing field. They depended on market coali-
tions that would be willing to invest in 2004, under uncertain conditions of play-
ing field. These coalitions would require government action to take away barri-
ers and change the playing field. Coalitions investing in 2004 would have to 
assume that the playing field was difficult to influence – they needed to assess 
their investment against plausible independent scenarios for government action. 
The Project Group was therefore forced to limit to supporting initiatives that 
assume no drastic changes of playing field, which might foreclose theoretically 
better options for the longer term. 
If more credible expectations could develop that a sustainable level playing 
field may be politically acceptable, more ambitious experiments, related to more 
complex transition, may have become possible. In this sense, the term ‘man-
agement of expectations’ was sometimes heard. Parliament would not create 
such expectations, and so it would have to be presented with different dilemmas 
in the first place. EZ had not been able to developed widely shared dilemmas on 
its own. These would have to be the result of a wider social learning process. 
With such questions in mind, EZ undertook two actions. First, in 2003, EZ 
financially assisted a group of twelve influential organizations1 in the energy 
world in developing a joint vision, making steps to ‘resolving their dilemmas’ as 
Hans Teljeur put it. They published the Manifest market and Environment: To-
ward an innovative climate for a sustainable energy supply in September 2003. 
However, Teljeur was disappointed. The group 
had not succeeded to frame their dilemmas in a 
way that was meaningful enough for political 
discussion. The manifest presented no new 
concrete perspective on cooperation; the choices 
between different level playing fields were still completely left open for ‘the 
government’ to decide about. The second initiative was to set-up an ‘intervision 
group’ for the energy transition, consisting of ex-ministers, industrials, academ-
                                                       
1
 Akzo Nobel Energy BV, Echte Energie, Essent, Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging, Gasunie Tra-
de & Supply, Koninklijke Vereniging MKB Nederland, Rabobank, Shell Nederland BV, Triodos Bank 
NV, Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth), Wereld Natuur Fonds (WWF), CE. 
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ics and influential NGOs2, a delayed implementation of environment DG Karel 
Zijp’s idea of a ‘transition council’. It was formally installed in January 2004. 
Klaas Vries said around that time: ‘these people can be the political ambassadors 
of the energy transition’. The intervision group was rather surprised at first that 
such a group would have to give advice about 23 small projects, whilst there 
clearly were major dilemmas related to the energy future. During the formal 
installation of the group, one of its members, Wim Hafkamp, already gave an 
advice – in public – to the minister: he should lead the process personally, to-
gether with his colleagues. In the course of 2005, EZ had learned from these 
initiatives, and decided to set-up new transition teams, and this time they were 
called platforms. The main lesson was, in the words of Klaas Vries, that ‘the 
chairmen have to be really good’. He aimed at their qualities of systems thinking 
and of managing co-evolution by leading the dialogue to the social dilemmas 
that, as understood by enough parts, could lead to shifts in policies. 
This new phase of the energy transition process had, according Hans Teljeur, 
a bright side: more credibility that a sustainable level playing field was within 
reach to facilitate breakthrough of more complex experiments. One the other 
hand, Teljeur also saw a dark side: in the eyes of the larger public, for example 
the environmentalists, the platforms and task force could be seen as the third 
restart of a process (after NMP4 and the project groups) that still had not deliv-
ered visible success. 
Trust and foresight 
The analysis makes clear that the transition discourse was widely supported, or 
at least it was not controversial enough to be politically threatened. Parliamen-
tarians were not interested simply because their audience was not ready for 
‘complexity speak’ like that. By applying the general rules of transition man-
agement, the coherence of thinking in the energy system seems to have in-
creased. Hundreds of policy makers from all domains had worked together in 
different transition teams (called working groups) on partial steps toward sus-
tainable transition paths, and the coherence of their knowledge has certainly 
increased. The teams were independent from EZ, and had a broad composition. 
Their visions and transition paths were widely shared. This was said to have 
resulted in more focused R&D policies for energy. 
However, there was no identifiable group of policy makers, connected with 
many parts of the system and with coherent views, which could really explain 
why the 23 selected transition experiments might become levers for a large-scale 
sustainable transition. This probably explains the BioSynGas controversy. Theo-
retically a proven sustainable option, but there were no widely shared ideas 
                                                       
2 Winnie Sorgdrager (fm Minister of Justice), Pieter Winsemius (fm Minister of Environment), Henk 
Dijkgraaf (president of Shell Netherlands), Sible Schöne (WWF), Herman Wijffels (chair of the Socio-
Economic Council), Wim Hafkamp (professor environmental sciences), Felix Rottenberg (former chair of 
socio-democrat party PvdA), Gertjan Lankhorst (Director-General for Energy).  
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“the environment 
movement played a 
linking role” 
about its success conditions, and how EZ or anyone else could influence that. In 
2004, EZ realized that it was not able to manage expectations about level play-
ing field in the market by itself. It tried several options and finally chose to set 
up platforms that would have to manage a more strategic process. 
The conclusion may be that trust in the ETP networks has been sufficient for 
less complex, and therefore less sensitive, breakthroughs. Only later in the proc-
ess more foresight emerged in EZ that for more complex breakthroughs, ten-
sions would have to be created that could make expectations of level playing 
field more credible. Coalitions for new experiments may then emerge on their 
own initiative. 
The limiting factor in the ETP had therefore been the span of knowledge and 
influence of the loose networks that concentrated in EZ and in the transition 
teams (working groups). The process suffered from the same problem as the 
earlier sustainability research programs: they did not link enough to implementa-
tion power, because they were fixed on the short-term objective to do experi-
ments. 
5.4 Strategic inter-ministerial cooperation 
Round 1: The Inter-ministerial Energy Transition Program (2001 – 2005) 
Around 2001 the loose sustainability networks extended into Parliament and 
supported transition management, despite its elusive objectives and 30 years 
horizon. This was a break with traditions in Dutch environmental policies, 
where quantitative targets for a four-year period were customary. Supporting 
transition management was not politically attractive (it was only understood by 
the loose networks and not by the voters). Despite sharing the transition dis-
course in a general sense, it is questionable if Parliament has asked for progress 
reports with the aim of creating an adaptive tension for Cabinet. Progress reports 
may also have been a means to keep the illusion that measurable progress would 
be expected every year. Openness of individual 
Parliamentarians can be attributed to their personal 
experiences in the greenpolder model and their 
contacts with lobby groups. In particular, one 
Parliamentarian had been closely involved in the 
greenpolder process Extension of Rotterdam Port. 
The environmental organization SNM played a linking role on the back-
ground. Transition management was difficult to explain to their supporters. A 
member of SNM’s management said that the first time he had heard about tran-
sition management, he and his direct colleagues thought that this might create 
opportunities for them. Others in SNM thought that transition management was 
intended to delay urgent interventions. SNM organized meetings with Parlia-
mentarians, and political parties, to clarify the discourse. Part of the urgency 
came from the idea that progress in normal environmental policies was slowing 
down. This is why members of the environmental movement on the one hand 
were critical about State Secretary Van Geel but supported transition manage-
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“doubts about 
competences” 
ment. Likewise, other policy makers also used their influence behind the scenes, 
and they did that without explicit support from their voters, shareholders or 
members. The loose networks also extended into two VROM and Energy Ad-
vice Councils, which wrote encouraging advice about transition management, 
and so did the Socio-Economic Council SER (said to be the heart of the Dutch 
polder model) in August 2001. Its core recommendation was that transition poli-
cies should be separated from other policies in discussions in Parliament, to 
ensure that long term needs receive attention in their own right. Parliamentarians 
quoted the SER in their discussions. 
Support in Parliament seemed to diminish after the elections of 2002, and in 
the debate about EZ’s synthesis report about the ETP, spring 2004. Doubts were 
expressed also in informal meetings like in September 2003, when SNM had 
organized a closed discussion about transition management 
where three of the main parties were present. They showed 
a real interest in the discourse, but saw no way of linking it 
to their day-to-day work. Yet, the loose networks continued 
to support the abstract discourse, whilst sometimes expressing doubts about how 
it was implemented. VROM and EZ regularly asked input from outside, like in 
November 2003, when it organized a ‘round table’ with State Secretary Pieter 
Van Geel and leaders of NGOs and industries3, where the discourse was once 
again supported. It was said that still too many groups were not participating in a 
leadership role, which was said to form a risk. Another remark was that the gov-
ernment should change its culture: it is still too much focused on preventing 
mistakes rather than learning from them – a prerequisite of transition manage-
ment. All this can be interpreted as a positive basic attitude, but doubts about the 
competences. There was pressure to show more, and trust not to break it down 
politically. As a Parliamentarian said: ‘I am not interested in all these stories. I 
know what needs to be done for a sustainable breakthrough. Why don’t they just 
make it happen.’ 
The five DGs deliberation was aware that the outside world asked for more 
coordination in government. DGs participated in open debates, and the group 
tried to be critical about the approach to the individual transitions, to ‘take each 
other’s measure’ as the DG Energy said. The DG for environment indicated later 
that his aim of organizing regular meetings with the five DGs therefore had 
simply been to keep transition management on the agenda in the first place. 
There was some tension in the five DG group, as the environment and energy 
DGs were, according to reports, more ambitious than the others. However, their 
agenda was only at the meta-level; there were little discussions about sensitive 
concrete government interventions. Their civil servants offered no such inte-
                                                       
3
 Guido Van Woerkom, director of mobilists’ union ANWB, Ad van den Biggelaar of SNM, Anne-
marie van der Rest of Shell, Edward Bosman of Siemens, Willem Ferwerda of IUCN and professor 
Jacqueline Cramer. 
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grated social dilemmas to them, and they did not ask for it. Policy-making proc-
ess was still fragmented. 
The tensions can be seen from the perspective of monitoring progress. 
VROM, eager to show their wider stakeholder groups that transition manage-
ment was actually on its way to success, pushed EZ at occasions to show what 
they were doing. However, EZ reacted ‘it can only be monitored when it be-
comes more concrete’. The ETP itself already made all available information 
public, and what happened behind closed doors to enhance public-private coop-
eration was too sensitive. All conduct in public was management of tensions, but 
others could not oversee its true nature or motive. On the other hand, VROM’s 
impatience can be understood, since if the EZ platforms were to succeed within 
four years, the first visible market breakthrough would still occur eight years 
after NMP4. 
This started to change slowly in 2004, when it became increasingly apparent 
that a bottleneck of transition management was the lack of credible cooperation 
in the government, and therefore the process was not attractive to private parties 
that might want to cooperate on real breakthroughs. They were worried that their 
proposals would not ‘land’ in the government or would be exposed prematurely 
by opportunistic and impatient civil servants or politicians. The debate in Par-
liament in spring 2004 made this failure clear. A crucial moment was a meeting 
of the five DGs in November 2004, where V&W’s project leader of Energy in 
Motion and the chairman of the EZ platform sustainable motor fuels, reported 
about the EU conference Energy in Motion. The DGs expressed their wish to 
organize a second international conference and asked them to organize a joint 
platform – the platform automotives. 
From interviews in that period it seems that the issue was only partly under-
stood, but that there were some people, at the core of the process, who made the 
dilemmas clear for the DGs. For example, Klaas Vries had participated since 
2001 in the Innovation Board Sustainable Development, which was part of the 
transition process to sustainable mobility organized by V&W. There, he had got 
to know and trust someone who later became chair of the automotives platform. 
One of the things he had learned, he said, was that ‘you need more than excel-
lent chairpersons’. Mid 2004, Vries still said, ‘the level playing field is not the 
most difficult part of transitions: first you need to collect initiatives in a logical 
way, aiming at a system change rather than just promising technology, which is 
a major change in the way we support the energy system.’ In 2005, collecting 
initiatives had succeeded, and focus could be given to the next weakest link: the 
level playing field. In May 2005, the DGs accepted the idea to set up an inter-
ministerial program for the EZ platforms. 
The fact that the DGs accepted the idea to establish an IPE illustrates that 
enough trust had developed between the DGs and between the DGs and the 
involved civil servants, to take a step of which the consequences were difficult 
to oversee. However, the IPE was seen as a step toward more coordination and 
therefore credibility, and the six ministers signed the agreement and provided 
budget. Visible success was now defined not only as concrete transition experi-
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“it depended on trust 
that Cabinet would 
be consistent” 
“the chair played with 
openness and closedness” 
ments, but also as large influential conferences, and perhaps also as growth of 
the loose sustainability networks, which could see at these conferences how 
transition management succeeded in creating more consensus about what the 
right questions and social dilemmas are (like the option to develop sustainable 
automotives had become widely supported at Energy in Motion). In that way, 
loose networks would generate invisible political support, like it had done when 
it approved NMP4. 
By approving the IPE, the DGs and the ministers built an adaptive tension 
for the DGs to show results – the IPE may be more politically sensitive than the 
four individual transition processes. It depended on 
trust that steps made in the dialogue between the 
ministries and the private sector would be reliable, 
and Cabinet would be consistent in its behavior in 
these dialogues. It was precisely this adaptive tension 
that made the process more attractive for private organizations, which had their 
own, internal tensions, and would have to engage in coopetition. That also cre-
ated uncertainties. Tulp put it like this in 2004: ‘Governments getting together 
with industries in this way are taking a risk. You have to find a joint problem 
definition and the process needs to become more formal and more in public. It is 
difficult to make a decision about this. Parties need to take a vulnerable position 
since whatever comes out of the process is not completely without engagement. 
There is also a risk that results cannot be implemented, which politically can be 
seen as failure.’ The fact remained that the process between industries requires a 
delicate, gradual build-up of trust, which takes time and needs to be done behind 
closed doors. And finally, there are limits to what can be done in The Nether-
lands alone. An insider said: ‘our platforms are often misunderstood in other 
European countries. It has the appearance of cartel formation. Therefore it may 
not be easy to develop European agreement about transition proposals’. 
Round 2: The platforms under the Inter-ministerial Program Directorate Energy 
Transition (IPE) (2004 - 2005) 
Despite positive intensions of several CEOs at Energy in Motion, their process 
had to cope with unforeseeable complexities and vested interests. Where the EU 
and the European car industries would be willing to invest in cleaning up diesel 
engines through soot filters, a measure needing 10 years to become fully effec-
tive, the US and Japan, where health is claimed to be a bigger political issue, try 
to jump directly to systems based on gas and hybrid systems. On the looks and 
feel of this divergence, the European car industry seemed to be less prepared for 
a substantially more demanding but more sustainable breakthrough. 
It was not difficult to make a quick start with the automotives platform. The 
networks of the ETP and the IB, as well as new 
members that had showed their interest at the 
EU conference, were easily mobilized. The 
chair developed a joint problem description, and 
organized separate strategy groups behind closed doors, one with the automobile 
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industry and one with the oil industry. He played with openness and closedness 
of the process by sharing problem descriptions in the larger group, which could 
serve as adaptive tensions for the competitors to discuss scenarios of coopeti-
tion. When agreement would be reached, the larger group would make the next 
step. If the coopetitive scenarios would require government interventions, the 
government would be invited for dialogue. Progress on all sides had to be coher-
ent and would depend on the weakest link. Since a deal could only be made after 
agreement about the whole package would reached expectations should be 
explicitly managed. The risk that a different political context may emerge after 
elections made the government unreliable by nature and legitimacy perhaps the 
weakest spot. And, finally, the deal would depend on the joint competency and 
willingness to play this game, since it would be sensitive for premature expo-
sure. The chair was aware of these needs and risks, and was confident that it 
could be done. 
Arthur Groen of oil multinational Klingon had higher expectations than be-
fore, because the discussion about a level playing field now had a strategic cli-
ent, since the joint ministries asked specifically for their advice about what the 
government should do. He said ‘The explicit task of the platforms is to give the 
government advice about regulations. Preparing legislation takes years and pro-
cedures therefore need to be started up years before the urgency is really felt’. 
Perhaps this makes the paradox clear of this process: politicians should be will-
ing to support processes years before the urgency is really felt, and they can only 
be rewarded for that in their informal networks. 
In some degree, the negotiators of organizations in the platform were better 
embedded in their own organizations and had a clear mandate. They were now 
closely linked to their highest management. Klingon, for example, had assigned 
Arthur Groen as coordinator for energy transition policies. 
Trust and foresight 
Trust and foresight have grown from two directions. From the top down, the five 
DGs developed personal relationships, and started to trust each other. It took the 
EU conference for them to realize that the government, their civil servants, were 
capable of organizing events like that and to use these to create more societal 
alignment about action scenarios (in this case about sustainable automotives), 
i.e. about social dilemmas. However, the core of the loose networks, including 
these civil servants, understood that such kind of cooperation would remain an 
exception if there would be no structural context for it. Some of them suggested 
the IPE, and the DGs accepted. There was confidence that the loose networks 
would stretch far enough to continue the process if well managed. There were 
more insights now about that management. Management of openness and clos-
edness, with an eye on development of trust for new interventions, was key. The 
ultimate bottleneck in these processes was legitimacy; that is political approval 
of market interventions by Cabinet. The closest insiders believed that as their 
process would gain momentum, politics would follow, thereby reducing this 
bottleneck. In other words, they had more trust in the external power context. 
  
 Adaptive Networks 143
This was among others based on the implicit idea that the adaptive tension be-
tween sustainable development and economic growth would continue, whatever 
the outcome of the next elections. 
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“Teljeur and Kort 
invested in the 
relationship” 
6 Change managers 
… the biggest fools are those who ware cuffs of cobweb and think they are powerless  
(Hella Haasse) 
It is truly remarkable how a few powerful individuals affect the lives of everybody else. We 
sometimes associate power with negative effects, but these individuals actively keep the 
peace, and in doing so strengthen the social fabric (Frans de Waal about pigtailed macaques) 
 
In this chapter I analyze the role of individual behavior in adaptive networks. 
Change managers, by definition, take initiatives for change of power networks. 
To reduce risk for CEOs and political leaders, they first build some momentum 
behind the scenes; that is, they start adaptive networks. Yet there is a risk be-
cause it is unknown how the larger social system will react. There is investment 
of time in building the adaptive network, in particular if the change manager 
wants to contribute to the solving of complex problems like sustainable devel-
opment. One question is with what kind of reward this risk and that investment 
is compensated. It is not possible to reconstruct all connecting interactions be-
hind the scenes in the transition discourse, and it is clear that at times connecting 
interactions must have occurred in many places, with many individuals taking 
localized initiatives, pushing the process a bit further in what they considered a 
positive spiral, and thereby being a change manager. I don’t aim at a compre-
hensive overview of all change managers, but focus on ones who many recog-
nized as influential. 
6.1 Development of major sustainable policy papers 
The success of transition management in NMP4 has depended on the initiative 
of civil servants in VROM and EZ who had an intuitive idea of the limits in the 
approach to sustainable development and who trusted each other to seriously 
seek a new approach, and to implement that later on. VROM and EZ had devel-
oped close relationships earlier in sustainable energy 
policies. Two key players in the NMP4 team were Jan 
Kort, VROM’s project leader, and Hans Teljeur, energy 
strategist in EZ. They used the opportunity of NMP4 to 
seek new approaches with their networks, and Jan Kort 
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did the interview series in the energy and sector. As the ideas of transition man-
agement resulted and the team could show there was support, EZ principals 
realized there was an opportunity. However, it would never had developed with-
out the initiative of individuals that broke with the tradition of making policy 
paper that was harmless for other sectors. Transition management had become a 
joint approach. It was only possible because Kort and Teljeur invested in their 
relationship. Kort was willing to take this up in NMP4, as they both saw an op-
portunity for a debate about the role of the government. Kort had to convince the 
minister, and Teljeur had to convince his principals. An open debate about EZ’s 
role was not normally done, but EZ principals were open to suggestions from the 
energy sector (which they saw as their clients).  When NMP4 was almost ready 
and EZ’s management had accepted the idea of becoming ‘transition manager’, 
the minister saw it as an opportunity to show Parliament that she wanted to ad-
dress sustainable development, which gave her political appreciation. An EZ 
principal indicated to me that transition management had been a good proposi-
tion that answered to a need in EZ’s ‘market’, and that it resulted from civil 
servants who had seen this opportunity and found a match with VROM. In 
VROM, many people were cautious about allowing non-environmental minis-
tries to implement transition management, but Kort was willing to defend that. 
People like Kort and Teljeur were in my view driven by enthusiasm for sustain-
able development and were struggling with a practical approach. They found 
others in their network, who followed. They also found enthusiastic people in 
other ministries, but at first not in higher management. 
Next to the necessary administrative handwork and gathering of support, 
many interviewees mentioned the importance of creative ideas that were offered 
by scientists, in particular prof. Jan Rotmans was mentioned several times. His 
analysis based on recent thinking in evolutionary economics, and introducing 
the term transition management to this process, appealed to the civil servants. 
This thinking was shared in a series of meetings and by preparing a report about 
a possible transition of the energy system (Rotmans et al. 2001). It matched the 
gut feeling of many that such a transition approach could work, and Rotmans 
helped the civil servants to find their own words for explaining transition man-
agement, to influence the political stakeholders and decision-makers. Despite 
the fact that the term 'transition management' did not appear in the NMP4 at the 
request of the minister, it became widely used and gave the discourse its name. 
6.2 Think tanks about sustainable mobility 
The Innovation Board Sustainable Mobility (IB) was an initiative of the trans-
port ministry V&W under environmental policy. This legitimized civil servants 
to spend a little time in it. Other than that, it completely depended on personal 
initiatives. All members participated from the beginning because they believed 
in it personally. Many have never been rewarded in a material sense. In the 
NMP4 team, the V&W representative and his superior became personally enthu-
siastic for these ideas and, because they too were part of the adaptive networks 
of people frustrated with the greenpolder model and sustainability research, it 
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“I tried to be a role model 
of systems thinking” 
was not difficult for them to get a core group quickly together that later became 
the IB. The Director-General for transport had played a key role when he de-
clared his support at a beech event with a large 
audience, but his commitment was limited. 
To the surprise and enthusiasm of several 
IB members, deputy DG Jeroen Tulp of V&W 
joined. Tulp later declared in an interview that 
his objective had been to develop ways of interaction between the public and 
private sector. He used the IB to discuss that in a non-formal setting that other-
wise would have been impossible. He was rewarded when the EU Conference 
Energy in Motion was such a big success in 2004. His contribution to the IB was 
the linkage to implementation power – having a shared foresight, a strategy to 
close in on power was for him a condition for participation. It was not a social 
club. When the EU conference had been prepared he saw little further use for 
the IB, and it was in a small temporary crisis. By investing so much time in the 
IB, Tulp had taken the risk that this time would be wasted. Yet, he was prepared 
to use his influence to communicate some of the lessons he had learned in the 
IB, as other IB members perceived. He had become an innovative force in the 
automotives debate. The enthusiasm of Tulp, and the line of reasoning of the IB, 
continued in the project leader for the preparations of the EU conference. She 
was carefully selected. Several times, she was invited to the IB to tell about 
progress. Several IB members indicated that she (and others) were rewarded in a 
different way – for showing initiative along the lines of transition management. 
The IB depended on personal initiative from others. EZ’s Klaas Vries, pro-
ject leader of ETP, was member of the IB from its beginning, which was a sig-
nificant time investment. This link was crucial to obtain the link between the IB 
and the ETP in 2005, when the IPE emerged. The mobilists’ union ANWB mil-
lions had of members and was experienced in lobbying about infrastructure and 
(against) policies like road pricing. It had built-up considerable experience in the 
greenpolder model, and there were many personal relations with the other NGOs 
involved in transition management. ANWB representatives were active in the 
IB, and they were prepared to discuss dilemmas and options that were not in line 
with their formal positions, for example what they had written in the commen-
taries in its magazine. They were looking for 
ways of bringing up these issues without losing 
the trust of their supporters. With this state of 
mind ANWB played an active role in the 
development of the EU conference energy in motion, activating their counterpart 
organizations in other EU countries, and contributing to preparatory dialogues 
along the line of the IB’s visions (the environmental group SNM did the same 
with its counterparts). The ANWB’s director was on the background involved 
and committed to this process. 
The person from environmental lobby group SNM had used ideas from the 
IB in communications with his supporters. Slowly he found arguments that cars 
may not be so bad forever. In 2005, SNM produced a report termed ‘The car of 
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the future’, which showed the result of that learning process. It had become 
acceptable in the environmental movement to speak about a future with any kind 
of car. SNM also published a page wide ad in a national newspaper, together 
with an automobile industry (also in the IB), to support sustainable automotives. 
These were the personal initiatives of individuals in SNM who connected the 
SNM core with the mobility system. Members of energy companies, oil multina-
tionals, auto multinationals and consultants also played an active connecting role 
in the IB. Most notably representatives of oil multinational Klingon and auto-
mobile industry Takey were prepared to search with other IB members for sce-
narios they could explain in their own organization, and helped each other to 
look for conditions. One consultant helped the IB with systems thinking. In 
interviews he explained what he did in terms of complexity theory, and indi-
cated that he tried to convey this type of reasoning to the group without impos-
ing it (‘present chocolate and hope they will like it’). He said, for example, that 
he tried to make the social subsystem of automotives meta-stable, creating a 
context where CEOs who had advocated their own role in sustainable develop-
ment would be attracted to a change dialogue, for their own credibility. This 
consultant also had intervened in the IB’s process behind the scenes, when key 
persons with links to power became less enthusiastic. He always tried to make a 
case for continuation, by stimulating to thinking in ‘what if’ scenarios. He 
helped others see opportunities. His skills were appreciated and he became chair 
of the automotives platform. 
As the EU conference was prepared, IB members could motivate their CEOs 
and ministers to commit with statements that went one step further than they 
otherwise would have done. Trust in the IB enabled this, which made CEOs 
believe that they could make that statement without much risk, and it was thanks 
to willingness of the CEOs to invest in sustainable development. They did not 
expect quick reward by shareholders. As management recognized the process of 
change management became more as an activity that had a value in itself, 
change managers were rewarded by officially getting time for making connec-
tions and participating in dialogues behind the scenes. This happened in Klin-
gon, Takey and other firms, and of course it also happened in the government 
with the IPE. The highest management gave this recognition because they saw 
the value in the long term, but their shareholders or voters did not directly re-
ward CEOs and ministers. In that sense, transition management still depended 
completely on personal initiative. 
6.3 Think tanks about sustainable energy 
Klaas Vries who became director of EZ’s transition 
program made the ETP politically acceptable by 
focusing on transition experiments, whilst holding 
on to the transition discourse of ‘reversed 
evolutionary thinking’. The Secretary General and later EZ’s Minister Brink-
horst and Director General Boer enabled the ETP, without interfering. Vries was 
enthusiastic because he really had come to believe the transition discourse, and 
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he could relate it to his earlier experiences in making deals with the energy sec-
tor about sustainable development. Vries and his colleagues created enthusiasm 
in the larger energy community to start the transition teams, among others by 
organizing events. They managed the relationship with policy makers in NGOs 
and academics who at a certain point did not agree with the outcomes. There 
was a tension between the desired progress in terms of experiments and the 
complexity of the transition that these experiments could address. EZ put a lot of 
energy in keeping connections, not breaking them in total disappointment, but 
looking for new opportunities. 
That enthusiasm also showed when Teljeur gave an assignment to a bureau 
to facilitate a dialogue in the energy system about dilemmas in the level playing 
field, or his project policy innovation, exclusively aimed at the learning process 
in EZ. Vries sought support for these choices through a high-level intervision 
group, with (ex) politicians and CEOs. High management in EZ still trusted that 
Vries and others were making steps in the direction of a more shared rationality. 
The energy community still largely supported the process as such, as EZ found 
out through the meetings it organized. Although it hadn’t really led to short term 
choices about playing field, it did have impacts on short-term choices about 
subsidies for research. As regards playing field, EZ in 2004 started to think 
about the power network required for further steps. 
Energy Minister Brinkhorst had key contributions when he approved the 
budget of 35 million euro, through his general communications and defending 
the ETP before Parliament. He also was supported by a wider discourse that the 
government had lost its credibility and would have to be less fragmented and 
more flexible (the ‘Program Different Government’, led by another minister 
from the same party). In the eyes of many, traditional politics was under pres-
sure to become more transparent, more participative and more effective. In 
many eyes, the government was too bureaucratic and too slow to adapt to chang-
ing circumstances in society. After NMP4 had been approved, Teljeur did the 
study ‘policy innovation’ about EZ’s role, and the report that wrapped up the 
results was not approved for publication by EZ’s management. It was considered 
politically dangerous. In 2004, it became clear that EZ was managing the dia-
logue in society, but not in the government. In the light of these discussions, in 
particular the fragmentation of the government, Vries 
initiated the intervision group that later became task 
force. 
Though transition management was an initiative at work floor level at first, 
some EZ principals soon embraced it and later also the minister did that. This 
gave civil servants room to implement the ETP. However, the larger part of EZ 
never had really understood the concept, and neither had Parliament. It was kept 
in the air by a chain of ‘believers’ who felt the pressure of developing new 
added value and using it as an opportunity. The ETP, of course, also depended 
on contributions of many enthusiastic policy makers and innovators who tried to 
get their ideas implemented. For many of these, their participation was unpaid 
and had to occur in their own time. An employee of a small enterprise in sus-
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tainable energy, a relative outsider participating in one of the conferences, was 
skeptical: ‘What is EZ expecting? Sustainable energy will always depend on 
subsidies.’ This person was clearly not willing to invest, since EZ was only 
promising limited subsidies. The promised 35 million was nothing more than 
partial seed money. 
6.4 Inter-ministerial cooperation 
The transition discourse had started under an adaptive tension in Parliament, 
which was created in loose networks. Initially, Cabinet only followed in that 
process. However, after elections, support or at least understanding seemed to 
decline in Parliament. On the other hand, Van Geel and later Brinkhorst took up 
the role of enabler. There was hardly any political reward, other than perhaps 
created by the discourses about ‘different government’ that lived especially in 
Brinkhorst’s party. Support also still came from individuals in the environment 
movement who used their influence on Parliamentarians. Mid 2001, Director 
General Karel Zijp arrived in VROM. He picked transition management up 
enthusiastically and pragmatically, in the first place by keeping it on the table by 
actively facilitating the five DG deliberation. Such a regular development-
oriented deliberation was uncustomary, and it would have been easy to neglect 
it. In that group it was difficult to have a debate or a decision about the coopera-
tion process. VROM had agreed that other ministries would lead the transition 
management process, and Zijp had no intentions of putting pressures on the 
other DGs to take risks they did not want to take. The annual progress reports 
were mainly produced by the four separate ministries, 
and tied-up by VROM before submission to 
Parliament. The preparation of the progress report 
was mainly a process of political risk reduction by 
keeping the text unspecific. 
An active role of the DGs was essential, since in their departments the chain 
of believers was thin, especially in V&W. There was more reward for contribut-
ing to politically sensitive files than to long-term dialogues. In 2005, unexpect-
edly perhaps, the DGs became aware that some of their civil servants had 
learned to work together and would be able to make joint proposals to the DGs 
that could offer opportunities to adapt the processes aimed at the short-term. 
Zijp and the DG of EZ asked support of their state secretary and minister, and 
initiated the Inter-ministerial Program. They had confidence that this would not 
be an extra wheel in Cabinet, but manage connections between ministries by 
managing platforms of forerunners. However, outside the inner circle, few peo-
ple were aware of the possible significance of this initiative, whilst they ran the 
risk of complete failure. The inner circle consisted of a limited number of civil 
servants in EZ, VROM and V&W. However, consultants, one from the IB and 
one who had given strategic advice in the ETP, have also significantly contrib-
uted to their enthusiasm; they at a point confronted the DGs with the fact that 
they hardly had any proactive role in transition management, and that this was 
what the private sector expected them to do. They sketched the perspective of a 
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joint undertaking in the form of an IPE. It seemed impossible for any of the DGs 
to make this intervention. It would be difficult to take shared initiatives if one of 
the DGs would take the initiative and other then would have to follow. The con-
sultants, as independent moderators, could create adaptive tension for them by 
confronting them with the tension between their words (transition management) 
and their conduct (not using any pressure to make their civil servants align bet-
ter). 
The IPE formed an opportunity as context of platforms that may bridge the 
gap public private, but the DGs were aware that success depended on adaptive 
networks in the government itself. The IPE should also form a context for that. 
Setting up the IPE was therefore an act of trust in the competencies and personal 
initiatives of at least a considerable part of civil servants. That was a risk the 
DGs were willing to take. Also, the dominant culture of setting measurable tar-
gets remained, but adaptive networks are difficult 
to monitor since the issues are by definition 
volatile and as implications for running policies 
become clear, sensitive. At the end of 2005, the 
leaders of the Directorate were wrestling with the 
question how to monitor progress, and to that end how to formulate the assign-
ments of platform chairs. 
6.5 Enthusiasm, uncertainty and reward 
In the transition discourse, dozens of people have participated in loose networks 
that supported it without often being able to explain the idea even to direct col-
leagues. It is a personal disposition that has been triggered by the participation in 
the greenpolder model and sustainable development research programs. The 
emergence of such loose networks probably also has been a latent possibility in 
the general ‘polder’ culture of The Netherlands. The irony of the situation was 
that sustainable development was imaginable but due to lock-in the resistance 
seemed unsurpassable. These policy makers dealt with this situation by looking 
for constructive, development-oriented propositions. They had a real concern for 
sustainable development, as they were easily mobilized for the think tanks IB 
(for mobility) and ETP (for energy), or to support the transition discourse. As 
interviews show, all participants had skills of systems thinking, which formed 
the basis of the cooperation. Different roles, often combined by one individual, 
can be observed in the adaptive networks: 
• Enablers could connect ideas with power, had the capacity to enable others 
to interact behind the scenes, and to intervene in power networks when oth-
ers were skeptical; 
• Initiators inspired others to focus on complex, long-term options; 
• Networkers formed the particle around which a crystal was formed, because 
they could mobilize individuals from throughout the composed subsystem 
with the appropriate attitude for networks with adaptive capacities; 
• Moderators (or connectors) helped others to perceive joint opportunities 
and to develop trust and foresight; they helped separating the adaptive inter-
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actions from visible power actions (playing with openness to visibly man-
age tensions and closedness to create internal trust); 
• Systems thinkers could inspire into joint visioning, making new combina-
tions and identifying possible joint action; 
• Letting goers passed over their idea to others and did not mind they would 
profit less from the eventual success. (With major example: non-
environmental ministries implemented the environmental policy paper.) 
• Experts contributed by showing possible developments at market level, as 
well as the impacts of these developments. 
 
Most participants actually may have been driven by intuitions rather than ex-
plicit system analyses and foresight. However, a limited number of people 
played key roles in the management of tensions in a localized way; these were 
exceptionally skilled in moderation and systems thinking, and appeared not to be 
interested in widely visible personal success. 
In the government and in larger corporations and NGOs, civil servants some-
times have time to ‘develop a hobby’. In the transition discourse, several hobby-
ists actually created impact in power networks. This was not only a result of 
enthusiasm, but also of competence. The number of the more competent policy 
makers spending some of their time in hobbies may be increasing. Jeroen Tulp is 
perhaps the clearest example, since he was one of the most influential civil ser-
vants in the mobility sector and felt the tension between the need to bridge the 
gap public – private, whilst not being able to do that in his ‘power’ role. He was 
prepared to ‘double think’ for at least a year in the IB, until the EU conference 
made the short term and the long term coincide. His behavior, and that of others, 
could also have been contagious to other civil servants who saw them operating. 
Some said it was a conscious strategy to try to serve as role model. Policy mak-
ers who had been involved in the IB and the automotives platform, seem to have 
tried to transfer the competencies of adaptive interaction to other platforms. 
Several organizations engaged in the platforms have assigned persons who 
participated in several related platforms as a kind of ‘proactive diplomats’. As 
someone said, ‘the IB members have been looking for wind in their sails, and 
they have gotten good at it’. Their management has recognized their skills and 
added value after the success of the IB. The transition discourse is actively ap-
plied to create an understanding and trust in these relationships. It seems that the 
language of transitions has become alive and creates a measure for rewarding 
change management in adaptive networks. On the other hand, this competence 
still seems to be personal. 
It seems important that these change managers be embedded in loose net-
works that understand their transition language. The loose networks surfaced 
regularly in several events where prominent Dutch policy makers and (ex) poli-
ticians made a case for transition thinking. Other examples were dozens of pub-
lications in ArenA, the magazine of the Netherlands Association of Environ-
mental Professionals. In the academic world there was increasing attention for 
transition management, with significant support of the government. Governmen-
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tal knowledge organizations gave support to all interested in transition manage-
ment (www.transitiemanagement.nl). The Environment and Nature Planning 
Bureau (www.mnp.nl), an independent think tank responsible for producing 
sustainability outlooks, took up the progress monitoring of transition manage-
ment. It is difficult to imagine that all these efforts are not rooted in strong and 
lasting loose networks, and that they will not actually create better understand-
ing of sustainable change management. 
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7 Sustainable change management  
You must become the change you seek in the world (Mahatma Gandhi) 
The chicken and the egg are products of co-evolution (this book) 
 
This book starts with a breakthrough in thinking about sustainable mobility and I 
asked the question if such breakthroughs could be managed. Based on complex-
ity theories, I redefined such management as conduct that helps a societal sys-
tem become more adaptable to changing circumstances like depletion of re-
sources. This is therefore sustainable change management. From my study of the 
transition discourse I draw the three following main conclusions, which I think 
are useful for sustainable change managers. 
Adaptive networks as living organisms: complexity theory offers understanding of 
social change 
First, because sustainable development is a wicked, complex problem, it helps to 
analyze such a situation from the perspective of complexity theories. This offers 
an analysis method that helps understand how the transition discourse has 
emerged and developed in connection with the sustainable development dis-
course. The conceptual distinction between power networks and adaptive net-
works helps to understand the conduct of policy makers, and how at times they 
self-organized into power-free groups I termed adaptive networks, which either 
were temporary and mixed with power networks, or separated and lasting longer 
with an increased success rate that gave them their own energy source compara-
ble with a living organism. Complexity theory helps to describe power networks 
in terms of adaptive tensions that attract emerging adaptive networks, which 
facilitate a co-evolution of ideas, first in the adaptive network itself and then in 
the power networks. This co-evolution leads to new adaptive tensions and the 
cycle repeats, one step closer to sustainable development. The ideas and ways of 
an adaptive network reproduce and adapt to evolving adaptive tensions, like an 
organism. Action in the whole social system becomes more aligned and geared 
toward dealing with the common problems on the long term. The fact that adap-
tive networks develop complex ideas that cannot be generated in power net-
works may suggest that they know better, but that may not be always the case. 
Adaptive networks are power free and only can make proposals that may com-
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pete with those of other adaptive networks, and power networks select, like 
always. Power networks, e.g. the primacy of politics over civil servants and 
societal platforms, therefore remain fully intact, but they are better informed. 
Adaptive networks can only survive if power networks are open for the inspira-
tion they offer. 
The organism’s metabolism: under complex conditions individual behavior creates 
more ‘fitness’ than collective behavior in hierarchies (the idea of forerunners) 
The second main lesson is that these adaptive networks depended on policy 
makers who were prepared to make the link between the short term and the long 
term by investing personally in making social and conceptual connections with 
policy makers in other parts. They found their personal motivation in the tension 
between current unsustainable practices and the desire for a sustainable devel-
opment in the societal system they were concerned with. This capacity may be 
defined as double think, which for example may allow a CEO to act in an adap-
tive network, developing ideas that undermine his formal corporate policies, and 
which may not be understood (yet) by most other policy makers in his corpora-
tion who do not share his (capacity of) double think. Outsiders asking for sus-
tainable development, seeing only the visible actions may then remain critical 
about that CEO. Even if power networks accept a breakthrough proposal, the 
CEO will hardly be rewarded, since his contribution occurred behind the scenes. 
What makes it even more unlikely is that solutions for complex problems like 
sustainable development are difficult to find, and take long series of interven-
tions in power networks, creating a much wider social learning process in 
waves, before an adaptive tension emerges that is open for visible market inter-
ventions. A major obstacle is the cultural gap between public and private sector, 
and leaders on both sides may have to invest for a long time before it culminates 
in a context that enables a non-fragmented dialogue across that gap. 
All this was in the mind of public and private leaders involved in transition 
management, and their right hands, since they had developed such competencies 
to some extent, individually and collectively. This enabled knowledge to flow 
more between parts. Each time a power network accepted a proposal, which 
could be the communication in public of a new problem definition, the social 
system was one step further in its thinking about sustainable development. Key 
to this success was that participants were driven by the common interest and not 
by individual material reward. One adaptive network, the Innovation Board 
Sustainable Mobility (IB), perfected these skills and made them explicit. They 
found success in developing new problem definitions in power networks, which 
created adaptive tensions for further steps. Because this process did not yet lead 
to visible market changes, the paradox emerged that they were successful in 
their own eyes but not in the eyes of the outside world. 
The idea that adaptive interactions must be power free, and therefore depend 
on individual willingness to manage sustainable change, is therefore key. Before 
adaptive networks can offer their complex ideas to power networks, there is no 
way to give their efforts legitimacy or resources. It is fundamentally unknowable 
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if they are going to develop useful ideas, the ideas are too sensitive to be widely 
understood since they require double think, and creating expectations of results 
by allocating resources already disturbs the required closedness. Just the fact 
that they are adaptive networks does not create legitimacy in the eyes of outsid-
ers, which is why they depend on their own rationality. 
Finally, sustainable change management can be done at different levels of 
complexity. Adaptive behavior can help to create relatively small changes in 
R&D policies or investments in sustainable products. Such initiatives may be 
successful even without major government market interventions, but they may 
still require adaptive behavior to develop more sustainable products that may not 
have developed without concern for sustainable development. At the same time, 
these successes may not lead to a chain of events that creates a sustainable tran-
sition. Sustainable transitions may actually depend on breakthroughs in thinking 
about government policies to facilitate market changes, and there a different 
kind of sustainable change management is needed. It is this second kind of sus-
tainable change management that has mainly been addressed in this book, but 
both depend on personal initiative, and an orientation towards change. 
The understanding of linkages between scales can make change management 
more credible 
A third main lesson was that complex change processes can be better understood 
if they are studied at different related time scales. On a time scale of decades, I 
have observed that in several waves (successions of large scale adaptive ten-
sions) loose networks of individuals emerged who had the basic competence to 
develop trust across societal domains and to roughly develop a common way of 
thinking about acting for sustainable development. These people had a shared 
history of unsatisfactory experiences, which made them tend to apply systems 
thinking and postpone their judgment in dialogues based on mutual respect of 
the person and his ideas. This was a process of cultural evolution. On a time 
scale of months, however, people from these networks could self-organize into 
adaptive networks that connected several societal domains. These then would 
develop a working method that, if they were successful in their self-defined 
terms, subsequently evolved on a time scale of years. Self-organization was 
induced by opportunities like the 4th National Environmental Policy (NMP4), 
and evolution was induced by the capacity of adaptive networks to ‘jump’ from 
one such opportunity to another, under different names and compositions, adapt-
ing to the changing power environment of the adaptive networks – i.e. the large 
scale evolution and the sudden political opportunities of adaptive tensions in 
power networks. 
By singling out the goal-seeking component of governance, as was the inten-
tion of my book, it looks like society as a whole has become more connected 
and adaptive. The focus on the IB, an adaptive network that was successful in 
self-defined terms, suggests that this is a trend. However, that may not be the 
case and their influence may be local and temporary. However, these networks 
depended on people who were personally willing to engage in sustainable 
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change management, and who could develop the capacity of double think in 
adaptive networks. These groups have grown in the past ten years in the mobil-
ity and energy systems, but they may still be small compared to groups who 
focus on the accounting component of governance. 
Further elaboration of my arguments 
The three conclusions above are based on my empirical research, but they need 
more explanation. I give that explanation hereafter. Since I write about concepts 
from complexity theory to explain what I see, I first summarize the theoretical 
thinking behind these terms again, and find illustrative examples from the em-
pirical cases. Then I explain my conclusions with a focus on the IB, where adap-
tive interactions were the clearest and that comes closest to a temporary 
manifestation of a living organism. Then, I describe the metabolism of that 
organism, applying trust and personal motivation as main factors. Finally, I 
identify issues that need the attention of sustainable change managers. 
7.1 Adaptive networks as living organisms 
Adaptive networks attracted by power networks 
On several occasions, networks have emerged with the explicit objective of 
learning. Because they enabled co-evolution to some extent they can at least 
partly be seen as adaptive networks. The first case I have analyzed is the NMP4-
team. It was established as a power network, because initially management of 
different non-environmental ministries did not have the intention to do more 
than prevent harm for their ongoing policies. However, the NMP4 team took it 
as an opportunity to develop a new discourse about governance of sustainable 
development; it was termed transition management. The second adaptive net-
work was the Innovation Board Sustainable Mobility (IB). The IB was estab-
lished as an initiative of V&W, the ministry for transport, as follow-up of the 
NMP4. However, it did not receive any budget and was not mentioned in 
V&W’s work programs, because the participants believed that such would bring 
power interactions into the IB. The IB had strong influence on an EU conference 
about automotives. The third adaptive network was the Energy Transition Pro-
gram (ETP). It was kept power-free to some extent, but the energy ministry EZ 
attracted participants with the promise of subsidies on the condition that they did 
market experiments within two years. The ETP therefore was not credible to the 
power networks that might have been able to decide about level playing field for 
a sustainable energy market. Attracted by the need to annually report progress to 
Parliament, high-level cooperation in the ministries emerged as a power network 
(the five DG deliberation, and interactions between ministers). However, they 
said they intended to learn from the processes initiated by each individual minis-
try, and be critical about each other. Their role in co-evolution was on the one 
hand passive, until after the EU conference energy in motion they and their min-
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isters approved the establishment of an Inter-ministerial Transition Program 
Directorate with the explicit and exclusive aim to facilitate co-evolution. 
Only the IB was completely power free, all the other adaptive networks were 
in some degree mixed with power networks. Or, within power networks sub-
structures have emerged that may have had a changing composition, but inter-
acted to achieve co-evolution of ideas that was not based on previous formal 
objectives. I will return later on to separation of power interactions and adaptive 
interactions, and to co-evolution. First I ask how these adaptive networks could 
emerge. 
Self-organization 
Self-organization is, like the synonyms ‘social systems’ and ‘social networks’, a 
term from complexity theories. It is applied to the process where spontaneous 
interaction patterns emerge in a social system as result of changing conditions. 
The interactions can only emerge if the agents in the network are capable, and 
somehow willing, to show that behavior. They don’t quickly learn that behavior 
– it was already an option to them. In the case of adaptive networks, that behav-
ior is by definition power free: it is not driven by predefined measures of suc-
cess, so there must be another motivation. In the cases above, such a quick 
change of interaction patterns after a change of conditions could nonetheless be 
observed on several occasions. 
In 2001, when NMP4 was under preparation, many people shared similar 
frustrations and hopes. They also knew that about each other, as they had had 
interactions in the Greenpolder Model and the sustainability research programs. 
They shared disappointments and general ideas. They also knew that others 
would be prepared to join in action that would help take away the previous bar-
riers to sustainable change. This, and trust in a power context that would support 
new ideas for sustainable development, formed fertile ground for the transition 
discourse. NMP4 attracted people from many domains, like the environment 
movement and the energy sector, who together formulated and supported the 
transition discourse, which was then accepted by Cabinet and Parliament. The 
loose networks of people who shared the sustainable development discourse, 
who were everywhere, quickly self-organized at the occasion of the NMP4, to 
develop and support the transition discourse. 
These loose networks stayed important in the following years, when the 
NMP4 was implemented. The acceptance of transition management by Parlia-
ment, created an opportunity for Cabinet to show implementation power. The 
next Cabinets (as of 2002) contained at least two persons who enabled continua-
tion despite eroding support in Parliament. They supported the transition dis-
course actively at many public occasions and one of them, the energy ministry, 
made extra resources available. They did that immediately after their appoint-
ment in Cabinet, which rules out that they quickly learned what others had to 
learn in years. They were already sensitive to the transition discourse, which is 
why their participation in the adaptive networks may be seen as self-
organization. The same is true for the Director General for Environment Zijp. 
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However, the clearest case of self-organization was the establishment of the IB 
in just a few months. About 20 persons came together with roughly the same 
idea; to link their knowledge to power. Many of these people actually shared 
similar experiences or actually knew each other. As V&W initiated a group to 
‘manage a transition to sustainable mobility’, it was easy to find this group from 
all relevant domains and sectors. The IB subsequently functioned within a year 
as a kind of hyperlink in the Dutch and European mobility system, feeding its 
components with knowledge about other components. They proposed stepwise 
innovative communications in power networks, and used the feedback for a next 
step. They focused on automotives, but also functioned as a kind of turning table 
for Chinese banquets, where each IB member could present latest trends in his 
system component as a dish to the others, and each other IB member could pick 
a dish that was to the taste in his world, matching it to trends in his own compo-
nent. 
Other cases of self-organization in adaptive networks were probably the peo-
ple who were first attracted to the EU conference on automotives. These people 
believed in the questions asked at the conference, and wanted to support that. As 
people were attracted from several domains, other people might have been at-
tracted to defend their vested interests, and that would have created power inter-
actions. At the conference, there was wide support for the ideas that the Euro-
pean car industry, itself present at the conference, was lagging with respect to 
sustainable development. 
The next self-organization may have been the attraction of participants to the 
automotives platform. A number of participants had already acted in the IB, but 
in this context new participants joined as well. Some of them probably quickly 
showed adaptive behavior. 
Autopoiesis 
The loose sustainability networks at occasions coagulated (i.e. self-organized) to 
active adaptive networks that somehow were connected through ideas and per-
sons. My hypothesis is that this structure has come alive. A structure is alive, 
that is, it shows autopoiesis, if it reproduces itself, dissipating some form of 
energy. In this process, agents should be replaced with new agents and the rela-
tive frequency of fitter agents should be favored through a selection mechanism. 
The term agent is easily interpreted as a person, but it could also be the ideas 
that lead the conduct of persons. As a person learns, he builds up his view of the 
world over and over again, together with others. In this process the ideas in his 
brain may be replaced with (or dominated by) ‘fitter’ ideas. The ideas, develop-
ing in interaction with ideas in other people’s brains, and expressed through 
people’s conduct, are then the co-evolving agents. This is the view of memetics. 
In the case of the loose networks under transition management, the ideas about 
the operation of the network evolved – i.e. ideas about developing ideas by 
means of co-evolution (meta-ideas). 
The clearest example is, again, the IB. The IB consciously developed a 
common vision about sustainable mobility, which gave direction to all its ac-
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tions. It consciously tried to improve the vision in several rounds, and detailed it 
out by focusing on ‘transition paths’, where the IB could have some influence on 
power networks. It consciously worked toward that influence. Its ideas about 
these transitions paths were gradually adjusted (ideas), and the collective work-
ing method itself was also improved (meta-ideas). The working method con-
sisted of what might be termed a Chinese turning table, a scanning of latest po-
litical developments in all parts of the mobility system with the aim of identify-
ing opportunities to link to power, and focusing on some specific transition path 
in more detail. This was first the transition path sustainable automotives, and 
later a new focus was chosen. 
Through this process, the IB became better at what it did (the ideas evolved 
and were perfected), in its first year without replacing the persons and develop-
ing it vision and basic working method. On the other hand, as a person may not 
be appropriate to develop a kind of ideas that would make an adaptive network 
as a whole fitter, the network would need to adapt its composition (looking for 
people with the right characteristics, i.e. added value in terms of, for example, 
knowledge or influence). In the case of sustainable development, the network 
eventually has to connect with the power networks that can implement a sustain-
able development. The IB and its offspring, among others the automotive plat-
forms, were steps in that direction. As the IB discovered that it lacked knowl-
edge about the automobile industry, someone from there was asked to join. The 
composition of the set of connected persons gradually changed, in order to get 
closer to power. In 2005, the IB’s ideas and several of its members returned in 
the automotives platform, where it connected with CEOs in the oil and automo-
bile industries. All this time the IB as a whole reproduced its vision to verify if 
they were headed in the right direction. The IB’s meta-ideas in some degree 
radiated to other networks, because change managers took these ideas with 
them. 
So, it can be concluded that ideas traveled between minds and between net-
works, as long as this migration is facilitated by meta-ideas, which first must 
develop, about the operation of adaptive networks, most centrally its common 
vision and how that is continuously reproduced and fed with new ideas and steps 
in the direction of power. The energy source of this adaptive network can be 
hypothesized to be successful co-evolution itself, since these ideas, leading to 
the observed conduct, were selected and survived in the struggle for life. The 
selection mechanism was created by an adaptive tension. 
Adaptive tensions 
Adaptive tensions create energy potential that a system can draw on as source 
for its own development. The studied adaptive networks thrived on large-scale 
societal tensions. They linked many parts of a large societal system. They were 
motivated to address the sustainable development of that system, since that de-
velopment currently was (in their eyes) not sustainable. The adaptive tensions 
that drove these adaptive networks were thus actually as wide as the tension 
between the economic growth discourse (or competitiveness in a global market) 
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and sustainable development discourse (in the Netherlands and in the world). 
These interests were represented in the adaptive networks. The IB focused on 
the mobility system and the ETP on the energy system. For the NMP4 team it 
was even wider. Apparently, somehow these adaptive networks were able to use 
these tensions as energy source for their own development. This was the compe-
tence that has evolved over the years, and it was closely connected with co-
evolution. 
Co-evolution  
Co-evolution of ideas implies that ideas in different parts of a composed subsys-
tem like the (social) mobility system, which is a nested conglomerate of living 
systems, do not evolve independently. There is a social link that ensures that 
ideas, and therefore conduct, in different parts become more aligned than they 
would be if conduct in each part were only the result of interactions in the mar-
ket. Since each part has its own ‘autopoietic dynamics’, it has a natural tendency 
to maximize the returns it is geared for, and that forms the primary selection 
mechanism for its ideas. There is no autopoietic reward for being sensitive for 
ideas in other parts. Some other mechanism has to develop for adaptive conduct 
connecting the parts at this scale. My hypothesis is that the mechanism that 
evolved in the transition discourse was reward for co-evolution itself. This can 
be seen from the conduct of the adaptive networks, which was increasingly 
aimed at co-evolution. 
The awareness of a need of co-evolution was present at the start of the 
NMP4. The greenpolder model and sustainable research programmes both had 
led to a shared awareness and trust between individuals in all domains, indi-
rectly from Parliament to CEOs. This shared awareness can be interpreted as a 
result of co-evolution, despite the fact that a clear line of thinking about co-
evolution, or a working method to facilitate co-evolution had not evolved yet. 
There was no sufficient linkage to implementation power, as celebrities like Arie 
de Geus remarked at NIDO’s final congress in 2004 (www.nido.nu). It is my 
assumption that this meta-discourse about sustainable development was the 
result of a large-scale, relatively slow (taking up at least 10 years), cultural evo-
lution process, where members of sustainability knowledge systems (networks 
that used research projects to push for sustainable development but did not suc-
ceed) became aware that it did not help to project sustainability problems on 
power networks, but even more patience would be needed to look for acceptable 
solutions by seeing it as a shared problem. In other words: these people had 
become aware that jumping to solutions and pushing does not help, ‘the system 
pushes back’, and perhaps that pushing even can make these solutions unaccept-
able for a long time, while technically they are still interesting. In complexity 
speak, if this analysis is adequate, these loose networks shared an awareness that 
they should contribute to requisite variety of the societal systems they were 
trying to influence. On the other hand, the pushing of sustainable solutions had 
been a useful phase to build up the tensions that now were widely felt, also by 
CEOs. Around 2000, the sustainable development discourse and the unspecific 
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idea of sustainable governance were increasingly advocated by CEOs. The chal-
lenge now became to tap this energy source for a goal-seeking process. Before 
2001, there was no discourse yet on ways to achieve that. 
The NMP4 succeeded in developing such a discourse, the transition dis-
course. It put in words what the earlier emerged loose networks intuitively un-
derstood. Academics helped to find these words. The ideas of systems thinking, 
teams of forerunners from all domains, visions, transition paths and learning-by-
doing form a representation of the idea of co-evolution. The NMP4 team also 
put transition management in practice itself by involving the groups from all 
domains in the development of the discourse, asking open questions, so this idea 
became shared among several domains especially in the energy and environ-
mental sectors. Of course, it was theoretical and only some people in each do-
main participated in the discourse, but it was enough to make Cabinet and Par-
liament accept the NMP4. 
The ETP tried to perfect co-evolution by setting-up transition teams that ap-
plied the tricks of the transition discourse. Behind the scenes there was an adap-
tive network that learned that the approach of the ETP did not generate requisite 
variety to address key issues like level playing field or investments by major 
industries. This contributed to the proposal of an Interdepartmental Energy 
Transition Program: the other relevant ministries would be able to join in the 
process of co-evolution, which was necessary to increase the complexity of the 
adaptive networks on the side of the government, which would, again, help to 
attract the industries. It also contributed to more alignment with respect to R&D 
for energy, which led to a better focus, through less controversy, of government 
support of that R&D. 
The IB did as the ETP, but was more aware of requisite variety: if complex 
change is discussed, the IB had to link to the sectors that would need to partici-
pate in the change. So the IB had to be as complex in the knowledge it could 
link. It did not jump to easily to transition paths and actions that either were not 
credible because major sectors did not participate, or only had limited effect on 
sustainable development. As they focused on a specific transition path they in-
volved key domains and sectors to enable co-evolution there, which is needed 
for joint implementation of sustainable scenarios. This can be seen from the 
initial composition of the IB and the fact that it extended itself with a member of 
the automobile industry. The IB’s efforts facilitated the cooperation between 
three ministries in the preparation of an influential EU conference, where views 
about sustainable development were widely shared between all domains and 
sectors in the automotives system. 
The five DG deliberation was less clear in its language and its efforts. How-
ever, the DGs for environment and energy focused on maintaining the link with 
the three other involved ministries, to at least maintain a basic involvement at 
the level of civil servants from a larger number of policy sectors. This probably 
helped in particular for the IB, where four directors from three ministries par-
ticipated. The Inter-ministerial Energy Transition Program, established by the 
DGs in 2005, had the clear intention of being nothing more than a link between 
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the six participating ministries and between the public and private worlds. In 
some degree, the DGs had developed joint ideas about their own role in sustain-
able development. 
Coherent specialization 
The IB perfected its capacity of co-evolution in a way that may be termed ‘co-
herent specialization’. It wanted to enable co-evolution in many parts of society, 
and looked for a method to deal with the complexity without losing requisite 
variety. Whilst no participant could oversee all parts, they developed enough 
shared knowledge and trust to use that as a common basis for action. To over-
come limited individual cognitive capabilities (bounded rationality), they spe-
cialized according to content. It did not try to change the mobility system as a 
whole in one time, but focused on power networks where they thought they 
could have influence, and certain participants contributed by influencing power. 
The group focused on specialization in a limited group that still was able to meet 
and ensure that their different ideas were coherently based on joint ideas. They 
all could explain the link between their own knowledge and the vision, and 
trusted that everyone understood the vision in the same way, and that there also 
was coherence between the knowledge and actions of all other participants and 
the joint vision. In this way, the IB as a whole could hold enormous complex 
ideas, more complex and adaptable than a single person could hold. A third kind 
of contribution was making this mode of operation explicit to ensure trust that 
coherence would be maintained. This division of roles was clearly visible in the 
IB, for example, since roles were explicitly addressed in its internal communica-
tions. For example, when I asked members how the group produced its analyses 
on which it based its actions, they usually referred to the same persons to create 
enthusiasm for certain lines of thinking and acting, whilst these often did not 
personally possess the knowledge for the analysis, or the influence to implement 
the actions. 
A great deal of the enthusiasm in the IB was formed by its capacity of 
facilitating co-evolution. They were close to power in many parts of the mobility 
system (they belonged to the rank and file), and had much additional knowledge 
about mobility. As via their backwards reasoning they conceptually approached 
social dilemmas, they prevented internal competition by proposing these dilem-
mas to power networks, where they were piloted. In this way they did not jump 
to solutions but maintained requisite variety for themselves. 
Other networks, principally the Energy Transition Process, also tried to fol-
low the transition discourse, but were not completely power-free, jumped to 
certain solutions that should be implemented via experiments, and lost influence 
on major players, i.e. it lost requisite variety. However, they still ensured co-
evolution in the parts on which their success did depend, and it created co-
evolution about possible solutions on a much longer term. It was nonetheless 
unlikely that the ETP had the requisite variety to address large-scale transitions. 
The enthusiasm therefore declined a bit, in particular when this became clear to 
more ambitious participants who regressed to old-fashioned power behavior of 
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pushing for specific solutions (the letter about the failure of the biomass transi-
tion in 2003). It can be interpreted that adaptive networks in the ETP, primarily 
in the ministry of EZ itself, became aware of this problem, and proposed the 
Inter-ministerial Program in order to attract the missing subsystems to the dia-
logue. The DGs, sensitized by the success of the EU Conference for the connect-
ing capacities of these civil servants, approved. The conclusion about coherent 
specialization in the ETP can be that it was less successful than in the IB, be-
cause it was not power free, and not as much linked to implementation power 
for large-scale breakthroughs. 
Natural selection 
More than the ETP, the IB had perfected the art of coherent specialization, 
therefore could maintain requisite variety. It could create influence toward more 
complex changes. It enabled co-evolution at a larger scale. Socio-cognitive 
forces drove this behavior: the IB had explicit ideas about co-evolution that they 
put in practice and improved, learning by doing. All members at least were pre-
pared to apply double think – willingness to take the joint vision, rather than 
their personal interests, as selector for action, making that action coherent. Oth-
ers were specialized in systems thinking, helping the others to see the bigger 
picture and act accordingly. They also helped the others to consciously deal with 
trust – by keeping the IB power free. This combination of skills enabled the IB 
to select ideas that contribute to co-evolution, and because co-evolution was 
their joint meta-objective, these skills constantly improved. This led to stepwise 
nearing, through co-evolution, of more concrete ‘implementable’ ideas, which 
eventually were discussed between capable CEOs under the automotives plat-
form. 
A live connecting subsystem 
My research gives indications that the transition discourse was more than ‘com-
plexity speak’. It inspired dozens of policy makers in the mobility and energy 
system to engage in goal seeking, and this actually led to a co-evolution of ideas 
in different components of a composed subsystem – principally in the automo-
tives system, but also in the larger mobility and energy systems. However, I 
have not explained yet how co-evolution led to recognizable successes, as a 
market breakthrough in mobility of energy systems has not yet been achieved. 
There must be some other way than observing market breakthroughs, in which 
adaptive networks recognize (meta)-ideas that successfully contributed to co-
evolution. This way of observing success as steps in the right direction that cre-
ate more hope of actual market breakthroughs is the basis of the natural selec-
tion mechanism. 
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7.2 The organism’s metabolism: feeding on connections 
Willingness to contribute to sustainable development 
Now it is clear that the IB and other adaptive networks aimed at making connec-
tions between thinking and acting in different parts of the mobility and energy 
systems, the question becomes, how does that work? The adaptive interactions 
are power free, to allow trust to emerge that persons act for the common good of 
sustainable development and not for their private benefit on the short term. If 
there is any benefit on the short term, that is the result of a goal-seeking process 
to match long-term goals with the short-term goals in power networks. Result of 
that goal-seeking process is, however, uncertain, and the considerable time in-
vestment is at everyone’s own risk. The IB needed a year, about ten meetings, 
before they saw a real perspective of influencing power through the EU confer-
ence. And even then, the IB and the time spent in it were not visible to the out-
side world. The civil servants in the ministries preparing the EU conference 
were hardly aware of the significance of the IB behind the scenes. There are 
other examples of policy makers who invested time or took some (limited) per-
sonal risk by participating in adaptive networks and make proposals for change 
in power networks. It seems safe to assume that their motivation was personal, 
or at least not given by reward that power networks had promised. I therefore 
assume that their conduct was in the first place personally motivated, and in the 
second place motivated by an expectation of success. That success was defined 
in the first place by an adaptive tension they felt, and in the second place by 
believing in their own judgment of small successes, which are steps in the direc-
tion of relieving that tension. Each successful step then may actually be experi-
enced as a source of energy, an encouragement to make further steps. The judg-
ment of small successes was in effect the selection mechanism for ideas, and, at 
the next order, the judgment of how their own conduct had contributed to that 
success was the selection mechanism for adaptive behavior (meta-ideas). The 
purpose of this section is to describe how that worked. 
Cognitive separation as energy source (i.e. creative tension) 
Interviews make clear that the participants all were capable of explaining their 
role: they saw a current reality and they had a dream that did not match with that 
reality. They were able to describe both, and explained how they were looking, 
with others, for proposals that could take reality one step closer to the dream. It 
is my assumption that all members of adaptive networks, if they are to contrib-
ute to co-evolution, should at least be able to sense that tension and combine the 
rationality based on sustainability of the whole societal system that the network 
intends to connect, with the rationality in the partial system where they have 
influence or knowledge. This is what Teisman (2005) terms double think. They 
should be prepared to invest energy in developing with others, together having 
knowledge and influence of other subsystems, views about the whole. Simulta-
neously they should be looking for opportunities to bridge the tension with their 
own part, making knowledge development in their part more consistent with the 
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whole. They should have the skill of creating trust among other members of the 
adaptive network that they do all that. At the basis of this skill is, in my view, 
cognitive separation between the part and the whole, whilst using the tension 
between both as ‘energy source’; a source of inspiration, always based on the 
internal drive to match the future with the present (or the whole with the parts). 
As I have observed several times, cognitive separation or double think oc-
curred several times in loose networks; members of power networks self-
organized for a while into small, temporary adaptive networks. What perhaps 
contributes most to giving life to these networks, is the recognition that cogni-
tive separation can be strengthened by other kinds of separation, like separation 
in time or space.  IB members were aware of this, which is why they empha-
sized that the IB should be power free. This is what, for example, the IB’s mod-
erator said to me in 2001. This enables collective cognitive separation – it is 
clear for everyone that when others act from the joint interest and when from the 
separate interest. It is also easier to visualize the steps necessary to bridge the 
tension – in other words to become creative (this tension was therefore termed a 
creative tension by Fritz 1989). 
Once cognitive separation occurs, an adaptive network can find its own iden-
tity and develop its own rules. This also entails finding a new composition, 
whilst maintaining the common understanding where it all began, the trust and 
the mode of interaction. As the network begins to influence power networks, it 
may consciously try to improve that skill, and have a common basis for evalua-
tion of success. Driven by previous success, and by the desire to solve the com-
plex problems of power networks, where the same people may participate in 
another role, they can become better. 
The acknowledgement that transitions are needed is an expression of a crea-
tive tension; it is in a way the first step toward problem solving: acknowledging 
that change needs to be managed. This acknowledgement has driven the adap-
tive networks in the transition discourse. 
The tension between knowledge and power 
Where creative tension is based on an analysis of content, it is matched with a 
tension in social networks. An adaptive network has to link with power net-
works in order to facilitate co-evolution. However, by definition power cannot 
be forced to listen. This tension is the other driver of adaptive networks. One 
adaptive network may be said to be ‘fitter’ (in terms of natural selection) than 
another if they are better able to connect with power – making better cases for 
interventions. 
How is the term ‘fitness’ defined? The following answer may be hypothe-
sized. The energy source are the successes based on the network’s belief that (a) 
it has a socio-cognitive basis, a common vision, which it can apply to test which 
ideas are in the long-term benefit of all, and (b) which can lead to series of 
short-term successes, visible to themselves, defined as interventions in a power 
network that fits the vision and might create reactions that change the system, 
and (c) each person also believes he can trust the others to have the same under-
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standing of this belief, and that they will act to that. If this belief is strong 
enough, reconfirmed by such successes, and even grows stronger through a 
learning process where the fitness of ideas increases, a living system has 
evolved that ‘feeds of’ its connections with several subsystems to create suc-
cesses. The primary energy source, however, is still the personal will to act for 
the common benefit rather than the personal short-term material benefit. 
This is the will and competence to engage in coopetition. If a power network 
develops a way to create such belief and such competence, the rules of its games 
can theoretically change. In theory Cabinet members and CEOs do not have to 
spend huge amounts of time, as long as they trust that the adaptive networks that 
propose interventions also match what they, personally, believe to be appropri-
ate (‘logic of appropriateness’). In that way, CEOs can concentrate on their 
usual power games, whilst remaining open to sustainable development of the 
system on which they too depend, in the long term. 
This has occurred in some degree under the transition discourse. The IB was 
independent of short-term political success, was hardly visible for power net-
works, and thrived of the interventions it developed, without outsiders being 
aware of their role. It created joint perceptions about several societal subsystems 
(subsystems of mobility) at the same time, but focused its interventions at first 
on automotives. Several Cabinet members and CEOs supported the automotives 
platform. When that was successful (in the IB’s own eyes), it shifted focus and 
adjusted its composition accordingly. It is therefore not dependent on success in 
one specific power network; it spreads its risks. 
Management of tensions 
Whilst the IB, and to a lesser extent the ETP, explicitly managed their internal 
tensions by cognitive separation to enable a goal-oriented search process, they 
tried to influence the tensions in power networks. This external tension man-
agement was visible for the outside world, because communications in power 
networks changed (although the sources of this change were not visible). 
The momentum of sustainable automotives has been created in a series of 
small interventions in power networks. The first is that the occasion of the Dutch 
presidency should be used to organize a conference about automotives. The 
second is the role of representatives in several ministries, the environment 
movement and the mobilists union, who were member of the IB, started to act in 
their formal capacity on behalf of the conference. The organizing committee, 
civil servants from three ministries, organized several pre-conferences where IB 
members acted on the basis of the case for sustainable automotives they had 
developed in the IB. They tried to take small steps trying to sense the reactions 
in the rest of Europe. As the reactions were favorable, the agenda of the confer-
ence was set-up so that it would attract a lot of participants to discuss about 
sustainable automotives. Deputy DG Jeroen Tulp of V&W did important power 
interventions, where he talked in public a language that had significant influence 
on the events, and which is completely attributable to his membership of the IB. 
In that way he increased the pressure on the power network for automotives to 
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discuss alternative scenarios. The EU conference was widely attended, and polls 
showed that the problem analysis was widely shared. The tension on the Euro-
pean automobile industries to participate in a process of change increased, and 
soon after that the automotives platform was established. 
In the ETP, there was a mix of tensions at several levels of complexity; 
where wide encompassing problems descriptions were expressed, CEOs of in-
fluential industries hardly acted in public in this debate. The link with imple-
mentation power was primarily made through influencing investment decisions 
about transition experiments that could be defined within a few years. EZ man-
aged tensions by requiring that these experiments would be supported by envi-
ronmental NGOs and implementing industries. However, EZ could not develop 
a credible tension between public and private sector, since the government was 
not organized integrally: the only tension EZ could create was that of subsidies. 
Whereas the experiments therefore were seen as steps in the direction of sustain-
able energy, they were contested as being step in the direction of a really signifi-
cant energy transition. The Inter-ministerial Program was the answer to this 
problem, and created more credibility in the eyes of the private world that the 
government was serious in its intentions to take the measures required to facili-
tate a sustainable level playing field, and make sustainable energy a business 
case. 
In some degree, tensions were also managed to keep the transition discourse 
as such alive in the much larger loose networks of the polder tradition that had 
supported transition management in the beginning. Progress reports by Cabinet 
to Parliament obviously did not show clear progress toward sustainable devel-
opment – the process in the IB and the ETP was too uncertain, fragile and sensi-
tive. To foster the loose networks, the transition discourse was kept alive 
through relatively ‘safe’ power interventions, like transition research programs, 
helpdesks, and, finally, setting up an interdepartmental program. 
The public – private gap as management challenge 
Whereas smaller industries can be innovative in a technological sense, they still 
largely depend on a sustainable level playing field in the market before they can 
break through. This was one of the outcomes of the ETP, and it was one of the 
sources of inspiration of the IB. The basic question was, how ambitious should 
one be as regards the calculation of external effects in the prices. For implemen-
tation of the more ambitious scenarios, linkage with the finance ministries in the 
EU was required. A less ambitious scenario would still depend on the support of 
large industrial players. Jeroen Tulp, deputy DG at V&W, was aware of this, 
and said that a main motivation for his participation in the IB was that there he 
could get to know some of these industries, and with them seek ways of dealing 
with the barrier between the public and the private world. He saw this as the 
final challenge before sustainable scenarios could be implemented. Where the 
private world is focused on business cases that should bring result in the rela-
tively short term, the public world is aimed at the next elections. As the playing 
field is strongly influenced by the government, any scenario had to be imple-
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mented by the private and public sector together. In the process of taking steps 
in the right direction, both see the other as unreliable, given their different auto-
poietic behavior (business cases and cooperation based on trust, versus public 
interventions with widely understood benefit that can easily be turned around 
after the next elections).  A tension needed to be managed that could attract both 
the public sector and the private sector to a dialogue about sustainable automo-
tives, and sustainable energy at large, and where both parties would believe in 
the trustworthiness of the other. At the EU conference, on both sides, statements 
were done that created expectations. The Inter-Ministerial Program, signed by 
six ministries and with significant budget to facilitate the dialogue and to hire 
competent chairs, increased the credibility. The involvement of NGOs increased 
the expectation that elections would not force the government to return expecta-
tions it created in the earlier steps of the public-private dialogue. 
In hindsight, several IB members indicated that all the time they had been 
trying to build up tensions to bridge the public-private gap. However, they were 
dependent on feedback from the social system to build that tension. They suc-
ceeded, because favorable feedback returned in the preparations of the confer-
ence and on the conference itself. People around Europe had created expecta-
tions that they would seriously participate in a dialogue about sustainable auto-
motives. 
In terms of complexity, the IB’s metabolism was based on small successes in 
the building-up of tensions to bridge, mainly, the public-private gap. The IB 
created waves in the social system to build up tensions if there was resonance – 
if the power network reacted favorably by creating new expectations and there-
fore new tensions. Several members of the IB explained how they consciously 
tried to disrupt the autopoietic balance in the automotives power network, in a 
way rocking the system by clever power interventions that are reinforced in the 
larger social system, and bring it out of balance. They interpreted the feedback 
as successes, whereas the rest of the world ever would have made that interpre-
tation, since a social transition only is only widely visible after the balance flips 
to another state. By developing a common language (in some degree) about this 
process of influencing, the IB had a common frame of reference for success, and 
could consciously try to improve its skill of ‘rocking the system’. As they got 
better, they had more successes (in their own eyes), and more motivation to 
continue their efforts. 
The metabolism emerged slowly and quickly 
The IB, the ETP and five DG deliberation and the Inter-Ministerial Program are 
all said to be unique, at least by many people who are acquainted with these 
groups. Since these groups, and what they do, and how they measure success, 
are only visible to insiders, this is a subjective proof. On the other hand, this 
group is well acquainted with the culture in Dutch national policy systems with 
regard to sustainable development. It is probably different than previous policy 
processes in these sectors. 
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It may then be concluded that a new metabolism developed in the early 2000s, 
of an invisible organism that grew by feeding on co-evolution in the energy and 
mobility systems. This organism is small, and limited to insiders from all do-
mains in these societal systems. However, it is embedded in larger loose net-
works of people who do not share the competences the IB and the ETP devel-
oped, but who are sensitive for their reasoning and probably willing to contrib-
ute when asked. This was shown when the IB’s and the ETP’s ideas emerged in 
other networks, carried by persons who had participated in both, but also trans-
ferred to new participants who were asked to contribute their knowledge and 
influence. The adaptive networks created its own feeding ground – new social 
tensions in slightly different power networks, that offered opportunities for new 
manifestations of itself. While the IB as such may die, it’s spirit may live on in 
‘offspring networks’, where the competences coagulate again, attracted by a new 
tension in power networks. In some degree the ideas are carried by the same 
persons, and in some degree, susceptible and willing persons join from the loose 
networks. As this energy source doesn’t dry out, and as its interconnectivity 
skills are gradually improved, it will live on, and improve, and it is clear that it 
is actually the ideas that are alive, and the persons that carry this organism. The 
organism might die, whilst the persons live on. So, whilst the organism has 
slowly evolved in the 1990s as a result of disappointment and emerging trust, it 
has quickly boosted its competences on several occasions in the transition dis-
course, and has become better in living on, feeding on small successes. 
The question is how long the adaptive networks will survive. The continua-
tion of the discourse is by itself no guard against complexity speak. The Inter-
ministerial program, like the NMP4, is no adaptive network, since both are 
highly visible, and create expectations that are susceptible to punishment and 
reward in power networks. By communicating about their activities, these net-
works engage in power games. They create expectations of result, which either 
is indefinable, or depends on other expectations it has to create of reward and 
punishment. This is the fate of most strategy departments. Established for the 
best reasons by managers who saw the need of co-evolution, they often become 
an extra player in the field, and one without resources of its own. If they are 
going to connect and let knowledge flow, they should do that in an invisible 
way, and they can only do that if the other departments (the sectors) are open to 
connective behavior, so that adaptive networks may self-organize. In other 
words, power is not an energy source for live adaptive networks, but it can be a 
context for self-organization. If that succeeds, the power networks can evolve 
under influence of co-evolution, facilitated behind the scenes by adaptive net-
works. 
7.3 Understanding the scale linkages as extra motivator 
Cultural evolution and large-scale adaptive tensions 
In chapter 5 I describe the rise of adaptive networks as a process that took more 
than a decade. A portion of the population of policy makers in all domains of the 
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energy and mobility systems was sensitive for the adaptive tension between the 
economic growth discourses and the sustainable development discourse. In that 
climate, the NMP4-team could self-organize and get favorable feedback on their 
ideas, the NMP4 could get politically approved (despite its unspecific and unac-
countable character), the IB and the ETP could self-organize and, in the context 
of these networks, the DGs and Cabinet could keep their hopes that there would 
be clear outcomes, and enable continuation. 
This process was driven by several adaptive tensions; some weakly felt by a 
large part of the population (primarily the tension between economic growth and 
sustainable development), and some felt strongly by a small part of the popula-
tion (primarily the tension between the political dynamics of the public sector 
and the private sector). The process of the past decade enhanced the collective 
capacity of making constructive use of the latter tension (through the automo-
tives platform), by somehow tapping the energy of large scale but weakly felt 
tensions. It seems like a redirection and concentration of social energy, enabled 
by the connectedness of adaptive networks. Where political opportunities 
emerged to make a further step in this building-up of tensions, groups like the IB 
quickly self-organized. It almost seems as if a subpopulation has emerged that 
has an intuitive grasp of management of tensions. Interviews do hardly give 
indications that this is conscious behavior; change managers who can describe 
the process in terms of successions of tensions are rare. More likely this gradual 
change should be seen as a cultural evolution where persons in the loose net-
works reward each other for connecting behavior. They see small steps to a 
wider consensus about sustainable development as encouraging, and they are 
willing to engage in this process without material reward. Geert Teisman and I 
(in prep) describe how this sensitivity was built not only on the personal charac-
teristics of these persons but also on the general polder tradition in The Nether-
lands. There is natural tendency to look for consensus. The socio-economic 
Polder Model was built on this and it has been applied for decades, as was the 
greenpolder model that was applied for less then a decade and then abolished. 
The emergence of a part of the population that was sensitive to the transition 
discourse, the loose networks, probably should be seen as a relatively slow cul-
tural evolution process. It also should be seen as a subculture that is enabled by 
double think, and that is difficult to perceive for those who form no part of it. 
The proportion of all policy makers actively participating in these loose net-
works is difficult to estimate, but most probably it is limited. On the other hand, 
the networks are sometimes close to power, like in the case of deputy DG Jeroen 
Tulp, and later in the automotives platform. The loose networks seem to consist 
of persons who have achieved what they wanted in the material and career 
sense, and therefore can afford to spend a corner in their mind on double think, 
ultimately driven by the tension between economic growth and sustainable de-
velopment, plus the idea, shared with others, that it is not hopeless to manage 
sustainable change if one only acknowledges the complexity and can find others 
to act together. 
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Context for self-organization 
Where the cultural evolution process is by definition a hidden process, its mani-
festations become more visible, also for the involved persons, when adaptive 
interactions are clearly separate from power interactions. This is the clearest in 
learning networks like the IB. In the ETP, it was slightly less clear, and this 
seems to have given a sense of doubt about the process that participants find 
difficult to explain. Major oil industries did not really participate, which gave a 
nervous feeling. EZ’s transition teams seemed to feel the tension between what 
power networks expect of them, and what really would create sustainable devel-
opment, but they had difficulties in using that tension constructively. It took 
EZ’s adaptive networks several years to propose a much stronger inter-
ministerial cooperation that would enable a process more credibly aimed at sus-
tainable energy transitions. Yet, the existence of the loose network of people 
with the capacity of double think seems to have enhanced the probability of 
emerging of self-organizing adaptive networks that separated their learning 
process from the power process. It may be hypothesized that these competencies 
have slowly improved in the past ten years, enhancing the probability of adap-
tive interactions. These temporary or longer lasting coagulations of double 
thinkers can be hypothesized as localized factories of individual and collective 
skills of adaptive behavior, which make the metabolism of the organism more 
efficient, feeding the loose networks again with competent members. On the 
other hand, of course, the participants who were prepared and capable of con-
necting major societal subsystems were a minority. Their linkage to power was 
still localized, as far as visible to me, to the automotives, and a breakthrough in 
the market had not yet been achieved. 
What you see depends on where you stand 
The mixture of skepticism and optimism about the transition discourse and the 
implementation of NMP4 as enabler of sustainable transitions was still present 
in 2005. Visible to the outside world were only the NMP4 itself, the unspecific 
reports to parliament, and the platforms under the Inter-ministerial Energy Tran-
sition Program. Many people who did not take part in the adaptive networks 
underneath these visible power structures, seem to have a tendency to be skeptic 
about them, whilst people who take part in the adaptive networks have a ten-
dency to be optimistic about what they do – otherwise they would not have done 
it. Both observations are correct from where these observers stand. Thinking in 
positive and negative spirals, the observable world can be in a negative spiral 
whilst an adaptive network anticipates a greater sense of urgency and (in a local 
positive spiral) prepares itself for interventions that they hope might turn around 
the large-scale observable development at some point in the future. There may 
be several adaptive networks active that compete for the attention of power net-
works rather than develop coherence (and given complexity this is likely to 
happen). From where these networks stand, they may not have the same view 
and recommend differently. 
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The loose networks of complexity acknowledging policy makers, extending into 
Cabinet and reaching CEOs, still believed in the validity of the transition dis-
course, and kept the Inter-ministerial Program in the air, despite skepticism all 
around them. When asking involved persons about this, they pointed to the im-
portance of trust. 
What participants say about trust 
Participants have identified trust as essential for the required level of dialogue to 
make influential proposals and to implement these proposals. Trust has enabled 
in their view the flow of knowledge. Interviews reveal that participants fre-
quently base their decisions about their own behavior on an assessment of the 
future behavior of others. In their accounts, the distinction between the conduct 
of power networks and the conduct of other members of the adaptive network 
were important (external and internal trust), and this had led to the analysis in 
Chapter 5, where a long-term trust dynamics was observed in external trust and 
a short-term dynamics in internal trust. The long-term dynamics was based on 
the expectation that power networks would maintain adaptive tensions or their 
sensitivity to proposals that would adjust these adaptive tensions (to form an 
adapted context for a adapted adaptive network). The adaptive networks seem to 
have been more confident as their linkage to power in many domains was 
stronger (as was the case in the automotives platform). Because the evolution of 
adaptive tensions in power networks is closely linked to a larger-scale social 
learning process (since power seeks legitimacy through public communications) 
the learning in power networks is slower, and larger-scale than the learning in 
adaptive networks. 
The short-term dynamics of internal trust were required to ensure that the 
adaptive network (in particular the IB) was confident that it made the right as-
sessment of adaptive tensions and of possible aligned interventions. They indi-
cated that the distinction between intentional trust and competence trust was 
important: some people’s intentions can be completely trusted, but their added 
value is insufficient, and vice versa. As people have the right intentions in the 
eyes of the rest of the group, but little added value in terms of knowledge, influ-
ence or systems thinking (‘connecting power’), they only might slowdown the 
overall process. However, participants who did not intend to share in the double 
think but rather protected vested interests formed a risk, and the IB checked 
newcomers. As the IB developed an adequate composition in terms of knowl-
edge, influence and connecting power, it gained self-confidence, i.e. internal 
trust in its own performance as a group. The IB’s dynamics from coming to-
gether with the vague hope that NMP4 would attract the right group of people 
(all domains), and making its first joint interventions, took about a year. 
Chapter five indicates that the adaptive networks were in some degree aware 
of the factor that limited their development of more self-confidence; in a way 
this factor was the weakest link in the linkage to power networks in order to 
acquire requisite variety to address a complex problem like sustainable devel-
opment. By focusing on that factor they could wind the spiral up step by step. 
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They first developed internal trust before making propositions to power net-
works, and if successful power networks adapted and created new adaptive ten-
sions. If the adaptive network trusted that the new situation was stable and there-
fore had external trust, it adapted to the new context and built-up new internal 
trust in order to make a next step. Trust in this way becomes a socio-cognitive 
variable: it is explicitly discussed in the network and it gets many faces accord-
ing to what the network thinks is the weakest link. In a way it is a process of 
constant looking for identity – because identity determines the next step, which 
determines required adaptations to the network, which determines the weakest 
link. As the network does not succeed to agree, it may split-up, or it has to admit 
power-interactions. 
Chapter five presents the successive limiting conditions in the external trust 
development as interpreted from the interviews. The limiting factors were, as 
adaptive networks gradually got better: 
• The closed shop of the greenpolder model (learning is not a trick of power – 
we should not create direct pressure for sustainable solutions because that 
only evokes countervailing powers and even is not discussable); 
• The lack of influence of the sustainability research networks (learning is not 
a powerless trick – we need to link to power before power is used to create 
pressure); 
• The political credibility of transition management (how can we make a fo-
cus on the permeability of the borders between domains for ideas politically 
attractive); 
• The span of knowledge and influence (can we create enough coherent spe-
cialization to come with acceptable proposals?); 
• Legitimacy (how can we ensure that the public sector creates reliable 
expectations about what it will accept in its dialogue with the private 
sector?).  
The word trust does not occur in these stepping stones in the learning process, 
but on the other hand trust (the self-confidence of the group) was increased if a 
group agreed about its goal, the limiting factor to focus on, thereby able to use 
that tension to drive its own thinking process – what should be our next step? 
Where is the weakest link? 
The analytical role of socio-cognitive trust 
Trust can be analyzed, depending on the type of research, in much more detail 
and in different ways. For me a question was, given the many different ways of 
structuring trust, how can one be sure which approach is valid? The analysis of 
trust as a variable that emerges in a socio-cognitive process seems somehow to 
intuitively catch the emerging patterns of trust in the development of the transi-
tion discourse, from Greenpolder Model to Inter-ministerial Program. Trust was 
socially constructed, like any other idea that emerged from adaptive networks. 
As far as trust was intuitive for the participants, it was in my view in a signifi-
cant degree part of the local culture of the network – it was a collective intuition. 
As people acted on the basis of that cognitive and intuitive trust, it becomes 
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difficult for a researcher to analyze in more detail how trust dynamics can be 
explained. It would be like reconstructing the butterfly that has created a storm. 
Therefore, in order to understand adaptive networks, the important point is in 
my view rather that in larger adaptive networks trust must be an explicit part of 
the interactions – it should be consciously constructed to identify the weakest 
link. In my view individuals in the IB, those with the best capacity of systems 
thinking and the moderators, took this into consideration. Participants seek more 
coordinated behavior through co-evolution under complex conditions. The limits 
of individual bounded rationality need to be crossed by developing overlapping 
and coherent sets of ideas (shared knowledge), and policy makers who are aware 
of this, deal with it consciously. They are aware that, as the societal problems 
and solutions are complex, many subsystems should be connected, and the over-
lap between the knowledge of the individuals becomes smaller (or: the vision 
that is really shared and reproduced by all individuals becomes more abstract). 
Coherent action, especially innovative proposals to power networks that may 
entail political risk, requires an accurate perception of what others will do, and 
on the truthfulness of the information given by others. There should be no misin-
terpretations, not of content nor of mutual expectations. Proposals that members 
of adaptive networks make to a power network should be based on solid inter-
pretations of the joint argumentation of the case (in order to be less sensitive for 
opportunism), and the anticipated behavior of competitors in the power network. 
There should be trust that others don’t make premature proposals, and that they 
are competent to assess the future conduct of leaders in their own subsystem. 
So, the members of adaptive networks see trust as a compensation of (indi-
vidual) bounded rationality and consciously build and verify trust. In chapter 
five I have reconstructed how participants analyzed trust, how they identified a 
limiting factor in trust, and focused their next effort on that factor. As an adap-
tive network has an adequate self-image, it will probably know where its focus 
should be. A researcher may, as a kind of psychoanalyst, ask questions that 
could improve the adaptive network’s self-image and that also could reduce 
misinterpretations between members of the adaptive networks. In that case, the 
researcher in effect becomes member of the network with connecting behavior 
as added value. 
The balancing of trust (and risk) 
Through intuitive analysis of the interviews external trust, internal trust, inten-
tional trust and competence trust, all identified in the literature before, emerge as 
important limiting factors at several stages. By dealing with that consciously, the 
networks in effect are managing critical uncertainties in their foresight, which on 
an individual basis is necessary to compensate for bounded rationality. In the 
backcasting exercise from joint vision to joint action (or from coherent vision to 
coherent proposals), the greatest uncertainties appear to be not in the technology 
or in the market, but in the conduct of social systems and their leaders (‘We 
have discovered that sustainable development is not a technological problem, 
but a governance problem’). 
  
 Sustainable Change Management 177
The effects of joint proposals primarily depend on the anticipated reactions in 
the power network. A chain is as strong as its weakest link. In the causal chain 
from far future to action today, the weakest link might easily be the first in the 
external effects of adaptive networks: trust in power networks; based on external 
trust, the trust that on the short or middle term power networks will be open to a 
certain type of proposals. The weakest link might also be inside the adaptive 
network. The network as a whole therefore needs to continuously re-establish its 
external trust based on its observations of the life world and how power net-
works deal with that. The networks also need to continuously re-establish its 
trust that the internal chain is not broken, as the IB as well as the ETP did, for 
example, by not allowing any payment for participation. 
What the networks constantly implicitly try to do is to balance the uncertain-
ties along the chain of effects. There is no point in making one specific link 
much stronger than the others (this is basically what happened in the sustainabil-
ity knowledge networks of the 1990s, by improving the strength of arguments 
all the time, while the weakest link was in the missing adaptive connections with 
implementing power.) The IB went as far as making the IB completely power 
free – it was not allowed to become an official project of the ministry of V&W, 
even though the implication was that it had no resources. Their implicit belief 
was that the slightest suggestion that short-term interests would enter the arena 
would disturb the balance of the strength of the links of its internal chain of 
trust. For the same reason the ETP was developed into an Interministerial Pro-
gram, where six ministries cooperated on an even basis – with no ministry in the 
lead, formally. The directors of the program were completely aware that success 
would depend on retaining credibility that this balance would not be disturbed – 
internal trust for adaptive networks in the government, external trust for adaptive 
networks that would be attracted to the Program’s platforms. 
In the above perspective, the balance of trust can be seen as a requirement for 
coopetition, like I indicated in chapter 1. Shared foresight becomes content: the 
rationality for joint action, assuming there is a balance in trust. And trust itself 
almost becomes, linked with knowledge, the energy that flows through the adap-
tive network that has become a living social system that feeds on connections. 
A trust threshold for living adaptive cultures? 
In my analysis, the adaptive system that during a certain period was labeled IB 
has become alive and is reproducing and improving itself by natural selection. 
The IB was born in 2001, needed a year before it made its first intervention, 
discovered it was successful (in self-defined terms), and now hops from transi-
tion path to transition path (from power network to power network). The basic 
drive is genuine concern for sustainable development, but an enabling condition 
is a success measure and self-confidence: trust in own competence to achieve 
further success; a kind of collective competence trust. The IB has apparently 
gradually developed such self-confidence. Since it also still has external trust, it 
continues and may give birth to other networks. It is perhaps more the adaptive 
culture, as complex behavior of persons that is alive than the network itself as 
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group of persons. On the other hand such competences seem to be rather diffi-
cult to learn or copy form one individual to the other. 
However, it may be assumed that from the start of the IB in 2001 and even 
before, there was some level of intentional and competence trust. An interesting 
question therefore is, has trust grown in a linear way, the IB coming more and 
more alive, or was there a quick growth of trust after reaching some threshold 
level? The interviews clearly suggest that in 2002, when the IB had developed 
its vision as basis for socio-cognitive trust, it made a jump. It may have made 
another jump in 2005, when it became aware that it does not depend for its suc-
cess on one major transition path (which had been automotives until then). 
However, this critical mass seems to depend on the localized context of the In-
ter-ministerial Program. The adaptive network may be severely set back after the 
next national elections, if the Program is not continued or if the new Cabinet 
does not share willingness to participate in these adaptive networks. 
Change management at different levels of complexity 
As problems are less complex, creative competition is frequently applied to 
stimulate creativeness and effectiveness. For example, a small power network 
may seek solutions of which it only can define the contours, of which several 
may seem to be conflicting. Different consultants or teams of civil servants may 
then be invited to develop the best idea that fits these contours. Reward is a 
contract for implementation. 
However, as tensions become more unspecific and general, as is the case for 
sustainable development, power networks almost always either define the con-
tours of partial solutions, or they define these contours very general. In both 
cases it may be difficult to find investors. Commercial firms are only willing to 
invest if they expect contracts on the short term. If the conditions are general it 
becomes a lottery, or the winning proposal may not be close enough to the for-
mal objectives of any party in the power network. There is too much investment 
risk. 
Creative competitors and adaptive networks are two extremes on the same 
axis. They are both driven by an adaptive tension, the former even consciously 
created with that purpose. As complexity increases, commercial action becomes 
unattractive. However, as adaptive networks find another energy source, they 
too may develop in competition, developing competing ideas that are all offered 
to power networks. This opens the option of intermediary forms – adaptive net-
works that mix idealism with commercial interest, by addressing issues of in-
termediary complexity. The proposals of such networks might be assumed to 
lead to market change on the medium term, and the participants, having time to 
prepare for this change, can profit from that. There are some indications that the 
IB also addressed issues of medium complexity (after verifying whether these 
were consistent with their long term ideas). This may have been part of the driv-
ers for enthusiasm (‘wind in the sails’ as one IB member remarked). The energy 
source of adaptive systems may therefore also be created by what I term a fore-
runner’s benefit. By participating in adaptive networks, there can be some wind-
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fall, or lessons that can be ‘cashed’ by a strategically thinking board in their own 
organization. One consultant in the IB organized a session in his firm to find 
support for his unpaid activity by referring to this benefit. His session was 
highly appreciated. 
If intermediary forms emerge, competition between different adaptive net-
works may create an additional selection mechanism, favoring the best goal-
seeking capacities. On the other hand, it seems contrary to requisite variety: as 
an intermediary network has an interest of its own, it may be less credible in the 
eyes of power networks. It may be accused of seeking one-sided alternatives 
(like the ETP was accused in the biomass discussions), requisite variety is lost, 
and such a network may either be successful if weaker interests are not repre-
sented in the power network, or they may meet countervailing powers.  There-
fore, perhaps the term ‘triple thinking’ should be invented: taking into account 
not only the joint interest (defined as sustainable development) and the interest 
of the systems represented in the adapted network, but also the interests of other, 
but not connected systems. This is precisely what the IB and the ETP tried to do, 
for example by letting the weaker interests (like those of children in developing 
countries) be represented by Dutch NGOs. 
This downside, the fact that it is not possible to connect everything, may per-
haps be overcome by linking to as many parts of the societal system as possible, 
as long as coherence can be maintained. Intermediary forms may share visions 
for the long term. Such a system can still create communication ‘waves’ in the 
social system, i.e. large- scale movements of tensions, and receive favorable 
responses throughout (resonation). Such a competition may perhaps be a guard 
against mistakes – by offering competing ideas to power networks, chances are 
that the one based on the most adequate self-image prevails. 
Theoretically, if in the whole population adaptive competencies would be 
present, it would become much easier to reward people for adaptive behavior, 
and more would engage in it. It would become a competitive asset. For the pri-
vate world, Hamel and Prahalad (1994), who used the term ‘competing for the 
future’, have applied this kind of reasoning, and distinguished several complex-
ity levels of competition. The limit is perhaps given by the complexity of behav-
ior persons can develop, given their necessarily restricted mental capacities. 
Connecting scales for inspiration about sustainable governance 
The IB was a ‘pocket’ of high levels of trust that emerged from the loose net-
works that formed a potential due to their attitude. It, like the ETP and the Inter-
ministerial Program, were embedded in loose networks of transition thinkers. 
They knew that to be adaptive to changes in context they had to easily find new 
members with the appropriate knowledge and influence. They also had a feeling 
that the transition discourse, as carried in Cabinet policies and widely communi-
cated, was important to ‘feed’ that discourse. 
However, the transition discourse was met with skepticism from outsiders, 
and identified as ‘complexity speak’. Many people ‘out there’ are still engaged 
in sustainability knowledge systems, Polder-like negotiations and conflicts. It 
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seems that several interviewees believed that it would be important that such 
processes would continue, in order to add more people to the transition thinkers 
– because they would develop similar personal experiences and disappoint-
ments. There is also a possibility that this is the intuitive argument, inexpressible 
in power networks, of those who advocate instruments like impact assessment to 
make power networks more complex through formal procedures. The formal 
argument behind such instruments is usually a rather naïve belief in rational 
decision-making (Nooteboom & Teisman 2002), but in reality the belief could 
be that if such instruments were abolished, the interdependencies that lead to 
negotiations and personal relationships between different domains may not be 
maintained. In 2005, Cabinet still supported the transition discourse, but, since 
adaptive networks were invisible, other structures would need to ensure contin-
ued reproduction of the loose networks that ultimately reach Cabinet, CEOs and 
Parliament. 
On the other hand, the polder culture is also quite robust. It has emerged in 
the middle ages, and it is still there. The loose networks of the transition dis-
course ‘float’ on that culture, and although they are therefore more dynamic than 
the culture in which they were embedded, they could be robust enough against 
the abolishment of the procedural basis of many interactions, in particular be-
cause the drive to participate depends on personal motives, which need not nec-
essarily be frustration. 
In short, the awareness that there is a linkage between processes that only 
can occur in pockets of trust and the large-scale awareness of the need that such 
processes are necessary for a sustainable development, inspires to support the 
transition discourse, and may have numerous implications for sustainable gov-
ernance. 
7.4 Implications for public management 
The ideas above have implications for sustainable change management. The 
most central point is perhaps that individual behavior, acknowledging complex-
ity and willingness to act, is key to sustainable change. In the next section I ad-
dress the individual policy maker, and in this section I first address the public 
management scientist. How can he analyze and help sustainable change man-
agement? The obvious answer would be to design power structures that create 
adaptive tensions contributing to sustainable development. The next option 
would be to create power structures that somehow stimulate a process where 
people can learn to become more adaptive. However, both are too simple. One 
problem is the management of openness and closedness of processes on the edge 
of the public world and private world. Another problem is that contribution to 
sustainable development is only in hindsight observable. The following ideas 
may inspire further theoretical and empirical study. 
Creating power structures to facilitate management of adaptive tensions 
It may be possible to acknowledge complexity as a political problem that needs 
attention in its own right, by institutionalizing the management of tensions. The 
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Inter-ministerial Energy Transition Program Directorate was set-up with that 
intention. It was aimed at setting-up societal platforms to advice the government 
about sustainable transitions, and to ensure that six ministries would coordinate 
their dialogue with these platforms. The Program had considerable budget, 
mainly to pay the platform chairs. Their assignment was to create some form of 
visible market breakthrough within a certain number of years. I use the Program 
hereafter as example for any formal structure that is set up to manage connec-
tions and co-evolution. 
The program and the platforms were therefore not power-free. Like in the 
ETP this may reduce the attainable complexity of the sustainable breakthroughs, 
and therefore it may lose requisite variety to address larger transitions. On the 
other hand, the difference between the Program and the ETP was that in the 
Program six ministries worked together at the highest level. Private parties may 
trust that in this dialogue the government would be able to make commitments 
about its own contribution to market breakthroughs. If the game is well played, 
connections may still be maintained with the implementation power for larger 
breakthroughs. After all, the type of breakthrough was not specified. First noises 
in 2006 were that the most difficult part is not to create coopetition between 
CEOs, but to create an alignment in the government. Will, under the pressure of 
the Program, adaptive networks emerge in the government? Will dilemmas from 
the point of view of the whole automotives system be identified and put forward 
to Cabinet to decide about the next step in the dialogue? Or are their other ways 
for the government to become a reliable negotiation partner? There is a pitfall 
that political reality chases the Program to a very small corner of political atten-
tion, so that it is forced to deal with the ministries directly. Like many strategy 
departments, their link to power may easily dissolve. 
Managing openness and closedness on the edge of the public and private world 
As an adaptive network develops argumentation for general transition paths, 
outsiders may not think this is relevant to them. However, if a network gets 
closer to implementation, deals must be made. The government may have to 
create conditions for these transition paths in the market, that is, adaptive ten-
sions in the market to allow sustainable business investments. Such interven-
tions may be subject to democratic approval; depending on the relationship be-
tween Cabinet and Parliament even smaller interventions may need to be openly 
discussed before they are final. No deal can then be made until Parliament 
agrees, and the platforms may have to open up to all parties that think that it is in 
their interest to influence its process. If credible participants are refused in the 
platform, this in itself may create political resistance against its proposals. And 
in the case of complex change, it is not unlikely that vested interests will believe 
that they may be harmed by the proposals, and whether rightful or ill informed, 
they may try to delay the process or set-up countervailing political power. 
To stay confident that an adaptive network will influence development some 
degree of predictability may therefore be required. The question is how this can 
be done. Again, cognitive separation could be the answer. External trust in adap-
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tive tensions should be maintained, as well as internal trust to not fall in the trap 
of making premature proposals for specific government interventions. This trust 
can be built-up by separating the adaptive interactions from the interactions in 
the platform, whilst the platform, in dialogue with the government, creates the 
adaptive tensions that drive the adaptive network (i.e. a co-evolutionary ap-
proach). The adaptive network may try to attract increasingly influential persons 
from the relevant sectors, until it has gained enough support to communicate the 
ideas openly in the platform. Thus, there is a critical phase where the outside 
world knows something irreversible may be developing, and where new mem-
bers have to be included in the trust chain of the network. 
Accounting sustainable change management 
If formal power structures are set-up with the aim to manage tensions to attract a 
process of co-evolution into a desired direction, their functioning should proba-
bly be transparent. Confidentiality may only be allowed in the case of negotia-
tions about purchases by the government, and matters of defense and secret 
service. If an activity is mentioned on the national budget, Parliament probably 
will want to be informed about progress. Dutch Cabinet had produced annual 
progress report about NMP4’s transition management since 2001. This had al-
ways been rather unspecific, and debates in Parliament about progress normally 
had not been about strategic choices or social dilemmas created by bifurcations 
of development, but about the desirability of specific government interventions 
– precisely the pitfall of sustainable change management. Parliament seemed to 
lose its interest in transition management. 
An important question is therefore how to deal with the paradox of transpar-
ency of processes that by nature should be closed to prevent premature exposure 
and becoming a play ball of power networks. One possible answer is that a 
Cabinet may bridge this paradox by protecting the process, giving it an unspe-
cific objective and allowing it years of quiet action. Cabinet members then ef-
fectively become part of the adaptive networks.  However, as budgets increase 
this may become difficult. Another course of action might be to share the re-
sponsibility of protecting the Program and the platforms by theoretical reasoning 
– thus, by perfecting the transition discourse, looking for more support, possibly 
by involving Parliamentarians in the adaptive networks, so that it includes a 
reasoning why such processes need to be allowed time whilst they do cost 
money. A third option may be opening-up the processes in the platforms, as 
these are power networks anyway. This would shed light on the agenda and 
composition of the platforms, the context for adaptive interactions and business 
deals. However, this could be risky as the edge of order and chaos may easily be 
crossed. Reporting in public creates the appearance of order, but if in reality the 
process has not settled yet, is still sensitive because people still act on the basis 
of trust, the process may collapse. 
The monitoring and publicizing about adaptive networks may only be feasi-
ble if they do not deal (yet) with interventions that vested interests may see as a 
threat, as was the case with the IB, or after several years when the dust has set-
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tled. It is therefore likely that a tension will remain, and adaptive networks may 
only survive as long as chains of trust extend into the political domain, and 
budgets remain limited. Other than that, there may be no distinction possible 
between governance and the monitoring of governance, in the sense of a direct 
process of feedback. If cooperation goes well, the monitoring may be assumed 
to already be an integrated component of governance processes, while adaptive 
networks are the vehicles for the flow of information. 
A quick comparison with what innovation theories and theories of social 
capital indicate about monitoring suggests that also here the same paradoxes 
may occur. There, it is suggested that bridges between subsystems and domains 
that are least connected and most interdependent are most critical and therefore 
the most informative. In innovation theories this is defined as the innovation 
system, connecting the academic, private and public worlds (the triple helix). 
However, such monitoring probably will be mainly in academic interest rather 
than the political interest, because reporting about these bridges may only be 
feasible with a considerable delay, or limited to superficial information about the 
connections. 
Power to stimulate individual learning: how to assess the critical values of 
adaptive systems? 
Public management scientists may also assess whether power structures, in par-
ticular procedures, may contribute to a learning process at the individual or insti-
tutional level, thereby increasing trust, willingness to double think, etc. In other 
words, whether adaptive tensions could be created as an incentive for learning 
and perhaps development of loose adaptive networks. In the recent past, several 
discourses have emerged in The Netherlands carrying such ideas, and have some 
prescriptive content. Obviously transition management itself is such a discourse, 
which in my analysis appears to be not only complexity speak. Other such gov-
ernance discourses are termed ‘different government’ and ‘development plan-
ning’. It would be interesting to review their effects, and see if they lead to more 
connectedness and co-evolution. 
Some of such discourses actually lead to interventions at a level of govern-
ance processes. A major example is that of impact assessment – procedures to 
ensure that certain information is presented before formal decisions are made. 
Geert Teisman and I wrote in 2002 that impact assessment is a lost opportunity. 
Offering information by force to a power network does not make that knowledge 
more acceptable or more influential. Knowledge should intertwine, communi-
cate, integrate, and create variety in power networks (Nooteboom & Teisman 
2002). That cannot be enforced by procedures: the power networks should be 
open to it, or it won’t happen. 
Yet, procedures also may create new interdependencies, which produce ten-
sions in the social system. Basic democratic procedures like elections and the 
separation of the powers undisputedly have contributed to more balance of 
power, and therefore adaptive tensions for proposals in the general benefit. It is 
still my belief that impact assessment, at least for less strategic government de-
 184 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
cisions, helps to create adaptive tensions in power networks that make them 
more sensitive to innovative proposals that diminish the impacts on interests that 
are otherwise relatively weakly represented in the early policy-making proc-
esses. Change managers may tap from that energy source to open power net-
works up for knowledge, gradually and in a positive spiral. On the other hand, 
by pushing too hard and making impact assessment procedures too complex, the 
tension exceeds the second critical level of dissipative systems, and chaos re-
sults. This seems to have happened around the year 2000 in Western countries, 
and it was termed an impact ‘assessment fatigue’ (De Jong & Nooteboom 2002). 
Advocates of impact assessment and other incentives for learning to deal 
with complexity therefore may behave as change managers, and try to assess 
these critical values. There is a clear need for methods to do that. This seems to 
be of a different order than the assessment of the impact of direct adaptive ten-
sion in a policy process, because some degree of generalization and repetition 
seems to be possible, as impact assessment will be applied many times. 
Trojan horses 
Nonetheless even if impact assessment is believed to create adaptive tensions 
that lead to sustainable development, it is quite possible that affected actors 
resist against procedures. It will make their reality more complex, and for exam-
ple it may reduce their competitiveness. Sometimes a lever can be found without 
enough support in all affected components, by making it serve as a Trojan horse. 
Such a Trojan horse could be regarded as a third kind of lever. The first kind are 
the traditional carrot, stick and preach, the second kind is the communication 
(power behavior) in networks, and the third kind is creating new tensions that 
encourage adaptive networks. (See also Figure 6 on page 69). 
The vested interests may be caught off guard. This may have happened ac-
cording to some with the European Directives on protection of habitats, or qual-
ity of air and water. It was sufficient to build-up influence and co-evolution in 
partial system components, after which the heads of state and Parliaments ap-
proved the proposals, since there was no time for vested interest to resist by 
organizing countervailing powers, and the Directives were approved. Subse-
quently, they created enormous pressures on the development of markets. The 
intensive farming of pigs, which used to be an important branch, is now disap-
pearing from The Netherlands, since no creative solutions have yet been found 
to merge the different interests. As regards air quality, the pressure is visible in 
the form of dozens of building projects that are delayed in 2005 and 2006, with-
out perspective yet on creative solutions that will make them go forward. These 
events take place and no analysis is made of the effects that can be expected 
from these pressures. One possibility is that polluting activities move to areas 
with less strict regulations. Another is that urbanization spreads over larger ar-
eas, creating more dilution of pollution thereby not exceeding legal limits, but 
also creating more transport and a reduction of large unspoiled areas. Yet an-
other possibility is a political crisis and disobedience with respect to the EU. The 
European Commission’s general secretariat has put procedures for impact as-
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sessment of new legislation in place, which should prevent legislation to have 
undesirable side effects. It seems helpful to develop a methodology for deter-
mining the effect of Trojan horses in terms of adaptive tensions in relation to 
critical values. 
Where impact assessment focuses on binding rules, governance discourses 
may also be seen as Trojan horse. The transition management discourse itself 
created momentum for the IB and the ETP for several years. This may also be a 
thought behind the ‘Open Method of Coordination’, which is suggested to better 
articulate the EU’s efforts towards sustainable development (CEC 2003). The 
promise of a large high-level EU meeting where dilemmas would be worded in a 
way that is meaningful to all countries, adequate to their sense of urgency, and 
all sectors, seems to have created the expectation that this conference may well 
become influential. This idea appears to have driven many people to participate 
in its preparations. There may be another factor yet: some people may have seen 
that differences between countries are smaller than differences between sectors 
(transport, environment and energy). Then, an international learning process 
may generate lessons. 
Sustainable development as strange attractor 
A theoretical problem is still how to make an independent judgment of whether 
the collective rationality of an adaptive network contributes to sustainable de-
velopment. There are still calls for instruments like sustainability impact as-
sessment, but these lack a theoretical basis in a socio-constructivist or memetics 
worldview. There have been many debates about the meaning of the term sus-
tainable development. Where hardly any interest group will deny that our devel-
opment should be sustainable, the debate is how that should be interpreted, and 
that is where controversy begins. On the other hand it is precisely this debate, 
engendered by the intuitive appeal of the term sustainable, which has created the 
primary adaptive tension that ultimately led to closer cooperation between the 
public and private sector in the field of automotives. Any effort to define sus-
tainable development in detail, and using that as an argument to achieve sustain-
able change in political debates, disturbs that process, and belongs to the class of 
sustainability research programs or sustainability knowledge systems, that may 
be expected to meet the same limits as DTO and NIDO did in the Netherlands. 
Therefore it may be more advisable from the point of view of sustainable de-
velopment itself, to keep it an unspecific term. In policy processes, driven by the 
interdependency in global and local power networks, it may then serve as a 
strange attractor (Judge 1993) – by avoiding development choices or inertia that 
are clearly unsustainable and that can be avoided, the goal-seeking process will 
deliver results that are more sustainable. The strange attractor may attract adap-
tive networks to engage in that goal-seeking process, ensuring that many groups 
participate in the co-evolution. An interesting question is, to which extent the 
establishment of national sustainable development action plans, sustainable 
development councils, sustainability impact assessment, etcetera, contribute to 
sustainable adaptive tensions. If the succession of stages I observed for The 
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Netherlands can be generalized, it may be possible to assess in which stage a 
specific societal system in a specific country is. The question then becomes, in 
which degree are adaptive networks emerging and alive? In which degree may 
the structures that are put in place contribute to the emergence of such networks, 
given the context that embeds these systems? What is the complexity of their 
joint vision and implementation potential (i.e. do they have increasing requisite 
variety?). An analysis framework probably should be derived from a more gen-
eral theory about the measurement of collective intelligence. 
Collective intelligence 
There are some wider theoretical considerations about collective intelligence 
that have implications for studying the sustainability effects of power interven-
tions. Theoretically, as (members of) adaptive networks evolve to become better 
at what they do, co-evolution speeds-up. Thinking and acting throughout the 
composed subsystem is then better attuned with the long-term interests of the 
system – provided the shared vision that adaptive networks continuously verify 
and reproduce as a selection mechanism for ideas to co-evolve, is accurate. If 
this shared vision is composed of input from all parts of the subsystem, all hav-
ing their own perception of possible developments in the real life world, it 
probably may be assumed to be relatively robust. Whilst not all participants 
need to oversee all details, they should develop a single language in order to 
trust that the whole vision really builds-up from these parts, and that others 
really act according to it. Trust is therefore important to compensate for bounded 
rationality of each individual (the limited cognitive capacity), it therefore builds 
up more complex socio-cognitive symbols (i.e. ideas that do not reside in any 
individual brain, but emerge as the interaction pattern of several brains), but it 
should be based on realistic expectations. 
Then, a more complex collective rationality may emerge. In other words, the 
whole adaptive network may be said to produce an image of the composed sub-
system, as it develops in relation to its environment, and through the adaptive 
networks, there is some level of coordinated action throughout the composed 
subsystem. Since all members of adaptive networks hold only part of the re-
quired knowledge, the capacity of verifying the coherence of these partial im-
ages with each other and with the shared vision becomes critical. The better the 
adaptive network can do that, ‘governancing’ trust and coherence, the more the 
composed subsystem, through its living adaptive networks, develops an implicit 
self-consciousness based on a self-image that not one member of the adaptive 
network can reproduce in its completeness – the consciousness only emerges at 
the level of the system as a whole. 
Through self-reference at higher-order level, the composed subsystem vi-
sions itself, wired by the adaptive network, in relation to its future environment, 
and it takes action that is required to become that. The quality of that action 
depends on the quality of the self-image. If it is one-sided, with a focus on the 
interests of specific system components, there is little requisite variety, and it 
will not be able to respond accurately to the complex changes. Its level of com-
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plexity will not be maintained as long, that is, its life will be shorter, compo-
nents may survive in new combinations, but the whole may disintegrate. Pre-
cisely like a person might have an inaccurate or schizophrenic self-image, so 
might a composed subsystem. The accuracy may depend on how its agents gen-
erally react to pressures – by inertia (‘cup half empty’), by investing in connect-
ing behavior under uncertainty (‘cup half full’), or by pushing for simple solu-
tions (‘cup half full with poison’). As all three will be present, these components 
of governance may occur alongside. 
Power interventions that are supposed to contribute to sustainable develop-
ment somehow have to be evaluated against this background. This becomes a 
question about the existence of adaptive networks and their interconnectivity. 
Loose networks as well as pockets of trust interact and both should probably be 
evaluated. A distinction may be helpful between the requisite variety in terms of 
influence (to which implementing power is a network linked?) and in terms of 
knowledge (does the network take weaker interests into consideration by devel-
oping knowledge about them that is connected to the shared rationality?). The 
latter may prevent mistakes that easily can be avoided by just mobilizing the 
right knowledge at an early stage. Then, sustainable development would func-
tion as strange attractor for a much larger system, based on responsibility one 
system takes for the benefit of another. 
Adaptive fitness 
As adaptive networks are living structures, they have to survive in an ecosystem. 
The capacity to evaluate their adaptive fitness in that ecosystem becomes impor-
tant when a change manager considers giving time and resources to that net-
work. It seems to be useless to spend resources in a network that has no influ-
ence, or that develops proposals that are not ‘intelligent’. 
CEOs or ministers may, for example, select proposals made to them by adap-
tive networks by an inference of the connectedness of these networks: in which 
degree do they have an overview of the complex problem, and capability of 
influencing other CEOs or ministers, with the potential of creating co-evolution 
in the power network? Such formal leaders may also generate creative competi-
tion by promising reward to several adaptive networks for the best proposals, 
and that selective pressure may then drive the evolution of adaptive networks. 
But on the other hand adaptive networks are internally driven and determine 
their own success parameters based on their vision, and ultimately based on self-
reference. Otherwise, the coherence in the network would quickly be gone, trust 
would evaporate and requisite variety would be lost. Adaptive networks there-
fore should become better in seeking opportunities under that pressure, matching 
both sides. 
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Table 15. Some structures identified in the literature, which are comparable with 
adaptive networks 
Network organizations and coopetition have been described in business networks (Branden-
burger & Nalebuff 1996), which probably may be expected to reach lower complexity levels 
than adaptive networks that address the sustainable development of total societal systems. 
Communities of practice (Wenger 1998) seem to be mainly aimed at learning from the prac-
tice of implementation, which perhaps might rather lead to incremental improvement close to 
current market processes rather than to totally new ways of thinking about progress. 
Advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1993) are perhaps one-sided, just like the sustainability knowl-
edge networks in the Netherlands in the 1990s. 
Connecting structures have been described also for globalized societal systems, like Kofi 
Anan’s Global Compact, where Ruggie (2002) applied the term learning networks. 
Closest to adaptive networks perhaps comes the idea of viable systems of Stafford Beer. The 
Viable Systems Model, as summarized with full bibliography in a web guide by Jon Walker 
(1991, first version) is based on ideas of cybernetics and focuses on change management in 
firms, but it also has been applied to world communities. The major difference with the idea 
of adaptive networks seems to be the conceptual separation of conduct based on power and 
goal-seeking. 
In the Netherlands, Wielinga (2001) has described networks as living tissue, and introduces 
the term vital space, developing in the tension between consensus, autonomy, hierarchy and 
competition. There may be similarities with Lester & Piore (2005)’s idea of ‘public space’. 
 
Perhaps the most critical double think, for sustainable development, is indeed 
that of CEOs and ministers to be willing to protect and guide adaptive networks 
whilst the time is not yet ripe for their proposals. This is for example what en-
ergy minister Brinkhorst did in 2004 when he defended transition management 
in Parliament, and six ministers in 2005. Such a CEO then still needs to evaluate 
which ideas, from which networks, are the best in terms of producing an ade-
quate self-image of the system with success potential. Whilst keeping some 
distance to the adaptive network, as CEOs are busy, such a CEO should know 
enough of it to make an assessment. What kind of information would give indi-
cations about the adaptive fitness of a network? A traditional ex ante evaluation 
is not helpful (e.g. De Bruin and Ten Heuvelhof, 2000). He should assess the 
competences of a network of creating change before he dedicates his resources 
to it, and compare this with other possible networks. In other words, the CEO or 
change manager should assess the (potential) interconnectivity in a network, the 
degree in which knowledge can be integrated and can be influential. I return to 
fitness measures in 7.5. 
Comparison of adaptive networks with similar concepts 
The theoretical framework for adaptive networks I have developed, based on 
complexity theory and memetics, is closely related to similar structures that have 
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been described in the change management literature. However, I have not made 
a systematic comparison. It might be that different concepts actually describe 
similar phenomena in different words, or that different organisms and species of 
learning networks should be described. A provisional inventory is presented in 
Table 15, which emphasizes the differences. 
Planning research about adaptive networks 
This PhD research was co-financed by one IB member’s firm, who created sup-
port in a small network in the consultancy where he worked. The aim was to 
inform the world about emerging adaptive networks (although success was by 
no means certain at the start). I have tried to be truthful to what I saw, but indi-
rectly I have become a member of the transition discourse and the IB, and I am 
therefore not objective. The question is whether objective research of adaptive 
networks is possible at all. The answer may be that social scientists may assist in 
reflecting from a distance on the self-image of an adaptive network, to identify 
blind spots. However, when keeping some distance it is theoretically impossible 
to share the knowledge that most members of the network have, given cognitive 
limitations of the researcher. There is still no way to determine if the cup is half 
full or half empty, but the researcher can ask questions that improve the net-
work’s self-image. The type of questions he would ask are the same a double 
thinking CEO would ask before giving support: the questions about adaptive 
fitness. 
7.5 Sustainable change managers: adaptive fitness 
Complexity theories and the experience under the transition discourse give some 
idea about how change managers should behave if they want to solve complex 
problems. If many change managers behave like that, an adaptive network can 
emerge with a high adaptive fitness, in the sense that the network develops an 
adequate self-image, from where it can effectively influence development in a 
desirable direction. I formulate these lessons for individual change managers in 
a prescriptive way, although the circumstances under which they are valid have 
not been tested or fully compared with the change management literature (other 
than what I have used in chapter 2). 
Awareness of complexity 
In my definition, all members in an adaptive network are change managers, 
since they need at least to apply double think and act on behalf of the whole 
rather than the parts that gives them material reward. That should be based on an 
awareness of complexity, the fact that each person (and each network) has a 
bounded rationality, and therefore that a process is required to achieve a collec-
tive rationality. More in detail I make the following recommendations. 
First, all members should think in terms of complex system analysis, in order 
to develop a shared rationality for action, and as a basis for trust. The ‘shared-
ness’ should be based on a joint view about the world, and how that might be 
influenced, and the most widely acceptable view seems to be complexity think-
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ing, since it provides place for different partial rationalities. The IB as well as 
the ETP made such analysis in terms of a vision (1 or two pages for each net-
work), an overview of transition paths, and individual joint actions. 
Second, awareness of non-linear change is needed to give the change manag-
ers tools for an agenda as well as for setting action priorities. If the power net-
works somehow are already destabilized by other factors, it may be easier to 
give them an extra push. The IB took this explicitly into consideration; it is what 
they observed in the case of automotives and regional mobility systems. By 
making this analysis earlier than others, and taking initiative, they became fore-
runners. For other transition paths, they focused on influencing research agendas 
or setting up associated networks. 
Third, the orientation on becoming a connecting network, with co-evolution 
as objective, and adaptive to context changes, should be conscious and explicitly 
shared in the network. It forms their self-image, which allows defining success. 
At early stages, when there are ad hoc connecting interactions between members 
of power networks, moderators should take steps toward a more stable adaptive 
network. The moderators may consciously combine the adequate knowledge and 
influence, and help the group to develop an interaction method, to create a self-
image in relation to the power context, and to learn-by-doing; in a way, taking 
care of the metabolism of this organism. 
Figure 10. Internal interactions between the members  
A, B and C of a network 
A
B
C
 
 
An internal interaction method 
An adaptive network needs to interact to achieve its theoretical potential (see 
Figure 10). Goal-seeking interactions and connecting behavior can be drawn by 
the tension created by accounting behavior in power networks. It is then unlikely 
that the shared rationality can be complex; for that purpose, the group probably 
needs to dedicate more time to reflection. 
In the IB, the interaction method was to organize two-monthly meetings that 
were completely dedicated to goal seeking. It developed a joint system analysis, 
  
 Sustainable Change Management 191
and discussed possible futures, transition paths, and aligned action between 
participating organizations. In the context of these meetings, there were ad hoc 
smaller meetings of change managers who discussed the terms of success. In the 
ETP, the working groups and platforms were formally learning networks, but 
the most effective connecting behavior occurred behind the scenes, in groups 
that discussed their joint behavior in the working groups and toward the rest of 
the national government. 
The only kind of decision-making required in the group is about the common 
system analysis and about actions its participants take to gather information 
needed to make a next step in building a case for interventions by a power net-
work. Theoretically, there needs to be no consensus since no member of the 
group can forbid others to cooperate on partial issues. They only can exclude 
themselves from the action, try to delay the process, or try to make opportunistic 
use of the information they have. To prevent the latter, an adaptive group can 
explicitly address internal trust, as the IB and ETP did. In addition, the group 
should discuss its own position with respect to power networks. It should ana-
lyze the expected development of the wider societal context on the longer term, 
the expected development of power networks on the middle term, and the possi-
ble effects of their own proposals on the short term, and relate the three two each 
other to develop their common rationality. Ideas can be piloted in power net-
works, they may or may not affect the tensions in the power network as feed-
back will illustrate, and based on that information a next step can be chosen. It is 
therefore useful to have an overview of transition paths, possible actions for 
reference, but also to be opportunistic in the precise focus or actions on the short 
term. 
An external interaction method 
After imagining interventions and their possible effects, an adaptive network 
should actually create an impact by communicating with the larger subsystem it 
tries to influence, i.e. the composed subsystem or the ‘whole’. It has no powers, 
and therefore it has to align thinking based on pure argumentation. This requires 
an external dialogue. Senge e.a. (2004) term this a ‘dialogue with the universe’. 
Such dialogue can occur in meetings, in larger events or via the media. To be 
heard, the adaptive network must first influence a power network (via a lever of 
the second type, see Figure 6 on Page 19). Any individual communicating in 
public acts as a member of a power network, since his communications have 
effect on his wider support and legitimacy, and create expectations of reward. If 
ideas are well received many people reproduce them in their own communica-
tions and the ideas resonate throughout the system. If they are not, the commu-
nication will be forgotten, or support will diminish. 
The idea of dialogue between an adaptive network and the composed subsys-
tem that it intends to influence is schematized in Figure 11. The arrows symbol-
ize the communications between adaptive networks and their composed subsys-
tem (the whole). The whole can also be seen as the total of individuals that are 
the clients, voters and employees that, through their behavior, reproduce the 
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structure of the societal system.  The adaptive network communicates with the 
whole via the agents (in this case A, B and C) who act at two levels: through the 
beliefs of the adaptive network, and in their capacity as power network (this is 
double think). As they do so, the agenda of the power network has changed, the 
adaptive tensions have changed, and depending on feedback from the whole a 
next step can be taken. The adaptive network is in the central circle, the con-
nected organizations are shown in a wider circle and the whole composed sub-
system encompasses it all. 
Figure 11. External interactions between an adaptive network and the whole it tries to 
influence, through its members A, B and C 
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Feedback returns through communications (reactions), and through observed 
changed conduct. On a larger timescale, an adaptive network may develop in 
continuous communication with its larger social system. In a larger composed 
subsystem there may be several active adaptive networks, all competing for the 
same resources of power networks, and all claiming that they contribute to the 
same general goal (e.g. sustainable development). The power networks select. 
A change manager in the power network who is capable of selecting the best 
ideas by giving them the resources they need, may evaluate which networks 
deserve his support by imagining each network ‘as the center of the universe’ 
and how it might develop, given its interconnectivity. In this thought experi-
ment, other proposals become part of the one that is evaluated (the satellites in 
Figure 11). Thus these other networks are simultaneously competitors and co-
operators in the larger process of generating and selecting ideas. These ideas 
about being in dialogue with the whole are closely related with my observations 
of the external interaction method of the IB. 
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Identity 
An adaptive network needs an identity, a self-image about its position in the 
world, and that self-image should be balanced in order to create requisite variety 
to match the complexity of the desired changes. It should have influence in 
enough system components to influence its development without meeting coun-
tervailing power. It needs to create co-opetition between these components, 
which requires balancing the knowledge about and influence in these different 
components. As regards the even larger units, which will be influenced by the 
changes (the world), it may take that up in the vision as conditions. Persons 
close to formal leaders may add a lot by functioning as ‘hyperlinks’. Jeroen Tulp 
in the IB was such a person. Other parts of the network may only be represented 
in terms of knowledge about these parts, not influence. As the group has direct 
influence at high level in more parts of the power networks in the composed 
subsystem, the interconnectivity of that subsystem is higher, and it can more 
effectively adapt to circumstances. 
Choices may be based on intuition. As issues get complex the group mem-
bers must trust the competence of the other members to make adequate assess-
ments of their position.  Interconnectivity can be assessed through comparing 
the images different members sketch of the group’s position, and agreeing that 
actions taken contribute to a joint vision. If these images are consistent and co-
herent, it is more likely that the group acts on shared ideas. This is important 
because inconsistent or premature outward communication about joint ideas 
entails a political risk – the credibility of the group in the eyes of enablers may 
diminish. 
In summary, in raising consciousness about identity the following factors are 
important: 
• How is the composed system wherein the group wants to achieve impact 
delineated? 
• Which are the relevant components of the composed subsystem (how is it 
structured)? 
• About which components does the group have (inside) knowledge? 
• In which components does the group have influence?  
• How is this influence related to the power network where possible interven-
tions need to be accepted? 
 
These questions can be answered with the help of in Figure 12, which I call the 
interconnectivity triangle. In my view the IB consciously discussed the type of 
knowledge and influence that was needed to make a next step, and implicitly 
applied the interconnectivity triangle. In this way it became more adaptive to its 
own perceptions. In the triangle, the adaptive network is shown on top, over-
looking the structure of and behavior in the composed subsystem. The structure 
is formed of power networks, and determines the components, leading organiza-
tions and agents, their mutual relations, interdependencies, and therefore the 
adaptive tensions. This adaptive tension is the ‘target’ of the adaptive network. 
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The interconnectivity triangle connects the adaptive network with the whole via 
the political leaders that they influence. The triangle is composed of three main 
processes, which are connected through influence and leadership: 
The first process is the evolution of behavior in the economic and political 
markets, where agents (lower governments, companies, consumers, citizens, 
voters, employees) make their daily decisions. This leads to the development of 
market systems and patterns of production and consumption. For market actors, 
leaders in the structure formed by the components of the composed subsystem, 
are highly visible. If these leaders change their agenda, a new adaptive tension 
emerges, and the market is rewarded in a different way. The adaptive network, 
on the other hand is invisible for the market at large, but the market may still be 
influenced by it indirectly, via the power network. The adaptive network can 
make its own direct observations of the market, for example by inviting academ-
ics. 
Figure 12. The interconnectivity triangle, three processes and their links 
Adaptive network
Power networks
(organisations, institutions)
Behavior in the whole
(citizens, production/
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The second process is the evolution of the adaptive tensions in the structure, 
which determines how agents in the market are rewarded for their behavior (or 
will be rewarded in the future if certain interventions are announced). Structure 
is composed of institutions, organizations and dominant rules of engagement. It 
is represented by the communications of its political leaders. Agents in the 
whole do what they are rewarded for, thereby reinforcing the structure time and 
again. Political leaders are rewarded for acting in the interest of continuity of 
their organization, which is why the whole influences them, but they may also 
take the initiative for change, awaiting the feedback from the whole. 
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The third process is the development of adaptive networks. Here, change manag-
ers try to influence the power networks that form the adaptive tensions from 
behind the scenes. Agents with power can engage in adaptive behavior, becom-
ing change managers. The adaptive networks develop an image of their position. 
By definition they cannot have direct influence on the market, but by influenc-
ing the adaptive tensions they can have indirect influence. 
Balance of knowledge 
The interconnectivity triangle also may help to create balance in the process by 
identifying the type of knowledge required for progress and balance. Goal seek-
ing obviously requires a lot of knowledge about the market and about develop-
ments in the power networks. The interconnectivity triangle may help to identify 
gaps in knowledge. Making the interconnectivity triangle for a particular socie-
tal system explicit requires three types of knowledge: 
Knowledge is needed to create a variety of perceptions about the societal 
system. Here, experts from components of the system indicate how people in 
their component think about the system and about changes and innovations. 
These experts may work in influential organizations in the political process, in 
particular in the government, NGOs and enterprises, but also in the academic 
world. 
Knowledge is needed to intertwine between separate views about the whole 
from the general point of view of possible futures. How are consumers likely to 
respond to structural changes? How are citizens going to evaluate the implica-
tions of these changes? The availability of such knowledge is not automatic. 
Structural organizations and their experts are by nature shortsighted. 
The third type of knowledge, or perhaps more adequately ‘skill’, is knowing 
how to communicate and integrate thinking of people, developing the group’s 
competency to undertake a goal-seeking process. These people may assemble 
the group, give structure to its thinking, and find words to describe the impor-
tance of this process and its chances of success. 
Political opportunities 
As an adaptive network achieves progress and balance, it depends on political 
opportunities for applying levers. The word ‘adaptive’ applies perhaps more to 
the required political opportunism than it applies to making use of societal 
trends. To be effective, a learning network must reach those who influence the 
formal, political agenda. For such persons, any communication in public is a 
political action. It is a political risk to do that, since even if the idea has been 
well thought out and is in the potential interest of the whole, opponents may 
respond opportunistically before a public that doesn’t oversee the depth of the 
issue. This is a political risk that may be reduced by creating adaptive connec-
tions with opponents (co-opetition). It may also be a risk to allocate resources 
for doing research or doing pilots in the market, if such is not yet accepted as a 
formal objective. Thus, the members of a learning network should always be 
keen on political opportunities, so-called windows of opportunity (Kingdon 
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1995). They should be masters of double think, where the tension between joint 
long-term objective and the short-term political objectives is used to create new 
matches. It may be so, that a learning network has identified a number of actions 
for which the time is not yet ripe, and these may be waiting ‘on the boiler plate’, 
until an opportunity arises. Such joint actions are to serve the common goal, 
which only can be achieved at the long term. These actions should match with 
the short-term goals of political leaders. Because of the chaotic and unpredict-
able political process (leaders may be replaced), a learning group should always 
discuss the political developments and be alert for opportunities. 
Power networks rarely explicitly indicate the types of proposals they will ac-
cept. Sometimes there simply may be room for such proposals in the wide and 
abstract statements politicians and CEOs have made. The IB has showed this by 
making use of the public declarations of the need for sustainable corporate gov-
ernance by some CEOs, but also by many of its smaller actions. 
One step at a time 
As described above, adaptive networks may become impatient and try to push 
power networks into a certain course of action (e.g. the example of DTO). In 
that way, the adaptive network has lost its adaptability and has become a force 
like any other. In order to keep progress to more interconnectivity until the 
power network really is ripe for change, the adaptive network should propose 
the power network to change its conduct one step at a time, and only push fur-
ther if connectivity, i.e. the influence of the adaptive network, proceeds accord-
ingly (‘those man can best lead who follow the same road a little ahead’). Push-
ing it may blow up the process of building trust and foresight, and the ideas may 
become unacceptable for a long time, since vested interests build their counter-
discourses. 
Opportunities for the discourse itself 
The six ministers cooperating in the Inter-Ministerial Transition Program (whilst 
being political competitors!) had never given any indications that they were 
interested in such a Program, but they were open for it; there was an opportu-
nity. The IB, the ETP and the five DGs had needed four years to achieve this 
level of complexity, and in these four years, political support for transition man-
agement had not been withdrawn. As the next elections are nearing, momentum 
outside the government has been built-up, the government itself has re-
organized itself to form a context for counter-acting adaptive networks in the 
government, and the two keep each other in balance. The implication is that the 
transition discourse, its effect on power networks and therefore its adaptive net-
works may have become less vulnerable for elections. 
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8 Glossary 
Accounting The type of behavior where an agent rewards another agent for contribut-
ing to his agenda. 
Adaptability The capacity of a subsystem to adjust to changing circumstances. Be-
cause of interdependency with other subsystems in a composed subsys-
tem, this capacity depends on the interconnectivity in the composed 
subsystem. 
Adaptive network Groups of policy makers having influence and knowledge in different 
parts of society, aiming for co-evolution of ideas. 
Agenda The (public) agenda is the set of objectives for which agents says to 
strive, and promises to reward agents who contribute to these objectives. 
This includes priorities. Agents may promise more than they can do, and 
may not be open about their true priorities. 
Agent A person, unit in a social subsystem, who makes independent decisions 
about its own conducts, and takes the mutual relations of the other agents 
in the subsystem into consideration. 
Change manager An agent who tries to make a subsystem more adaptable through con-
necting behavior. In the transition discourse, such a person is called a 
transition manager. 
Co-evolution The mutual influence of ideas, structure, process, conduct and reward in 
different, interdependent subsystems through mutual selective pressures 
at market level or at social level. In the latter case an awareness of possi-
ble selective pressures through the market can help align development of 
ideas and subsequent alignment of market actions. Co-evolution of think-
ing is hypothesized to make the higher order subsystem more adaptive to 
changing circumstances. 
Complexity speak A normative discourse about the themes of this book: content, structure, 
process, behavior and reward. The term complexity speak is used to 
suggest that those who express this discourse are not willing or capable 
to follow its suggestions. 
Composed subsys-
tem 
The social subsystems that are all related to the same market system, and 
therefore they are interdependent. 
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Conduct Observable behavior of agents; in either specific situations or in general. 
Patterns of behavior form a strategy that may or may not be intentional. 
Connecting behav-
ior 
Conduct that initiates or constitutes an adaptive network. Same as adap-
tive behavior and change management. 
Content What is, or could be, expressed in language: ideas, views, perceptions, 
memes, theories, discourses and knowledge. 
Context The context of an adaptive network is the power network that generates 
an adaptive tension. The context of the power network is the composed 
subsystem they govern (the ‘whole’).  
Cooperation An agent’s conduct in the interest of a subsystem, for which the agent 
expects reward. 
Coopetition Conduct that is based on, and leads to, trust and shared foresight between 
agents who compete for the same resources. 
Development The process, the whole of interactions that lead to change of structure, 
which may have visible effects at market level and therefore in the life 
world. 
Dialogue A form of communication where two agents try to understand the other 
in order to identify a common perception or rationality. 
Double think To think and act in the interest of different levels of nested subsystems, 
with different delay times and probabilities for material reward. 
Enabler A change manager at a high position in a hierarchy, who spends only 
little time on activities of change management, and allows another 
change manager to spend significant amounts of time. 
Foresight A type of rationality that explicitly tries to make adequate assessments of 
the effects of own conduct in networks and ultimately on societal sys-
tems; the adequacy is not directly observable but it is assumed that sys-
tems thinking (complexity thinking) is the most universal language to 
develop joint foresight. 
Goal-seeking The type of behavior that leads to ideas that is expected to be acceptable 
for a power network, and to relieve a tension in that network. A form of 
learning where a number of agents link their resources and interact with 
their larger subsystems to create lessons for a mutual benefit. 
Governance The interactions patterns, or the generalized interactions, in a network. 
There may be an emphasis on accounting or goal-seeking behavior. For 
optimal adaptability the two need to be in balance, since then mental 
flexibility is combined with the capability to physically implement. 
Higher order Subsystem X is one order higher than subsystem Y if Y (perhaps repre-
sented by one of its agents) is one of the agents in X. The ideas formed in 
X are meta-ideas of the ideas formed in Y. 
Innovation The impact of goal-seeking interactions in adaptive networks, aimed at a 
different kind of development. 
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Institutionalized An emerging structure that many agents perceive who determine their 
rationality to a significant extent on it and its ideas.  
Interconnectivity The degree in which content is passed around in a social subsystem, 
influencing conduct through co-evolution. Depends on the quantity and 
quality of connections between agents. 
Interdependent Two or more agents are defined to be interdependent if they compete for 
the same limited resources they need to exist, as expressed in their rou-
tine behavior. 
Lever An intervention a power network can make into either the market or in 
the social processes about possible market interventions. 
Market The exchange of goods and services that shapes the development of the 
real, visible world. 
Mutual relations The perception two agents have about the behavior of the other; this 
perception may develop in interaction. 
Nested subsystems A general term for subsystems that are composed of smaller subsystems. 
In the context of sustainable development, the term composed subsys-
tems is used, which are linked to societal systems. 
Network A (governance) network is group of agents who have mutual relations 
based on interdependencies; it is a kind of subsystem whose agents are 
representatives of other subsystems. These agents are, in their own per-
ceptions, more or less equal in their degree of dependency.  
Organization A hierarchical organization, an institutionalized subsystem 
Process The whole of interactions in a subsystem, which is based on and lead to 
conduct. 
Proposal An idea that an adaptive network proposes to a power network, to adjust 
its agenda. 
Rationality The relationship between ideas and behavior 
Reward Recognition an agent gets from other agents for his behavior, that may or 
may not be material 
Societal system A market system and the social subsystems that depend on it, like the 
mobility system; the energy system. 
Structure An idea about the pattern of a subsystem as observed by many agents in 
the subsystem. Adaptive networks are volatile structures that are only 
observable for its members. Power networks are institutionalized and 
visible. 
Subsystem A (social) subsystem is a group of agents with mutual relations. The 
prefix ‘sub’ is often added to emphasize that each system is an agent of a 
higher-order system and therefore dependent. 
System innovation Changes of societal systems, and related changes of composed subsys-
tems. 
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Systems thinking Thinking according to the principles of cybernetics and complexity 
theories, based on an evolutionary worldview. 
Trust A bet on the future conduct of other agents. 
Wicked problems Conflicting agendas; the same as complex problems. 
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9 Abbreviations 
ANWB An NGO for mobility, outdoor recreation and tourism 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
DG Director General / Directorate General 
DTO Sustainable Technological Development 
EC European Commission 
ETP Energy Transition Process 
EU European Union 
EZ Ministry of Economic Affairs (responsible for the energy sector) 
IB Innovation Board Sustainable Mobility (which had no formal status) 
IPE Program Directorate Energy Transition (a cooperation of six ministries) 
IUCN The World Conservation Union 
LNV Ministry of Agriculture Nature and Food Quality 
LTVE Long Term Energy Outlook 
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
NIDO National Initiative Sustainable Development 
NMP4 Fourth National Environmental Policy Paper 
R&D Research and development 
SER Socio-Economic Council 
SG Secretary General 
SNM Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment 
V&W Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water management 
VROM Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
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14 Summary 
The governance for sustainable development 
In this book, I reconstruct how policy makers, working together in what I term 
adaptive networks, have enabled a breakthrough in thinking about sustainable 
mobility in certain policy circles. I define the conduct of leading actors in these 
adaptive networks as sustainable change management. Sustainable development 
is conceptualized as a complex problem. No single person or organization can 
‘manage’ sustainable change autonomously. It is a joint concern and therefore a 
matter of effective governance – a joint effort of several domains. Adaptive 
networks are self-organizing groups of policy makers who enable joint fact-
finding and visualizing a direction towards improvements, in this case sustain-
able transport. These policy makers combine two capabilities. First they are 
influential in, and have knowledge about, different power networks. Secondly 
they try to break away from the existing policies in those power networks and 
develop a joint understanding about new, more effective policies. They try to 
align the evolution of this process of rethinking with the behavior in their power 
networks. In this perspective, breakthroughs stem from the co-evolution of 
partly conflicting ideas and interests. Change managers in adaptive networks act 
on their personal initiative. Power networks are not able to reward their initia-
tives, unless the new ideas they create have been accepted to a considerable 
degree. 
Adaptive networks develop in the context of power networks – the existing 
hierarchical leadership that has power over the short-term use of resources, 
which includes making public statements about (un)desirable developments, 
creating new expectations of their own conduct and reward. Interactions in adap-
tive networks are not primarily based on the use of power and much more on the 
development and spreading of ideas. To become effective, adaptive networks 
should develop ideas in contrast with the ones in existing power networks and at 
the same time infect the power networks with these ideas. 
The distinction between adaptive networks and power networks is conceptu-
ally useful. In practice, there is (and there should be) some overlap between the 
two, to link innovative ideas with power. People in high (power) positions, who 
also participate in the learning process, are important linking pins. Adaptive 
networks become highly influential if they are able to use the existing tensions 
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in and between power networks. Such tensions are continuously available, be-
cause in Western democracies environmental, social and economic interests are 
separately organized and tend to apply their power in different directions.   
The theory about adaptive networks is applied to the Dutch policy making 
process about sustainable transport. In The Netherlands the intended policy ap-
proach has been termed ‘transition management’. The concept of transition has 
been adopted in government policies through the 4th National Environmental 
Policy (NMP4) in 2001. The existing physical and social complexity creates 
wicked problems. Setting targets cannot solve these problems, since the prob-
lems cannot be fixed and solutions have not been found yet. Political leaders and 
business leaders oriented towards existing targets will not look for solutions for 
wicked problems. If they seek new solutions and targets in a governance net-
work, they reduce the chances of short-term accountable progress. 
The tension between the accounting component of governance and the goal-
seeking component can, however, also be used constructively. If policy makers 
develop proposals that actors take up in their power networks, the power net-
work may be changed. The changed power network may create new tensions, 
forming opportunities for new types of proposals. The iteration between adap-
tive (reflexive, learning) interactions and power interactions leads to different, 
more sustainable outcomes, since the justification of policies is based on more 
complex ideas. 
However, this conduct places high demands on its participants; they must be-
lieve they can make a difference. Adaptive networks can be temporary manifes-
tations of individuals willing to think ‘out of the box’ and define new objectives 
for the common good, initially not fitting their individual good. I postulate that 
their emergence and impact depends on internal trust – trust in the other mem-
bers of an adaptive network – as well as external trust – trust in the relative sta-
bility of the power context and its susceptibility for a certain kind of proposals. 
Internal trust resembles the idea of coopetition – the cooperation between com-
petitors based on common interests that only can be served after a long search 
process. A third factor is foresight (or trust in an adequate self-image) – the 
collective capacity of making adequate assessments of the effects of own con-
duct in power networks. 
Research question 
I have postulated the existence of adaptive networks. In terms of complexity 
theory, these are networks that develop trust and can connect different parts of 
society, so that they can help their system become adaptable to change of cir-
cumstances that forms a joint threat, alias a joint opportunity. They do that by 
trying to contribute to an alternative, more sustainable development. In such a 
way, the capacity of humans to anticipate also becomes a conduct of the social 
system as a whole. However, complexity impedes reward of this individual be-
havior, due to uncertainty and a long feedback cycle. The key question for this 
book goes one step back: How can new ideas about sustainable development be 
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widely adopted, and how can this be evaluated in the case of transition man-
agement? This question is answered through the following sub-questions: 
• How can the idea of adaptive networks be related to existing theories of 
complexity and change? This question is answered in chapter 2, which in-
cludes the philosophical question related to the evaluation of the 
sustainability of ideas 
• How can these theories be operationalized to observe adaptive networks, 
their interaction with power networks, and the spreading of sustainable 
ideas in the real world? This is elaborated in chapter 3. 
• In the case of transition management, how did: 
o Power networks evolve, and where can adaptive networks be hy-
pothesized as an explanation of that evolution? (answered in chap-
ter 4) 
o Adaptive networks evolve, and where can change managers be hy-
pothesized as an explanation for that evolution? (answered in chap-
ter 5) 
o Change managers influence development? (answered in chapter 6) 
• Which lessons for sustainable change management, contributing to sustain-
able governance, can be drawn? This is answered in chapter 7, which deals 
with issues like coopetition and trust, which, as conduct in adaptive net-
works, may contribute to a more adaptable society. 
Chapter 2: Theoretical notions of complexity 
In complexity theory, social systems are conceptualized as an embedded hierar-
chy (a nested structure) that is closely related to historical, geographical and 
market factors. Individuals are rewarded for behavior that fits preset hierarchical 
objectives, which necessarily do not fit complex problems. The result is that 
social systems develop through their internal driving forces. A social system is a 
dissipative structure – using some form of energy that can be converted to other 
forms and passed on in the social system through its reward system, eventually 
converting to order and disorder. As the agents in the system are replaced and 
may evolve, a social system can resemble a living organism – with its own me-
tabolism. In the case of social systems, the energy source is material reward by 
the market system in the real life world, but cultures can also emerge that reward 
types of behavior that are less clearly linked with material reward for the person 
or community. This is caused by the long feedback time between behavior and 
effect in the market system. The agents that determine the reward system and 
that are replaced and may evolve, are ideas. This is the epistemological view of 
memetics, which builds on social constructivism. The common rationalities 
develop as discourses, which still present either overly simple or overly abstract 
solutions to complex problems. Persons and social groups, which also reproduce 
and evolve, carry ideas.  The capacities of persons and groups therefore may co-
evolve with the evolution of the ideas that motivate them. This may lead to insti-
tutionalized discourses and practices like the democratic system, which may 
create a shorter feedback cycle for impact of conduct. A division of powers 
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Naked eye 
Magnifying glass 
Microscope 
Power  networks 
Adaptive networks 
Change managers 
Sustainable change  management 
produces checks and balances, 
new interdependencies, and 
therefore social tensions, which 
may encourage cooperation and 
learning. 
If a social system increases its 
adaptability to changing circum-
stances (i.e. its sustainability), it 
must create requisite variety: its 
ensemble of evolving discourses 
must lead to a pattern of thinking 
and behavior that meets the 
complexity of the changes in the environment. The conduct that ‘works’ sur-
vives through in a process of selection. This depends on individual capacities 
(bounded rationality; cognitive limitations) and on collective capacities (social 
capital; trust; connectivity). It helps to acknowledge complexity and to apply 
systems thinking in governance networks. The capacity and willingness of 
double think is important (meeting requirements for short-term survival in a 
hierarchical system, whilst trying to bridge the tensions with interdependent 
other hierarchies). There is a theoretic possibility of management instruments 
that stimulate such behavior, in innovation sciences termed systemic instruments 
or public spaces, but this has not yet been well elaborated. 
Several authors see as key to such instruments that they create tensions that 
may attract adaptive 
interactions. Whether that 
happens depends on the charac-
teristics of the social system 
under tension. If the pressure is 
too high, it will collapse; if it is 
too low, it will not change. 
Survival then may depend on 
the availability of enough policy 
makers in different parts of the 
system, capable and willing to 
engage in reflexive interactions, 
and linking to power networks, 
creating a next order selection mechanism for ideas. This may create more 
alignment between conduct in different subsystems, and a more effective re-
sponse to common challenges. Trust is an important variable to allow reflexive 
interactions, and whilst it may develop in a positive or negative feedback cycle, 
it is also embedded in the more stable culture in a social system. 
Chapter 3: A method of complexity research 
To observe and explain social change under complex conditions, I have chosen a 
case study based approach. The case study is formed by the sustainable devel-
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opment and transition management discourses in The Netherlands, with a focus 
on specific networks in the context of NMP4, in the period 2001 – 2006. Dia-
gram 1 gives an idea of the main networks I have identified and studied. The 
period before 2000 is described in some detail to explain the state of mind of the 
NMP4 team in 2000. After that, several networks emerged of which the main 
ones are indicated. For the NMP4 team in 2000 and later networks that took 
over its ideas, I structure the 
analysis in development rounds 
until 2006 in terms of content 
(ideas), structure (networks), ten-
sions (compensated by trust and 
foresight shown in conduct), at 
three levels of scale or detail (see 
Diagram 2). Trust is closely re-
lated to expected reward. 
The interaction between power 
networks and adaptive networks is 
described in terms of adaptive 
tensions that attract adaptive in-
teractions, which generate a proposition, as in Diagram 3. When successful, the 
adaptive network develops a proposition that is accepted by members of the 
power network with whom they are linked. This acceptance means that they 
change their visible power interactions; e.g. by probing (testing) new ideas. By 
doing that, they create expectations about their own future behavior, and there-
fore social tensions that may provoke a reaction throughout the power system. 
Where Diagram 3 structures the adaptive tension to which individuals and net-
works can respond, Diagram 4 shows how that response is structured. Adaptive 
networks develop ideas that lead to propositions to power. If power accepts the 
proposition, a visible intervention occurs in the power networks, which then 
may respond by an adjustment 
of tensions. 
In the period 2000 - 2005, I 
have indirectly observed the 
development of content, struc-
ture, process, conduct and re-
ward. The power context is in-
terpreted from these interviews, 
supplemented with documents. 
Large-scale change represented 
in power networks can assist in 
hypothesizing the existence of 
adaptive networks where actions 
are aligned by emerging next-order ideas (i.e. shared vision). The adaptive 
groups, interactions and their impact are then interpreted from interviews, mak-
ing use of triangulation (cross-checks), identifying common perceptions of the 
Diagram 4: Adaptive propositions 
leading to interventions in power 
networks
proposition
Power network
(visible for 
outsiders)
Adaptive networks
(only visible 
for insiders)
Mental or
physical 
separation
intervention
Co-evolution
Learning,
trusting
Probing
Creating expectations
Diagram 3: Adaptive tension
Power network 
(motivated by 
the “now”)
Adaptive network
(motivated by the future)
Goal A Goal B
Goal C, 
a third way that may
(or may not) be discovered
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relevant parameters. By monitoring the process, a first hand account has become 
possible. This material then should create an overview perception of the devel-
opment of power networks, adaptive networks, the tensions that drove them, as 
well as the impact of change managers, and it should provide insights of effec-
tive conduct in terms of sustainable change management. 
Since sustainable development is my research object, I have to define a 
boundary for research that is meaningful in that sense. I assume that a natural 
boundary is the composed subsystem – a set of social systems that all depend 
on, or are affected by, the same market system. This is why the link between 
large-scale and small-scale processes, i.e. the whole system versus individual 
conduct, is important. A composed subsystem has market components (like in 
the mobility system infrastructure managers, commuters, manufacturers), as 
well as domains with a different type of internal reward system (government, 
business, academic, civil society). Sustainable development is in that context 
defined as a development that enables long-term continuation of the composed 
subsystem, through adaptation to changes in its environment (i.e. other com-
posed subsystems with which it has relations, or the physical environment on 
which the market depends). Sustainable development is by no means secure, 
because market interactions may lead to depletion of critical resources or other 
undesirable side effects that may destabilize the composed system. Yet, the con-
duct in the composed subsystem may not reflect the concerns for the future 
some of its members may have. 
Chapter 4: power networks; adaptive tensions attracting adaptive networks 
The outcome of the historical description of the power networks related to tran-
sition management can be summarized as a series of visible interventions about 
novel ideas, which may have emerged in adaptive networks. Several interven-
tions were visible as well as successful, in the sense that the interventions re-
ceived positive reactions. The central idea that has emerged was that sustainable 
automotives are feasible, The Netherlands is a good place for experimentation, 
and the government should organize a platform that can serve as a power con-
text where the different private stakeholders and public stakeholders can develop 
widely acceptable ideas about concrete implementation. Direct involvement of 
top management and Cabinet at crucial moments would ensure implementation 
of proposals. The most compelling interventions and the associated adaptive 
networks were: 
• The NMP4 team (the first hypothesized adaptive network), with civil ser-
vants from several ministries, proposed transition management to the prin-
cipals of the ministry of economic affairs EZ, responsible for energy poli-
cies, and the environment minister and proposing that non-environment 
ministries were to ‘manage sustainable transitions’; and Parliament sup-
ported this unusually vague approach; 
• The members of the innovation board sustainable mobility IB (the second 
hypothesized adaptive network), from governments, industries, academics 
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and NGOs, communicated differently in their organizations about automo-
tives; the car as such became more accepted in the environment movement; 
• Speakers and voters at the EU conference Energy in Motion, influenced by 
the IB, took clear positions about sustainable automotives; 
• The energy transition process, a team in EZ (the third hypothesized adaptive 
network), developed transition experiments and more focus in R&D for sus-
tainable energy; 
• The Director Generals of several ministries (the fourth hypothesized adap-
tive network) proposed to establish an Inter-ministerial Energy Transition 
Program Directorate (IPE), which created an adaptive tension for more co-
ordination between six ministries in order to engage in a constructive dia-
logue with the automotives sector and other sectors. 
 
This evolution toward bridging the gap public – private in the case of automo-
tives was taken as an example for other paths to sustainable transitions under the 
IPE. The driving force was the tension between the sustainable development 
discourse and sectoral growth and competitiveness discourses, which was 
strongly felt in Parliament. This potential energy has now been focused on the 
gap public – private through a chain of interventions and tensions. The series of 
power interventions may be compared with waves of tension that propagate in 
power networks until, in events like the EU conference, a widely shared new 
problem definition emerges that gives focus (alignment). 
These large-scale waves were built-up through smaller-scale waves. For il-
lustration, I summarize the propositions and interventions in three rounds, dur-
ing the development of NMP4 in Diagram 5. Here, the adaptive tensions were 
large scale (as large as the tension between the sustainable development dis-
course and the economic growth discourse), and the emerging transition man-
agement discourse was vague. At later stages, discourses about more specific 
scenarios emerged (sustainable automotives). This also illustrates that adaptive 
propositions emerged from different groups at different stages – whereas simul-
taneously, these groups were linked and the ideas could be shared through adap-
tive interactions between the groups. Each innovative power intervention can 
therefore be hypothesized as a manifestation of co-evolution that has occurred 
before in adaptive networks and has built momentum for the intervention behind 
scenes. Whilst these adaptive networks as such were not visible due to their 
sensitivity, politicians communicated about the need of adaptive networks, and 
the need to give them time. For example, state secretary for environment Van 
Geel used the metaphor of a ‘peat fire’. Minister Brinkhorst of economic affairs 
also made several statements. The state of affairs early 2006 was that the transi-
tion discourse was still alive, and institutionalized through a Directorate. Its 
profile had been raised, despite a lack of clear outcomes and, related, substantial 
criticism. 
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Chapter 5: adaptive networks; trust and foresight 
I have analyzed interviews with policy makers who have been closely involved 
in the interventions above, to identify how and why they acted. I focused on 
external trust, internal trust and shared foresight. External trust is seen as con-
duct based on the assumption that adaptive tensions in power networks are sta-
ble, creating lasting opportunities for interventions toward more sustainable 
power contexts. Internal trust is trusting that partners in adaptive networks share 
in the joint enterprise. 
Shared foresight might 
be expressed as a com-
mon idea about a 
sustainable future and a 
limiting factor for fur-
ther build-up of adaptive 
tension in what is 
believed to be the right 
direction. A term fre-
quently used in the IB 
and ETP was ‘credible’. 
Whenever some propos-
als were not seen as 
credible, there were 
Diagram 5: NMP4 process 2000 -2001
Sustainable development 
discourse
1 – Environment minister: an 
innovative but concrete NMP4
2 – VROM principals: EZ to 
manage energy and mobility 
transition
3 – Believers in politics: the 
analysis is correct and deserves 
our support; it is the road to 
sustainable development
Sectoral development 
discourse
1 – EZ principals: NMP4 
should be harmless
2 – EZ principals: V&W to 
manage mobility transition; 
EZ only energy transition
3 – Skeptics in politics:
despite importance sustain. 
development this is a waste 
of time for Parliamentarians
NMP4’s Transition Discourse
1 – NMP4-team: vague discourse supported by private (energy) sector and by 
relevant NGOs; at several stages Teljeur, linking the NMP-team with EZ 
principals, obtained the approval of his principals at EZ
2 – Civil servants, in particular V&W, present transition management as 
opportunity; The Director General of V&W saw the opportunity as well and 
changed the perception VROM had of his ministry
3 – The Minister for energy agreed to ‘manage the transition to sustainable 
energy’ after her civil servants had put her in this position, enabled by the 
discourse in Parliament. This created pressure on the other ministers and state 
secretaries to follow, which they did.
Diagram 6: Trust dynamics
Context of 
power networks 
Greenpolder and sustainability research
NMP4: Significance of policy papers
and sense of interdependency for 
sustainable breakthroughs
NMP4 implementation: Politics asks 
for annual progress reports and five DGs
have bimonthly meetings
Inter-ministerial program:
EU conference leading and sustainable 
corporate governance discourse
Hypothesized
Adaptive networks
Loose network of 
lobby groups;
Loose network of 
research and policy groups
Team EZ –VROM
developing NMP4
Innovation Board and 
Energy Transition Process
Automotives platform
Hypothesized
Limiting condition
Closed shop: 
no power trick;
Lack of influence: 
no powerless trick
Balance between 
public and 
private forrunners
Span of knowledge
and influence
Legitimacy
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different views about limiting factors. 
These three factors have been interpreted, and the overview is shown Dia-
gram 6. The arrows from left to right indicate that an adaptive tension exerted by 
a power network, and trusted by adaptive networks. The arrows from right to 
left indicate power interventions after co-evolution in adaptive networks; the 
power interventions may create a new power network with a new adaptive ten-
sion. The development of trust was a spiral of positive feedback, leading to more 
trust. Successful adaptive networks enabled this, and common understanding of 
their situation drove them. As the networks (apparently) influenced their context 
to create a new stage of adaptive tension, it trusted that the power context would 
consolidate for a while, and the adaptive networks had a period to adjust to the 
new situation, and had to build up new trust to make a next step. 
The question emerges in which degree collective behavior in adaptive net-
works was intentional. It is my observation that specific policy makers were 
capable of seeing the opportunities for innovative network building. These trail-
blazers were able to make others enthusiastic. These others were susceptible to 
this enthusiasm because they had shared the general desire to support sustain-
able development, and an intuition about large-scale adaptive tensions. They 
acknowledged complexity, and by getting closer to implementation power they 
became increasingly committed to the adaptive interactions. They explicitly 
discussed motives and trusted that the others had no hidden agenda (i.e. the in-
teractions were power free). 
This intuition was formed by collective disappointments the 1990s with the 
greenpolder model and the sustainability research programs. An ironic (in the 
sense: not discouraged by the seemingly impossible task) and trusting attitude 
was enough to create some level of shared foresight by contributing knowledge 
to the common overview. This trust enabled, for example, the members of the IB 
to take the opportunity of the EU conference, and it connected the involved 
domains to allow the three ministries to develop a widely accepted problem 
definition at the EU conference, which was why it was well visited and enthusi-
asm for addressing sustainable automotives grew again. It is my observation, 
and that of several members of these networks, that wide acceptance of the tran-
sition discourse facilitated these connections. In terms of trust theories, the 
socio-cognitive understanding of trust (making trust itself an object of policies 
and conduct aimed at a positive spiral) enabled trust. Trust was explicitly dis-
cussed and the process could therefore focus on an agreed limiting factor, and 
ideas could at times be passed on from one power network to another, if that 
would enable a focus on the weakest link. 
As the trust in intentions of others in the network grew, the limiting factor 
seems to have become the belief in the competences of others to create increas-
ingly more complex shared foresight as basis for action; i.e. competence trust. 
Insiders see this development as a breakthrough in policy culture in the Dutch 
mobility, energy and environmental subsystems, since it takes away the cyni-
cism caused by distrust in intentions. However, outsiders don’t see this at all, as 
they form no part of it. With this perspective, shared foresight itself becomes a 
 226 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
component of trust – it is the resource needed to believe that a group can change 
the power context by interventions that create co-evolution in the larger system. 
It may also be termed the self-confidence of a network, or the complexity of co-
evolution, and therefore conduct, that is reachable. It builds up through co-
evolution between change managers in the adaptive network. 
Chapter 6: change managers; enthusiasm, uncertainty and reward 
In the transition discourse, dozens of people have participated in loose networks 
that supported it without often being able to explain the idea to direct colleagues. 
It is a personal disposition that has been triggered by the participation in the 
greenpolder model and sustainable development research programs. The emer-
gence of such loose networks probably also has been a latent possibility in the 
general ‘polder’ culture of The Netherlands. The irony of the situation was that 
sustainable development was imaginable but due to lock-in the resistance 
seemed unsurpassable. These policy makers dealt with this situation by looking 
for constructive, development-oriented propositions. They had a real concern for 
sustainable development, as they were easily mobilized for the IB and the ETP, 
or to support the transition discourse. As interviews show, all participants had 
skills of systems thinking, which formed the basis of the cooperation. Different 
roles, often combined by one individual, can be observed in the adaptive net-
works: 
• Enablers could connect ideas with power, had the capacity to enable others 
to interact behind the scenes, and to intervene in power networks when oth-
ers were skeptical; 
• Initiators inspired others to focus on complex, long-term options; 
• Networkers formed the particle around which a crystal was formed, because 
they could mobilize individuals from throughout the composed subsystem 
with the appropriate attitude for networks with adaptive capacities; 
• Moderators (or connectors) helped others to perceive joint opportunities 
and to develop trust and foresight; they helped separating the adaptive inter-
actions from visible power actions (playing with openness to visibly man-
age tensions and closedness to create internal trust); 
• Systems thinkers could inspire into joint visioning, making new combina-
tions and identifying possible joint action; 
• Letting goers did not mind that others were allowed to further develop their 
idea, without getting personal credit for it. (With major example: non-
environmental ministries implemented the NMP4.); 
• Experts contributed by showing possible developments at market level, as 
well as the impacts of these developments. 
 
Most participants actually may have been driven by intuitions rather than ex-
plicit system analyses and foresight. However, a limited number of people 
played key roles in the management of tensions in a localized way; these were 
exceptionally skilled in moderation and systems thinking, and appeared not to be 
interested in widely visible personal success. 
  
 Summary 227
In the government and in larger corporations and NGOs, civil servants and em-
ployees sometimes have time to ‘develop a hobby’ – to spend time on a cause 
they personally believe to be important. In the transition discourse, several 
‘hobbyists’ actually created impact in power networks. This was not only a re-
sult of enthusiasm, but also of competence. There could be a trend toward an 
increasing number of the more competent policy makers spending some of their 
time in hobbies. Jeroen Tulp is perhaps the clearest example; he was one of the 
most influential civil servants in the mobility sector and felt the tension between 
the need to bridge the gap public – private, whilst not being able to do that in his 
‘power’ role. He was prepared to ‘double think’ for at least a year in the IB, until 
the EU conference made the short term and the long term coincide. His behav-
ior, and that of others, could also have been contagious to other civil servants 
who saw them operating. Some said it was a conscious strategy to try to serve as 
role model. Policy makers who had been involved in the IB and the automotives 
platform, seem to have tried to transfer the competencies of adaptive interaction 
to other platforms. 
Several organizations engaged in the platforms have assigned persons who 
participated in several related platforms as a kind of ‘proactive diplomats’. As 
someone said, ‘the IB members have been looking for wind in their sails, and 
they have gotten good at it’. Their management has recognized their skills and 
added value after the success of the IB. The transition discourse is actively ap-
plied to create an understanding and trust in these relationships. It seems that the 
language of transitions has become alive and creates a measure for rewarding 
change management in adaptive networks. On the other hand, this competence 
still seems to be personal. 
It seems important that these change managers be embedded in loose net-
works that understand their transition language. The loose networks surfaced 
regularly in several events where prominent Dutch policy makers and (ex) poli-
ticians made a case for transition thinking. Other examples were dozens of pub-
lications in ArenA, the magazine of the Netherlands Association of Environ-
mental Professionals. In the academic world there was increasing attention for 
transition management, with significant support of the government. Governmen-
tal knowledge organizations gave support to all interested in transition manage-
ment (www.transitiemanagement.nl). The Environment and Nature Planning 
Bureau (www.mnp.nl), an independent think tank responsible for producing 
sustainability outlooks, took up the progress monitoring of transition manage-
ment. It is difficult to imagine that all these efforts are not rooted on strong and 
lasting loose networks, and that they will not actually create better understand-
ing of sustainable change management. 
Chapter 7: sustainable change management 
It helps to compare networks with living organisms. The first main lesson for 
sustainable change management is that sustainable change managers may be 
aware that they form part of a loose network that can be compared with a living 
organism. It then becomes easier for them to make the link between individual 
 228 Adaptive Networks - The Governance for Sustainable Development 
and collective complexity-acknowledging behavior. It becomes easier to be 
ironic rather than cynical or skeptical, and this development-oriented drive can 
lead to more complex conduct and more complex and flexible collective poli-
cies. Being development-oriented rather than oriented toward reducing unsus-
tainable options for others (what I have termed accounting behavior), implies 
having faith in a similar understanding and attitude in other parts of the com-
posed subsystem, so that loose networks can emerge. These loose networks have 
the capability of self-organizing into adaptive networks, and by doing so, they 
improve their skill of self-organizing and developing propositions that can influ-
ence power. If they are successful, trust and foresight increase, and the loose 
network has increased its collective competence. 
The metabolism of this organism is based on making propositions to power 
that actually influence adaptive tensions in a direction it considers desirable. The 
power networks should respond favorably, and it should create stronger expecta-
tions that it will reward more detailed propositions for alternative development 
challenges as opposed to business-as-usual. Such success can give the loose 
network renewed energy and more hope for a sustainable future. An outsider can 
evaluate the degree of sustainability of these successful propositions by assess-
ing the complexity of the emerging ideas in adaptive networks, which have de-
veloped the proposition. If knowledge about weaker groups, like future genera-
tions, is represented in the adaptive network, by definition it has become more 
complex and more sustainable. Although this is still an imperfect measure, it is 
clear that the adaptive networks evaluated in this book were more sustainable 
than previous adaptive networks. They achieved considerable complexity, be-
cause for the first time there was some agreement between all domains of the 
significantly complex automotives system, including environmental NGOs. 
The conceptual distinction between power networks and adaptive networks 
helps to understand the conduct of policy makers, and how at times policy mak-
ers self-organized into networks, with a varying degree of separation of adaptive 
interactions and power interactions. This conceptual separation offers the possi-
bility of making the separation explicit and physical, so that power-free groups 
can emerge, which intentionally can facilitate a co-evolution of ideas. This co-
evolution leads to propositions to power, which can lead to power interventions 
and waves of change in the larger social system if the time is right for that. New 
adaptive tensions emerge and the cycle repeats, one step closer to sustainable 
development. Action in the whole social system becomes more aligned and 
geared toward dealing with the common problems on the long term. 
The fact that adaptive networks develop complex ideas that cannot be gener-
ated in power networks may suggest that they know better, but that may not be 
always the case. As any distinctive social group they suffer from self-reference 
and groupthink. Adaptive networks can only make proposals that compete with 
the proposals of other adaptive networks, and power networks select, like al-
ways. Power networks, e.g. the primacy of politics over civil servants and socie-
tal platforms, therefore remain fully intact, but they are better informed. Adap-
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tive networks can only survive if power networks are open for the inspiration 
they offer; if their ideas are convincing. 
 
The individual role to bridge gaps. The second main lesson is that adaptive net-
works depend on policy makers who are prepared to make the link between the 
short term and the long term by investing personally in making social and con-
ceptual connections with policy makers in other parts. They found their personal 
motivation in the tension between current unsustainable practices and the desire 
for a sustainable development in the societal system they depended on. This 
capacity may be defined as double think, which for example may allow a CEO 
to act in an adaptive network, developing ideas that undermine his formal corpo-
rate policies, and which may not be understood (yet) by most other policy mak-
ers in his corporation who do not share his (capacity of) double think. Outsiders 
asking for sustainable development, seeing only the visible actions may then 
remain critical about that CEO. Even if power networks accept a breakthrough 
proposal, the CEO may hardly be rewarded in a material sense, since his contri-
bution occurred behind the scenes. Only the loose networks that had seen his 
actions may reward him. What makes reward even more unlikely is that solu-
tions for complex problems like sustainable development are difficult to find, 
and take long series of interventions in power networks, creating a much wider 
social learning process in waves, before an adaptive tension emerges that is open 
for visible market interventions. A major obstacle is the cultural gap between 
public and private sector, and leaders on both sides may have to invest for a long 
time before the process culminates in a context that enables a non-fragmented 
dialogue across that gap. 
This was in the mind of public and private leaders involved in transition 
management, and their right hands, since they had developed such competencies 
to some extent, individually and collectively. This enabled knowledge to flow 
more between parts. Each time a power network accepted a proposal, the social 
system was one step further in its thinking about sustainable development. One 
adaptive network, the Innovation Board Sustainable Mobility (IB), perfected 
these skills and made them explicit. They found success in developing new 
problem definitions in power networks, which created adaptive tensions for 
further steps. Because this process did not yet lead to visible market changes, the 
paradox emerged that they were successful in their own eyes but not in the eyes 
of the outside world. 
The idea that adaptive interactions must be power free, and that they there-
fore depend on individual willingness to manage sustainable change, is therefore 
key. Before adaptive networks can offer their complex ideas to power networks, 
there is no way to give their efforts legitimacy or resources. It is fundamentally 
unknowable if they are going to develop useful ideas, the ideas are too sensitive 
to be widely understood since they require double think, and creating expecta-
tions of results by allocating resources already disturbs the required closedness. 
Just the fact that they are adaptive networks does not create legitimacy in the 
eyes of outsiders, which is why they depend on their own rationality. They must 
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be willing to accept the idea that the larger social system may not appreciate 
their ideas, power networks may develop in a (to them) undesirable direction, 
and the loose network may not be able to self-organize for a while into active 
adaptive networks. To keep the loose networks alive, it helps to cultivate a 
common language of management of tensions through adaptive networks, where 
success is determined by increasing the complexity of conduct in power net-
works. 
 
It helps to link time scales and social scale. Certain adaptive networks only can 
make a difference in power networks with little power and therefore little inter-
nal complexity. For example, adaptive behavior can help to create relatively 
small changes in R&D policies or investments in somewhat more sustainable 
products. Such initiatives may be successful even without major government 
market interventions, but they may still require adaptive behavior. At the same 
time, these successes may not lead to a chain of events that creates a sustainable 
transition. Sustainable transitions may actually depend on breakthroughs in 
thinking about government policies to facilitate market changes, and, there, a 
different kind of sustainable change management is needed. It is this second 
kind of sustainable change management that has mainly been addressed in this 
book. Yet, different levels of complexity can be linked. Small changes may be 
designed to fit, or not contradict, desirable larger changes. Processes aimed at 
major transitions can aim at facilitation of adaptive tensions at a scale of smaller 
complexity, contributing to the larger scale social change. 
Like scales of social complexity, also time scales can be linked. On a time 
scale of decades, I have observed that in several waves loose networks emerged 
of individuals who had the competence to develop trust across societal domains 
and to develop a common way of thinking about sustainable development. These 
people had a shared history of unsatisfactory experiences, which made them 
apply systems thinking and postpone their judgment in dialogues based on mu-
tual respect of the person and his interests. This was a process of cultural evolu-
tion. On a time scale of months, however, people from these networks could 
self-organize into adaptive networks that connected several societal domains. 
These then would develop a working method that, if they were successful in 
their self-defined terms, subsequently evolved on a time scale of years. Self-
organization was induced by opportunities like the 4th National Environmental 
Policy (NMP4), and evolution was induced by the capacity of adaptive networks 
to ‘jump’ from one such opportunity to another, under different names and com-
positions, adapting to the changing power environment of the adaptive networks 
– i.e. the large scale evolution and the sudden political opportunities of adaptive 
tensions in power networks. 
Finally, my messages should not be overrated. I have deliberately tried to 
develop a development-oriented view of sustainable development. To that end, 
sustainable development should be linked to personal behavior, linking all scales 
of time and space. To that end, I singled out the goal-seeking component of 
governance. I have depicted society as a whole as connected and adaptive. The 
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focus on the IB, an adaptive network that was successful in self-defined terms, 
and its successors, suggests that this is a trend. However, that may not be the 
case and the influence of loose networks may be local, temporary or even not in 
the interest of future generations. On the other hand, these networks depended 
on people who were personally willing to engage in sustainable change man-
agement, who developed double think, and clearly were not only driven by ma-
terial reward. These groups have grown in the past ten years in the mobility and 
energy systems, but they may still be small compared to groups who focus on 
the accounting component of governance. 
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15 Samenvatting 
Besturing voor duurzame ontwikkeling 
In dit boek reconstrueer ik hoe beleidsmakers, die samenwerkten in wat ik noem 
adaptieve netwerken, een doorbraak hebben mogelijk gemaakt in het denken 
over duurzame mobiliteit in bepaalde beleidskringen. Ik definieer het gedrag van 
vooroplopende actoren in adaptieve netwerken als duurzaam verander manage-
ment. Duurzame ontwikkeling wordt gezien als een complex probleem. Geen 
enkele persoon of organisatie kan zelfstandig duurzame veranderingen ‘mana-
gen’. Dat vergt een gezamenlijke inspanning van verschillende domeinen. Adap-
tieve netwerken zijn zelforganiserende groepen beleidsmakers die gezamenlijk 
onderzoek en gezamenlijke visievorming mogelijk maken, in dit geval voor 
duurzame mobiliteit. Deze beleidsmakers hebben twee vaardigheden. Ten eerste 
hebben ze invloed en kennis over verschillende machtsnetwerken. Ten tweede 
proberen ze los te komen van bestaand beleid in die machtsnetwerken en ont-
wikkelen een gezamenlijk beeld van nieuwe, effectievere beleidsopties. Ze pro-
beren de evolutie van hun denken op een lijn te krijgen met het gedrag in hun 
machtsnetwerken. Vanuit dit gezichtspunt ontstaan doorbraken door co-evolutie 
van deels strijdige ideeën en belangen. Verandermanagers in adaptieve netwer-
ken handelen op eigen initiatief. Machtsnetwerken zijn niet in staat om hun ini-
tiatieven te belonen, tenzij de ideeën die ze ontwikkelen in enige mate door de 
machtsnetwerken worden geaccepteerd. 
Adaptieve netwerken ontwikkelen in de context van machtsnetwerken  - de 
bestaande hiërarchische structuren die kunnen besluiten over de inzet van mid-
delen op de korte termijn, wat ook het maken van openbare verklaringen over 
(on)gewenste ontwikkelingen omvat, omdat daarmee verwachtingen ontstaan 
over hun eigen gedrag en beloning. Interacties in adaptieve netwerken zijn niet 
primair gebaseerd op het gebruik van formele macht maar op het ontwikkelen en 
verspreiden van ideeën. Om effectief te worden, moeten adaptieve netwerken 
ideeën ontwikkelen die contrasteren met de ideeën in bestaande machtsnetwer-
ken maar meteen ook die machtsnetwerken daarmee infecteren.  
Het theoretisch onderscheid tussen machtsnetwerken en adaptieve netwerken 
is zinvol. In de praktijk is er een zekere overlap tussen beide nodig, om nieuwe 
ideeën met uitvoeringsmacht te verbinden. Personen op hoge (machts)posities, 
die ook deelnemen in het leerproces, zijn belangrijke verbinders tussen de twee. 
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Adaptieve netwerken worden invloedrijk als ze gebruik weten te maken van de 
spanningen binnen en tussen machtsnetwerken. Dergelijke spanningen zijn be-
schikbaar omdat in Westerse democratieën milieubelangen, sociale belangen en 
economische belangen apart georganiseerd zijn en de neiging hebben om tegen-
gestelde invloed uit te oefenen.   
De theorie over adaptieve netwerken wordt in dit boek toegepast op een Ne-
derlands proces gericht op duurzame mobiliteit, genaamd transitiemanagement. 
Het idee van transities is opgenomen in het vierde Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan 
(NMP4) in 2001. De bestaande fysieke en sociale complexiteit leiden tot hard-
nekkige problemen (wicked problems). Deze kunnen niet worden opgelost door 
kwantitatieve doelen te stellen, omdat de beleidsmakers geen greep krijgen op 
de problemen en daardoor geen oplossingen worden gevonden. Publieke leiders 
en leiders in de marktsector richten zich op bestaande afrekenbare doelen lossen 
geen complexe problemen op. Als ze nieuwe oplossingen en targets zoeken in 
een besturingsnetwerk verminderen ze de kansen op beloonbare doorbraken op 
korte termijn. 
De spanning tussen de afrekencomponent van besturing en de doelzoekende 
component kan ook constructief worden benut. Als beleidsmakers voorstellen 
ontwikkelen die machtsnetwerken accepteren, heeft er een verandering plaats-
gevonden. Het veranderde machtsnetwerk creëert nieuwe spanningen die nieuwe 
kansen bieden voor nieuwe voorstellen van adaptieve netwerken. Deze iteratie 
tussen adaptieve (lerende, reflexieve) interacties en machtsinteracties leidt tot 
andere, meer duurzame uitkomsten, omdat de onderbouwing berust op com-
plexere ideeën.  
Dit soort gedrag stelt hoge eisen aan de deelnemers, die moeten geloven dat 
ze invloedrijke ideeën kunnen ontwikkelen. Adaptieve netwerken kunnen tijde-
lijke manifestaties zijn van individuen die buiten gebaande paden willen denken 
en nieuwe doelen willen stellen voor hun gezamenlijke belang, ook al lijken die 
doelen in strijd met hun individuele belang. Ik postuleer dat het verschijnen en 
de invloed van adaptieve netwerken afhangt van intern vertrouwen – het ver-
trouwen van in de leden van een adaptief netwerk in elkaar – en in extern ver-
trouwen – het vertrouwen van een adaptief netwerk in een blijvend ontvankelij-
ke machtscontext. Intern vertrouwen lijkt op het idee van coöpetitie, samenwer-
king tussen concurrenten gericht op een gezamenlijk belang op lange termijn. 
Een derde factor is vooruitzicht (of het vertrouwen in een adequaat zelfbeeld); 
de gezamenlijke capaciteit om correct in te schatten welke invloed de groep 
heeft in machtsnetwerken. 
Onderzoeksvraag 
Ik heb het bestaan van adaptieve netwerken gepostuleerd. Vanuit de complexi-
teitstheorie kunnen deze worden gezien als netwerken die vertrouwen ontwikke-
len en verschillende delen van de samenleving zo met elkaar kunnen verbinden 
dat ze het systeem als geheel helpen om zich aan te passen aan veranderende 
omstandigheden die zowel een bedreiging als een kans zijn. Dit doen ze door te 
pogen bij te dragen aan een andere, duurzamere ontwikkeling. Zo wordt de mo-
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gelijkheid van mensen om te anticiperen ook een mogelijkheid voor een sociaal 
systeem als geheel. Aan de andere kant verhindert complexiteit dat dit gedrag 
beloond wordt. Dit komt door onzekerheid en een lange terugkoppelingstijd. De 
centrale vraag in dit boek gaat daarom een stap terug: Hoe kunnen nieuwe idee-
en over duurzame ontwikkeling in brede kring worden overgenomen en hoe kan 
dit worden geëvalueerd in het geval van transitiemanagement? Deze vraag 
wordt beantwoord met de volgende deelvragen: 
• Hoe past het idee van adaptieve netwerken in bestaande theorieën over 
complexiteit en verandering? Deze vraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk 2, 
dat ook ingaat op de filosofische vraag hoe we de duurzaamheid van een 
idee kunnen evalueren; 
• Hoe kunnen deze theorieën worden geoperationaliseerd om adaptieve 
netwerken te kunnen waarnemen, hun interactie met machtsnetwerken, en 
de spreiding van duurzame ideeën in de wijdere wereld? Dit wordt 
uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 3. 
• How can these theories be operationalized to observe adaptive networks, 
their interaction with power networks, and the spreading of sustainable 
ideas in the real world? This is elaborated in chapter 3. 
• Hoe ontwikkelde zich in het geval van transitiemanagement: 
o Machtsnetwerken, en welke adaptieve netwerken kunnen worden 
verondersteld als verklaring van deze ontwikkeling? (hoofdstuk 4); 
o Adaptieve netwerken, en welke verandermanagers kunnen worden 
verondersteld als verklaring van het ontstaan van deze adaptieve 
netwerken? (hoofdstuk 5); 
o Het gedrag van verandermanagers die de ontwikkeling beïnvloed 
hebben? (hoofdstuk 6). 
• Welke lessen voor duurzaam verandermanagement, als bijdrage aan duur-
zame besturing, kunnen hieruit worden afgeleid? Hierop gaat hoofdstuk 7 
in, dat ingaat op samenwerking en vertrouwen die, als gedrag in adaptieve 
netwerken, kunnen bijdragen aan een zich aanpassende samenleving. 
Hoofdstuk 2: theoretische noties van complexiteit 
De complexiteitstheorie conceptualiseert sociale systemen als een ingebedde 
hiërarchie (een geneste structuur) die sterk is gerelateerd aan historische, geo-
grafische en marktfactoren. Individuen worden beloond voor gedrag dat bij 
vooraf bekende doelen past, die niet noodzakelijk leiden tot oplossing van com-
plexe problemen. Het resultaat is dat sociale systemen zich door interne drijven-
de krachten ontwikkelen. Een sociaal systeem is een structuur die energie van 
buiten omzet in andere vormen en intern doorgeeft in het systeem door middel 
van een beloningsysteem, wat leidt tot ofwel nieuwe orde ofwel wanorde. Als de 
agenten, onderdelen, van een systeem vervangen worden kan gedrag ook evolu-
eren als een levend organisme, met zijn eigen metabolisme. In het geval van 
sociale systemen is de energiebron de beloning in de markt en in de zichtbare 
wereld, maar er kunnen zich ook culturen ontwikkelen die gedrag belonen dat 
minder herkenbaar gelinkt is aan materiele beloning. Dit komt door de lange 
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terugkoppelingstijd tussen gedrag en effect in de markt. De agenten die het be-
loningssysteem bepalen en die regelmatig worden vervangen en daardoor kun-
nen evolueren, zijn ideeën. Dit is de wetenschapsfilosofie van memetica, voort-
bouwend op het sociaalconstructivisme. Gezamenlijke rationaliteit ontwikkelen 
zich als discoursen die gesimplificeerde en geabstraheerde  oplossingen voor-
stellen voor complexe problemen. Personen en groepen, die zich vernieuwen en 
daarbij kunnen evolueren, dragen deze ideeën of memen. Het gedragsrepertoire 
van personen en groepen kan daarom co-evolueren met het discours dat hen 
motiveert. Dit kan leiden tot geïnstitutionaliseerde discoursen en praktijken 
zoals het democratisch systeem, dat een kortere terugkoppelingstijd schept voor 
het effect van eigen handelen op de samenleving. Een scheiding der machten 
produceert nieuwe afhankelijkheden en daardoor sociale spanningen, die sa-
menwerken en leren kunnen bevorderen. 
Als een sociaal systeem zijn aanpassingsvermogen vergroot (en daarmee zijn 
duurzaamheid), moet het de vereiste diversiteit (requisite variety) aan responsen 
kunnen creëren. Het geheel aan zich ontwikkelende discoursen moet leiden tot 
een patroon van ideeën en gedragstypen dat overeenkomst met de diversiteit van 
veranderingen n de omgeving. Het gedrag dat ‘werkt’ zal dan vanzelf overleven 
in een proces van selectie. De diversiteit hangt af van individuele competenties 
(bounded rationality, cognitieve beperkingen) en collectieve competenties (soci-
aal kapitaal, verbondenheid). Het helpt om complexiteit te accepteren en sys-
teemdenken toe te passen in adaptieve netwerken. De capaciteit en bereidheid 
tot dubbeldenken is belangrijk (overleven in een hiërarchisch systeem en tegelijk 
ook de spanning met andere hiërarchieën proberen te overbruggen). Er is een 
theoretische mogelijkheid van managementinstrumenten die dit soort gedrag 
stimuleren, die systeeminstrumenten worden genoemd, of publieke ruimten, 
maar dit is niet goed uitgewerkt. 
Verschillende auteurs zien als sleutel dat deze instrumenten creatieve span-
ningen moeten voortbrengen die adaptieve interacties aantrekken. Of dat gebeurt 
hangt af van de kenmerken van het sociale systeem dat onder spanning staat. Als 
de druk te groot is zal het instorten, als de druk te laag is verandert het niet (ont-
staan er geen adaptieve interacties). Overleving hangt dan af van de beschik-
baarheid van genoeg beleidsmakers in verschillende delen van het systeem die 
in staat en bereid zijn om met elkaar in adaptieve (reflexieve) interactie te gaan, 
en daarmee invloed uit te oefenen op machtsnetwerken. Dit schept een hogere 
orde systeem voor selectie van ideeën. Dit kan meer samenhang opleveren in het 
gedrag in verschillende subsystemen, en een effectiever antwoord op gemeen-
schappelijke problemen. Vertrouwen is een belangrijke variabele om reflexieve 
interacties mogelijk te maken, en terwijl het zich in een cyclus van positieve of 
negatieve feedback kan ontwikkelen is het ook ingebed in de meer stabiele cul-
tuur van het sociale systeem. 
Hoofdstuk 3: Een methode voor complexiteitsonderzoek 
Om sociale veranderingen in complexe omstandigheden te kunnen waarnemen 
en verklaren heb ik gekozen voor een case studiebenadering. De case studie 
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bestaat uit de duurzame ontwikkelings- en transitiemanagement discoursen in 
Nederland, met een focus op specifieke beleidsnetwerken in de context van het  
NMP4, in de periode 2001 – 2006. De periode voor 2000 is ook in enig detail 
beschreven om de situatie te kunnen verklaren rond het jaar 2000. Na 2000 ver-
schenen verscheidene netwerken waarvan de belangrijkste zijn aangegeven. 
Voor het NMP4-team en latere netwerken die ideeën overnamen, structureer i de 
analyse in ontwikkelronden tot 2006, aan de hand van inhoud (ideeën), structuur 
(netwerken), spanningen (gecompenseerd door vertrouwen en vooruitzicht voor 
zover waarneembaar in gedrag), en dit op drie schaalniveaus. Vertrouwen ligt 
dicht aan tegen verwachte beloning. 
De interacties tussen machtsnetwerken en adaptieve netwerken wordt be-
schreven aan de hand van adaptieve spanningen die adaptieve interacties aan-
trekken, die dan weer een voorstel genereren. Indien succesvol ontwikkelt het 
adaptieve netwerk een voorstel dat wordt geaccepteerd door leden van machts-
werken met wie ze verbonden zijn. Deze acceptatie betekent dat de zichtbare 
(machts)interacties veranderen; er worden bijvoorbeeld proefballonnetjes opge-
laten. Individuen in machtsnetwerken scheppen daarmee andere verwachtingen 
binnen het netwerk en bij de achterban van hun toekomstige gedrag. Dit leidt tot 
sociale spanningen die een reactie in het systeem oproepen. Adaptieve netwer-
ken ontwikkelen ideeën die leiden tot voorstellen aan de macht. Als machtheb-
bers deze voorstellen accepteren doen ze een zichtbare interventie in een 
machtsnetwerk, dat kan reageren met een aanpassing van spanningen. 
In de periode 2000 – 2005 heb ik indirect de ontwikkeling van structuur, 
proces, gedrag en beloning bestudeerd. De machtscontext interpreteer ik uit 
interviews, aangevuld met documenten. Grootschalige verandering in machts-
netwerken kan helpen om hypotheses te stellen over adaptieve netwerken die 
aan het werk moeten zijn geweest, als acties meer op elkaar afgestemd zijn door 
emergente hogere orde ideeën (zeg maar gedeelde visie).  De adaptieve netwer-
ken, interacties en hun effect worden vervolgens geïnterpreteerd uit interviews, 
gebruik makend van triangulatie (vergelijking van bronnen), het identificeren 
van gedeelde percepties van relevante parameters. Door dit proces te volgen is 
een eerstehands verslag mogelijk geworden. Dit materiaal zou dan een overzicht 
moeten opleveren van de ontwikkeling van machtsnetwerken, adaptieve netwer-
ken, de spanningen die hen dreven, maar ook de invloed van verandermanagers. 
En het zou inzicht moeten geven in effectief gedrag met het oog op duurzaam 
verandermanagement. 
Omdat duurzame ontwikkeling mijn studieobject is, moet ik ook een onder-
zoeksafbakening kiezen die daar bij past. Ik ga ervan uit dat een natuurlijke 
grens is het samengestelde subsysteem – een set van sociale systemen die alle-
maal afhangen, of onder invloed staan, van hetzelfde marktsysteem. Daarom is 
het verband tussen grootschalige en kleinschalige processen, het hele systeem 
versus het individu, belangrijk. Een samengesteld subsysteem heeft marktcom-
ponenten (zoals in het mobiliteitssysteem infrastructuurmanagers, forensen, 
goederenproducenten), maar ook domeinen met verschillende typen belonings-
systeem (overheid, bedrijven, wetenschap, belangenorganisaties). Duurzame 
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ontwikkeling is in die context gedefinieerd als een ontwikkeling die het moge-
lijk maakt dat het systeem nog lang blijft bestaan door aanpassing aan een ver-
anderende omgeving (andere samengestelde subsystemen waar het relaties mee 
heeft, of het fysieke systeem waar de markt afhankelijk van is). Duurzame ont-
wikkeling is niet gegarandeerd omdat martkinteracties kunnen leiden tot uitput-
ting van kritische hulpbronnen of ongewenste neveneffecten kunnen hebben die 
het samengestelde systeem destabiliseren. Tegelijkertijd hoeft het gedrag in het 
samengestelde systeem niet de toekomstzorgen van sommige individuen in het 
systeem te reflecteren. 
Hoofdstuk 4: machtsnetwerken, adaptieve spanningen die  
adaptieve netwerkingen aantrekken 
De uitkomst van de historische beschrijving van machtsnetwerken die betrokken 
waren bij transitiemanagement kan worden samengevat als een serie zichtbare 
interventies met het oog op nieuwe ideeën die zouden kunnen zijn ontstaan in 
adaptieve netwerken. Verschillende interventies waren zichtbaar en ook succes-
vol omdat er positieve feedback kwam. Het centrale idee dat ontstond was dat er 
een duurzame co-evolutie in de markt tussen automotoren en autobrandstoffen 
(samen genaamd automotives) mogelijk was, dat Nederland een goede plaats is 
voor experimenten met die systemen  en dat de overheid een platform zou moe-
ten organiseren dat als machtscontext kan dienen waar de verschillende private 
en publieke partijen gedeelde ideeën en handelsstrategieën kunnen ontwikkelen. 
Directe betrokkenheid van het topmanagement en Kabinet op bepalende mo-
menten zou implementatie verzekeren. De meest opvallende interventies en de 
geassocieerde adaptieve netwerken waren: 
Het NMP4 team (het eerste veronderstelde adaptieve netwerk), met ambtena-
ren van verschillende ministeries, stelde transitiemanagement voor aan de be-
stuursraad van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken, dat verantwoordelijk was 
voor energiebeleid, en de milieuminister. Het voorstel was dat niet-
milieuministeries ‘duurzame transities zouden managen’. De Tweede Kamer 
steunde dit vage idee; 
De leden van het innovatieberaad duurzame mobiliteit (IB) (het tweede ver-
onderstelde adaptieve netwerk), van overheden, industrieën, universiteiten en 
belangenorganisaties, communiceerden anders naar hun eigen organisaties toe 
over automotives. De auto als zodanig werd geaccepteerd door de milieubewe-
ging; 
Sprekers en stemmers op de EU conferentie Energy in Motion, beïnvloed 
door het IB, namen duidelijk positie in voor duurzame automotives; 
Het energietransitieproces, initiatief van een team in EZ (het derde veronder-
stelde adaptieve netwerk), ontwikkelde transitie experimenten en meer focus in 
het R&D beleid voor duurzame energie; 
De Directeuren Generaal van verschillende ministeries (het vierde veronderstel-
de adaptieve netwerk) stelde voor om een Interdepartementaal Programma 
Energietransitie (IPE) te starten. Dit schiep een adaptieve spanning voor meer 
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coördinatie tussen zes ministeries om samen een constructieve dialoog aan te 
gaan met de automotives sector en andere sectoren. 
Deze evolutie naar een brug over de kloof publiek – privaat in het geval van 
automotives werd als voorbeeld gebruikt voor andere paden naar duurzame tran-
sities onder het IPE/. De drijvende kracht was de spanning tussen het duurzame-
ontwikkelingdiscours en de sectorale groei en concurrentiekracht-discoursen. 
Deze spanning werd sterk gevoeld in de Tweede Kamer. Deze potentiële energy 
is nu gefocust op de kloof publiek – privaat door een keten van interventies en 
spanningen. De serie machtsinterventies kan worden vergeleken met golven van 
spanning die zich voortplanten in machtsnetwerken totdat, in het geval van de 
EU conferentie, een breed gedeelde nieuwe probleemdefinitie verscheen die 
focus geeft aan verdere stappen. Deze grootschalige golven bouwden zich op uit 
kleinere golven. De adaptieve spanningen waren tijdens het ontwikkelen van 
NMP4 grootschalig (zo groot als past bij de spanning tussen het duurzame-
ontwikkelingdiscourse en het economische groei discours), en het emergente 
transitiediscours was vaag. In latere fasen verschenen discoursen over meer 
specifieke scenario’s (duurzame automotives). Dit illustreert ook dat adaptieve 
voorstellen opdoken in verschillende groepen op verschillende momenten – 
terwijl deze groepen ook weer met elkaar waren verbonden en de ideeën werden 
gedeeld in adaptieve interacties tussen de groepen.  Iedere innovatieve machtsin-
terventie kan daarom worden verondersteld een manifestatie te zijn van co-
evolutie die eerder heeft plaatsgevonden in adaptieve netwerken, waar achter de 
schermen steun werd opgebouwd. Hoewel deze adaptieve netwerken niet zicht-
baar waren vanwege hun gevoeligheid, communiceerden politici over de nood-
zaak van adaptieve netwerken, en de noodzaak om ze tijd te gunnen. Staatsse-
cretaris Van Geel bijvoorbeeld gebruikte de metafoor van een veenbrand. Minis-
ter Brinkhorst van EZ deed verschillende vergelijkbare uitspraken. Begin 2006 
was het transitiediscours nog springlevend en werd geïnstitutionaliseerd met een 
directoraat. Het aanzien van transitiemanagement werd hiermee verhoogd on-
danks een gebrek aan duidelijk zichtbare resultaten en daaraan gerelateerde 
kritiek. 
Hoofdstuk 5: adaptieve netwerken; vertrouwen en vooruitzicht 
Ik heb interviews geanalyseerd met beleidsmakers die nauw betrokken waren bij 
de genoemde interventies, om te zien hoe en waarom ze acteerden. Ik concen-
treerde me daarbij op extern vertrouwen, intern vertrouwen en vooruitzicht. 
Extern vertrouwen wordt gezien als gedrag dat is gebaseerd op de veronderstel-
ling dat adaptieve spanningen in machtsnetwerken stabiel zijn, en daarom be-
trouwbare kansen scheppen voor interventies naar meer duurzame machtsnet-
werken. Intern vertrouwen is het vertrouwen dat partners in adaptieve netwerken 
delen in hun gezamenlijke onderneming. Gedeeld vooruitzicht kan worden ge-
zien als een gemeenschappelijk idee van mogelijke duurzame toekomsten en van 
een beperkende factor in het opbouwen van adaptieve spanning in de ‘juiste’ 
richting. Een term die vaak gebruikt werd was ‘geloofwaardig’. Als voorstellen 
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bestempeld werden als niet geloofwaardig, dan waren er binnen de groep ver-
schillende ideeën over beperkende factoren. 
De vraag ontstaat in welke mate collectief gedrag in adaptieve netwerken 
ook echt zo bedoeld was. In mijn observatie waren er specifieke beleidsmakers 
in staat om te zien welke kansen er waren om nieuwe netwerken te bouwen. 
Deze koplopers konden anderen enthousiast maken. Die anderen stonden open 
voor dit enthousiasme omdat ze de algemene wens met elkaar deelden om duur-
zame ontwikkeling te steunen, en ook een intuïtie over grootschalige adaptieve 
spanningen. Ze ontkenden complexiteit niet, en door zich te verbinden met im-
plementatiemacht werden ze steeds meer gecommitteerd aan de adaptieve inter-
acties. Ze besproken expliciet elkaars motieven en vertrouwden erop dat de 
anderen geen verborgen agenda hadden (de interacties waren machtsvrij).  
Deze intuïtie werd gevormd door gemeenschappelijke teleurstellingen in de 
jaren 90 met het groenpoldermodel en met het kennissysteem duurzame ontwik-
keling (bijvoorbeeld de DTO en NIDO programma’s). Een ironische (in de zin 
van niet ontmoedigd door een schijnbaar onmogelijke taak) en vertrouwende 
houding was nodig om een zeker gezamenlijk vooruitzicht te kunnen ontwikke-
len door kennis in te brengen voor het gezamenlijke overzicht. Dit vertrouwen 
maakte bijvoorbeeld mogelijk dat de leden van het IB om gebruik te maken van 
de EU conferentie als kans, en zo kon het IB de betrokken domeinen met elkaar 
verbinden zodat de drie ministeries een breed geaccepteerde probleemstelling 
konden ontwikkelen voor de EU conferentie. Die werd goed bezocht en het 
enthousiasme om duurzame automotives aan te pakken groeide. In mijn waar-
neming, en die van verschillende leden van deze netwerken, werden deze ver-
bindingen makkelijker door de brede erkenning van het transitiediscours. In de 
termen van theorieën over vertrouwen, werd het vertrouwen groter omdat er 
bewust aan werd gewerkt – er was een socio-cognitief discours over en er werd 
gestuurd op een positieve spiraal. Vertrouwen werd expliciet besproken en het 
proces kon daarom focussen op een gedeelde beperkende factor, en ideeën kon-
den soms worden doorgeven van het ene machtsnetwerk naar het andere, als dat 
een focus gaf op de zwakste schakel. 
Naarmate het vertrouwen in de bedoeling van anderen in het netwerk groeide 
leek het erop alsof de beperkende factor werd het geloof in de competenties van 
anderen om steeds complexere ideeën te delen als basis voor actie; vertrouwen 
in competentie dus. Insiders zien deze ontwikkeling als een doorbraak in de 
beleidscultuur in overlap van de de Nederlandse mobiliteits, energie en milieu-
systemen omdat het cynisme er mee weggenomen wordt dat ontstaat door wan-
trouwen van elkaars bedoelingen. Aan de andere kant zien buitenstaanders dit 
vaak niet zo, want die zijn geen lid van de netwerken. Vanuit dit perspectief is 
gedeeld vooruitzicht zelf een component van vertrouwen. Het is de hulpbron die 
nodig is om te geloven dat een groep de machtscontext kan beïnvloeden en co-
evolutie in het grotere systeem op gang kan brengen. Het zou ook het zelfver-
trouwen van een netwerk genoemd kunnen worden, of het haalbare ambitieni-
veau voor co-evolutie. Dit bouwt zich op door co-evolutie tussen veranderma-
nagers in een adaptief netwerk.  
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Hoofdstuk 6: verandermanagers, enthousiasme, onzekerheid en beloning 
Tientallen mensen in het transitiediscours hebben deelgenomen in lossen net-
werken die het discours steunden, vaak zonder het idee te kunnen uitleggen, 
zelfs aan directe collega’s. Het lijkt een persoonlijke dispositie die werd ge-
triggerd door de deelname in het groenpoldermodel of het duurzame kennissys-
teem. Het verschijnen van losse netwerken was waarschijnlijk ook een latente 
mogelijkheid van de algemene poldercultuur in Nederland. De ironie van de 
situatie was dat duurzame ontwikkeling voorstelbaar was maar dat er onneemba-
re barrières leken te zijn. De beleidsmakers gingen hiermee om door construc-
tieve, ontwikkelgerichte voorstellen te maken. Ze waren echt betrokken bij 
duurzame ontwikkeling, ze waren immers snel bereid deel te nemen aan netwer-
ken zoals het IB en het ETP, of om het vage transitiediscours op andere manie-
ren actief te steunen. De interviews wijzen uit dat alle deelnemers systeemden-
ken toepasten, en dat dit de basis van hun ‘actiegerichte’ samenwerking vormde. 
Verschillende rollen, vaak samenlopend in individuen, zijn waarneembaar: 
• Sponsors konden ideeën met macht verbinden, hadden de capaciteit om 
anderen ruimte te geven om achter de schermen te interacteren, en interven-
ties te plegen in machtsnetwerken waar anderen sceptisch waren; 
• Initiatiefnemers inspireerden anderen om te focussen op complexe, lange-
termijnveranderingen; 
• Netwerkers vormden de kern waaromheen een kristal ontstond, omdat ze de 
juiste mensen konden mobiliseren uit het hele samengestelde systeem; 
• Verbinders hielpen anderen om gezamenlijke kansen in beeld te brengen en 
vertrouwen en vooruitzicht te ontwikkelen. Ze hielpen om adaptieve inter-
acties te scheiden van zichtbare machtsinteracties (het spelen met openheid 
om zichtbaar spanningen te managen en met geslotenheid om intern ver-
trouwen te krijgen); 
• Systeemdenkers die anderen konden inspireren om een gezamenlijke sys-
teemanalyse en scenarioanalyse te maken, gericht op nieuwe kenniscombi-
naties en kansen voor gezamenlijke actie; 
• Loslaters vonden het niet erg dat anderen hun eigen idee verder brachten 
zonder dat zij daar zelf nog veel credits voor kregen. (Groot voorbeeld: niet-
milieuministeries implementeerden het NMP4); 
• Experts droegen bij door mogelijke ontwikkelingen op marktniveau te 
schetsen, maar ook de effecten van die ontwikkelingen. 
 
De meeste deelnemers werden misschien echt gedreven door intuïties meer dan 
expliciete systeemanalyses en vooruitzicht. Maar toch speelde een beperkt aantal 
mensen een sleutelrol bij het managen van spanningen en systeemdenken op 
lokaal niveau; deze waren bijzonder vaardig in modereren en systeemdenken, en 
schenen niet geïnteresseerd in zichtbaar persoonlijk succes. 
Bij de overheid en in grote bedrijven en belangenorganisaties, krijgen amb-
tenaren en werknemers soms ruimte om een hobby te ontwikkelen – tijd beste-
den voor een doel dat ze persoonlijk belangrijk vinden. In het transitiediscours 
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creëerden verschillende hobbyisten daadwerkelijk impact in machtsnetwerken. 
Dit was niet alleen maar het resultaat van enthousiasme, maar ook van compe-
tentie. Er zou een toename kunnen Jeroen Tulp is misschien het duidelijkste 
voorbeeld; hij was één van de meest invloedrijke ambtenaren in het mobiliteits-
systeem en voelde de noodzaak om de kloof publiek – privaat te overbruggen 
maar ook de onmogelijkheid om dat te doen in de bestaande machtscontext. Hij 
was bereid om een jaar lang te dubbeldenken in het IB totdat de EU conferentie 
een kans bood om de korte termijn en de lange termijn te laten samenvallen. Dit 
gedrag en dat van anderen zou ook besmettelijk kunnen zijn voor andere ambte-
naren die hem hebben zien opereren. Sommigen zeiden dat het hun bewuste 
strategie was om als rolmodel te functioneren. Beleidsmakers die in het IB en in 
het platform automotives acteerden, schijnen te hebben geprobeerd om adaptieve 
competenties ‘mee te nemen’ naar andere platforms. 
Verschillende organisaties die actief waren in platforms hebben werknemers 
aangewezen die als een soort ‘proactieve diplomaat’ konden deelnemen aan die 
platforms. Iemand zei ‘de IB leden zochten wind in hun zeilen, en zijn daar goed 
in geworden’. Hun management nam deel aan Energy in Motion en had gezien 
welke vaardigheden ontstonden op de grens van organisaties en zagen de toege-
voegde waarde op termijn. Het transitiediscours wordt actief gebruikt om een 
sfeer van vertrouwen en begrip te krijgen in deze relaties. Het lijkt alsof de tran-
sitietaal levend is geworden en een mate van beloning voor verandermanage-
ment in adaptieve netwerken schept. Aan de andere kant is de positieve waarde-
ring voor deze taal nog zeer persoonlijk. 
Het lijkt belangrijk dat deze verandermanagers onderdeel uitmaken van losse 
netwerken die dezelfde transitietaal spreken. De losse netwerken kwamen aan de 
oppervlakte op verschillende momenten waar prominente Nederlandse beleids-
makers en (ex) politici pleitten voor transitiedenken. Andere voorbeelden zijn de 
tientallen publicaties in het blad ArenA, het magazine van de Vereniging voor 
Milieukundigen. In de academische wereld nam de belangstelling voor het tran-
sitiediscours verder toe, met belangrijke steun van de overheid.  Kennisinstituten 
van de overheid gaven steun aan alle geïnteresseerden in transitiemanagement 
(www.transitiemanagement.nl). Het milieu- en natuurplanbureau (www.mnp.nl), 
een onafhankelijke denktank die onder andere milieuverkenningen maakt, begon 
transitiemanagement te monitoren. Het is moeilijk voorstelbaar dat deze inspan-
ningen niet geworteld zijn in sterke en blijvende losse netwerken, en dat deze 
niet bijdragen aan een beter begrip van duurzaam verandermanagement. 
Hoofdstuk 7: duurzaam verandermanagement 
Vergelijk netwerken met levende organismen. De eerste les voor duurzaam ver-
andermanagement is dat het helpt als verandermanagers zich ervan bewust zijn 
dat ze onderdeel vormen van een los netwerk dat kan worden vergeleken met 
een levend organisme. Het wordt dan makkelijker om het verband te leggen 
tussen individueel en collectief complexiteitserkennend gedrag. Het wordt ook 
makkelijker om ironisch te zijn in plaats van cynisch of sceptisch, en deze ont-
wikkelgerichte drijfveer kan leiden tot complexer gedrag en complexere en 
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flexibeler gezamenlijk beleid. Ontwikkelgericht zijn, in plaats van een exclusie-
ve oriëntatie op het verhinderen van onduurzaam gedrag bij anderen (afrekenge-
drag), impliceert vertrouwen hebben dat een vergelijkbaar begrip van de situatie 
en houding in andere delen van het samengestelde systeem bestaan, zodat losse 
netwerken kunnen ontstaan.Deze losse netwerken hebben de mogelijkheid om 
door zelforganisatie adaptieve netwerken te vormen en door dat te doen de vaar-
digheid van zelforganisatie en het ontwikkelen van invloedrijke voorstellen ook 
te verbeteren. Als ze succes hebben nemen vertrouwen en vooruitzicht toe, en 
het losse netwerk heeft zijn collectieve competentie vergroot. 
Het metabolisme van dit organisme is gebaseerd op voorstellen aan de macht 
die ook echt invloed hebben op adaptieve spanningen in een richting die past bij 
hun visie. De machtsnetwerken zouden instemmend moeten reageren, en dit zou 
sterkere verwachtingen moeten creëren dat de voorstellers beloond worden met 
een nieuwe kans om voorstellen te leveren die afwijken van de bestaande prak-
tijk. Dit succes kan het netwerk nieuwe energie geven en meer hoop op een 
duurzame toekomst. Een buitenstaander kan de mate van duurzaamheid van 
deze voorstellen evalueren aan de hand van de complexiteit van de ideeën die 
ontstaan in adaptieve netwerken. Als kennis over zwakkere groepen, zoals toe-
komstige generaties, wordt gerepresenteerd in het adaptieve netwerk zijn de 
ideeën per definitie complexer geworden en dus meer duurzaam – een ander 
operationeel criterium is er niet. Ook al is dit geen perfecte maat, is het duidelijk 
dat adaptieve netwerken die in dit boek zijn onderzocht duurzamer zijn dan 
voorgaande adaptieve netwerken, die minder complex en vluchtiger waren. 
Voor de eerste keer was er overeenstemming tussen alle domeinen in het com-
plexe automotives systeem, inclusief milieuorganisaties.  
Het conceptuele onderscheid tussen machtsnetwerken en adaptieve netwer-
ken helpt om het gedrag van beleidsmakers te begrijpen, en hoe deze af en toe 
zelforganiseerden in netwerken met een variërende mate van scheiding van 
adaptieve interacties en machtsinteracties. Deze conceptuele scheiding biedt de 
mogelijkheid om de scheiding expliciet en fysiek te maken zo dat machtsvrije 
groepen kunnen ontstaan die bewust co-evolutie kunnen nastreven. Dit leidt tot 
machtsinterventies en golven van verandering in het grotere sociale systeem als 
de tijd daar rijp voor is. Nieuwe adaptieve spanningen verschijnen en de cyclus 
herhaalt zich, één stap dichter bij duurzame ontwikkeling. Actie in het totale 
systeem wordt meer coherent en afgestemd op gemeenschappelijke problemen 
op de lange termijn. 
Het feit dat adaptieve netwerken complexe ideeën ontwikkelen die niet in 
machtsnetwerken kunnen ontstaan zou kunnen suggereren dat ze het beter we-
ten, maar dat hoeft niet altijd. Zoals iedere herkenbare sociale groep kennen ze 
zelfreferentie en groepsdenken. Adaptieve netwerken kunnen alleen voorstellen 
doen die concurreren met de voorstellen van andere adaptieve netwerken en 
machtsnetwerken selecteren dan. Machtsnetwerken, bijvoorbeeld het primaat 
van de politiek over de ambtenarij blijven intact, maar worden alleen beter geïn-
formeerd over hun opties. Adaptieve netwerken kunnen alleen overleven als 
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machtsnetwerken openstaan voor de inspiratie die zij bieden; als hun ideeën 
overtuigend zijn.  
 
De individuele rol om kloven te overbruggen. De tweede les is dat adaptieve 
netwerken afhankelijk zijn van beleidsmakers die bereid zijn om het verband te 
leggen tussen de korte termijn en de lange termijn door persoonlijk te investeren 
in sociale en conceptuele verbindingen met beleidsmakers in andere delen. Ze 
vonden hun persoonlijke motivatie in de spanning tussen bestaande onduurzame 
praktijken en de wens van duurzame ontwikkeling van het maatschappelijk sys-
teem waarvan ze afhankelijk zijn. Deze capaciteit mag orden gedefinieerd als 
dubbeldenken, wat bijvoorbeeld een CEO in staat kan stellen om op te treden in 
een adaptief netwerk en ideeën te ontwikkelen die zijn formele beleid ondermij-
nen, wat misschien (nog) niet wordt begrepen door een meerderheid van andere 
beleidsmakers in zin bedrijf die zijn competentie van dubbeldenken niet hebben. 
Buitenstaanders die vragen om duurzame ontwikkeling zien alleen maar de 
zichtbare acties en blijven kritisch over deze CEO. Ook al machtsnetwerken een 
doorbraakvoorstel accepteren wordt de CEO misschien niet materieel beloond, 
omdat zijn bijdrage achter de schermen plaatsvond. Alleen de losse netwerken 
hebben dat optreden kunnen waarnemen en kunnen hem belonen. Beloning 
wordt nog onwaarschijnlijker omdat oplossingen voor complexe problemen 
zoals duurzaam ontwikkeling moeilijk te vinden zijn, en lange series interventies 
in machtsnetwerken vereisen, waarmee veel meer mensen bij het golvende leer-
proces betrokken worden alvorens een adaptieve spanning ontstaat die leidt tot 
marktdoorbraken. Een groot obstakel is de cultuurkloof tussen de publieke en 
private sectoren, leiders aan beide zijden moeten langdurig investeren voordat 
een context ontstaat die een niet-verbrokkelde dialoog over de kloof heen moge-
lijk maakt. 
Publieke en private leiders die deelnamen aan transitiemanagement deelna-
men of het steunden waren zich hier waarschijnlijk ten volle van bewust. Dit 
geldt ook voor hun rechterhanden die individueel en gezamenlijk deze compe-
tenties ontwikkelden. Hierdoor kon kennis makkelijker stromen tussen de delen. 
Iedere keer als een machtsnetwerk een voorstel accepteerde was het sociale 
systeem een stap verder in het denken over duurzame ontwikkeling. Eén adap-
tief netwerk, het IB, verbeterde deze vaardigheden heel gericht en maakte ze ook 
expliciet. Succes ontstond door nieuwe probleemdefinities in machtsnetwerken 
die nieuwe adaptieve spanningen creëerden. Omdat dit nog niet tot zichtbare 
veranderingen in de markt leidde ontstond de paradox dat ze succesvol waren in 
hun eigen ogen maar nog niet in de ogen van de buitenwereld.  
Het idee dat adaptieve netwerken machtsvrij moeten zijn en dus afhankelijk 
zijn van individuele bereidheid tot duurzaam verandermanagement, is daarom de 
sleutel. Voordat adaptieve netwerken hun complexe problemen kunnen aanbie-
den hebben ze geen bron van legitimiteit of hulpbronnen. Het is principieel niet 
kenbaar of ze bruikbare ideeën zullen ontwikkelen; de ideeën zijn te gevoelig 
om breed correct begrepen te worden omdat ze dubbeldenken vereisen. Ver-
wachtingen creëren door allocatie van geld verstoort de geslotenheid al. Alleen 
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het feit dat het adaptieve netwerken zijn is voor de buitenwereld geen legitima-
tie, en hierom zijn ze volledig afhankelijk van hun eigen rationaliteit. Ze moeten 
bereid zijn om te accepteren dat het grotere systeem hun ideeën niet op prijs 
stelt, hun ideeën misschien niet op prijs stelt dat machtsnetwerken zich anders 
ontwikkelen dan ze hopen, en het losse netwerk moet dan even afwachten. Om 
de losse netwerken toch levend te houden helpt het om een gezamenlijke taal 
voor het managen van spanningen te cultiveren in adaptieve netwerken, waar het 
succes bepaald blijft worden toenemend complex gedrag in machtsnetwerken. 
 
Het helpt om tijd- en ruimteschalen met elkaar te verbinden. Sommige adaptieve 
netwerken kunnen alleen verschil maken in machtsnetwerken met weinig macht, 
en daardoor beperkte interne complexiteit. Adaptief gedrag kan bijvoorbeeld 
helpen om relatief kleine veranderingen in R&D-beleid te krijgen of investerin-
gen in iets duurzamere producten. Dit soort initiatieven kan succesvol zijn zelfs 
zonder belangrijke ingrepen van de overheid in de markt, maar kunnen toch 
adaptief gedrag vereisen. Toch hoeven deze kleine successen niet te leiden tot 
een keten van gebeurtenissen die uiteindelijk leidt tot een duurzame transitie. 
Duurzame transities kunnen in werkelijkheid afhangen van doorbraken in het 
denken over overheidsbeleid om marktverandering te faciliteren, en daar is een 
ander soort verandermanagement nodig. Juist dit tweede soort verandermana-
gement is behandeld in dit boek. Maar deze complexiteitsniveaus kunnen ook 
worden verbonden. Kleine veranderingen kunnen worden ontwikkeld om te 
passen binnen gewenste grote veranderingen, zodat de kleine veranderingen daar 
in ieder geval  aan bijdragen. 
Zoals de schalen van sociale complexiteit kunnen ook tijdschalen verbonden 
worden. Op een schaal van decennia heb ik verschillende golven zien verschij-
nen waarin losse netwerken ontstonden die de vaardigheid hadden om vertrou-
wen te bevorderen over domeingrenzen heen en die een gezamenlijk manier van 
denken over duurzame ontwikkeling evolueerden. Deze mensen hadden een 
gezamenlijke geschiedenis van onbevredigende ervaringen, die hen ertoe aanzet-
te systeemdenken te hanteren en hun oordeel uit te stellen in dialogen gebaseerd 
op onderling respect van een persoon en zijn belangen.  Dit was een proces van 
culturele evolutie. Op een tijdschaal van maanden, daarentegen, leden van deze 
netwerken konden zich zelforganiseren in adaptieve netwerken die verschillende 
domeinen konden verbinden. Deze konden dan een werkwijze ontwikkelen die 
als de groep in eigen ogen genoeg succes had om door te blijven gaan, geleide-
lijk kon verbeteren in de loop van enkele jaren. Zelforganisatie werd opgeroepen 
door kansen zoals het NMP4, en evolutie werd mogelijk doordat het adaptieve 
netwerk kon schotsspringen van het ene machtsnetwerk naar het andere, onder 
verschillende namen en in verschillende samenstellingen, zich steeds aanpas-
send aan een veranderende machtscontext, zowel de grootschalige evolutie als 
de politieke kansen in machtsnetwerken op korte termijn.  
Tenslotte moeten deze waarnemingen niet worden overgewaardeerd. Ik heb 
bewust gestreefd naar een ontwikkelgerichte oriëntatie op duurzame ontwikke-
ling. Daartoe moet duurzame ontwikkeling worden verbonden aan het gedrag 
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van een enkel persoon, alle schalen van tijd en ruimte verbindend. Ik heb de 
samenleving beschreven als verbonden en adaptief. De focus van het IB, een 
adaptief netwerk dat in eigen ogen succesvol was, en zijn opvolgers, suggereren 
dat dit een trend is. Maar daar staat tegenover dat deze netwerken afhangen van 
mensen die persoonlijk bereid waren om aan de slag te gaan met duurzaam ver-
andermanagement, die dubbeldenken ontwikkelden, en duidelijk niet uit waren 
op materiële beloning. Deze groepen zijn in de afgelopen tien jaar gegroeid in 
het mobiliteits en energiesysteem, maar zijn nog beperkt vergeleken met de 
groepen die zich uitsluitend richten op de afrekenende component van besturen. 
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